Islamic State’s Online Propaganda

Explaining the means utilised by the editors of the Islamic State’s online magazines to win the “hearts and minds” of their audiences, this book is a result of a multidimensional content analysis of two flagship periodicals of the Islamic State: Dabiq and Rumiyah.

Drawing from a number of theoretical concepts in propaganda studies, the research uses comparative analysis to understand the evolution of the modus operandi employed by the editorial staff. The volume evaluates the types of arguments used in these magazines, as well as the emotions and behaviour that these triggered in readers. This book concentrates on the formats and thematic composition of a variety of the Islamic State’s e-periodicals, including Dabiq, Rumiyah, Dar al-Islam or Konstantiniyye, from the viewpoint of the constantly changing strategic situation and priorities of the “Caliphate.” The e-magazines of the post-territorial phase of the Islamic State, e.g. From Dabiq to Rome and Youth of the Caliphate, were also taken into consideration.

Overall, this book does not only offer new insights into the propaganda methods of the Islamic State’s periodicals, but it also summarises their rise and fall between 2014 and 2019. The volume is dedicated mostly to academics and postgraduate students specialised in terrorism studies, political violence, and security studies.

Miron Lakomy is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the University of Silesia, Poland. He was a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford and the European University Institute and a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge. His research focuses mostly on online terrorist propaganda and he has published in world-leading journals in the field of security studies, including Terrorism & Political Violence, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, and Security Journal.

Islamic State’s Online
Propaganda

A Comparative Analysis

Miron Lakomy

First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2021 Miron Lakomy

The right of Miron Lakomy to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lakomy, Miron, author.
Title: Islamic State’s online propaganda : a comparative analysis / Miron Lakomy.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020050063 (print) | LCCN 2020050064 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: IS (Organization) | Propaganda. | Internet and terrorism. | Electronic journals--Political aspects.
Classification: LCC HV6433.I722 L35 2021 (print) | LCC HV6433.I722 (ebook) | DDC 956.9104/238--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020050063
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020050064

ISBN: 978-0-367-69947-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-69948-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-14397-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by SPi Global, India

To my parents
for raising me to believe in the meaning of scholarship

Contents

Acknowledgements

List of figures

List of tables

Introduction

1Going virtual: Islamic State’s shock and awe campaign on the Internet

1.1Origins of the “virtual Caliphate”

1.2Understanding IS’s digital jihad: why has it drawn the world’s attention?

1.3Organisation of the Islamic State’s media arm

1.4From apex to crisis: Islamic State’s online propaganda in the post-territorial phase

2United they stand: rediscovering the thematic landscape of the “Caliphate’s” e-periodicals

2.1Evolution of the Islamic State’s written propaganda 2014–2019

2.2Crude beginnings: Islamic State News and Islamic State Report

2.3Flagship magazines revisited: the thematic composition of  Dabiq and Rumiyah from a comparative perspective

2.4Francophone Internet users as a target of the propaganda machine of Daesh: the case of Dar al-Islam

2.5Konstantiniyye as a means of reinforcing radicalism in Turkey

2.6Reaching out to Russian communities: Furat.Press and Istok

2.7Al-Naba as a tool of communication with internal audiences

2.8Written propaganda reborn? Unofficial periodicals after the fall of the “Caliphate”

3Reading between the lines: understanding the propaganda techniques exploited by Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.1Methodology of the research project

3.2Propaganda devices and argumentation used in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.3Triggering emotions or behaviour? Identifying core messages aiming to inspire the target audience to follow IS’s agenda

Conclusions

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me to complete this book. First of all, I would like to thank the National Science Centre (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) in Poland, whose generous grant allowed me to carry out research focused on understanding IS’s propaganda for three years. Without its support, this monograph would never have been created, at least in this form. Moreover, I would like to thank Jesus College, University of Oxford and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In 2018 I had the privilege of undertaking fellowships in these institutions which were dedicated to gaining a better understanding of the past and present of digital jihad. They proved to be a magnificent opportunity to improve my skills as a scholar. I would also like to express my gratitude to experts from the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre (CCC) of the University of Cambridge for all their advice on how to safely track terrorists on the Internet. The time I spent at the CCC allowed me to take the first steps in the difficult and constantly changing world of open-source intelligence.

Many thanks to my editors, James Whiting and Ella Panczel, for their invaluable help in getting this book to appear in print. Likewise, I am grateful to Matthew Siegal for his support enabling me to improve the style of the typescript. Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude towards David Cram for his extraordinary kindness and all these enriching discussions we have had – both online and offline – over recent years. I am thankful for Olivier Roy’s seamless support and expertise that I value greatly. Also, thanks to Ulrich Krotz, for the opportunity he gave me in 2018, and to Moign Khawaja for all those interesting chats we have had on terrorism. I have learnt a lot from them.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my beloved family, my wife Aleksandra and my children Nina and Miron, for standing with me through the good and the bad.

Funding: This work was supported by the Polish National Science Centre (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) under grant no. 2017/25/B/HS5/00002

Figures

1.1Comparison of the front pages and regular sections of AQ’s magazines Mu’askar al-Battar #10 (left) and Inspire #1 (right)

1.2Al-Furqan Media Productions’ video presenting ISI’s (Islamic State in Iraq) sniping attacks

1.3Screenshot from Clanging of the Swords IV, published in May 2014

1.4The inactive website of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz blog in Polish

1.5Screenshot of the Structure of the Caliphate video, published by the al-Furqan Foundation

1.6Advertisement of the Huroof application

1.7Screenshot from the Harvest of the Soldiers #5 video, released by the al-Hayat Media Center in August 2018

1.8Ahlut-Tawhid Publications’ al-Ghuraba website, state as of June 22, 2018

2.1Le Comportement du Mujahid. L'Altruisme cover page

2.2English translation of Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir's statement

2.3Cover page of the Islamic State News #1

2.4Comparison of the cover pages of Dabiq #15 and Rumiyah #1

2.5Cover page of Dar al-Islam #1

2.6Cover page of Dar al-Islam #2

2.7Comparison of the content of Dabiq #8 (left) and Dar al-Islam #3 (right)

2.8Fragment of Maysarah magazine advertisement in Dar al-Islam #5

2.9Cover page of Dar al-Islam #6

2.10Cover page of Dar al-Islam #7

2.11Cover page of Dar al-Islam #8

2.12Poster included in Dar al-Islam #9

2.13Cover page of Dar al-Islam #10

2.14Comparison of the “Top 10/Selected 10” column in the second issue of Konstantiniyye #2 (left) and Dabiq #10 (right)

2.15Advertisement in Konstantiniyye #5

2.16Cover page of Konstantiniyye #7

2.17Cover page of Istok #1

2.18Cover page of Istok #3

2.19Infographics included in al-Naba #1

3.1“Among the Believers Are Men” section in Dabiq #15

3.2Cover page of Dabiq #15

3.3Cover page of an interview featured in Rumiyah #10

3.4Cover page of Rumiyah #8, featuring the hagiography of Abu Sulayman ash-Shami

Tables

1.1Selection of the unofficial propaganda centres affiliated to the Islamic State between 2014 and 2019

2.1Number of pages of Dabiq and Rumiyah

2.2Core themes exploited in the content of Dabiq (per page)

2.3Core themes exploited in the content of Rumiyah (per page)

3.1Pages consisting of name-calling devices in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.2Frequency of selected “bad names” exploited in Dabiq

3.3Frequency of selected “bad names” exploited in Rumiyah

3.4Pages consisting of the glittering generalities device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.5Pages consisting of transfer device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.6Pages consisting of the card-stacking device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.7Pages consisting of the bandwagon device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.8Pages consisting of the plain folks device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.9Pages consisting of the testimonial device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.10Types of argumentation exploited in Dabiq

3.11Types of argumentation exploited in Rumiyah

3.12Pages consisting of detailed profiles of the Islamic State’s enemies

3.13Frequency of words related to selected “far enemies” in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.14Frequency of words related to selected “near enemies” in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.15Frequency of words referring to martyrdom in Dabiq

3.16Frequency of words referring to martyrdom in Rumiyah

3.17Pages consisting of profiles of shuhada in the content of Dabiq

3.18Pages consisting of profiles of shuhada in the content of Rumiyah

3.19Martyrs featured in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section of Dabiq

3.20Martyrs featured in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section of Rumiyah

3.21Pages consisting of argumentation legitimising violence in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.22Pages consisting of narratives focused on the persecution of Muslims en masse

3.23Pages consisting of calls to conversion in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.24Pages consisting of direct recruitment appeals in Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.25Pages consisting of calls to violence in Dabiq and Rumiyah

4.1Comparison of core themes discussed by Dabiq and Rumiyah (average page count)

4.2Comparison of propaganda devices exploited in Dabiq and Rumiyah (average page count)

Introduction

The emergence of the Islamic State has proven to be one of the key factors that has influenced international security in recent years.¹ Its rapid rise to power in 2014, manifested by the military offensive that steamrolled Iraqi armed forces, the subsequent proclamation of the “Caliphate,” and a series of meaningful terrorist attacks, was met with shock and disbelief by the world.² As Fishman rightly emphasised, the fall of Mosul constituted the greatest achievement of any jihadi group since the 9/11 attacks.³ This triumphant march through the Levant and Iraq, which marked the beginning of another difficult chapter in the war against Islamist terrorism, was not an accident. Daesh, being a direct descendant of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, for years nurtured statehood ambitions, which came to the fore in 2014, mostly due to the opportunities provided by the Syrian conflict. It quickly capitalised on these events and developed a sophisticated organisational structure, including territorial administration, the equivalent of armed forces,⁴ as well as a quasi-legal system based on shari’ah courts.⁵ Its well-motivated, fanatical fighters not only achieved a series of victories in the Middle East but, in addition, soon after branches of Daesh emerged elsewhere, including Africa, the Caucasus, as well as Central and South-Eastern Asia. In this context, as Byman accurately noted, the Islamic State proved to be a completely new phenomenon from the viewpoint of counterterrorism, as it moved “beyond terrorism and even insurgency” and aspired to build a state “on its own terms.”⁶

Most of these unexpected or even shocking achievements of Daesh would not have been possible if the group did not develop global appeal. According to 2018 estimates, 41,490 international citizens from 80 countries became affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.⁷ Anderson noted that foreign fighters constituted half of Daesh’s ranks,⁸ transforming it into a truly “Islamist International.” No other terrorist organisation, including al-Qaeda, achieved such massive, global recruitment success in such a short period of time.⁹ There is ongoing academic debate which attempts to explain in detail what has led to this unprecedented inflow of militants to Iraq and Syria to fight for one of the most – if not the most – barbaric Islamist terrorist groups in history. There are many factors that contributed to this process to a greater or lesser degree, according to experts. Primarily, it was undoubtedly caused by the very fact that on June 29, 2014 this faction proclaimed a “Caliphate,” the significance of which for Muslim communities worldwide is difficult to overestimate. This move essentially meant that all members of ummah¹⁰ should pledge allegiance to “Caliph” Ibrahim. As Alexander and Alexander noted, he attempted “to supersede the authority of the religious and secular leadership in the Muslim world and beyond. The title of caliph is meant to hold authority over emirs, imams, and other subjects.”¹¹ Additionally, Roy emphasised that the “proclamation had an impact on Westernized youth, whether Muslims or converts. They are not interested in the subtleties of the situation in the Middle East, but the concept enables them to see themselves as the vanguard of the Muslim ummah.”¹² In effect, according to him, “ISIS’s stroke of genius […] is to have connected specifically local territorial demands […] to the domain of global jihad.”¹³

The enticement of this group was also based on its radical Salafi-jihadist ideology, consisting of classic elements, such as martyrdom, takfir, wala and bara, combined with new ideas, which were not so popular among other Islamist terrorist groups.¹⁴ Primarily, these organisations, labelled as “jihadi claimants,” were accused by Daesh of twisting the religion of Islam and deviating from the “true” path.¹⁵ This served the purpose of attracting radicalised Muslims to IS and diverting their attention or support from other rival groups. Secondly, it emphasised and built its narration upon prophetic “methodology.”¹⁶ It argued that the statehood of Daesh as well as its political and religious system are a direct emanation of the rules coming from the Golden Age of Islam. Finally, they initially exploited the powerful and compelling theme of the “End Times.” As Ingram noted, “the apocalypse hangs like a pall over IS’s entire messaging effort emerging as a flexible and ever-ready mechanism to amplify perceptions of crises and the urgency of its agenda amongst supporters whether in times of boom or bust.”¹⁷

An important factor that influenced the rise of Daesh was related to its military victories which increased its credibility among potential supporters, who were willing to enlist and partake in jihad.¹⁸ Its militants in 2014 and 2015 succeeded in multiple military operations, conquering a part of the Middle East which was comparable in size to Great Britain. No other terrorist organisation from this area was capable of doing this. According to Gates and Podder these successes enhanced the effectiveness of the recruitment efforts of the self-proclaimed “Caliphate.”¹⁹ A plethora of fatal, Daesh-affiliated terrorist attacks, including those taking place in Europe and North America, only strengthened this “triumphant” image. This issue was interestingly summarised by Staffell and Awan who noted that

IS play on similar grievances to AQ, but in a way that often rejects complex ideological justifications in favour of action. IS’s focus is on creating the utopia in the here and now, and they provided ample evidence of both tangible goals, but also unprecedented material success. This is perhaps the most fundamental divergence in the ideology of al Qaeda and Islamic State, and the reason for the competitive advantage of the latter in terms of global recruitment over the past several years.²⁰

None of these or many other issues would have had a great impact if not for the final factor which contributed to the eruption of IS’s appeal worldwide – its online propaganda. It proved to be the only tool that enabled Daesh to advertise its uniqueness, achievements and notoriety. This combination was noted by McCants who argued that the “Caliphate’s” “apocalypse-laced recruiting pitch had drawn thousands of foreign fighters, as had its political theology and state-building program.”²¹ This “shock and awe” campaign in cyberspace was initiated at the turn of 2013/2014 and aimed to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim ummah, as well as to intimidate “societies of kufr.” Clearly, digital jihadist productions were nothing new in 2014, but the Islamic State’s specialised media bureaus brought them to a completely new level. They exploited all possible formats of propaganda (and even invented new ones) to promote its cause in the Web 1.0 and Web 2.0²² environments. As Awan rightly stressed, “just as it seized territory at lightning speed, Islamic State has been able to consolidate its ideological catchment with unprecedented stealth and efficiency. The internet has given Islamic State opportunities that its predecessors neither fully exploited nor understood.”²³ From 2014 Daesh published thousands of propaganda pieces, including various types of audiovisuals, anashids, audio statements, photo reportages, infographics, bulletins, leaflets, and magazines of outstanding quality, which promoted the cause of the “Caliphate.” Some of them, such as videos presenting the barbaric executions of hostages, directly or indirectly (through the mainstream media)²⁴ reached millions of Internet users. From the viewpoint of the history of Islamist terrorist propaganda in cyberspace, this was an incredible achievement.

The Islamic State’s audiovisuals and visuals were – by definition – the most eye-catching and effectively the most alluring pieces they published, but they did not usually consist of the most sophisticated manipulative layer. They attempted to win over Internet users by triggering their extreme emotions, which was done through their exposure to controversial, frequently gruesome images. Text propaganda usually took a different path. Daesh-affiliated leaflets, essays, e-books, bulletins, and magazines were clearly much less dynamic or even entertaining for their readers, but they contained carefully considered content and developed, but obviously biased, argumentation designed to influence more demanding types of audience. From 2014 the organisation spawned eight core periodicals, which were dedicated to reaching qualitatively different types of audiences. Two of them – Dabiq and Rumiyah – emerged as the primary means of influencing Anglophone Internet users for more than three years. The first of the two, Dabiq, emerged in July 2014 and became the flagship mouthpiece of Daesh at the apogee of its prominence. After two years it was replaced by Rumiyah, which had a slightly different focus and specificity, but maintained the extraordinary quality of its predecessor. Both publications were representative of the Islamic State’s modus operandi of manipulating Internet users and universal in terms of their target. The vast majority of other projects were narrowed down in order to influence ethnic- or language-specific types of audience. For instance, Konstantiniyye aimed to reach readers of Turkish origin, Dar al-Islam was published in French, Istok in Russian, while al-Naba – chronologically the first periodical of IS – targeted Internet users acquainted with Arabic. Despite the fact that most of these projects were short-lived, they were still quite advanced when compared to most pieces of written propaganda published previously by other Salafi-jihadist groups. Ultimately, Islamic State’s e-periodicals proved to be a unique phenomenon and one of the pillars on which its strong online presence and appeal were founded.

In this context, it is unsurprising that since 2014 the propaganda campaign of Daesh has been intensively studied by the academic community. Hundreds of papers and dozens of books²⁵ have been published which focus on various aspects of its innovative digital jihad. Many of these publications concentrated on text propaganda, most notably bulletins and magazines. For instance, El-Damanhoury and Winkler analysed the visual layer of Dabiq; they discussed how it visualised the Islamic State’s “law enforcement.”²⁶ Watkin and Looney compared this periodical to other jihadi publication series in terms of how they exploited images of children.²⁷ Macdonald and Lorenzo-Dus explained how these magazines constructed the image of a “good Muslim.”²⁸ Lorenzo-Dus, Kinzel and Walker compared Dabiq and al-Qaeda’s Inspire in terms of representing the West and infidels.²⁹ Wignell et al. conducted a comparative analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah, which predominantly focused on their emphasis and style.³⁰ Religious aspects of Dabiq’s content were discussed by Jacoby.³¹ IS’s periodicals were also studied by Ingram,³² Welch,³³ Macdonald et al.,³⁴ Kibble,³⁵ Droogan and Peattie,³⁶ Colas,³⁷ as well as Noverario.³⁸ The vast majority of these pieces of work either debated the content of these publications or the messages conveyed by them. It is, however, surprising that little to no analyses have been released which would explain in detail the means of manipulating readers exploited by the periodicals of Daesh. The works of Ingram³⁹ and Macdonald⁴⁰ are noticeable and valuable exceptions. However, these studies were not based on the established concepts within propaganda studies.

This monograph aims to fill this gap in research.⁴¹ It is a result of a research project funded by the National Science Centre in Poland⁴² and it attempts to understand the significance and specificity of online magazines in IS’s campaign in cyberspace. It took the form of a case study, which concentrated on identifying the methods of propaganda exploited in the flagship magazines of Daesh – Dabiq and Rumiyah. In other words, the major goal of this project was to understand not only how the content of these periodicals evolved over time but also how they manipulated readers into “joining the caravan” of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In order to reach this objective, the study was based on multidimensional content analysis, drawing from a number of theoretical concepts in propaganda studies, including the proven framework of the seven devices of propaganda, elaborated by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis.⁴³ This work also aimed to understand the types of argumentation⁴⁴ utilised in the content of these magazines, as well as the means used to trigger the emotions and affect the behaviour of their readers. Finally, the project was founded on comparative analysis in order to understand the evolution of the modus operandi employed by their editorial staffs. This does not mean, however, that this book is limited strictly to Dabiq and Rumiyah. They were analysed in a broader context of narratives employed by other Islamic State-affiliated periodicals published from 2014. It focused on their formats and thematic composition from the viewpoint of the constantly changing strategic situation and priorities of the “Caliphate.”

In order to reach these objectives, the content of this book has been divided into three chapters. The first serves the purpose of introducing readers to the origins of the Islamic State’s digital jihad, which can be traced back to the beginning of the 21st century. It also recapitulates all existing information, concerning the organisation of the media branch of Daesh, and discusses the most important features of its online campaign. Finally, it explains how Islamic State’s propaganda adapted to the new circumstances of the post-territorial period.

The second chapter starts with a brief description of the evolution of the written propaganda of Daesh. It also explains the motives behind the emergence of online periodicals, their role in the online campaign of the “Caliphate,” as well as the reasons for their eventual fall. Subsequently, it deliberates on the organisation of content and the most important themes exploited by the editors of the magazines and bulletins associated with the “Caliphate” between 2014 and 2019. It discusses both official publication series, which were released at the peak of IS’s power, such as al-Naba, Islamic State News, Dar al-Islam, or Konstantiniyye, as well as new phenomena and developments in this field since the end of 2017, such as From Dabiq to Rome and Youth of the Caliphate.⁴⁵ Obviously, particular emphasis here has been placed on understanding the most important tendencies in terms of the topics exploited by Dabiq and Rumiyah.

The third and most important chapter of this book explains the manipulative layer of the two flagship magazines of Daesh: Dabiq and Rumiyah. Based on multilayered content and comparative analysis, this part focuses on identifying the devices of propaganda as well as the means of argumentation exploited by their editorial staffs. It also discusses the specificity of the messages utilised by them to manipulate, mobilise, and recruit readers. This includes the designation of its enemies, promotion of martyrdom, as well as calls for recruitment, violence, and conversion.

Notes

1 See e.g. William F. Wechsler, Mark N. Katz, Charles Lister and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices,” Middle East Policy 23, 1 (2016); Michaela Martin and Hussein Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 4, 1 (2017).

2 Simon Staffell and Akin N. Awan, “Introduction,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.

3 Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016), 199.

4 See Marco Longobardo, “The Self-Proclaimed Statehood of the Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 and International Law,” Annuario español de derecho internacional 33, (2017), 205–228.

5 Mathias Rohe, “The Origins of the Islamic State and Its Legal System,” Islamic Law Past and Present 8, (2015).

6 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 170, 225.

7 13% of this number were recorded as women, while 12% were minors. 20% (7,366 people) returned to their countries of origin. Other, earlier assessments of the Soufan Group from December 2015 indicated that between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the IS from at least 86 countries. See Joana Cook and Gina Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018), 3; Richard Barrett et al., Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015), 4.

8 Bozorgmehri Majid, “Recruitment of Foreign Members by Islamic State (Daesh): Tools and Methods,” Journal of Politics and Law 11, (2018), 53.

9 On traditional modus operandi of Salafi-jihadi terrorist organisations in recruiting new members see e.g.: Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), chap. 4.

10 This term is traditionally defined as “community of believers.” See Gabrielle Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006), 105.

11 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 36.

12 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of Islamic State (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 81–82.

13 Ibid., 81.

14 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS. Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), 222–225.

15 Nelly Lahoud, “The ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 31.

16 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS. Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 193.

17 Haroro J. Ingram, “Islamic State’s English-language Magazines, 2014–2017: Trends & Implications for CT-CVE Strategic Communications,” ICCT Research Paper March, (2018), 5.

18 This book narrows down the term of jihad in its meaning to military struggle against the enemies of Islam, i.e. jihad al-asghar (“lesser jihad”), also known as jihad bi-al-saif (“jihad of the sword”). On the complicated concept of jihad see more in: Gabrielle Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006), 17–30.

19 Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 113; Amin ElSayed, Reclaiming Jihad: A Qur’anic Critique of Terrorism (Cambridge: Kube Publishing Ltd., 2015); David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

20 Simon Staffell and Akin N. Awan, “Introduction,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 15.

21 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse. The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 126.

22 According to Aghaei et al., Web 1.0 is “the first generation of the web which […] could be considered the read-only web […] the early web provided a limited user interactions or content contributions and only allowed to search the information and read it.” They argue that the Web 2.0 “allow[s] assembling and managing large global crowds with common interests in social interactions.” See Sarah Aghaei, Mohammad Ali Nematbakhsh and Hadi Khosravi Farsani, “Evolution of the World Wide Web: From Web 1.0 to Web 4.0,” International Journal of Web & Semantic Technology 3, 1 (2012), 1–2.

23 Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State. The Digital Caliphate (London: Saqi Books, 2015), 212.

24 Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2017), 20.

25 See Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside and Charlie Winter, The ISIS Reader. Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

26 See Carol K. Winkler, Kareem El-Damanhoury, Aaron Dicker and Anthony F. Lemieux, “The Medium is Terrorism: Transformation of the About To Die Trope in Dabiq,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, 2 (2019); Kareem El-Damanhoury and Carol Winkler, “Picturing Law and Order: A Visual Framing Analysis of ISIS’s Dabiq Magazine,” Journal of Arab Media & Society 25, (2018).

27 Amy-Louise Watkin and Seán Looney, “‘The Lions of Tomorrow’: A News Value Analysis of Child Images in Jihadi Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 1–2 (2019).

28 Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Stuart Macdonald, “Visual Jihad: Constructing the ‘Good Muslim’ in Online Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1559508.

29 Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Anina Kinzel and Luke Walker, “Representing the West and ‘Non-believers’ in the Online Jihadist Magazines Dabiq and Inspire,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 11, 3 (2018).

30 Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017).

31 Tim Jacoby, “Islam and the Islamic State’s Magazine, Dabiq,” Politics and Religion 12, 1 (2019).

32 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State’s Propaganda War,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, 5 (2017).

33 Tyler Welch, “Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 11, 3 (2018).

34 Stuart Macdonald, Nyasha Maravanyika, David Nezri, Elliot Perry and Kate Thomas, “Online Jihadist Magazines and the ‘Religious Terrorism’ Thesis,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11, 3 (2018); Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Stuart Macdonald, “Othering the West in the Online Jihadist Propaganda Magazines Inspire and Dabiq,” Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict 6, no. 1 (2018).

35 David G. Kibble, “Dabiq, the Islamic State’s Magazine: A Critical Analysis,” Middle East Policy 23, 3 (2016).

36 Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie, “Mapping the Thematic Landscape of Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, 6 (2017).

37 Brandon Colas, “What Does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organization Fractures within Dabiq Magazine,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, 3 (2017).

38 Celine Marie I. Novenario, “Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, 11 (2016).

39 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, 3 (2016).

40 Stuart Macdonald, “Radicalisers as Regulators: An Examination of Dabiq Magazine,” in Terrorists’ Use of the Internet. Assessment and Response, edited by Maura Conway, Stuart MacDonald, Lee Jarvis, Lella Nouri and Orla Lehane (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2017).

41 It should be stressed that this project has already resulted in a few pieces of work which discuss the propaganda layer of the flagship magazines of Daesh. This book is partially based on the same set of data, but consists of new findings, as well as significantly expanded analysis and conclusions. See Miron Lakomy, “Between ‘Camp of Falsehood’ and the ‘Camp of Truth’: Exploitation of Propaganda Devices in the ‘Dabiq’ Online Magazine, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1711601; Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

42 Grant no. 2017/25/B/HS5/00002.

43 See e.g. J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 135.

44 See Mike Allen, “Meta-analysis Comparing the Persuasiveness of One-sided and Two-sided Messages,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 55, (1991), 390–404; Adam Kosseski and Stanisław Kuśmierski (eds) Teoria i praktyka propagandy (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1985), 171–172.

45 In some publications the German-language magazine Kybernetiq was labelled as a pro-IS magazine. However, this particular periodical was – at least unofficially – associated with al-Qaeda in Syria. Thus, it falls outside of the remit of this book. See Burcu Kaya Erdem and Remzi Bilge, “The Announcement of Dar al-Harb in Cyber Media in Context of the Theological Policy of Jihad: Reading the Cyber-Jihad and ISIS based on the Pharmakon Characteristic of the Cyber Media,” International Journal of Islamic Thought 11, June (2017), 30; Fabian Lenglachner, Kybernetiq: Analyzing the First Jihadi Magazine on Cyber and Information Security (Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2018), 8.

1 Going virtual

Islamic State’s shock and awe campaign on the Internet

1.1Origins of the “virtual Caliphate”

The emergence of the Internet as a global communication network since the turn of the 1990s was surely one of the most important technological breakthroughs in history.¹ Aside from the great benefits that this invention has brought for humankind, it has also created significant – but mostly unexpected – challenges for international security. One of them is strictly related to terrorist organisations. The emerging Web 1.0 environment combined with constantly increasing access to the Internet proved to be a huge opportunity for these groups to move beyond the classic constraints of their modus operandi. Cyberspace became a “promised land” for Islamist terrorists in terms of safe communication, coordination, and financing. Moreover, it allowed them to undertake new types of hostile activities, namely cyber-attacks. Last, but not least, the World Wide Web initially had tremendous potential in terms of gaining direct access to millions and later to billions of Internet users.² As Sageman argued:

the nature of this relationship between individuals and the Internet favors the Salafi message. The Internet both appeals to and fosters disembeddedness […] it appeals to isolated individuals by easing their loneliness through connections to people sharing some commonality […] it leads them to spend more time with this virtual community at the expense of interaction with the immediate social environment.³

According to Sageman, the Internet “can help bridge the gap from the isolated potential mujahed to the global jihad.”⁴ Overall, jihadis gained instruments that circumvented the traditional barrier of public communication being controlled by the mass media and governments. Holtmann accurately summarised this trend by stating that their major goal was to “make the divide between the virtual and the physical more permeable with the help of elaborate media strategies.”⁵

At the beginning of the 1990s this tremendous opportunity was yet to be recognised. It took more than half a decade before the first Islamist terrorist organisations could grasp the rising potential of cyberspace. The breakthrough took place between 1995 and 1996, when they slowly began to realise that the Internet allowed them to influence global audiences without committing acts of terrorism. Surprisingly, their archaic, medieval-like and radical ideology was no obstacle to adopting new technologies of Western, “crusader” as they frequently refer to it, origin. Political Islam, as well as Salafi-jihadis, proved to be very keen to exploit these technologies for the purposes of furthering their agenda.⁶ As Kosmynka noted, Salafi violent extremist organisations (VEOs) primarily recognised the usability of the Internet to manipulate the beliefs and opinions of online audiences, present a twisted interpretation of the religious texts of Islam, distort the reality surrounding Muslim communities, and exploit visual symbols to generate affective states among their target groups, which would inspire them and channel their activities in a desired direction.⁷

Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) from Algeria were among the first Islamist terrorist organisations to “test the waters” when they published their first online bulletins (al-Kital, al-Ansar). Additionally, Hamas and Hezbollah established their first websites and also created anti-Semitic and anti-American comics dedicated to indoctrinating children.⁸ The most compelling and comprehensive experiments were, however, undertaken by al-Qaeda, as well as its affiliated groups, such as the Chechen Salafi militants of Shamil Basayev and Thamir Samir Saleh Abdullah (bearing the nom de guerre of ibn al-Khattab).⁹ They were probably behind the early – somewhat rudimentary – attempts at creating various forms of text propaganda, which were distributed through traditional Web 1.0 channels, namely in the form of standalone websites. These usually contained news and articles which were enriched with rather simplistic visuals, including all sorts of banners, logos, and images of leaders (sheikhs). Interestingly, some of them stood in line with the latest trends in developing websites at the time, such as dedicated guestbooks. At the turn of the century, online radios broadcasting in Arabic also emerged as a tool of influencing Internet users. This was visible, among others, on the al-Qaeda-affiliated jehad.net webpage. Salafi-jihadis also utilised increasingly popular message boards, such as Ansar, Hanin, Shumukh, al-Buraq, Sinam al-Islam, at-Tahaddi,¹⁰ as well as dedicated communication software.¹¹ As Sageman noted, they allowed radicalised young Muslims to

share their hopes and dreams with their virtual friends […] Some might have joined a given forum out of a sense of alienation, of feeling alone […] This mutual sharing makes them feel ever closer to each other, in a virtual process similar to the one previously described as in-group love with face-to-face interactions. This provides them with a sense of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in common, Islam.¹²

In this context, according to Weimann, in 1998 around half of the 30 terrorist organisations recognised by the United States had websites. Two years later all of them had established an online presence.¹³

As for the early audiovisual propaganda, its birth probably took place in the North Caucasus. Accessible data suggests that – once again – the Chechen Salafi militants were the first to record low quality videos attempting to promote jihad against Russian “crusaders.” Having a good opportunity to do so, due to two military conflicts with the Russian Federation between 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, they produced a number of pieces, some of which are still accessible online. In a certain sense these usually short movies set the standard for the Islamist terrorist audiovisuals that followed. They usually contained instances of combat footage and executions of Russian soldiers, compiled with anashid soundtracks and profiles of leaders (e.g. ibn al-Khattab). Initially, these productions were distributed via VHS cassettes. Later, however, they emerged online.¹⁴ Some of them, such as the infamous Shatoy ambush video, are still accessible on YouTube, despite the fact that they show corpses of Russian soldiers. Militants in the northern Caucasus were also among the “pioneers” that developed dedicated decapitation videos.¹⁵ In 1998 three British citizens and one from New Zealand were executed in Chechnya. Their confessions of alleged spying and acting against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, followed by their beheading, were recorded on camera and made public.¹⁶ In 1999 they released the beheading of a Russian conscript.¹⁷ In 2000 al-Khattab’s group published the Hell of the Russians video, which became iconic for jihadi propaganda going forward.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the online activities of these groups until the end of the 20th century were merely an experiment, an interesting yet unsophisticated addition to their everyday, classic – and offline – activities.

These relatively primitive instances of digital jihad started to evolve at the turn of the 21st century, marking the increased interest of al-Qaeda, as well as other Salafi groups, in exploiting cyberspace for propaganda purposes. There were several reasons for this shift. First of all, the tragic 9/11 attacks occurred, which caused the outbreak of the War on Terror, effectively drawing the attention of the international community to the armed struggle against Islamist terrorists. This meant that all communiqués coming from al-Qaeda et consortes began to have potentially a much greater – global – audience.¹⁹ The subsequent US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were even more important. From the Salafi-jihadi perspective they provided a great opportunity to depict both interventions as a Christian “Holy War” against Islam. According to Ibrahim, they also “provided useful confirmation for their ideological model.”²⁰ This, in turn, facilitated all recruitment and inspiration initiatives, which were heavily reliant on arguments emphasising the subjugation and hardships of Muslim societies. In this context, Sageman was right to stress that “the invasion of Iraq galvanized young Muslims worldwide to join the fight against the West.”²¹ Symbolic stories of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, or even simple mistakes committed by American and allied soldiers resulting in casualties suffered by the civilian population,²² proved to be a great opportunity to fan the flames of this narration. This was fuelled even more by George W. Bush himself who recklessly declared a “crusade” against terrorism.²³ From this moment on, this infamous statement was relentlessly exploited by the jihadis to legitimise their cause. Moreover, the arrival of Western soldiers in the Middle East and Central Asia provided opportunities for creating new types of propaganda. Both wars increased the opportunities to record audiovisuals depicting mujahidin fighting against or even executing “crusaders.” Finally, the beginning of the 21st century marked new developments in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT). Internet bandwidth increased significantly. In contrast to the 56k modems in the 1990s, emerging broadband access enabled the uploading and downloading of increasingly sophisticated multimedia. The same happened with Internet coverage. In only four years, between December 1999 and December 2003, the number of Internet users almost tripled from 248 to 719 million.²⁴ The Web 2.0 environment also emerged, which marked the advent of the era of social media.²⁵ The establishment of MySpace in 2003 and Facebook in February 2004 opened new, increasingly important venues of Internet communication and interaction.²⁶ The advent of mobile phones, and eventually smartphones, also had a significant impact.²⁷ Mobile phone cameras and increased access to editing software provided new ways of producing alluring, but frequently shocking propaganda. Greater Internet bandwidth enabled their easy upload and distribution among the rising pool of online audiences.²⁸ All of these developments combined clearly constituted a great opportunity for jihadis.

In effect, since the advent of the War on Terror, al-Qaeda, as well as other jihadi movements, started to become increasingly immersed in the online environment. As Jordán, Torres and Jeep argued in 2004,

after September 11th, Al Qaeda’s true communication-intensive and propagandistic nature emerged. The organization then converted into a much more recognizable and communicative enemy. Of the almost four hundred texts and documents of various types released since 1993, only twenty four date from before September 11th.²⁹

In the following years al-Qaeda developed a set of tools which allowed them to influence and manipulate Internet users on a massive scale. Its actions in cyberspace began to be supported by a number of dedicated media cells. The official cells, bearing the name of al-Sahab Institute for Media Production and al-Fajr Media Center, were backed by a plethora of semi-official and unofficial groups, promoting their cause and productions in the Web 1.0 environment. One of the most renowned was the Global Islamic Media Front, which, among others, released propaganda supporting the cause of AQ.³⁰

As Schmid emphasised, at this time al-Qaeda’s propaganda was founded on several core messages. Firstly, it emphasised the sufferings of the Muslim ummah, which were allegedly caused by the alliance of “crusaders” and “Zionists.” Secondly, it stated that the only way to bring back the dignity of Muslims was to proclaim a Caliphate that should replace the tawaghit (apostate political elite).³¹ Thirdly, it stressed that the way to reach this objective was through violent jihad against Western influence in the Muslim world, conducted by the vanguard of AQ’s mujahidin. Additional elements, according to Schmid, consisted of presenting martyrdom as a legitimate asymmetric tactic of warfare, making no distinction between civilian and military targets, takfir (excommunication of Muslims who do not comply to shari’ah law), as well as presenting jihad as an individual obligation of every member of the ummah.³²

The distribution strategy of its emerging online campaign was founded on a plethora of unofficial and semi-official webpages, such as:

Alneda.com – which was officially endorsed by AQ Central officials and featured news on its achievements and transmitted encrypted messages to its members,

Almuhrajiroun.com – consisting of al-Qaeda’s demands to assassinate the President of Pakistan,

Jehad.net – publishing AQ’s statements,

Aloswa.org – featuring lectures and statements of bin Laden, as well as fatwas justifying terrorist attacks,

Drasat.com – reporting on the achievements of al-Qaeda.³³

There is no consensus within academia on the role and efficiency of these instruments. For instance, Sageman argued that such “passive” websites in the early 21st century were hardly an “engine of radicalization,” but at the same time they fostered “a terrorist worldview.”³⁴ In contrast, Powers and Armstrong emphasised that these websites were in fact an instrument of Islamic extremism and radicalisation.³⁵ Despite these differences, it has to be stressed that their number and level of sophistication increased dramatically in just a few years. By 2007 there were thousands of webpages which were more or less engaged in propagating AQ-related propaganda.³⁶ By the end of the decade, al-Qaeda grew proficient in exploiting popular Web 2.0 communication channels, such as blogs and YouTube.³⁷ It also took the first steps in using popular social networks and even managed to set up an online library consisting of thousands of e-books and articles.³⁸

Through these websites al-Qaeda started to proliferate increasingly differentiated forms of propaganda, starting from audiovisuals, such as combat footage or recordings of suicide attacks, through audio statements and lectures, to visuals (e.g. photo reportages), and various text publications, including essays, e-books and manuals.³⁹ In 2002 the organisation released the first dedicated, AQ-produced decapitation video of Daniel Pearl, which was met with consternation and shock by the international public.⁴⁰ The organisation was also responsible for the publication of a series of online magazines and bulletins, such as the Sawt al-Jihad (“Voice of Jihad”),⁴¹ al-Khansaa (literally “the snub-nosed,” which was a periodical dedicated to women),⁴² and Mu’askar al-Battar (being, in fact, a dedicated training manual).⁴³ As Bunt noted, they discussed issues of religious significance, as well as news, which acted as a “motivation for future activities and to provide exemplary models to follow.”⁴⁴ Additionally, legitimisation of violence was also provided. These periodicals were followed in 2010 by the “Vanity Fair of jihadi publications” as Bruce Hoffman described the Inspire magazine.⁴⁵ It constituted a major breakthrough in terms of text propaganda. It was the first high-quality jihadi periodical published in English, which was sophisticated not only in terms of the messages conveyed but also in terms of graphic design (Figure 1.1). It was founded by the members of the al-Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula: Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki. As Dziewanowski noted, each volume of this magazine constituted a mixture of complex techniques of indoctrination combined with manuals providing advice on the planning of terrorist attacks.⁴⁶ In this context, it has to be stressed that training manuals were also provided by other magazines at the time. For instance, Alma’sadah al-Jihadiah released instructions on how to create a dirty bomb.⁴⁷ The aforementioned Mu’askar al-Battar, according to Springer et al., “covered everything from instruction in using weapons to case studies for assassinations and ambushes.”⁴⁸ However, some academics doubted the efficiency of these instructions, compared to the personal training received in terrorist camps.⁴⁹

Figure 1.1Comparison of the front pages and regular sections of AQ’s magazines Mu’askar al-Battar #10 (left) and Inspire #1 (right).

Source: Internet Archive.

The videos produced by the group proved to be increasingly popular among Internet users. In 2005 websites featuring images and recordings of beheadings were visited as often as 60,000 times per hour.⁵⁰ Moreover, al-Qaeda started to experiment with other innovatory formats of audiovisual propaganda. Among others, it followed the example of Hezbollah and developed a video game entitled the Quest for Bush (also known as the Night of Bush Capturing). This piece was released by the Global Islamic Media Front in 2006 and constituted a simple modification of an American-made FPS (First-Person Shooter) – Quest for Saddam – which was launched three years earlier. The game promoted the profiles of Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab az-Zarqawi and allowed players to kill the President of the United States. The game also featured a soundtrack composed of anashids.⁵¹ However, the majority of al-Qaeda’s audiovisual productions were much less alluring. As Kepel noted, at the beginning of the 21st century, the organisation published numerous video statements of Zawahiri, which were “generally videotaped in front of a background cloth featuring a rifle or a machine gun (the symbol of armed jihad).”⁵² According to Kepel, they were repetitive in nature, had “little news value” and were “mentioned by large media organizations […] only when a precise threat against a particular target”⁵³ was issued.

In this context, there is a final way in which the US intervention toppling Saddam Hussein’s rule affected the emergence of the “virtual Caliphate.” As Torres, Jordán, and Horsburgh accurately noted, from the spring of 2003 “Iraq became the epicenter of GJM [global jihadi movement – M.L.] propaganda.”⁵⁴ The eruption of insurgency in Iraq constituted a fantastic opportunity to expand the presence of al-Qaeda in the area and this eventually resulted in the creation of the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Lands of the Two Rivers (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn).⁵⁵ After some years, this branch, created by the notorious Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, mutated into the Islamic State.⁵⁶ Despite the fact that he pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, significant tensions between him and AQ’s leadership arose. They were related mostly to the volatile modus operandi adopted by az-Zarqawi, including his aggressive attitude towards Shia Muslims, who were continuously attacked despite the firm opposition of Ayman al-Zawahiri.⁵⁷ Micallef summarised this peculiar ‘schism’ by stating that

Bin Laden wanted to unite both Shia and Sunni in a war ‘against the global infidel alliance,’ while Zarqawi argued that the ‘near enemy,’ the apostate Shia and moderate Sunni, posed a bigger threat than the ‘far enemy,’ the United States and its allies.⁵⁸

These differences were also visible when it came to online propaganda. Ibrahim rightly argued that

the US-led invasion lifted the constraint on the group from Saddam’s regime, and it quickly emerged as one of the most violent parts of the anti-US opposition. From the start its tactics differed from those preferred by Al-Qaeda’s international leadership; their tactics also shaped AQI from its foundation to the current Islamic State. Very early on, the use of public beheadings, filmed and placed on the Internet, was adopted along with that of suicide bombing.⁵⁹

Iraqi al-Qaeda (AQI) was behind the second dedicated decapitation video of a Western hostage, which caused worldwide public outrage.⁶⁰ The death of Nicolas Berg proved to be a breakthrough in terms of exploiting gore videos for propaganda purposes. As Harrow noted, “even though the Daniel Pearl decapitation received a lot of attention, the decapitation campaign did not really start before the Nicolas Berg decapitation, two years later.”⁶¹ According to Harrow, the recording of Berg’s death proved to be the model for all execution videos that followed, including, for example, the use of orange jumpsuits, which were similar to the uniforms of the Guantanamo prisoners.⁶² Iraqi al-Qaeda was also behind a series of videos presenting terrorist and militant attacks. For instance, in July 2005 the Global Islamic Media Front published a piece entitled Top 10 Video of Insurgent Attacks in Iraq, which featured combat with US-led coalition soldiers. Another, similar production – Jihadist Candid Camera – combined laughter with scenes presenting attacks against American troops in Iraq,⁶³ which was unprecedented. It also regularly released videos presenting IED attacks against patrols, e.g. in Ramadi, Anbar and Baghdad (Figure 1.2).⁶⁴ As Stern and Berger summarised, all audiovisuals of this kind

were distributed physically on DVDs in Iraq, but they became an Internet phenomenon. Unlabeled online file repositories were linked to by members of jihadist message boards, and the videos were passed around the Web, violence porn with a mission to intimidate and enrage. They succeeded.⁶⁵

Figure 1.2Al-Furqan Media Productions’ video presenting ISI’s (Islamic State in Iraq) sniping attacks.

Source: Internet Archive.

Propaganda productions of az-Zarqawi’s organisation proved to be not only more shocking and attention-drawing but also of a higher quality when compared to releases of other AQ branches. This was mostly caused by their more thoughtful exploitation of editing software in order to satisfy the needs of younger Internet users, who were accustomed, according to Torres et al., to more sophisticated multimedia pieces.⁶⁶ The group also operated standalone websites, such as the Voice of Jihad, which constituted an online repository providing downloads of all propaganda productions related to AQI.⁶⁷

Iraqi al-Qaeda and its subsequent incarnations were also active in generating text propaganda. From March 2005, it began to release a magazine entitled Thurwat al-Sinan (“The Camel’s Hump”), which was dedicated to legitimising jihad with religious argumentation, distributing military instructions for al-Qaeda followers, praising the group’s achievements, as well as presenting the core elements of its agenda. For instance, a volume released on March 2, 2005 featured an article of AQI’s spokesperson, Abu Maysara, who listed the most important motives behind the group’s activities, including the restoration of pure monotheism, carrying out jihad against “infidels” and “apostates” to liberate Muslim lands, freeing Muslim prisoners, establishing shari’ah, as well as defending the honour and dignity of the members of ummah, including “sisters” and children allegedly kidnapped by Americans and Shias. It also emphasised willingness to restore the “Caliphate” in Baghdad.⁶⁸

Propaganda productions promoting all subsequent incarnations of al-Qaeda in Iraq (Islamic State in Iraq) were usually related to the activities of al-Furqan Media. For the years preceding the eruption of the civil war in Syria in 2011, this media outlet accumulated significant experience in producing and distributing increasingly professional propaganda. In 2010 it was listed by the Middle East Media Research Institute’s experts among the four primary media organisations that generated high-end digital jihadist releases.⁶⁹ As Stern and Berger noted, a visible change in ISI’s online propaganda could be seen at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. This was marked by a series of audio statements by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the group’s spokesperson. Among others, he emphasised that the organisation will remain (baqiyyah), which subsequently became a slogan exploited by Daesh in the years to come.⁷⁰ Between 2012 and 2013 the organisation advertised a successful campaign called Breaking the Walls, this being a series of successful jail breaks of jihadi inmates.⁷¹ The group also started to promote its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as his first audio statements emerged online. In one such recording published on April 9, 2013, he proclaimed the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL), which was a natural step when considering the recent extension of its activities into Syria, due to the ongoing civil war.⁷² Development of the ISI/ISIS’s online capabilities in terms of promoting its radical agenda is especially noticeable when analysing the video series called Salil as-Sawarim (“The Clanging of the Swords”). Its first part, released in June 2012,⁷³ was followed by three sequels published in August 2012, January 2013 and May 2014 (Figure 1.3). They featured SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) attacks, house raids, combat footage (in the first-person perspective) and even shots taken from UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles).⁷⁴ While the first audiovisual production of ISI did not bear signs of noticeable changes when compared to other mainstream jihadi propaganda at the time, the second part looked significantly better, in terms of content (combat footage), filmmaking techniques exploited and the overall quality of the video. According to Stern and Berger, it constituted a great step forward and was of comparable quality to professional television programmes. The final, fourth part of the series meant, as they suggested, that ISIS’s propaganda specialists had to be considered professionals.⁷⁵ Soufan held a similar opinion and stated that “the group began producing slick, high-definition videos depicting the fighting as a sort of real-life, post-apocalyptic Hollywood action movie, complete with explosions and bleeding corpses.”⁷⁶

Figure 1.3Screenshot from Clanging of the Swords IV, published in May 2014.

Source: Jihadology.net.

It is therefore not a surprise that ISIS consisted of a critical number of experienced specialists in information warfare, as for years they polished their skills in manipulating online audiences. It also recognised the great potential of using Internet propaganda to promote its cause. Byman was therefore right when stating that “The Islamic State and its predecessors inherited Al Qaeda’s emphasis on proselytizing and propaganda.”⁷⁷ Digital jihad was perceived by its leadership as an integral part of its strategy, as it fulfilled several functions, such as influencing (intimidating) adversaries, manipulating worldwide public opinion and inspired audiences to follow the group’s radical agenda. The latter was manifested in engagement in violent actions (including lone-wolf terrorist attacks⁷⁸) against real or artificial enemies or in the direct enlistment of members into ISIS ranks (through hijrah).⁷⁹ The motives behind ISIS/IS’s online presence were accurately described by Winter, who argued that its propagandists

are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation’s global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with ‘evidence’ to convince potential recruits to become active members.⁸⁰

To summarise, ISIS’s propaganda arm from around the turn of 2014 proved to be an efficient media force multiplier.⁸¹

This was evident as early as November 2013, when ISIS demonstrated sophisticated capabilities of creating high-definition movies consisting of battle footage. Its unusual quality managed to gather increased attention from Internet users on the popular video-hosting website Liveleak.com. With the series of military victories achieved by the group at the beginning of 2014, productions of similar quality started to be published more and more frequently. While the quality of these releases clearly increased, the group’s online popularity was still somewhat limited. Everything changed when the “Caliphate” was proclaimed on June 29, 2014. From that moment, all the experience and skills developed were utilised to promote the idea that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the legitimate successor of the Caliphs from the Golden Age of Islam, and that the Islamic State is the only true representation of Islamic values.⁸² Nance and Sampson noted that “Al-Furqan shocked the world and thrust ISIS upon the stage with a series of videos launched in the summer of 2014.”⁸³ On July 5, 2014 the group published its first audiovisual production – Kutbah and Jum’ah Prayer in the Grand Mosque of Mosul – which featured Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s speech. It quickly and easily captured the attention of the world’s media. It was, however, nothing when compared to the video released on August 19, 2014 – A Message to America. This piece is, probably, one of the most – if not the most – popular digital jihadist productions in history. The five-minute recording challenged the United States by brutally decapitating its citizen James Foley.⁸⁴ On YouTube alone, its censored or modified versions, with media commentary attached, were viewed by millions of Internet users.⁸⁵ This piece, which received a huge amount of coverage from the mass media and a rapid reaction from the political elite and international public opinion, was quickly followed by other productions. Second Message to America appeared online on September 2, 2014 and featured the execution of Steven Sotloff. Twelve days later A Message to the Allies of America emerged, which presented the death of David Haines. This was followed by the subsequent murders of Alan Henning, Peter Kassig, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa.⁸⁶ This period between June and August 2014 proved to be a turning point in the history of online Salafi-jihadi propaganda. Never before had productions associated with the Islamic terrorist organisation proved to be so “popular” among Internet users. It was also the moment when the behemoth of the “virtual Caliphate” was born. No other VEO in history, in such a short period of time, generated such enormous propaganda output, both in terms of quality and quantity. At the apogee of its power, Islamic State created almost 800 visual releases and almost 150 videos per month, not to mention audio and text publications. Milton’s study identified over 9,000 official pieces of visual (including videos) propaganda productions of Daesh released only between January 2015 and August 2016, as well as 52,000 photographs.⁸⁷ While the scope of its digital jihad decreased in time due to the deepening crisis of the group, in just a few years it still managed to produce thousands of different pieces which inspired online audiences to follow its radical agenda and intimidated disbelievers.

1.2Understanding IS’s digital jihad: why has it drawn the world’s attention?

Alexander and Alexander noted that “the extent of IS’s political and media outreach aimed at garnering support is unprecedented in the history of global jihadist movements.”⁸⁸ Friis underlined the Islamic State’s ability to capture the imagination of the global public and labelled it as one of the most remarkable phenomena in recent years.⁸⁹ Both are correct, as since 2013/2014 millions of Internet users have been exposed, both willingly and unwillingly, to its propaganda in cyberspace. In effect, the Internet constituted a significant tool for its radicalisation and recruitment efforts,⁹⁰ targeting mostly young men and women, as well as minors.⁹¹ In this context, the vast majority of experts agree that the reasons for this unprecedented efficiency in generating the attention of online audiences are related to unique features of its campaign. According to Byman, the digital jihad of Daesh “has earned grudging respect from a range of commentators in the West who, though they obviously abhor the content of the messages, acknowledge the level of sophistication of the group’s social media strategy.”⁹²

From the viewpoint of the goals of this study, it is, therefore, interesting to understand and outline what exactly has contributed to the uniqueness and scale of the Islamic State’s online campaign at the apogee of its power between 2014 and 2016. To begin with, its campaign was abundant with different types of propaganda, frequently combined together, which enabled the creation of new, sometimes surprising and compelling formats. As for visual productions, it not only produced banners and photo reportages, which were utilised by Salafi terrorists in the past, but also memes, infographics, maps and 3D logos. Audio releases were less concentrated on relatively tedious and boring statements and lectures, but focused more on catchy anashids, such as Salil al-Sawarim (quickly becoming the unofficial anthem of Daesh), Let’s go for Jihad or Fisabilillah.⁹³ It also developed the professional al-Bayan Radio, which combined anashids with news and lectures. Text propaganda became unprecedentedly varied; in addition to a number of newsletters and bulletins released (Islamic State News, al-Naba, Islamic State Report), Daesh started to release high-profile, sophisticated, and technically advanced magazines in various languages (Dabiq, Konstantiniyye, Dar al-Islam), e-books, manuals, essays and even leaflets.⁹⁴ Finally, multiple forms of audiovisuals were utilised. They consisted not only of executions but also of full-blown “documentaries,” advertisements, combat footage, as well as materials depicting suicide terrorist attacks. Some of them were even recorded with UAVs. The most sophisticated videos were usually published by the al-Hayat Media Center and were dedicated to targeting global audiences. For instance, IS exploited one of its British hostages – John Cantlie – to produce slick “reportages,” providing viewers with the illusion of a “reasonable” and “unbiased” perspective.⁹⁵ It also managed to develop music videos combining anashids with advanced filmmaking that encouraged, for example, home-grown terrorism. Daesh even exploited video games (e.g. Grand Theft Auto 5 and ARMA 3 mods) in order to target youngsters, being the main group that the organisation attempted to manipulate.⁹⁶ Interestingly, it was also responsible for developing standalone applications for Android smartphones, which were used either to facilitate the propagation of its messages (through programs such as Dawn of Glad Tidings or Amaq Agency) or to indoctrinate priority targets, such as toddlers (Huroof – Arabic teacher for children). Some authors suggested that some of IS’s apps were used to create a botnet, which was responsible for DDoS attacks against Internet root name servers.⁹⁷

Secondly, these releases proved to be outstanding in terms of technical quality. In contrast to the earlier, mostly amateurish productions of other jihadi groups, Daesh released pieces of propaganda which were developed by professionals, who sometimes had Western education or experience.⁹⁸ For instance, Mohammad Emwazi (a.k.a. Jihadi John), the infamous executioner of James Foley and other prominent hostages, was a computer scientist educated in Great Britain.⁹⁹ Ahmad Abousamra (a.k.a. Abu Sulayman ash-Shami) was the co-founder and a member of the editorial staff of Dabiq and Rumiyah, and he was also a computer scientist educated in the United States.¹⁰⁰ Denis Cuspert (known as Abu Talha al-Almani or Deso Dogg) was a popular “gangsta” rapper in Germany prior to his radicalisation and accession to the Islamic State. In its ranks, he was responsible for the production of anashids and featured as a celebrity in recruitment videos.¹⁰¹ However, it has to be stressed that the Western-educated media operatives were accompanied in IS’s ranks by a number of skilled professionals originating from the Middle East.¹⁰² In this context, it is therefore unsurprising that the propaganda productions of the Islamic State were of the highest technical quality. Materials were produced in high definition, with the use of advanced equipment, consisted of excellent post-production effects and were skilfully directed. The movies of Daesh used filmmaking methods which were rare or non-existent in the earlier productions of other Islamist terrorist organisations, such as: aerial shots, crowd shots, ambient light, depth of field, various camera angles (including the first person perspective), special effects, electronically augmented sound, compilations, slow motion and adjustment of the range of colours.¹⁰³

Thirdly, Islamic State proved to be the only Islamist terrorist organisation that reconstructed its traditional jihadi propaganda in a way that allowed it to become much more universal in its message, which was adapted to the specificity of many cultural and civilisational backgrounds. In a certain sense, the campaign of the “Caliphate” had a truly global scope, not only in sense of scale, but also in terms of its content.

On one hand, it was the first truly multilingual campaign of Salafi extremists in history. With the exception of Arabic and English, being the most obvious choices, its media outlets also published pieces in French, Italian, German, Russian, Turkish, Urdu, Pashto, Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, Persian, and even in Hebrew and Polish.¹⁰⁴ Some even exploited sign language for deaf audiences.¹⁰⁵ This meant that IS was the first to find a proper solution to the classic problem experienced by terrorist organisations attempting to instil the ideology of jihad among Internet users. In the past most of their productions were either published in a few local and regional languages (Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Dari or Urdu) or – quite rarely – in English.¹⁰⁶ Considering the fact that only about a quarter of Internet users are English-speakers and only 5% speak Arabic,¹⁰⁷ their propaganda initiatives did not and could not reach the majority of online audiences due to obvious linguistic barriers (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4The inactive website of the Wilayat al-Qawkaz blog in Polish.

Source: Blogspot.com.

On the other hand, followers of al-Baghdadi showed great proficiency in exploiting canons of mass culture. Until the advent of the IS campaign, Salafi-jihadis exploited somewhat played out and intricate themes, mostly related to perplexing religious deliberations. Classic theological audio lectures of the most important radical Sunni leaders and “scholars,” such as Anwar al-Awlaki and Osama bin Laden,¹⁰⁸ were tiresome and anything but alluring for most youngsters, who are, by definition, the primary target of digital jihad. If these early productions of al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, Hamas, Hezbollah or the Taliban referred to mass culture, it was usually depicted in a negative manner, as a threat to the pure and true foundations of Islam. It was customarily depicted as concentrated on materialism, secularism, hedonism, individualism and, thus, permeated with moral decay.¹⁰⁹ Daesh decided to choose a different path. Obviously, it did not back away from harsh criticism of Western values. Its publications are full of arguments denouncing mass culture, which – according to its ideology – stands in direct opposition to the purity of Islam founded on the prophetic methodology. Nevertheless, while it targeted young Muslims from developed (not only Western) countries, it symbolically crossed the boundaries of classic jihadi propaganda by adopting some, selected elements of pop culture. Some of its canons, which were not directly related to moral or religious issues, were skilfully exploited in the form of memes, photographs, slogans and even videos. For instance, Daesh was known for using images of militants posing with jars of Nutella.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the group used references to popular brands of video games. Among others, it released banners advertising the Call of Jihad, which was a direct refence to the globally acclaimed Call of Duty First Person Shooter series. In this context, armed struggle against infidels was frequently compared to electronic entertainment.¹¹¹ Sometimes media outlets promoting Daesh appealed to its audiences’ sense of humour, which was a rare technique among Islamist terrorists. For instance, as emphasised by Semati and Szpunar, mujahidin recited poetry, posed with cats, and complained about the lack of specific types of candy.¹¹² The instrumental use of kittens was especially eye-catching, as they constitute a leading theme in many popular online communities.¹¹³ As Roy emphasised, the Islamic State’s propaganda even drew from popular culture canons related to “superheroes,” which might be alluring for some members of younger audiences. According to Roy, its narrative

plays on the image of movie and videogame superheroes. A typical cliché is that of the future hero whose destiny is not at first clear, as he leads an empty or too-normal life. And then he receives the call (taken in its religious sense of a sudden vocation, but with reference to the popular video game “Call of Duty”) and turns into an almost supernatural, omnipotent character. Not only does he save the suffering and passive ummah, but he also possesses great powers, including the power of life and death and sexual power.¹¹⁴

Finally, to advertise its cause, Daesh exploited the popularity of the World Cup in 2014 by posting an image of a decapitated head on Twitter with a statement “This is our football, it’s made of skin #WorldCup.”¹¹⁵ Thus, Daesh proved that it was not only following the latest trends in pop culture but that it could use them for furthering its agenda. The exploitation of humour, as well as global trends in mass communication was a valid method of moving away from their image as senseless savages, which effectively improved their chances of successfully recruiting children and teenagers.

Fourthly, as Stern and Berger rightly argued:

ISIS has made its name on the marketing of savagery, evolving its message to sell a strange but potent new blend of utopianism and appalling carnage to a worldwide audience, documenting a carefully manipulated version of its military campaigns, including its bloody 2014 rampage across much of Iraq and Syria. ISIS is using beheadings as a form of marketing, manipulation, and recruitment, determined to bring the public display of savagery into our lives, trying to instill in us a state of terror.¹¹⁶

This peculiar relationship between raw brutality and utopianism was also noted by Nance who argued that members of IS’s media outlets

make videogame-like combat videos of merciless mayhem and bathe them with sacred mission rhetoric purposed by God alone to the tune of nasheeds or religious chants and hymns. To a man (and sometimes woman) they use the phrase “In the name of God” to justify whatever horror they are about to reveal.

He labelled such videos as “thrill kill cult.”¹¹⁷

Clearly, the Islamic State’s media outlets demonstrated exceptional inventiveness in presenting the death of its enemies. Their recordings not only consisted of beheadings but also of immolations, crucifixions, stonings and shotgun executions. They showed people being dropped from rooftops or run over by tanks. Daesh did not shy away from anything that could draw additional attention of their target audience, such as the unprecedented use of children (including toddlers) and teenagers as executioners. Many pieces of IS’s propaganda were literally full of death and gore. Obviously, there was a clear motive behind this distressing danse macabre.¹¹⁸ On the one hand, Friis labelled it as a specific type of political practice.¹¹⁹ On the other, Micallef argued that they allowed Daesh “to shape and control its media exposure in the West.”¹²⁰ It was a means of moulding the public debate in Europe and the US, as well as an efficient tool of putting Western governments under public pressure. Nevertheless, these images were also a valid tool for inspiring and recruiting followers.¹²¹ Pictures of brutally killed enemies of the “Caliphate” served as proof of its efficiency and they were – in effect – an instrument for creating its triumphant image.

However, there was something more behind the “gore content.” Daesh did not just publish images and videos depicting the death of “infidels” (kuffar), many also consisted of the bodies of its fallen members. According to Soufan “propaganda across all media glorified gruesome images of the dead who had martyred themselves.”¹²² From a qualitative viewpoint, they were usually considerably less appalling, as they did not contain excessive amounts of blood, were less concentrated on depicting serious injuries and body mutilations, and were frequently artificially brightened with computer graphics software. This was due to the fact that they served the purpose of familiarising its followers with the final and desirable goal of all mujahidin, i.e. death in the service of the Islamic State.¹²³ Thus, from a certain viewpoint, savagery was also a valid means of inspiring members to tread in the footsteps of the “sacred” shuhada (martyrs).¹²⁴

Fifthly, IS exploited advanced strategies of distribution, which were founded on the deliberate and advanced use of the potential offered by the Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 environments. To begin with, it operated hundreds (if not thousands) of standalone websites and message boards from 2014. Webpages, frequently built with the use of popular CMSs (content management systems), served as sources of news on the Islamic State’s achievements and as repositories of propaganda releases. Both standalone websites and message boards frequently exploited names and addresses which had little to nothing in common with jihadism in order to avoid being detected by law enforcement agencies. They were also located in secondary folders, away from the root directory (home page), for the same purpose. Additionally, these websites were also known for exploiting unpopular TLDs (Top-Level Domains) such as: .ml, .biz, .host, .website, and .top. Nevertheless, common TLDs such as .com were exploited as well. Islamic State websites were primarily located in the surface web, but the dark web (accessible via The Onion Router) was also utilised.¹²⁵

While the Web 1.0 environment was clearly an important channel of distribution, the proliferation of IS propaganda was heavily founded on professional and extensive use of social networks.¹²⁶ According to Herrick, social media provided Islamic State with

a flexible and streamlined set of tools for creating and distributing videos, images, and other content […] Inherent network effects then magnify the reach and effect of this propaganda. Social media also provides ISIS with a valuable means of engaging in targeted recruitment campaigns and attempts to radicalise target populations.¹²⁷

Lister noted that social media has “not only attracted recruits and worldwide attention but also enabled potential recruits to coordinate their arrival in Syria or Iraq, and to secure tazkiyya.”¹²⁸ Daesh has been primarily known for exploiting the vast potential of Twitter, which is the most popular social network for political debates. According to the study of Morgan and Berger, just between September and December 2014 Islamic State supporters exploited at least 46,000 accounts on Twitter and about 20% of them primarily used English. On average, each ISIS-linked account had approximately 1,000 followers.¹²⁹ Just one user, based in the United Kingdom, was able to post 45,000 pro-Daesh messages on Twitter and Instagram in less than a year, which is on average approximately 125 posts per day.¹³⁰ The scope of IS propaganda on social media was proven by the activities of Twitter itself. Since mid-2015 to February 2016, the company banned as many as 125,000 pro-IS accounts. Between January and August 2016 an additional 235,000 were deleted.¹³¹ While IS activity on Twitter was generated by a relatively small number of dedicated Internet users,¹³² the scale of this campaign was unprecedented when compared to previous actions of other Salafi terrorist organisations.

In addition to Twitter, the group used a plethora of other popular and niche social networks, including Instagram, Facebook, Ask.fm, and even Vkontakte, the last of which was used to target Russian-speaking users.¹³³ As Stern and Berger emphasised, “ISIS social media operatives liked Facebook, with its rich media capabilities and multiple network options (such as fan pages and moderated groups that resembled the old forums), and they took a sophisticated approach to establishing its presence.”¹³⁴ Their activities on FB included fan pages of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Bilad al-Shaam. The group was also behind a Facebook campaign which exploited the slogan “We Are All ISIS.”¹³⁵ It also exploited less popular networks such as Quitter, Friendica and Diaspora.¹³⁶

Additionally, the “Caliphate” was also engaged in exploiting popular microblog platforms, such as Tumblr and Reddit, as well as the most popular video and audio hosting websites, such as YouTube, LiveLeak, SoundCloud, Medium.com, Dailymotion.com, and Bitchute.com.¹³⁷ Both individual users as well as official and unofficial media outlets frequently exploited these – and many others – webpages to proliferate productions promoting al-Baghdadi’s cause. IS also utilised blogosphere platforms such as Wordpress and BlogSpot. Finally, the group was heavily involved in disseminating its propaganda or communicating via a set of popular apps, such as Skype, Signal, Wickr, Surespot, Threema, Silent Circle, Viber, Whatsapp and SnapChat.¹³⁸ All these Web 2.0 communication channels were used by Daesh with great proficiency and the group showed determination in maintaining its networks. However, due to the increased efforts of the IT community and law enforcement agencies to curb digital jihad, for several years the Islamic State’s strategy of distribution has become increasingly focused on the utilisation of Telegram.¹³⁹

Since 2014 the organisation has also exploited a huge number of file sharing websites and pastebins. Daesh was known for utilising JustPaste.it to proliferate its text releases (e.g. statements, articles and essays), as well as to propagate its website addresses and Telegram channels. As for their use of file sharing websites, the following can be mentioned: Google Drive, Internet Archive (Archive.org), Scribd.com, Docdroid.net, En.calameo.com, Pdf-archive.org, Docgo.net, Archive.fo, and many others.¹⁴⁰

Finally, many Daesh productions were designed to draw the attention of the mass media, which was indirectly used to proliferate news on developments in IS’s propaganda. As Fishman accurately noted:

Most Islamic State propaganda is produced in Arabic, but English-language content tends to get far more attention in the international press – and it should be thought of as an effort to generate earned media. In other words, it is often constructed so that journalists will cover the content and amplify the Islamic State’s message.¹⁴¹

Moreover, the campaign utilised methods known from viral marketing by mixing technical proficiency with differentiated and up-to-date forms of online communication and shocking, gruesome scenes and images.¹⁴² The aforementioned, infamous executions of Western hostages in 2014 and 2015 went viral and constituted the most “popular” terrorist-produced content in history. This was even more visible considering the fact that Internet users created a plethora of content referring to IS’s beheadings, including memes and parodies.¹⁴³

Last, but not least, on a general level, the content of Islamic State’s productions was a mixture of both new and old themes,¹⁴⁴ which were customarily exploited in jihadi propaganda. According to Winter, IS’s brand was advertised with six core narratives, including: brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism.¹⁴⁵ Zelin identified six top types of messages: productions promoting military-related activities, governance, hisbah (control of the observance of Islamic values), da’wah (invitation to Islam), promotion of the “Caliphate,” and attacks against Muslims.¹⁴⁶ Macnair and Frank listed the following themes: brotherhood and inclusivity, depictions of violence, strength and victory, crimes of enemies, calls for recruitment and spiritual fulfilment.¹⁴⁷ Finally, according to Gertenstein et al. there were nine core narratives deployed:

winner’s image,

discrediting the competition (al-Qaeda, Taliban),

illegitimacy of political Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood),

sowing discord within enemy ranks (misinformation),

exploiting sectarian tensions,

the “Caliphate” as an Islamic utopia,

jihadist adventure and camaraderie,

driving a wedge between Muslims and the West,

joining the IS as a religious obligation.¹⁴⁸

Among the relatively new themes that distinguished IS from other Islamist terrorist organisations one can mention the strong emphasis placed on the legitimisation of the “Caliphate’s” statehood (including hisbah, Islamic punishments and the military achievements of the group), as well as relentless attacks against so called “jihadi claimants,” i.e. rival Islamist factions. Daesh continued its tradition, originating from the Zarqawi era, of exploiting sectarian tensions (especially in relation to Shias and Sufis), which is not so evident in the propaganda of other Salafi terrorist groups. Additionally, the cherry on top of all of the themes mentioned above was the “End Times” narrative, combined with millenarian bent.¹⁴⁹ As Weiss and Hassan argued, “ISIS relies on Islamic eschatology for legitimacy and mobilization […] ISIS has managed to turn outsider or enemy opinion of it into part of its world-historical struggle.”¹⁵⁰ According to McCants, this was a “big selling point with foreign fighters, who want to travel to the lands where the final battles of the apocalypse will take place.”¹⁵¹ However, it has to be noted that since the beginning of IS’s crisis around 2016, the group has become less and less interested in exploiting this particular topic.

Ingram was right when stating that:

the appeal of ISIS propaganda and its role in radicalising potential supporters cannot be adequately explained by pointing to any single factor. Rather its potency lies in the cumulative impact of a range of strategies and levers it deploys as part of its propaganda efforts.¹⁵²

Truly, it drew the world’s attention because it constituted a carefully considered conglomerate of features, which were either traditional or unusual for jihadi propaganda. Even these standard traits were brought by Daesh to a completely new level in terms of innovativeness and technical proficiency. Simply, its communication methods, as well as its means of distributing productions advertising al-Baghdadi’s group were well adapted to the specificity of online mass communication in the second decade of the 21st century, especially among youngsters, which were the most important target group for Daesh.

1.3Organisation of the Islamic State’s media arm

The roots of the propaganda machine of Daesh originated, as previously mentioned, from the times of az-Zarqawi, but it has evolved considerably over time. The “Caliphate’s” specific style and narrative were partially inherited from the experience gathered by AQI, Mujahideen Shura Council (Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin), and the Islamic State in Iraq. In April 2007 ISI established a Ministry of Media (diwan), which controlled all developments in the field of the online and offline propaganda of the group.¹⁵³

In this context, it is not a surprise that at the apogee of Islamic State prominence in 2014 and 2015, the group was capable of developing a constellation of professional structures that were responsible for the emergence of its “mediated phenomenon.”¹⁵⁴ According to Badar,

the propaganda machine at the forefront of IS artillery is comprised of a robust, multi-level organizational structure designed to exercise central control over the terrorist groups’ external messaging, while also harvesting important content from different geographic areas of its operations. Their media proficiency exists because of an extensive media infrastructure that allows it to produce high-quality, timely products.¹⁵⁵

From an organisational viewpoint, the Islamic State’s arm which was responsible for manipulating Internet users was composed of central and local media cells, and overseen by the Ministry of Central Media, which was inherited from the internal structure of ISI. This particular diwan was primarily tasked with exercising control over all propaganda activities of the group, both internally and externally. It was also responsible for acquiring financial resources to maintain the media machine, as well as to pay salaries to its operatives.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, as Milton’s report suggests, the Ministry

has gone to great lengths to centralize the propaganda production and dissemination process. It has done so through written guidance, an evaluation system for both bureaus and products, and a quality-control process that provides near real-time interaction between itself and the local media bureaus.¹⁵⁷

Interestingly, it was also extremely interested in information security, due to possible leaks caused by the propaganda productions, which could be used to gather intelligence.¹⁵⁸

Islamic State’s digital jihadist production was highly organised. Media officers were skilled professionals and received higher salary than frontline fighters.¹⁵⁹ According to Winter’s study, at the peak of its power in 2015, there were seven core media offices directly subjected to Islamic State’s leadership: al-Furqan Foundation (Mu’assasat al-Furqan), al-I’tisam Foundation (Mu’assasat al-I’tisam), al-Hayat Media Center (Markaz al-Hayat l-il-l’lam), Ajnad Foundation (Mu’assasat Ajnad), al-Bayan Radio (Idha’at al-Bayan), al-Himma Library (Maktabat al-Himma) and A’maq News Agency (Wakalat A’maq al-Akhbariyya). Their actions were supported by around 35 local media offices, including: Khurasan Province Media Office (Wilayat Khurasan), responsible for Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Aba Foundation (Mu’assasat al-Aba-Tunus) in Tunisia, nine offices in Syria, ten in Iraq, three in Libya, as well as six in Yemen. Dedicated media units also operated in Algeria, Western Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Caucasus and Egypt.¹⁶⁰ However, according to Milton, al-Naba was also considered to be a central media entity of Daesh, which was responsible for releasing a newsletter in Arabic.¹⁶¹ This was confirmed by the Structure of the Caliphate video published in 2016, which included al-Naba’s logo in the core of “Diwan of Media’s” structure, besides al-Bayan Radio and the al-Furqan Foundation (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5Screenshot of the Structure of the Caliphate video, published by the al-Furqan Foundation.

Source: Jihadology.net.

The distribution of tasks between these groups was not entirely clear,¹⁶² but their general specialisation was more or less visible. The first prominent centre which was established and remained active under the “Caliphate” was the previously mentioned al-Furqan Foundation (also described in Anglophone literature as the al-Furqan Media Foundation or al-Furqan Media). As Nance noted, “with hundreds of releases, before the group called itself ISIS, al-Furqan was the granddaddy media organization.”¹⁶³ From 2012 this office was responsible for publishing a series of increasingly compelling videos, including the previously mentioned Clanging of the Swords. Later the group produced a plethora of other, usually high-quality audiovisuals, including videos promoting the statehood ambitions of the “Caliphate,” as well as executions. Between 2014 and 2015 the office released multiple recordings containing gruesome images of the enemies of Daesh being brutally murdered. They included, for instance, the immolation of a Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasabeh, the execution of Muhammad Musallam conducted by a child, as well as beheadings of Syrian soldiers and Christians from Maghreb.¹⁶⁴ The office was also responsible for publishing the statements of the Islamic State’s leaders, proving that its members were close to the “Caliph.” Thus, al-Furqan was primarily known for producing high-profile video and audio releases. They were distributed, among other methods, via a standalone Twitter account.¹⁶⁵

The second cell that received widespread attention from the worldwide media and Internet users was the al-Hayat Media Center. It was established in 2014 and was tasked with producing propaganda targeting non-Arabic audiences, including materials in English, German, Russian and French. Al-Hayat was known for elaborating the most technically exquisite productions promoting al-Baghdadi’s organisation.¹⁶⁶ In effect, it was deemed to be responsible for the “Hollywood style” of the online campaign.¹⁶⁷ It not only released videos but also pieces of text propaganda, such as its flagship magazines – Dabiq and Rumiyah – as well as numerous periodicals targeting more specific audiences: Konstantiniyye, Istok or Dar al-Islam.¹⁶⁸ Similarly to al-Furqan, this cell also owned a separate Twitter account.¹⁶⁹

In contrast to al-Hayat and al-Furqan, the tasks of the Ajnad Foundation were much more limited. This bureau was responsible, strictly, for producing audio content, in the form of anashids, which usually glorified the Islamic State’s martyrs, advertised the proclamation of the “Caliphate,” as well as encouraged audiences to embark on the path of jihad. It released the following chants: Oh Soldiers of Truth; Let’s Go; Soon, Soon; My Brother, Inform My Companions; Oh My Lord I Ask You; We Have The Swords; Alhamdullilah; In the Way of God; This Brotherhood; Walk Towards the Light and Oh Hearts of Iron.¹⁷⁰Ajnad was responsible for producing two of the most recognised Islamic hymns, which are sometimes even considered to be IS’s unofficial anthems: My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared and Clanging of the Swords.¹⁷¹ The group was also engaged in the production of popular recitations of the Quran.¹⁷²

Similarly, al-I’tisam Foundation’s tasks were limited to messages recorded from inside Islamic State territories. The apogee of this cell’s activity was between 2013 and 2015.¹⁷³ According to El Araby, it was primarily focused on producing war propaganda videos that showcased the triumphs and efficiency of the mujahidin on various fronts. Its releases focused, among others, on battles against Shias in Iraq (including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and against Kurdish troops. Furthermore, it was responsible for elaborating recruitment videos targeting various groups of audiences, including Uzbeks (Follow the Caravan), Britons (Message of a Jihadist) and Jordanians (A Message to Jordan).¹⁷⁴

Radio al-Bayan was the main radio network of the self-proclaimed “Caliphate” and it was established after the conquest of Mosul in summer 2014. Therefore, aside from the Ajnad Foundation, it was the primary source of the group’s audio propaganda. Initially it broadcasted 9 hours a day. It aired daily bulletins and dispatches from the frontlines in multiple languages, including Arabic, English, French, Russian and Kurdish. The content of the radio broadcasts also included religious anashids, IS’s decrees, religious lectures, as well as news from the provinces of the organisation. This radio station operated both online (among others, via al-Sawarim and Haqq websites, as well as through its profile at Internet Archive) and offline.¹⁷⁵

The Al-Himma Library, as its name suggests, was the official publishing house of the “Caliphate” tasked with providing da’wah literature.¹⁷⁶ It distributed e-books and pamphlets discussing various, usually religion-related, issues.¹⁷⁷ Interestingly, the office not only released its own, original publications but was also engaged in elaborating new editions of older jihadi pieces, such as Thirty Suggestions for Islamic State Emirs and Soldiers, which was released in November 2010.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Al-Himma Library launched various instructions for mujahidin, such as the Media Operative. You are also a mujahid, which discussed the propaganda doctrine of Daesh.¹⁷⁹

Finally, the A’maq News Agency is considered to be the “press agency” of the “Caliphate” and it was primarily responsible for issuing news and statements to online audiences, including terrorist attacks and conducted military operations.¹⁸⁰ It released propaganda both in written and audiovisual forms. According to available data, A’maq was considered to be a crucial element of the media branch of Daesh. Milton’s study indicates that each local media office was encouraged to cooperate with the news agency. Results of their monthly evaluations were also dependent on the efficiency of their collaboration with A’maq.¹⁸¹ This cell disseminated its releases both through a variety of Telegram channels, as well as through standalone websites, such as Akhbar al-Muslimin. Its announcements were also easily accessible on Twitter, not only due to the activities of the followers of Daesh, but also via pundits and experts who frequently share its claims of responsibility for terrorist attacks. Interestingly, while the group primarily published in Arabic, it also sometimes exploited English, German, French, Russian and even Italian.¹⁸²

The structure and modus operandi of the media branch of IS obviously changed over time due to the deteriorating strategic situation of the group. Both central and local media offices, which produced a plethora of different forms of propaganda, were heavily influenced by the changes in the territorial organisation of the “Caliphate.” In effect, over time many bureaus ceased to operate, due to the series of losses experienced by the group. For instance, al-I’tisam Foundation became inactive in 2016.¹⁸³ The same happened with the most crucial channels of distribution exploited by the Islamic State’s media branch, such as the Haqq and al-Ansar websites, as well as profiles on social media.¹⁸⁴

As of 2014 the group has also been supported by a constantly changing constellation of online groups, which formally were not a part of the organisation, nor funded by its leadership. Nevertheless, due to ideological proximity and the universal appeal of the “Caliphate,” radicalised Internet users formed specialised, unofficial online “centres” or “media foundations” that became engaged either in the independent production of pro-Islamic State’s materials or in the redistribution of its official releases in cyberspace (Table 1.1). Among the most active groups in recent years one can mention the al-Battar Foundation, Ahlut-Tawhid Publications and al-Furat Media Foundation. The first was known for publishing different formats of propaganda, including audiovisuals, audio productions and visual productions, which were released, among others, via the Blogspot platform. This cell was also responsible for posting standalone articles promoting the “Caliphate’s” ideology.¹⁸⁵ The second was specialised in releasing pieces of written propaganda, including reproductions of jihadi e-books in English, as well as the From Dabiq to Rome bulletin.¹⁸⁶ The Al-Furat Media Foundation was established in July 2015 in the Caucasus and was initially specialised in producing pro-IS propaganda in Russian. However, over time, it expanded its activities to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Eastern and Southern Asia. In effect, the group produced audiovisual and audio pieces (anashids) in Arabic, English and Pashto.¹⁸⁷

Table 1.1 Selection of the unofficial propaganda centres affiliated to the Islamic State between 2014 and 2019

Name | Specialisation | Name | Specialisation
al-Furat Media Foundation | Audiovisual, audio and visual propaganda in Russian, Arabic, English and Pashto | al-Qarar | Local news agency affiliated with followers of IS in Kashmir
Ahlut-Tawhid Publications | Written propaganda in English, including e-books and a bulletin From Dabiq to Rome | al-Muhajireen Foundation | Written and visual propaganda, responsible for operating a standalone website issuing statements for mujahidin
Al-Battar Foundation | High-quality audiovisual, audio and visual propaganda related to events in Syria, Sinai, Khurasan and West Africa | Ansar al-Khilafah fi Italia | Group of IS supporters releasing Italian translations of IS written propaganda
Al-Dhakhair Foundation | Visual propaganda, including posters containing threats related to President Donald Trump | Centre Médiatique an-Nur | Written propaganda in French, including pamphlets and religious essays
Al-Wafa Foundation | Visual and written propaganda, including posters on lone-wolf terrorism, calls for terrorist attacks and religious e-books | Afaaq Electronic Foundation | Cybersecurity instructions
Remah Foundation | Audiovisual propaganda in Arabic and English, active since 2017 | al-Faqeer Media | Visual propaganda, including posters containing threats to the West
al-Yaqin Foundation | Audiovisual propaganda in Arabic and English | Media Front to Support the Islamic State | Written propaganda in the form of translations of IS materials, active on Twitter
Muharir al-Ansar | Visual propaganda, such as posters containing threats to the West, both in English and Arabic | Bunat al-Amjad Media | Visual propaganda in the form of posters
Al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation | Audiovisual, written and visual propaganda, including posters containing calls to conduct terrorist attacks in the West, animated videos for children and magazines (Shahab al-Khilafah and Ashbal al-Ummah) | Al-Fateh Media | Visual propaganda
Mu’ta Agency | Press agency releasing visual and written propaganda on Telegram, including claims of responsibility in Arabic and English | Al-Wafa Media Foundation | Visual propaganda, including photographs
Ashhad Foundation | Audiovisual, visual and written propaganda, e.g. in the form of brochures | Khattab Media Foundation | Group active on social media, responsible for publishing pieces supporting violent jihad
Muntasir Media | Audiovisual and visual propaganda, including calls for terrorist attacks in the West | Al-Dar al-Sunni Foundation | Written propaganda in the form of booklets and magazines (“Al-Anfal”)

Sources: ISIS’s media network: Developments in 2018 and future courses of action (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019); ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018); Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s online propaganda: vanishing or resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018); “Tracking Terrorism,” www.trackingterrorism.org; “Jihad Intel,” jihadintel.meforum.org; Bennett Clifford and Helen Powell, Encrypted Extremism. Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State Ecosystem on Telegram (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2019).

It ought to be emphasised that these groups were usually ephemeral in nature. While some of them, including the cases mentioned above, remained active for years, others produced only several propaganda pieces and were quickly replaced by others. Interestingly, aside from unofficial propaganda cells, there were also pro-Daesh groups, which were tasked with coordinating the cyberwarfare efforts of the “Caliphate”: Sons of the Caliphate Army, the Caliphate Cyber Army, the Ghost Caliphate Section, and the Kalashnikov E-security Team. They were merged into the United Cyber Caliphate in 2016, but it is uncertain whether this group was officially affiliated to the IS. It was accused of being responsible for cyber-attacks against Twitter accounts, as well as for numerous defacements of websites.¹⁸⁸

1.4From apex to crisis: Islamic State’s online propaganda in the post-territorial phase

At the end of 2015, the Islamic State started to face a rising wave of military challenges in the lands of Iraq and Syria. The activities of the Syrian, Kurdish, and Iraqi forces, combined with support from the US-led coalition and Russian airstrikes proved to be an extremely difficult obstacle to overcome for troops faithful to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.¹⁸⁹ Around this time, the first manifestations of a crisis within its prolific propaganda machine occurred. However, at first glance, no negative changes were noticeable and some innovations in its online campaign were also introduced. The technical quality of some video series was visibly improved, especially in terms of special effects and CGI (computer-generated imagery). The Islamic State started to exploit drone footage more frequently, mostly as a means of advertising its SVBIED attacks against disbelievers. It also introduced a series of videos and photo reportages, which documented assassinations conducted by members of Daesh in the first-person perspective. This means of presenting violent actions against kuffar was probably borrowed from video games, namely those from the first-person shooter genre, which effectively increased the “immersion” of younger audiences. In 2016, the group also released the aforementioned Huroof mobile application which was dedicated to indoctrinating children (Figure 1.6).¹⁹⁰

Figure 1.6Advertisement of the Huroof application.

Source: Rumiyah 2 (2016), 31.

In spite of these certain improvements, a number of weaknesses started to become visible as well. Initially, some of the most important, high-profile audiovisuals produced by the group’s official and unofficial media cells consisted of surprising mistakes or instances of downgrading, in terms of language used, editing, montage, and post-production. Secondly, Daesh started to reuse content elaborated at the apogee of IS’s power much more frequently. This tendency clearly indicated that they were encountering growing challenges in terms of recording new, alluring videos in high definition. This was visible, for example, in the video on anti-tank warfare featuring John Cantlie that was released in December 2016, as it utilised fragments of battles recorded more than two years earlier. Thirdly, the campaign started to be more focused on the forms of online propaganda which were easier and quicker to produce. This tendency proved to be especially noticeable from the initiation of the Mosul operation at the end of 2016. Islamic State’s media arm started to produce less and less sophisticated productions which were replaced by simpler formats of propaganda.¹⁹¹ Finally, there was a significant drop in terms of the Islamic State’s propaganda output. According to Milton’s study conducted between January 2015 and August 2016 the monthly productions of visual content experienced an almost four-fold decrease in just 12 months, from 761 in August 2015 to 194 in August 2016.¹⁹²

These trends continued in the subsequent years, which corresponded with the deteriorating strategic situation of the “Caliphate” and a series of defeats suffered in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. By early 2016, the US-led coalition alone damaged and destroyed more than 21,500 targets owned by this terrorist organisation. By the end of 2015 only, airstrikes had killed around 20,000 militants.¹⁹³ In 2016 the Islamic State lost Sirte in Maghreb, as well as Ramadi and Manbij in the Middle East.¹⁹⁴ As Jones et al. reported, it had lost 45,377 km² and 2.5 million inhabitants in Iraq and Syria by early 2017, which constituted a 56% decline in its Syrian population and an 83% decline in its Iraqi population, when compared to its peak in the autumn of 2014. At this time, the group had lost almost all of its territories in Libya, 75% in Nigeria and 87% in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁵ In 2017 Daesh lost its two most important hubs – Raqqa and Mosul – which constituted a major breakthrough in the war. This also meant, as Othman Alkaff and Mahzam stressed, that the group had lost its main sources of revenue.¹⁹⁶ Its last remaining pocket of resistance in Syria – the town of Baghuz Faqani – was seized in March 2019.¹⁹⁷

The fall of the “Caliphate” as a territorial organisation had a critical impact on its online propaganda capabilities, which – for years – were supported by its vast financial resources and logistical backbone. Due to rapidly decreasing revenue, the salaries of IS militants dropped by 50% by early 2016.¹⁹⁸ It is likely that the same happened to members of its media operations. Aside from the shortfalls in terms of infrastructure and finances, the Islamic State’s propaganda machine suffered serious losses among its most prominent and skilled members. Accessible data suggests that the US-led coalition since, at least, 2016 specifically targeted members of Daesh who played crucial roles in its digital jihadist campaign. Among others, it managed to kill two of the key figures of its media arm: Daesh’s spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani) and Wa’il Adil Hasan Salman al-Fayad (also known as Abu Muhammad al-Furqan), who was the minister of media and the mastermind behind the online and offline propaganda efforts of the group. Moreover, airstrikes killed Ibrahim al-Ansari (responsible for instructions for homegrown terrorists and the recruitment of foreign fighters), Mohammad Emwazi (the aforementioned Jihadi John) and Ahmad Abousamra (Abu Sulayman ash-Shami, co-founder and editor of Dabiq and Rumiyah). Casualties also included Abu Khabbab al-Masri (a member of IS’s methodological committee and a close collaborator of Abu Muhammad al-Furqan), Denis Cuspert (Abu Talha al-Almani, aforementioned IS celebrity and anashid producer), Amr al-Absi (head of IS’s Media Council) and Shaker Wahib al-Fahdawi (warlord and a “star” in many productions of the “Caliphate”).¹⁹⁹ Islamic State’s media branch announced the “martyrdom” of 91 media operatives in just three years, between the second quarter of 2015 and the second quarter of 2018.²⁰⁰ In effect, the group lost a great part of its online propaganda professionals.

Another factor which impaired IS’s capabilities on the Web was related to countermeasures undertaken by law enforcement agencies and leading Internet companies. Due to the huge popularity and dynamic proliferation of its productions, from the end of 2014 the world’s top Internet corporations steadily increased their efforts to curb jihadi propaganda in the surface web. For instance, between mid-2015 and February 2016 Twitter alone removed 125,000 Islamist extremist accounts, most of which were related to Daesh. Between January and August 2016, 235,000 profiles were banned.²⁰¹ In order to detect and delete these releases more efficiently Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and YouTube formed a Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism in June 2017, which works in close partnership with, for example, the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate and the Tech Against Terrorism initiative. In time, GIFCT proved to be the cornerstone of efficient international efforts to combat the Islamic State’s presence on the surface web. It has developed and exploited a number of advanced technological solutions to facilitate and automatise the identification of terrorist-related content. Thanks to this, Twitter, for instance, managed to suspend more than 274,000 accounts related to the promotion of terrorism between July 2017 and December 2017, but not all of them were related to IS.²⁰²

Likewise, Western governments launched countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes in 2015, which aimed to hinder the narratives employed by Daesh and other VEOs. For example, the United Kingdom established the Commonwealth Countering Violent Extremism Unit, which works under the auspices of the secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations. Similar initiatives were conducted in the United States, where the Department of Homeland Security created a CVE task force. Moreover, in May 2016 the US Department of State and USAID released a joint strategy on countering violent extremism.²⁰³ This corresponded with the increased efficiency of law enforcement in spotting and curbing the online presence of Daesh, such as standalone websites, blogs, and message boards. In effect, since 2017 it has become increasingly difficult to find instances of the Islamic State’s presence in the Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 environments.²⁰⁴

Finally, Internet communities took an active part in campaigns targeting extremist narratives related to al-Baghdadi’s organisation. Since 2014, more and more content has been produced independently by electronic media and Internet users, which attempted either to undermine the argumentation of Daesh or – more frequently – to ridicule it. For instance, in April 2016 Vice News uploaded a video on YouTube, which was recorded by the headcam of a fallen Islamic State’s militant. It presented pure chaos among mujahidin during the battle against the Kurdish troops. This audiovisual, entitled What It’s Really Like to Fight for the Islamic State, stood in direct opposition to the “official” propaganda of Daesh, which presented its militants as brave and skilled. By August 2019 it had been viewed more than 23 million times, which proves the huge popularity of this piece which, in fact, ridiculed IS’s military efforts.²⁰⁵

In effect, the lack of developed logistics and experienced professionals behind the online campaign of Daesh, combined with much more hostile online environments, resulted in its output and quality being significantly reduced.²⁰⁶ The aforementioned trends, which were noticeable from 2016, intensified over time. In 2018 the production of the “Caliphate’s” propaganda proved to be just a fraction of its former self from the apogee of its capabilities in 2014 and 2015. According to Zelin’s study, during a one-week period in April 2015, Islamic State was able to release 24 new videos. In contrast, it took one month for a similar number of new audiovisuals to be published between September and October 2018.²⁰⁷ This suggests that the output of IS’s media bureaus in terms of videos produced significantly decreased after more than three years. This trend was confirmed by Nanninga; according to his research, “the average number of videos released per month decreased from more than 70 in the first half of 2015 to less than four in the first half of 2018.”²⁰⁸ Other, more indicative data provided by Milton demonstrate that there was a 94% drop in the visual propaganda output of Daesh between August 2015 and June 2018 – from 754 to 44 new releases per month.²⁰⁹

Furthermore, high-quality and carefully thought-out productions were less and less visible from 2017. The group ceased to publish flagship magazines in English. The last issue of Rumiyah was released in September 2017. The only prominent periodical, which remained unaffected by the crisis and was regularly published since the apogee of IS’s campaign was the Arabic newsletter al-Naba. Execution videos of comparable quality and coverage to A Message to America were nowhere to be seen. The same trend was visible with dedicated music videos or high quality “documentaries.” Instead, the group’s online activity became more focused on compilations and battle videos, bearing little to no signs of advanced post-production. Islamic State’s increasingly incapacitated media arm started to visibly prefer the types of propaganda which were the easiest and quickest to produce without support from the non-existent logistical backbone of the territorial organisation. In effect, many of the features, which were responsible for the uniqueness of its digital jihad, slowly faded away and disappeared.²¹⁰ This is proven by the fact that since 2017 there have been very few productions of Daesh which have drawn the increased attention of the worldwide public. Among the very few that did, one can mention a video depicting the death of the US special forces operators in Niger, which was released by the group in March 2018.²¹¹ Another was al-Baghdadi’s video statement released in April 2019.²¹² Both, however, sparked great interest from mass media and Internet users, not because of their exquisite quality but due to other factors at play. The first video was, in fact, recorded by the headcams of the fallen US soldiers and released online by Daesh. This was the very reason why it went viral. The second production was met with increased attention because the self-proclaimed “Caliph” made an appearance for the first time since 2014. It was obviously a means of damage control in the face of a morale crisis among IS ranks. Both releases lacked, however, sophisticated post-production or directing. Even the most advanced cells, such as the al-Hayat Media Center, were much more inclined to exploit recordings and CGI elaborated at the apogee of the “Caliphate’s” power.²¹³ For instance, a series called Harvest of the Soldiers, which was published regularly between August 2018 and January 2019, and focused on presenting statistics of IS’s achievements in one-week intervals,²¹⁴ exploited the same set of special effects in every edition (Figure 1.7). This clearly meant that al-Hayat lacked the necessary human or technical resources to create more interesting and differentiated pieces. Finally, propaganda published in languages other than Arabic and (to a lesser extent) English proved to be much more sporadic than a couple of years prior. This was possibly related to serious casualties among IS’s ranks and to a great drop in the inflow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq,²¹⁵ effectively cutting the access of its media arm to a wide pool of capable translators.

Figure 1.7Screenshot from the Harvest of the Soldiers #5 video, released by the al-Hayat Media Center in August 2018.

Source: Jihadology.net.

The themes exploited in the visual releases became predominantly focused on military issues. Non-military productions constituted only about 15% of the output in the first quarter of 2018. Moreover, the group’s videos increased in length when compared to those from early 2015. Their average duration between the first five months of 2015 and 2018 grew from a bit more than six minutes to 16 minutes 30 seconds. According to Milton, “this may suggest a decreased ability to create narrowly tailored and targeted videos.”²¹⁶

To summarise, not only did the output and quality of the online propaganda of Daesh plunge but it also received much less attention from Internet communities. The vast logistical backbone of the Islamic State’s media branch, as well as its “winner’s image,” fuelling the interest of potential recruits, were gone by 2018. This does not mean, however, that the group’s online campaign ceased to pose a significant threat to international security, as it did adapt to these new determinants discussed above. There were generally three ways in which its propaganda branch responded to the crisis.

Firstly, while the Islamic State suffered from the increased awareness of Internet companies and law enforcement of digital jihad, resulting in quicker detection of its productions on the surface web, it shifted to exploiting the previously mentioned Telegram encrypted communication software as its primary means of propaganda distribution.²¹⁷ As Clifford and Powell argued, it “remains vital to the organization’s ecosystem of communications. The platform’s functional affordances, paired with relatively lax enforcement of Telegram’s terms of service (ToS), offers IS sympathizers a user-friendly medium to engage with like-minded supporters and content.”²¹⁸ Their study identified 636 pro-IS Telegram channels, which were active between June 1, 2017 and October 24, 2018.²¹⁹ Moreover, between June and December 2017, 98 channels on this platform disseminated instructional materials.²²⁰ This data indicates how important this application has become for the Islamic State. In this context, as Shehabat, Mitew and Alzoubi emphasised, the emergence of end-to-end encrypted communication software, such as Telegram, but also Kik, Surespot, and WhatsApp, “have allowed ISIS, as well as other groups, to establish and successfully leverage a secure medium of communication.”²²¹ Such a tendency also had one more important implication. IS’s official media cells, such as al-Hayat Media Center, A’maq News Agency, or al-Furqan Media gradually resigned from maintaining a significant presence on the Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 environments, in the form of standalone websites or dedicated accounts on social networks and hosting websites. Instead, they operated their channels on Telegram, which were accessible for the group’s followers.

Secondly, the gap left by the official media outlets of Daesh was quickly filled by a plethora of semi-official and unofficial groups, such as the aforementioned al-Muhajireen Foundation, Centre Médiatique an-Nur, Ahlut-Tawhid Publications, Ansar al-Khilafa fi Italia, al-Faqeer Media, al-Battar Media Foundation or Afaaq Electronic Foundation. While most of them also operated on Telegram, many have remained very active on the surface web, producing their own content and redistributing official releases of the Islamic State. For instance, the Afaaq Electronic Foundation proliferated bulletins consisting of cyber security manuals for mujahidin, while Centre Médiatique an-Nur published essays on the Internet Archive in French. Ahlut-Tawhid Publications in 2018 operated a Ghuraba website (Figure 1.8) and maintained an active, online presence in various Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 hotspots, including Bitchute.com, Medium.com and the popular microblog platform Reddit. The Al-Muhajireen Foundation operated a standalone website, which consisted of statements and messages to mujahidin in several languages, including English, Arabic, Persian, Dutch, Turkish, and German. Many of these groups kept a low-profile for a long time and benefited from a lack of awareness of Internet companies and law enforcement. Thus, their releases and online profiles were relatively more long-lasting, when compared to, for example, the productions of the al-Hayat Media Center.²²²

Figure 1.8Ahlut-Tawhid Publications’ al-Ghuraba website, state as of June 22, 2018.

Source: Wayback Machine.

Thirdly, the core of the “Caliphate’s” narration was slightly modified to meet the new circumstances. The group started to argue that it is in a state of a long war of attrition against the disbelievers, and that territorial control is not necessarily crucial at the time, which stood in direct opposition to the messages it conveyed in 2014. Its media releases started to be more inclined to present IS’s terrorist and militant activities as an insurgency campaign and proof that it cannot be defeated, as it maintained a global appeal. Its supporters were encouraged to join IS in more easily accessible provinces than Iraq and Syria, such as the Khurasan region. Ordinary life under the “Caliphate” ceased to be an important theme.²²³ Moreover, according to Nanninga, video propaganda in this phase of decline heavily exploited nostalgia over the Islamic State’s apogee, and presented current hardships experienced by mujahidin as a trial from God, as well as a means of purification and a promise of imminent victory.²²⁴ All these themes were incorporated into the classic, core narratives used by Daesh.

Effectively, Islamic State’s propaganda capabilities in the post-territorial phase were seriously maimed, but not entirely crippled. The group failed to maintain the same quality and quantity of productions when compared to its peak, but it still released some of the best digital jihadist materials. Its official media cells received valuable help from a plethora of unofficial groups, which basically took over part of the burden of disseminating propaganda in the surface web. Thus, the online campaign of Daesh in the post-Raqqa period mutated, but it was far from over.

Notes

1 Barry M. Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 39, 5 (2009), 22–23.

2 See Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Financing and the Internet,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, 4 (2010); Murat Dogrul, Adil Aslan, and Eyyup Celik, “Developing and International Cooperation on Cyber Defense and Deterrence against Cyber Terrorism,” in 2011 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict, edited by Christian Czosseck, Enn Tyugu, and Thomas Wingfield (Tallinn: CCD COE Publications, 2011); Richard Barrett, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).

3 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 161.

4 Ibid., 163.

5 Philipp Holtmann, “Virtual Jihad: A Real Danger,” in New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012), 9–10.

6 Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age. E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 1–2, 33–34.

7 Stanisław Kosmynka, “Cyberdżihad. Wykorzystanie internetu przez współczesny terroryzm islamistyczny,” in Cyberterroryzm zagrożeniem XXI wieku, edited by Andrzej Podraza, Paweł Potakowski, and Krzysztof Wiak (Warszawa: Difin, 2013), 109–113.

8 Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, (2006), 410–411; Stanisław Kosmynka, “Cyberdżihad. Wykorzystanie internetu przez współczesny terroryzm islamistyczny,” in Cyberterroryzm zagrożeniem XXI wieku, edited by Andrzej Podraza, Paweł Potakowski, and Krzysztof Wiak (Warszawa: Difin, 2013), 109–113.

9 In 1998 they founded an Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade. On the relationship of its leaders with al-Qaeda see Caleb Weiss, “Transformative Networks: The Case of North Caucasian and Central Asian Jihadist Networks,” The Illini Journal of International Security 3, (2017), 14.

10 Philipp Holtmann, “Virtual Jihad: A Real Danger,” in New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012), 10.

11 See Stanisław Kosmynka, “Cyberdżihad. Wykorzystanie internetu przez współczesny terroryzm islamistyczny,” in Cyberterroryzm zagrożeniem XXI wieku. Perspektywa politologiczna i prawna, edited by Andrzej Podraza et al. (Warszawa: Difin, 2013), 105; Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 127; Miron Lakomy, “The Evolution of Cyber Jihad: From al-Qaeda to the Islamic State,” Міжнародні відносини Серія ‘Політичні науки 13, (2017).

12 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 116.

13 Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net. How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 116, March (2004), 2.

14 “43 Russian Soldiers Killed in Zhani-Vedeno Ambush,” Funker530, June 12, 2018, https://www.funker530.com/zhani-vedeno-ambush/.

15 The first cases of decapitations in the Post-Cold War era by Islamist extremists were reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992–1995 war. However, these brutal executions of Croat and Serb belligerents and non-belligerents were not part of the digital jihad, as they were not distributed via the Internet. See Joseph V. Micallef, Islamic State. Its History, Ideology & Challenge (Vancouver/Portland: Antioch Downs Press, 2015), 89.

16 Ruslan Musayev, “Chechnya Shows Slain Hostage Video,” APNews, December 10, 1998, https://www.apnews.com/115075247a4b2b0cf2b72a629ecf7652.

17 Martin Harrow, “Video-recorded Decapitations – A Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread,” DIIS Working Paper 08, (2011), 8.

18 Anne Stenersen, “Gathering Data Through Court Cases: Implications For Understanding Visual Messaging,” in Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment, edited by Carol K. Winkler and Cori E. Dauber (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 45–46.

19 Interestingly, as Burke noted, in the 1990s and prior to 9/11, Osama bin Laden was much more interested in exploiting traditional media, but with very limited effects. Among others, he issued a number of communiqués, which were sent to Al Jazeera. Of course, traditional media proved to also be useful after September 11th, but since that moment the Internet proved to be much more important for the communication strategy employed by al-Qaeda. See Jason Burke, The New Threat. The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy (New York/London: The New Press, 2015), 54–55.

20 Azeem Ibrahim, Radical Origins. Why We Are Losing The Battle Against Islamic Extremism – And How To Turn The Tide (New York/London: Pegasus Books, 2017), 201.

21 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 136.

22 See Adam Jacobs, “‘The True Ugly Face of America’: Al Qaeda’s Propaganda Use of Guantanamo Bay and Implications for US Counterterrorism,” SSRN, February 6, 2015, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 2,614,056; “Al Qaeda and ISIS Use Of Guantanamo Bay Prison in Propaganda and Materials,” Human Rights First Brief, September (2017); George R. Mastroianni, “Looking Back: Understanding Abu Ghraib,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College 43, 2 (2013); Avery F. Gordon, “Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror,” Race & Class 48, 1 (2006).

23 Douglas Keller, “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation,” Critical Discourse Studies 1, 1 (2004).

24 “Internet Growth Statistics,” Internet World Stats, https://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm.

25 See San Murugesan, “Understanding Web 2.0,” IT Professional 9, 4 (2007); John G. Breslin, Alexandre Passant, and Stefan Decker, “Introduction to the Social Web (Web 2.0, Social Media, Social Software),” in The Social Semantic Web, edited by John G. Breslin, Alexandre Passant, and Stefan Decker (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 21–44.

26 Simeon Edosomwan et al., “The History of Social Media and Its Impact on Business,” The Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship 16, 3 (2011); Karen McIntyre, “The Evolution of Social Media from 1969 to 2013: A Change in Competition and a Trend Toward Complementary, Niche Sites,” The Journal of Social Media in Society 3, 2 (2014).

27 See Nico Prucha, “Jihad via Bluetooth: Al-Qa’ida’s Mobile Phone Campaign,” in New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012).

28 Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, (2006), 418.

29 Javier Jordán, Manurel R. Torres and Edward Jeep, “The Propaganda of al Qaeda: A Key Dimension of Their Strategy,” European Consortium For Political Research, ECPR Joint Sessions, April 14–19, 2005, https://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID = 13,602&EventID = 50, 4.

30 See more in: John M. Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 236, (2010), 6; Manuel R. Torres-Soriano, “Between the Pen and the Sword: The Global Islamic Media Front in the West,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, (2012), 770–771; Gabriel Weimann, “New Terrorism and New Media,” Wilson Center Research Series 2, (2014), 6.

31 Taghut (plural tawaghit) means “idol” in Arabic. This term has been used by radical Islamists to denounce Muslim rulers, by claiming that they make themselves objects of worship, which should only strictly apply to Allah. See Giora Eliraz, “The Aceh-based Militant Network: A Trigger for a View into the Insightful Complex of Conceptual and Historical Links,” RSIS Working Paper, 214 (2010), 3.

32 Alex P. Schmid, “Al-Qaeda’s ‘Single Narrative’ and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge,” ICCT Research Paper, (2014), 6–7. See also: Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008), chap. 2.

33 See Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning’,” Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly 33, 1 (2003), 113; Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net. How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 116, March (2004), 11; David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Los Angeles/Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 2005),169–208.

34 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 114.

35 Shawn Powers and Matt Armstrong, “Conceptualizing Radicalizing in a Market for Loyalties,” in Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment, edited by Carol K. Winkler and Cori E. Dauber (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 166.

36 Rosanna E. Guadagno, Adam Lankford, Nicole L. Muscanell, Bradley M. Okdie, and Debra M. McCallum, “Social Influence in the Online Recruitment of Terrorists and Terrorist Sympathizers: Implications for Social Psychology Research,” Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 23, 1 (2010).

37 See, for example, Bouchra Oualla, “YouTube Jihad: A Rhetorical Analysis of an Islamist Propaganda Video,” in New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012).

38 John M. Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 236, (2010), 8.

39 Rosanna E. Guadagno, Adam Lankford, Nicole L. Muscanell, Bradley M. Okdie, and Debra M. McCallum, “Social Influence in the Online Recruitment of Terrorists and Terrorist Sympathizers: Implications for Social Psychology Research,” Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 23, 1 (2010).

40 Ariel Koch, “Jihadi Beheading Videos and their Non-Jihadi Echoes,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, 3 (2018), 27.

41 The editorial staff of this magazine encouraged readers to distribute copies among pilgrims in Mecca. See Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, (2006), 414.

42 Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 261.

43 It was released in December 2003. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” in Political Islam. A Critical Reader, edited by Frédéric Volpi (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 315; Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, and Vahid Brown, Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (Carlisle: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007), 125; Marcin Styszyński, “Al-Qaeda’s Structure According to Propaganda Techniques,” Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia, 24 (2011), 9.

44 Gary R. Bunt, iMuslims. Rewiring the House of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 233.

45 Maura Conway, Jodie Parker, and Sean Looney, “Online Jihadi Instructional Content: The Role of Magazines,” in Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response, edited by Maura Conway, Lee Jarvis, Orla Lehane, Stuart Macdonald, and Lella Nouri (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2017), 182.

46 Jacek Dziewanowski, “AQAP Inspire Magazine as a Tool Motivating to Terrorist Activities,” Internal Security Review 11, 20 (2019), 342.

47 Gary R. Bunt, iMuslims. Rewiring the House of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 234.

48 Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 156.

49 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 113.

50 Stanisław Kosmynka, “Cyberdżihad. Wykorzystanie internetu przez współczesny terroryzm islamistyczny,” in Cyberterroryzm zagrożeniem XXI wieku, edited by Andrzej Podraza, Paweł Potakowski, and Krzysztof Wiak (Warszawa: Difin, 2013), 106.

51 See Miron Lakomy, “Let’s Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 4 (2019), 389; Nico Prucha, “Worldview Online Jihad versus the Gaming Industry Reloaded – Ventures of the Web,” in New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2012).

52 Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 121.

53 Ibid., 121.

54 Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, (2006), 417.

55 Nelly Lahoud, “The ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 24–25.

56 Jason Burke, The New Threat. The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy (New York/London: The New Press, 2015), 62–82.

57 These differences later evolved into a schism between Al-Qaeda and ISIL, which took place in 2013. See more in: Nelly Lahoud, “The ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

58 Joseph V. Micallef, Islamic State. Its History, Ideology & Challenge (Vancouver/Portland: Antioch Downs Press, 2015), 17.

59 Azeem Ibrahim, Radical Origins. Why We Are Losing the Battle Against Islamic Extremism – And How To Turn The Tide (New York/London: Pegasus Books, 2017), 207.

60 On the “management of savagery” by Iraqi al-Qaeda also see: Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 156–160.

61 Martin Harrow, “Video-recorded Decapitations – A Seemingly Perfect Terrorist Tactic That Did Not Spread,” DIIS Working Paper 08, (2011), 10–11.

62 Ibid., 10–11.

63 Hanna Rogan, Jihadism Online – A Study of How Al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment FFI Rapport, 2006), 23.

64 Eli Alshech and Jacob Apelbaum, “Behind the Scenes of Virtual Jihad IV. Jihadi Media: A Global Production of Local News,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis 592 (2010), 7.

65 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 3.

66 Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, (2006), 418.

67 Hanna Rogan, Jihadism Online – A Study of How Al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment FFI Rapport, 2006), 23.

68 “New Magazine for al-Qaeda in Iraq,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 3, 2005, https://jamestown.org/program/new-magazine-for-al-qaeda-in-iraq-2/.

69 It was, however, not the only AQ-related media cell which released productions from Iraq. There were others, such as the al-Ansar Media Foundation. See Eli Alshech and Jacob Apelbaum, “Behind the Scenes of Virtual Jihad IV. Jihadi Media: A Global Production of Local News,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis 592 (2010), 8; “An Al-Furqan Media Productions Presentation Media Section of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Rafidayn,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/B6/B6B68BAC05F26E830E97B9A252942EBE_cricket.pdf; “Video by al-Furqan Media Shows Attacks on Iraqi Army and Police Posts,” CBS News, April 2, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/video-by-al-furqan-media-shows-attacks-on-iraqi-army-and-police-posts/.

70 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 105–106.

71 Charles R. Lister, The Islamic State. A Brief Introduction (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 17; Ali Soufan, Anatomy of Terror. From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 249.

72 Joby Warrick, Black Flags. The Rise of ISIS (Toronto: Doubleday, 2015), 283. More on the history of ISIS, and its deteriorating relations with al-Qaeda in: Jason Burke, The New Threat. The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy (New York/London: The New Press, 2015), 56–79; Charles R. Lister, The Islamic State. A Brief Introduction (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015).

73 Salil al-Sawarim I was watched by almost 60,000 viewers on YouTube within 24 hours only. The video was tweeted more than 32,000 times over a 60-hour period. See Charles R. Lister, The Islamic State. A Brief Introduction (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 41–42.

74 See more in: Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 136–137.

75 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 106–110.

76 Ali Soufan, Anatomy of Terror. From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 249.

77 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 177.

78 However, as Sageman accurately stated, “these loners appear as ‘lone wolves’ only offline.” According to him, they are usually encouraged to conduct actions by online peers. See Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 122.

79 Adam Hoffman and Yoram Schweitzer, “Cyber Jihad in the Service of the Islamic State (ISIS),” Strategic Assessment 18, 1 (2015), 74–76; Jessica Stern, “Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What Have We Learned and What Can We Do About It,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, 1 (2016).

80 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), 7.

81 See Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 85.

82 Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 41; Patrick Cockburn, The Age of Jihad. Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East (London/New York: Verso, 2016), 344.

83 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 137.

84 Ibid. 137–138.

85 See e.g. “James Foley Execution,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=james+foley+execution&sp.=CAM%253D.

86 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 137–138; Lawrence Wright, The Terror Years. From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 344–395; Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 240–241; Jay Sekulow, Jordan Sekulow, Robert W. Ash and David French, Rise of ISIS. A Threat We Can’t Ignore (New York: Howards Books, 2014), 20–21.

87 Daniel Milton, Down but Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), 4–5; Daniel Milton, Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2016), 12, 21.

88 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 72.

89 Simone Molin Friis, “‘Behead, Burn, Crucify, Crush’: Theorizing the Islamic State’s Public Displays of Violence,” European Journal of International Relations 24, 2 (2018).

90 However, it has to be stressed that radicalisation is not the equivalent of recruitment. As Springer et al. argued, “formal recruitment does produce individuals who are radicalized prior to becoming full-fledged members of the group.” Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 138. On the efficiency of “virtual entrepreneurship” see e.g. Francesco Marone, “Violent Extremism and the Internet, Between Foreign Fighters and Terrorist Financing,” in Digital Jihad. Online Communication and Violent Extremism, edited by Francesco Marone (Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2019), 19–21.

91 Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda,” GSCP Policy Paper, 2 (2015); Sara Mahmood, “‘Cubs of the Caliphate’: The Islamic State’s Focus on Children,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016); Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 69.

92 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 178.

93 See more on the IS’s anashids in: Henrik Gråtrud, “Islamic State Nasheeds As Messaging Tools,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, 12 (2016), 1050–1070.

94 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 85–97; Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 47; Peter Wignell, Sabine Tan, Kay L. O’Halloran and Rebecca Lange, “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017).

95 Lawrence Wright, The Terror Years. From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 394.

96 Miron Lakomy, “Let’s Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 4 (2019); Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 70; Ahmed al-Rawi, “Video Games, Terrorism, and ISIS’s Jihad 3.0,” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, 4 (2018).

97 See James Scott and Drew Spaniel, The Anatomy of Cyber-Jihad. Cyberspace Is the New Great Equalizer (Washington D.C.: Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, 2016), 31–33.

98 On the education of jihadi terrorists see more in: Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad. The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).

99 Dominic Casciani, “Islamic State: Profile of Mohammed Emwazi aka ‘Jihadi John’,” BBC, 13.11.2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31,641,569.

100 “Ahmad Abousamra,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-abousamra.

101 Interestingly, in March 2015 he also released a hip-hop album called Straight Outta Syria, the content of which had Islamist elements and was accompanied by IS’s symbols. See Alberto M. Fernandez, “Profile Of German Jihadi Denis Cuspert, A Key ISIS Media Operative, Recently Killed in Syria,” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 7295, 23.01.2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/profile-german-jihadi-denis-cuspert-key-isis-media-operative-recently-killed-syria; Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, “The ISIS “Honey Trap’ to Catch Recruiter Deso Dogg and the Rogue FBI Translator,” HSToday.us, 10.06.2019, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/the-isis-honey-trap-to-catch-recruiter-deso-dogg-and-the-rogue-fbi-translator/; Denis Cuspert (Deso Dogg), “Straight Outta Syria,” Audiomack, https://audiomack.com/album/trapspotsyria/straight-outta-syria.

102 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors. Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate (Washington D.C.: Advances Press, 2016), 176–177.

103 See more in: Cori E. Dauber, Mark D. Robinson, Jovan J. Baslious, and Austin G. Blair, “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif Has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, 3 (2019), 17–31; Hamilton Bean and Amanda Nell Edgar, “A Genosonic Analysis of ISIL and US Counter-extremism Video Messages,” Media, War & Conflict 10, 3 (2017); Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 44; Cori E. Dauber and Mark Robinson, “GUEST POST: ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style,” Jihadology, July 6, 2015, https://jihadology.net/2015/07/06/guest-post-isis-and-the-hollywood-visual-style/.

104 Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018), 5; Imran Awan, “Cyber-Extremism: ISIS and the Power of Social Media,” Society 54, 2 (2017).

105 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 70.

106 On languages used by al-Qaeda and Taliban see, for instance: Michael Semple, Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 10; Thomas H. Johnson, “Analyzing Taliban Taranas (Chants): An Effective Afghan Propaganda Artifact,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, 1 (2011), 5; Manuel R. Torres Soriano, “The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, 1 (2010).

107 “Most Common Languages Used on the Internet as of April 2019, by Share of Internet Users,” Statista, July 22, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262946/share-of-the-most-common-languages-on-the-internet/.

108 See Jack Barclay, “Challenging the Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki,” ICSR Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, September (2010).

109 See, for example, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, and James Sheehan, Lights, Cameras, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012), 25–26. Laurence Bindner, “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France,” ICCT Policy Brief, February (2018), 6–8; Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, “Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation,” International Journal of Peace Studies 9, 1 (2004).

110 Zehra Yilmaz, “Critique of ISIS’ Women Policy,” Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 4, 2 (2017), 15.

111 Joby Warrick, Black Flags. The Rise of ISIS (Toronto: Doubleday, 2015), 290; Miron Lakomy, “Let’s Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 4 (2019).

112 Mehdi Semati and Piotr M. Szpunar, “ISIS Beyond the Spectacle: Communication Media, Networked Publics, Terrorism,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 35, 1 (2018), 4.

113 See Sean Rintel, “Crisis Memes: The Importance of Templatability to Internet Culture and Freedom of Expression,” Australasian Journal of Popular Culture 2, 2 (2013), 257–258.

114 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of Islamic State (London: Hurst&Company, 2017), 49.

115 Jay Sekulow, Jordan Sekulow, Robert W. Ash, and David French, Rise of ISIS. A Threat We Can’t Ignore (New York: Howards Books, 2014), 35.

116 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 3.

117 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS. Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 385.

118 See more in Miron Lakomy, “Danse Macabre: Gore Images in the Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine as a Propaganda Device,” The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 21, 2 (2019), 144; Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State. The Digital Caliphate (London: Saqi Books, 2015), 147.

119 Simone Molin Friis, “‘Behead, Burn, Crucify, Crush’: Theorizing the Islamic State’s Public Displays of Violence,” European Journal of International Relations 24, 2 (2018).

120 Joseph V. Micallef, Islamic State. Its History, Ideology & Challenge (Vancouver/Portland: Antioch Downs Press, 2015), 94.

121 Ibid., 94–95.

122 Ali Soufan, Anatomy of Terror. From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 249.

123 Miron Lakomy, “Danse Macabre: Gore Images in the Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine as a Propaganda Device,” The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 21, 2 (2019), 156.

124 On the significance of martyrdom in Islam see: Michael Bonner, Jihad and Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), chap. 5.

125 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 45–46; Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018), 2.

126 Paolo Magri, “Introduction,” in Digital Jihad. Online Communication and Violent Extremism, edited by Francesco Marone (Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2019), 8; Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan. ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016), 228; Md Sazzad Hossain, “Social Media and Terrorism: Threats and Challenges to the Modern Era,” South Asia Survey 22, 2 (2018), 141–142.

127 Drew Herrick, “The Social Side of ‘Cyber Power’? Social Media and Cyber Operations,” in 2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Cyber Power, edited by Nikolaos Pissanidis, Henry Rõigas, and Matthijs Veenendaal (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2016), 104.

128 Charles R. Lister, The Islamic State. A Brief Introduction (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 43.

129 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census. Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper, 20 (2015), 2–3.

130 Alberto M. Fernandez, “Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers, October (2015), 19.

131 Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 47.

132 IS’s opponents outnumbered pro-Daesh users on Twitter six to one, according to a study by Helmus and Bodine-Baron. See Todd C. Helmus and Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Empowering ISIS Opponents on Twitter, RAND Corporation Perspective, 2017.

133 See Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Madeline Magnuson, and Zev Winkleman, Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 1; North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2015), 12.

134 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 161.

135 Ibid., 161.

136 Ibid. 168.

137 Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018), 6.

138 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 62–71; Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 41–42.

139 See Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan, “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram,” Terrorism and Political Violence, (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695.

140 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 177; Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018), 6.

141 Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan. ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016), 227.

142 According to Milton’s study, violence in the Islamic State’s photo reportages leads to increased viewership. See Daniel Milton, “Fatal Attraction: Explaining Variation in the Attractiveness of Islamic State Propaganda,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218759008.

143 Miron Lakomy, “Lessons Learned from the ‘Viral Caliphate’: Viral Effect as a New PSYOPS Tool?,” Cyber, Intelligence, and Security 1, 1 (2017), 58–59.

144 Among the classic themes exploited by terrorist propaganda Macnair and Frank listed: friendship and camaraderie, strength and victory, religion and religious persecution, as well as spiritual and existential fulfilment. See Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, “‘To My Brothers in the West…’: A Thematic Analysis of Videos Produced by the Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media Center,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 33, 3 (2017), 236–238.

145 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), 22–31.

146 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 90–94.

147 Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, “‘To My Brothers in the West…’: A Thematic Analysis of Videos Produced by the Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media Center,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 33, 3 (2017), 241–249.

148 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget Moreng, “The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy,” ICCT Research Paper, March (2016), 5–6.

149 J.M. Berger, “The Metronome of Apocalyptic Time: Social Media as Carrier Wave for Millenarian Contagion,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 61.

150 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS. Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2016), 177.

151 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse. The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 147.

152 Haroro J. Ingram, “Understanding ISIS Propaganda: Appeal, Radicalisation and Counter-strategy Implications,” in Expanding Research on Countering Violent Extremism, edited by Sara Zeiger (Perth: Hedayah, Edith Cowan University, 2016), 145.

153 Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 97–98.

154 Mehdi Semati and Piotr M. Szpunar, “ISIS Beyond the Spectacle: Communication Media, Networked Publics, Terrorism,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 35, 1 (2018), 2.

155 Mohamed Elewa Badar, “The Road to Genocide: The Propaganda Machine of the Self-declared Islamic State (IS),” International Criminal Law Review 16, (2016), 5–6.

156 ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018), 7.

157 Daniel Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Media Organization (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), 19.

158 Ibid., 19.

159 Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016), 227.

160 See Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), 14.

161 Daniel Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Media Organization (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), 2.

162 Gunnar J. Weimann, “Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013–2014,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 1 (2019), 36.

163 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 136.

164 Ibid., 138.

165 Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 4; Ahmed S. Hashim, The Caliphate at War. Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 180.

166 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 72.

167 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS. Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 398.

168 Harleen Gambhir, The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2016), 22; Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, “‘To My Brothers in the West…’: A Thematic Analysis of Videos Produced by the Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media Center,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 33, 3 (2017); Gunnar J. Weimann, “Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013–2014,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 1 (2019), 35.

169 Ahmed S. Hashim, The Caliphate at War. Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 179.

170 See more in: Henrik Gråtrud, “Islamic State Nasheeds As Messaging Tools,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, 12 (2016), 1050–1070.

171 “Best Nasheed Channel – Ajnad,” Internet Archive, 23.02.2019, https://archive.org/details/24alMalikiIsVanquishedTomorrowOw/Best+Nasheed+Channel+−+Ajnad/22+−+%E2%80%9CClanging+of+the+Swords%2C+Nash%C4%ABd+Of+The+Defiant%E2%80%9D+%D8%B5%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85.mp3.

172 Harleen Gambhir, The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2016), 22; “Ajnad Media Foundation Nasheeds,” Internet Archive, 28.03.2019, https://archive.org/details/Hallili_201807/Ajnad+-+In+the+way+of+God.mp3.

173 Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 4.

174 Mohammad El Araby, “Terror Propaganda: Da’ish Media and Operating Strategies,” Dirasat 8, (2016), 21.

175 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), 12; Mohammad El Araby, “Terror Propaganda: Da’ish Media and Operating Strategies,” Dirasat 8, (2016), 25; ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018), 27–28.

176 Charlie Winter, Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’ (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015), 13.

177 Christopher C. Harmon and Randall G. Bowdish, The Terrorist Argument: Modern Advocacy and Propaganda (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2018), 310; Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 4.

178 “‘The Thirty Suggestions’ of Abu Ayyub al-Misri – A New Edition by the Al-Himma Library,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/JWMG-Ins-Al-Misris-Thirty-Suggestions.pdf.

179 Haroro J. Ingram, “The Use of Narratives by Terrorists and How to Prevent Their Resonance: Hedging, Legacy-Nostalgia and Its Counterstrategy Implications,” in Combatting Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe. From Cooperation to Collaboration, edited by Christian Echle, Rohan Gunaratna, Patrick Rueppel, and Megha Sarmah (Jalan Besar: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018), 68; Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2017), 8.

180 Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 5.

181 Daniel Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Media Organization (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), 2.

182 ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018), 15, 30.

183 Ibid., 29.

184 Ibid. 1–40.

185 Mohammad El Araby, “Terror Propaganda: Da’ish Media and Operating Strategies,” Dirasat 8, (2016), 27.

186 Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018).

187 See ISIS’s Media Network: Developments in 2018 and Future Courses of Action (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019), 24.

188 James Scott and Drew Spaniel, The Anatomy of Cyber-Jihad. Cyberspace Is the New Great Equalizer (Washington D.C.: Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, 2016), 25.

189 See Kabir Taneja, “The Fall of ISIS and its Implications for South Asia,” ORF Issue Brief, 220 (2018); Gregory Aftandilian, “A Security Role for the United States in a Post-ISIS Syria? Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Policy,” A Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper, September (2018), 10–12; John Holland-McCowan, The Kurds After the ‘Caliphate’: How the Decline of ISIS has Impacted the Kurds of Iraq and Syria (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018), 5–6.

190 Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 45; Cori E. Dauber, Mark D. Robinson, Jovan J. Baslious and Austin G. Blair, “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif Has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, 3 (2019), 18–19.

191 Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 45.

192 Daniel Milton, Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2016), 21.

193 Cameron Glenn, “ISIS Losses By the Numbers,” Wilson Center, 25.03.2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-losses-the-numbers.

194 Willem Theo Oosterveld and Willem Bloem, The Rise and Fall of ISIS. From Evitability to Inevitability (The Hague: The Hague Centre For Strategic Studies, 2017), 19.

195 Seth G. Jones, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler, Rolling Back the Islamic State (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), ix.

196 Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff and Remy Mahzam, “Islamic State after the Fall of Mosul and Raqqa: Impact on Organisation and Propaganda,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10, 1 (2018), 57.

197 Caleb Weiss, “Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab,” CTC Sentinel 12, 4 (2019), 33.

198 Cameron Glenn, “ISIS Losses By the Numbers,” Wilson Center, 25.03.2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-losses-the-numbers.

199 See Cole Bunzel, “Ideological Infighting in the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, 1 (2019), 16; Kyle Orton, Profiles of Islamic State Leaders (London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2016); Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017), 49; Alberto M. Fernandez, “Profile Of German Jihadi Denis Cuspert, A Key ISIS Media Operative, Recently Killed in Syria,” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 7295, 23.01.2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/profile-german-jihadi-denis-cuspert-key-isis-media-operative-recently-killed-syria.

200 Michael Munoz, “Selling the Long War: Islamic State Propaganda after the Caliphate,” CTC Sentinel 11, 10 (2018), 35.

201 See Majid Alfifi, Parisa Kaghazgaran, James Cavarlee, and Fred Morstatter, “A Large-Scale Study of ISIS Social Media Strategy: Community Size, Collective Influence, and Behavioural Impact,” Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Web and Social Media 13, (2019); Rachel E. Van Landingham, “Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material Support to Terrorism, and Muzzling the Modern Press,” Cardozo Law Review 39, 1 (2017), 16.

202 “About our Mission,” Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, https://gifct.org/about/.

203 Courtney C. Radsch, Media Development and Countering Violent Extremism: An Uneasy Relationship, a Need for Dialogue (Washington D.C.: Center For International Media Assistance, 2016), 7.

204 See e.g. Rita Katz, “To Curb Terrorist Propaganda Online, Look to YouTube. No, Really,” Wired, 20.10.2018, https://www.wired.com/story/to-curb-terrorist-propaganda-online-look-to-youtube-no-really/.

205 “What It’s Really Like to Fight for the Islamic State,” YouTube, 27.04.2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aM3ElTvF52I.

206 See ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018).

207 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 85–89; Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018), 27.

208 Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 9.

209 Daniel Milton, Down But Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), IV.

210 See Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017).

211 “Video of Deadly Niger Ambush Raises Questions About Military Mission,” YouTube, May 5, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Y2wChG-pRA.

212 “So-called IS leader Al-Baghdadi Appears in Alleged New Video for First Time in 5 Years,” YouTube, 30.04.2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = HQyzbpnvCrc.

213 Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online ‘Caliphate’: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017).

214 “New Video Message from The Islamic State: ‘Harvest of the Soldiers #25’,” Jihadology.net, 17.01.2019, https://jihadology.net/2019/01/17/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-harvest-of-the-soldiers-25/.

215 See Lorne L. Dawson, “The Demise of the Islamic State and the Fate of Its Western Foreign Fighters: Six Things to Consider,” ICCT Policy Brief, June (2018).

216 Daniel Milton, Down but Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018), IV.

217 Nico Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, 6 (2016), 48.

218 Bennett Clifford and Helen Powell, Encrypted Extremism. Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State Ecosystem on Telegram (Washington D.C.: The George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2019), 3.

219 Ibid., 3.

220 Bennett Clifford, “‘Trucks, Knives, Bombs, Whatever:’ Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram,” CTC Sentinel 11, 5 (2018), 23.

221 Ahmad Shehabat, Teodor Mitew, and Yayha Alzoubi, “Encrypted Jihad: Investigating the Role of Telegram App in Lone Wolf Attacks in the West,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, 3 (2017), 27.

222 Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018).

223 Michael Munoz, “Selling the Long War: Islamic State Propaganda after the Caliphate,” CTC Sentinel 11, 10 (2018), 31–35.

224 Pieter Nanninga, “Branding a Caliphate in Decline: The Islamic State’s Video Output (2015–2018),” ICCT Research Paper, April (2019), 18–21.

2 United they stand

Rediscovering the thematic landscape of the “Caliphate’s” e-periodicals

2.1Evolution of the Islamic State’s written propaganda 2014–2019

At the apogee of the Islamic State’s power in the Middle East, its online campaign heavily relied on various types of written propaganda, which followed the pattern of the top al-Qaeda publications and also creatively developed them. The exact amount of such materials issued by the group is currently unknown. According to Prucha and Fisher, as of March 2018 the “Caliphate” published 52,368 pages of its original text.¹ Data collected by Onlinejihad.net in March 2019 indicate that the Caliphate Library channel on Telegram alone consisted of 1,208 documents, including 908 .PDF files, which collectively contained over 111,000 pages. They encompassed pieces published by IS and its previous incarnations, earlier works of al-Qaeda, as well as historical and contemporary writings of Salafi scholars. Other releases were uploaded in .DOC, .DOCX and .JPG formats. Seventy-five per cent of them were original “Caliphate” productions, including: al-Bayan Radio transcripts (25.4%), al-Himma Library publications (19.2%), pieces from the ISI Times (18.2%), Arabic translations of Dabiq (7.6%), al-Naba articles (6.9%), Sunni Shield Media (4.8%) or al-Battar releases (4%) and an-Anfal magazine (2.8%).² It is clear that this particular Telegram channel consisted of only a part of the propaganda associated with the self-proclaimed “Caliphate,” as it lacked, for instance, many magazines and newsletters released by the al-Hayat Media Center, as well as pieces that were published by a plethora of other, aforementioned official and unofficial media offices. Nevertheless, it gives some idea of the productivity of the Islamic State’s online media machine in terms of written propaganda.

Between 2014 and 2019 al-Baghdadi’s organisation developed a varied set of formats of written propaganda, including magazines, bulletins, e-books, newsletters, essays, and standalone articles. The first serious attempt to launch a periodical that would target a massive online audience was carried out in March 2014, when al-Naba was established.³ As mentioned above, after some years, it became the only regularly published periodical of Daesh, which survived its downfall in 2016. The next step took place on May 31, 2014, which preceded the conquest of Mosul and the proclamation of the “Caliphate.” At this time, the al-Hayat Media Center developed the first newsletter,⁴ which was dedicated to targeting Anglophone audiences and was called Islamic State News. This proved to be one of the shortest written endeavours of this media outlet, as only three editions were published. As Ingram noted, “ISN’s issues were short publications of no more than ten pages, its authors highlighted a range of topics from military operations in Iraq and Syria, tribal reconciliation efforts, education programs, the implementation of hudud […] and initiatives to boost trade.”⁵ Islamic State News was followed by another brief, four-volume series of the Islamic State Report, which was introduced on June 3, 2014 by al-Hayat Media Center. Its last edition was published on July 5, 2014.⁶

They were quickly replaced by the dedicated, flagship magazine of Daesh in English – Dabiq. This constituted a significant step forward as its organisation of content, layout and themes, at first glance, was reminiscent of the best pieces of al-Qaeda’s written propaganda, such as Inspire. Its first issue was released on July 5, 2014 by the al-Hayat Media Center.⁷ It was created by a highly skilled and multilingual group of media operatives, under the supervision of Abu Muhammad al-Furqan. The magazine was also edited by the US citizen Abu Sulayman ash-Shami.⁸ Little is known of the identity of other members of its editorial staff. However, as Azman emphasised, the magazine continued to “retain a group of writers and researchers who not only have some ‘familiarity’ with Islamic religious texts and history but also Christian and Jewish scriptures and Western history.”⁹ Dabiq primarily targeted transnational, Anglophone audiences and for about two years it became one of the key instruments in the online campaign of Daesh. Among thousands of pieces of the Islamic State’s written propaganda at the apogee of its power, Dabiq undoubtedly played a crucial role. It constituted the most universal and, by definition, the most sophisticated means of winning the hearts and minds of Internet users.¹⁰

There are several potential reasons for the emergence of Dabiq. First of all, Daesh had some previous experience in publishing newsletters and bulletins, but none of them were of a quality that would ensure the proper and desired resonance in the Internet. Al-Naba, which was the earliest endeavour of this group, since its expansion into ISIS, was in Arabic and therefore had a different – and narrower – target group. The two Anglophone short publication series that followed, ISN and ISR, could be perceived as merely a means of testing deeper, international waters. Both were, however, too crude to make a serious impact. In this context, the emergence of the flagship magazine was a natural step forward in the development of the Islamic State’s written propaganda. Until this moment it was deprived of a publication series with universal reach and comparable quality to its greatest jihadi rival – al-Qaeda.

Secondly, Dabiq could be perceived as a manifestation of the rising ambitions of the Islamic State as the ultimate authority for all Muslims. Its global appeal required an advanced publication series with an international scope that would advertise its statehood and legitimacy. In other words, a universal state required a universal magazine. Neither al-Naba, nor ISR or ISN, could achieve such a goal. According to Bartolucci, even the visual layer of this magazine attempted “to demonstrate visually the magnitude of the threat posed by the Islamic State, as well as how the role of the organization goes beyond simple military or terrorist objectives, to function as a proto-state seeking global support from all pious Muslims.”¹¹ Dabiq was thought to be the “crown jewel” of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine, which would gain the attention of not just Middle Eastern Sunnis but also extra-regional and more globalised Internet users.

Thirdly, the framework adopted by this magazine indicated that the universalism of Islamic State’s message was related to its statehood ambitions and to its final, millenarian goal. The periodical – Dabiq – constituted a direct reference to its well-known, and widely discussed in academia, apocalyptic narrative.¹² According to Islamic eschatology, Dabiq – a small town in northern Syria – should be the place of the prophesied battle between true Muslims and Christians (“crusaders”) that will precede the Apocalypse. On the one hand, it suggested that this terrorist organisation is the embodiment of true Islam, representing Muslims during the approaching “Hour.” As a consequence, it indirectly supported the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed “Caliphate.” On the other hand, the adoption of such a title was also a manifestation of its ambitions to defeat all enemies of Islam. This intent was emphasised in the quotation of az-Zarqawi, which was included in the table of contents of all the editions of Dabiq: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.”¹³ However, while the apocalyptic inclination and the ambitious, universal goal of vanquishing all disbelievers was highlighted by the very idea of Dabiq, as McCants noticed, the magazine barely mentioned Mahdi. According to McCants, “the shift of eschatological emphasis from the person of the Mahdi to the institution of the caliphate buys the group time to govern while sustaining the apocalyptic moment that has so captivated its supporters.”¹⁴

Many issues of Dabiq quickly resonated among European and North American Internet users, blogosphere pundits and the mass media, which proved that it was a valuable means of reaching out to non-Arabic readers. According to Ingram, it offered “its readership a powerful ‘competitive system of meaning,’ that is, an alternative perspective of the world compared to that presented by its opponents,” and deployed “a diverse array of messaging that fuses rational- and identity-choice appeals as a means to ensure its message and broader ‘system of meaning’ resonates with a broad and diverse spectrum of potential supporters.”¹⁵

The launch of Dabiq was quickly followed by the development of other, dedicated e-magazines, which targeted more specific online audiences. The first issue of Dar al-Islam was published in December 2014 and its last edition was published in the summer of 2016. It specifically aimed to influence Francophone Internet users. As Sparks noted, the magazine focused on religious issues and the rationalisation of the Islamic State’s existence.¹⁶ In June 2015 the first issue of Konstantiniyye was released by Darul Hilafe (a Turkish-language organ of the Al-Hayat Media Center), which coincided with the anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire. The final volume was released in April 2016. This periodical was dedicated to reaching out to Turkish-speaking readers. It was an understandable move, considering the fact that the Islamic State’s situation was heavily dependent on Ankara’s policy in the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey was a crucial transfer hub in terms of the inflow of foreign fighters to the Levant.¹⁷ In May 2015 the first edition of Istok was published by the al-Hayat Media Center. It targeted Russian-speaking readers, not only from Russia, but also from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Surprisingly, despite the wide “pool” of potential recruits in these areas, Istok had very few releases. The final, and only the fourth issue appeared online in May 2016. Interestingly, at the same time a second pro-Daesh periodical for Russian-speaking audiences – Furat.Press – emerged. Unlike Istok it was a simplistic bulletin, and only two issues were published, both in April/May 2015.¹⁸ All of these publication series constituted the “Caliphate’s” “attempt to direct its strategic messaging to specific audiences in their respective mother-tongues,” as Mahzam noted.¹⁹

In 2016 they were all replaced by a new multilingual magazine called Rumiyah.²⁰ In fact, it constituted a shorter and simpler version of Dabiq under a new, but still symbolic title. As Lister noted, it was “slickly produced on multiple online platforms and also distributed in hard-copy format within IS territory.”²¹ According to its editors, its major goal was to:

expand the Islamic State’s reach by releasing one magazine in several languages, with each language’s version being periodically released at the same time. By the grace of Allah, the project was successful and Rumiyah was released as a monthly magazine – published in eight languages – by which Allah enraged the disbelievers, brought joy to the believers, and supported the Islamic State and the Muslims.²²

The actual influences that led to this meaningful breakthrough in the written propaganda of Daesh were probably different. Firstly, it could have been a result of the American campaign targeting media operatives that was discussed in previous sections. There is a high chance that the severe casualties suffered by IS’s propaganda branch affected the members of the al-Hayat Media Center, who were responsible for the management of periodicals. In effect, this cell could have been forced to introduce a simpler and shorter magazine. It is worth mentioning that this change coincided with the death of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, who was featured as a martyr in the first issue of Rumiyah.²³ Secondly, this decision could have been influenced by the overall crisis being experienced by the Islamic State, which meant that the heavily exploited “End Times” rhetoric, inseparably connected to the town of Dabiq, proved to no longer be valid. This symbolic area was lost by Daesh not even six weeks after the launch of Rumiyah – in October 2016.²⁴ Thus, the al-Hayat Media Center, being aware of the deteriorating military situation of the “Caliphate,” may have made a pre-emptive decision to rename its flagship publication in order to avoid embarrassment. Thirdly, such a decision could also have been perceived as a means of damage control, as Rumiyah in Arabic means Rome. In the introductory section, each consecutive issue contained the following indicative statement of Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir: “O muwahiddin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome).”²⁵ Effectively, it created an “alternative battle space outside Syria and Iraq” as Azman noted.²⁶ In other words, it suggested that the focus of the group had shifted from the local arena of Sham to the global war against the “crusaders,” which will be concluded by the conquest of the city recognised as the capital of Christendom. Therefore, this message could have been interpreted by online audiences in a way that suggested that the Islamic State is not over, but that its goals have become much more ambitious.

All the reasons listed above may correspond with another factor which is directly linked to the US operation in cyberspace codenamed Glowing Symphony. According to recent media reports, it was conducted against the Islamic State in the autumn of 2016, thus at the very moment of the transition between both flagship periodicals. During the spring and summer of 2016, the so called “Task Force ARES” from the US Cyber Command and the National Security Agency prepared a cyber-attack by gaining access to the computer networks of Daesh and gathering all necessary intelligence, including encryption keys and login credentials. Subsequently, US cyber-troops hacked its systems, took them over, deleted files, and changed passwords in order to impede any attempts of recovery. In effect, after the first phase of the Glowing Symphony, the Islamic State’s propaganda machine was cut off from many of its crucial assets stored online. Later, the operation shifted in order to keep constant pressure on the media arm of Daesh, curbing its fundraising abilities and limiting its World Wide Web presence. Overall, Glowing Symphony proved to be a huge success. In this context, according to the NPR report, the actions of “Task Force ARES” contributed to the fall of Dabiq.²⁷ This means that the al-Hayat Media Center lost some of its resources which were used for this publication series due to cyber-attacks, which may have been a major motivator for kick-starting a new periodical.

The Islamic State’s e-periodicals were obviously not the only form of written propaganda exploited. The group’s official and unofficial media bureaus were responsible for publishing a wide range of other materials, which attempted to further its agenda in cyberspace. To begin with, the group released multiple e-books in .PDF format. Some of them originated from the times of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq, while many had been elaborated since the turn of 2014. According to Bunker and Ligouri Bunker, there were four thematic series of IS e-books:

Black Flags (e.g. Black Flags from Arabia, September 2013; Return of the Global Caliphate, May 2013; Black Flags from the Islamic State: How al-Qa’idah became the Islamic State (1989–2016), November 2015), which discusses political and military affairs, in relation to the emergence of the “Caliphate,”

Martyrs (e.g. The Under Warriors, January 2013; Miracles in Syria (2012–2013), November 2013; Heroes of Syria: Shuhada stories from al-Sham, September 2014), which seeks to discuss and promote the martyrdom of Islamic State members,

Islamic State (e.g. The Revived Caliphate, August 2014; The Islamic State, January 2015; Hijrah to the Islamic State: What to Pickup, Who to Contact, Where to Go, Stories and More!, February 2015), which debates the emergence, structure, activities and recruitment of the “Caliphate,”

The West (How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide, March 2015; Muslim Gangs: The Future of Muslims in the West, July 2015).²⁸

These resources were enriched by the activities of the aforementioned unofficial media outlets, which became increasingly active during the downfall of the Islamic State. A significant part of their contribution to its online campaign was related to publishing new e-books, which either directly supported Daesh or originated from earlier periods. For instance, Ahlut-Tawhid Publications was responsible for releasing a series of Anglophone reproductions of the classic works of Arabic Salafi scholars. These included:

Clarifying Matters of Methodology,

And They Were Ordered to Disbelieve in it. A compilation from the words of the ‘ulama regarding the disbelief of ruling by man-made laws and issues connected to it,

Shirk of Obedience by Abu Ali al-Anbari,

Indeed They Are Mushrikun by Abu Hamzah ar-Rumi,

The Description of the Prophet’s Fast by ‘Abdullah ibn Jibrin.

Usually, they consisted of a “publisher’s note,” which ensured the proper – i.e. radical – interpretation of the text that followed. It not only discussed the purpose of issuing this book but was also a pro-IS manifesto. For instance, AHP’s introduction to Clarifying Matters of Methodology expressed the following: “unlike many who do not live up to that honored phrase and principle of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, the Islamic State are followers and not innovators, and this book will testify to that.”²⁹ Thus, it was a piece dedicated to denying the allegations of some of the Islamist rivals of Daesh that the group is not in principle Sunni, but Khariji.

Islamic State’s campaign also relied on newsletters and statements released, among others, in. PDF and. JPG formats. They provided somewhat detailed information on its activities, including military actions, communiqués of leaders, as well as claims of responsibility for terrorist attacks. News was usually provided by the A’maq News Agency, which conveyed its messages in multiple languages via numerous Telegram channels, as well as through standalone websites and pro-IS Twitter accounts.

As for newsletters, the followers of Daesh were known for releasing a series of daily reports called Khilafah News (KN), which gathered all instances of IS propaganda and information on its operations in one place. It was very crude in terms of graphical layout, even when compared to Islamic State News. KN was full of low-resolution images, which were accompanied by short informative statements on IS’s achievements in various wilayats (provinces). Interestingly, these daily newsletters were full of direct links leading to instances of pro-IS audiovisual and visual productions.

Finally, shorter pieces of text propaganda were usually issued in the form of .PDF files or articles posted on affiliated websites. Initially, they consisted of essays raising theological, ethical or ideological problems which are important from the viewpoint of the Islamic State’s agenda. One of the cells responsible for producing this type of material in the post-territorial period was Centre Médiatique an-Nur, which released a series of essays in 2018, including Ô Moudjahid. Écoute & Obéis and Le Comportement du Mujahid. L’Altruisme (Figure 2.1).³⁰ The first proved to be damage control, emphasising the importance of obeying commanders (emirs), as ordered by Allah himself. This was probably a reaction to the morale crisis within the ranks of the “Caliphate.”³¹ The second was full of theological deliberations concentrated on altruism, which was presented as a preferred trait of mujahidin. It argued that they should focus on the wellbeing of their “brothers” over themselves. Hundreds of other, similar pieces have circulated on the surface web since 2014.

Figure 2.1Le Comportement du Mujahid. L’Altruisme cover page.

Source: Internet Archive.

Moreover, the most important communiqués of the group’s leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s and Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir’s were generally published in written format. They were also translated by official and unofficial media offices into multiple languages, including English, French and Italian (Figure 2.2). They usually discussed issues of the greatest importance for the Islamic State’s agenda.

Figure 2.2English translation of Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir’s statement.

Source: Internet Archive.

Finally, some forms of written propaganda were dedicated to providing instructions on a range of practical skills to followers of Daesh, including safe online communication, means of cyber security, as well as techniques of terrorist attacks. It should, however, be noted that the Islamic State itself produced relatively few original manuals. Notable exceptions include the “Just Terror Tactics” section of Rumiyah and cyber security guidebooks for mujahidin, which were distributed by the Afaaq Electronic Foundation on Telegram. In this context, the “Caliphate” was, however, keen to provide its supporters with instructions which had been created by other jihadi organisations in the past,³² which was somewhat surprising, considering the fact that IS was known for harsh attacks against these groups.

To summarise, between 2014 and 2019 the Islamic State issued almost every possible type of written propaganda. Bulletins and magazines stood out, as they merged sophisticated narratives of e-books with comprehensiveness of shorter formats. Moreover, they were usually enriched with a range of interesting graphics, which was not so common in newsletters, statements, or e-books. In effect, despite their relative evanescence, they managed to attract a huge amount of attention from Internet users, law enforcement agencies and academia.

2.2Crude beginnings: Islamic State News and Islamic State Report

Islamic State News, as previously mentioned, was the first endeavour of Daesh to reach out to Anglophone online audiences. It emerged at the end of May 2014 in a somewhat simplistic form as a newsletter. The first issue consisted of only seven pages³³ and was dominated by images accompanied with short informative statements and propaganda slogans (Figure 2.3). Three predominant themes could be seen in its content. First of all, it informed readers about the actions of the “apostates” and “hypocrites” that attacked Daesh, which was in contrast to the usual approach of its media arm of emphasising its victories only. This, in turn, may suggest that the priorities of ISN’s editorial staff at the time were not crystal clear. On the one hand, it also featured a car bomb attack in Raqqa, which was, as ISN argued, organised by the Sunni traitors (sahwat/sahwah). The description, accompanying images of its aftermath, spoke of civilian losses, including primarily women and children. This piece was concluded with the statement: “May Allah expose the hypocrites behind the attack.”³⁴ On the other hand, information on the Syrian Arab Army’s attack in the Homs province was also included.³⁵ Nevertheless, Islamic State’s achievements were also highlighted. Among others, the newsletter reported that its militants reached the gates of al-Khair³⁶ and also reported on the activities of tank-hunters that destroyed Iraqi Abrams in Wilayat al-Anbar.³⁷ It also boasted about Iraqi Sunnis surrendering to Daesh: “Members of the Sahwah voluntarily coming to the Dawlah to announce their repentance in Ewessat.”³⁸ It even praised an elderly mujahid on the frontline (ribat) in Homs, which was accompanied by the symbolic question: “where are the Muslim youth!”³⁹ It indirectly suggested that IS suffered from an insufficient inflow of young fighters at the time. The third group of themes was related to the statehood of Daesh. ISN reported on the humanitarian aid distributed by the Islamic State,⁴⁰ religious education of the youth,⁴¹ as well as hadd punishment in the form of the public execution of a “sorcerer” in Manbij.⁴²

Figure 2.3Cover page of the Islamic State News #1.

Source: Internet Archive.

The second issue of ISN was published in June 2014. There were certain similarities and differences, when compared to the first edition. On the one hand, this 11-page volume once again provided pictures and slogans manifesting IS’s state-building ambitions. Its first pages featured images of markets full of fruits with statements such as “Trade flourishes under the rule of the Islamic State” and “Fresh Produce Injects Life Into Halab Market.”⁴³ Photographs of hadd (Islamic punishment) were included, this time referring to the penalty for drinking alcohol.⁴⁴ “Humanitarian” aid for refugees was also mentioned.⁴⁵ Likewise, ISN #2 was very interested in exploiting themes which were related to the promotion of the Islamic State’s triumphant image. It boasted about its efficiency in killing disbelievers and “apostates.” Thus, ISN reported on the executions of IS’s enemies,⁴⁶ the retaking of al-Khayr,⁴⁷ as well as the “liberation” of as-Sabhah and al-Bareehah.⁴⁸ Even tank-hunters were once again promoted.⁴⁹

On the other hand, new elements were introduced. This second issue contained much more gruesome imagery. Pictures of the dead and dying were scattered throughout its content. Most of them were related to executions committed by Daesh,⁵⁰ but some of them also depicted deceased mujahidin.⁵¹ However, images of the latter did not contain visible injuries or blood. Mutilations were noticeable only in reports related to enemies of the “Caliphate.” Additionally, this volume proved to be interested in promoting martyrdom. This was manifested by reports on the actions of suicide bombers,⁵² as well as through aforementioned images of the dead mujahidin, who were labelled as shuhada (martyrs). Finally, it contained a direct call to violence which was included on its final page: “Wait for them in every place of ambush.”

The final issue consisted of only seven pages and was dominated by two themes. On the one hand, it was permeated by reports building the positive image of the group by praising its achievements on the frontlines. The cover page was focused on the victory against Iraqi forces and included a gruesome image of executed soldiers.⁵³ This topic was exploited on the following pages, which also contained references to the Quran.⁵⁴ This issue also discussed the victory in al-Khayr, accompanied with the statement that sahwat was “eradicated from Koniko gas field.”⁵⁵ On the other hand, once again statehood ambitions were expressed through a number of photo reportages, related to IS providing security to farmers⁵⁶ and public punishment, for example. The latter, through pictures of crowds attending the event, was also an indirect instrument of arguing that the organisation was supported by masses of Muslims.⁵⁷

Overall, ISN was relatively crude in terms of its graphical quality, not to mention its content. Barrett was right when stating that it merged “picture-based material and a brief propagandistic commentary in English about various day-to-day events.”⁵⁸ The same was noticed by Badar, who argued that the newsletter was short and based on images in order to magnify its narrative.⁵⁹ In a certain sense, this publication series could hardly be perceived as pieces of written propaganda, as consecutive issues predominantly featured photos which were accompanied with simple slogans or concise informative statements. ISN did not even contain a single standalone article, which is symbolic. Thus, it is not a surprise that it found relatively little resonance among Internet users.

This periodical was quickly followed by a short, four-volume series of the Islamic State Report, which was introduced on June 3, 2014 by the al-Hayat Media Center.⁶⁰ While it was similar to ISN in terms of average length, ranging from six to eight pages, the textual layer was significantly different. ISR was much more focused on providing readers with dedicated articles which aimed to mould a new genre of jihadists following IS’s “methodology,” instead of just pictures.

The first edition focused on the legitimisation of the statehood of Daesh. Its cover story discussed education of new imams and khateebs (individuals delivering sermons in mosques), which manifested IS’s leadership ambitions to radicalise the civilian population under its rule. The article argued that “spreading Islamic knowledge, correcting the people’s understanding of the religion, and clarifying the truth are all from among the most important goals of the Islamic State of Iraq and Shaam.”⁶¹ It was followed by an interview with the organiser of a seminar dedicated to the indoctrination of Islamic scholars. He compared the results of this initiative to the process of the transition from darkness to light.⁶² ISR #1 also discussed the activities of the Islamic State in terms of consumer protection. Among others, it stressed that “caring for the residents of Wilayat ar-Raqqah is a goal of the Islamic State.”⁶³

The content of the second edition was similar to the first one, as it effectively lacked any reports on violent actions conducted by Daesh. Instead, it concentrated on showcasing farmers, who “willingly” provided zakah (obligatory charity) to the Islamic State’s administration. As the newsletter argued, “the residents of some of the villages voluntarily gathered the Zakah and piled it up in front of the masjids of their respective villages and invited the Zakah committees to come and collect it.”⁶⁴ It also boasted of the crops gathered in Wilayat al-Barakah, as well as informed readers about the help provided by IS to farmers.⁶⁵ The second leading topic of this volume was related to the activities of the Islamic police in al-Raqqa. ISR #2 claimed that it is a “group comprised of some of the best men of the Islamic State and its people, and are responsible for protecting the Muslims and their property from being violated.”⁶⁶ Thus, once again the organisation presented itself as the only safeguard for the wellbeing of Muslims.

The final two issues of ISR were qualitatively different. The third volume focused on the “liberation” of Mosul and the new arrangements introduced by Daesh in this area. It expressed Islamic State’s ambitions to expand in the Middle East: “the state would […] continue its policy of governing any liberated areas in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah, providing civilians with a range of social services based on the needs of the population and locality, and educating, recruiting, training and deploying more and more Muslims eager to play their role in rebuilding the Islamic khilafah.”⁶⁷ The article consisted of a number of images, depicting the aftermath of battle and victorious mujahidin, strengthening their “winner’s image.” ISR #3 also featured a summary of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s victory speech, which was accompanied by images of crowds in the streets, cheering the Islamic State’s conquest. Thus, it capitalised on the triumphant march of the group’s militants across Iraq.⁶⁸

The final edition was much more focused on the military aspect of IS’s activities. Its cover page contained a symbolic slogan: “Smashing the borders of the tawaghit.” The first text focused on the nullification of the Sykes-Picot agreement by the conquests of the “Caliphate.” It stressed that “it was only a matter of time before the oppressive tawaghit of the Muslim world would begin to fall one-by-one to the swords of the mujahidin, who would raise the banner of tawhid, restore the hukm of Allah, direct the masses back to the prophetic manhaj of jihad and away from the corruption of democracy and nationalism, and unite them under one imam […] The mujahidin had taken a major step in casting off the shackles of the kafir nations and proving that no kafir was strong enough to separate the Muslims from one another, neither with their artificial borders, nor with their corrupt ideologies, for the end result would always be in favor of the muttaqin.”⁶⁹ Thus, the current political shape of the Middle East was presented as something imposed against the unity of Muslims by “infidels.” In this context, the Islamic State was depicted as the only organisation that acted to remove them, in order to bring back the unity of ummah. Moreover, ISR #4 discussed the battle of Asadullah al-Bilawi and praised militants for their assaults against Shias. This report was accompanied by numerous images presenting mujahidin with war booty (ghanimah), as well as executions of 1,700 captured Iraqi soldiers.⁷⁰ In effect, it became the only edition that consisted of images of gore and was focused on military affairs. In contrast, earlier issues were much more inclined to present the internal situation in territories seized by the followers of al-Baghdadi.

While ISN and ISR were in fact very short and crude both in form and substance, each consecutive edition manifested visible improvements, indicating that their editors learned from their mistakes. From the viewpoint of the organisation of content, there were certain similarities and differences noticeable between these two publications. On the one hand, both adopted distinct forms. ISN was dominated by visuals, in the form of photo reportages, accompanied by brief commentary. In contrast, as Ingram noted, “with Islamic State Report (ISR), IS transitioned to a format that prioritized short articles allowing for more detailed reporting on not only its efforts in the field but the strategic, operational and jurisprudential logic driving them.”⁷¹ ISR paid less attention to military events and more to the internal situation of the “Caliphate.” It was also less inclined to use gory images to influence readers, but obviously such scenes were still used. On the other hand, both series attached great importance to expressing the statehood ambitions of the Islamic State, as well as contributed to building a triumphant image of the group at the apogee of its prominence. They were also inclined to highlight the ordinary lives of the Islamic State’s “citizens.” To summarise, in a certain sense, ISN and ISR could be perceived as precursors of the Islamic State’s flagship magazines. They constituted an opportunity to gather necessary experience that could be used in the written propaganda that followed. Additionally, some of the – inconsistent – narratives employed by them were similar to the sophisticated worldview conveyed by their successors – Dabiq and Rumiyah.

2.3Flagship magazines revisited: the thematic composition of Dabiq and Rumiyah from a comparative perspective

The content of Dabiq and Rumiyah has been frequently discussed by academics in recent years, as stated in the introduction. Most of them agree on general issues related to the worldview displayed by their editors. However, in the plethora of works analysing these means of “strategic messaging,” as Gambhir labelled the first magazine,⁷² some signs of a lack of consensus were also visible.⁷³ Thus, in order to test the leading conclusions of scientists, this study employed theme-focused content analysis, related both to the composition and substance of the Islamic State’s flagship magazines. It adopted 28 units of analysis, i.e. 15 editions of Dabiq and 13 editions of Rumiyah. Consecutive pages served as units of observation. This means that 1,532 pages of all the units of analysis combined were considered. Each page was categorised and analysed in six qualitatively different groups:

politics (e.g. the foreign policy of Western states, the activities of Middle Eastern governments, international relations, criticism of other jihadi organisations),

operations (e.g. terrorist and military activities of Daesh, instructions),

religion (criticism of other religions, theological deliberations related to pillars of Islam or Christian dogmas),

society (preferred model of a family, slavery of women, concubinage, the role of women and children in ummah, etc.),

economy (the introduction of a new currency, taxes, wealth of Muslims),

miscellaneous (themes which did not fit the aforementioned categories, including personal profiles and judicial issues).

Each page was coded as part of up to three categories. The goal here was to understand – and compare with other, similar studies – what kind of themes were predominantly discussed by both magazines. It also enabled the understanding of who were the most important target audiences.

In this context, while both flagship magazines were at least partially elaborated by the same editors, they were not identical in terms of their organisation of content. There are two potential reasons for this. On the one hand, it was possibly caused by the simple fact that the strategic situation of the group between 2014 and 2017 changed dynamically, effectively influencing the priorities of Islamic State’s propaganda machine. This, in turn, enforced changes in focus and style. On the other hand, even a cursory glance at these publications shows that the editorial staff constantly experimented with their internal structure, which usually – but not always – led to the improved quality of each consecutive release. For instance, there is a huge difference between the first and the 15th issue of Dabiq in terms of the columns included. A significant breakthrough was noticeable between the sixth and seventh edition. Such a shift was, relatively, less visible in Rumiyah, which partially inherited patterns adopted by the final volumes of an earlier periodical, but also introduced new solutions. Overall, both magazines manifested not only eye-catching similarities, but also interesting differences in terms of content organisation.

To begin with, it has to be stressed that Dabiq was much lengthier than Rumiyah, which may be explained by the very fact that the Islamic State’s propaganda machine between 2014 and 2016 was in a much better condition than between 2016 and 2017,⁷⁴ when all e-magazines merged into one, which was multilingual in nature (see Table 2.1). The length of Dabiq’s editions ranged from 40 (#5) to 83 (#7) pages, with an average for all 15 issues of 62.8 pages. In contrast, Rumiyah ranged from 38 (#1, #2) to only 60 pages, with an average of 45.38 pages. This probably meant that fewer human resources, in terms of independent and skilled authors and editors, were at the disposal of the al-Hayat Media Center from mid-2016, due to reasons outlined in previous sections.

Table 2.1 Number of pages of Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Number of pages in DABIQ | Number of pages in RUMIYAH
1 | 50 | 38
2 | 44 | 38
3 | 42 | 46
4 | 56 | 40
5 | 40 | 44
6 | 63 | 44
7 | 83 | 38
8 | 68 | 48
9 | 79 | 58
10 | 79 | 46
11 | 66 | 60
12 | 66 | 46
13 | 56 | 44
14 | 68 | -
15 | 82 | -
Average | 62.8 | 45.38

Source: Content analysis.

Secondly, while the introductory and closing sections of Dabiq remained relatively intact throughout all 15 issues, the editorial staff of Rumiyah adopted two contrasting approaches. The earlier issues of the magazine were based on a classic layout, which consisted of a separate cover page (with a cover story featured) and a table of contents. The latter was accompanied by the aforementioned quotation from az-Zarqawi, which referred to the battle in Dabiq and the final destiny of Daesh.⁷⁵ This could be, therefore, treated as a reference to the periodical’s name and viewed as the cornerstone of its apocalyptical narrative. In comparison, the first six volumes of Rumiyah merged the cover page and table of contents in a way that may have been alluring for some readers, due to the interesting visual form adopted (Figure 2.4). Nevertheless, due to unknown reasons, from the seventh edition editorial staff decided to separate the cover page and table of contents, in a similar way to Dabiq. Rumiyah also contained a citation related to the title of the magazine, which accompanied the table of contents. It was a statement of Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir: “O muwahiddin, rejoice for by Allah we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome).”⁷⁶ Thus, as mentioned above, it illustrates the changing priorities in IS’s written propaganda, as Apocalypse-driven narratives were dropped. Instead, a more “offensive” slogan was featured, which emphasised the ambitions of the “Caliphate” to defeat Christendom.

Figure 2.4Comparison of the cover pages of Dabiq #15 and Rumiyah #1.

Source: Internet Archive.

The function of the final pages was identical in both cases. As Wignell et al. noted, they constituted “short articles imparting words of wisdom.”⁷⁷ The final page’s messages were composed of religious quotations, which, at least indirectly, corresponded with the cover story of each issue or the general idea of the magazine. Dabiq generally utilised lengthier fragments of hadiths, while Rumiyah was keen to use shorter quotations from the Quran. Interestingly, in the first six issues of the second periodical, the same citation from the hadith on the conquest of Constantinople and Rome was used. This tendency changed from the seventh edition, which coincided with the aforementioned modifications of the introductory sections.

The core sections of Dabiq and Rumiyah evolved over time, but the general pattern in each case is identifiable. The first six editions of the first magazine were relatively simplistic in terms of internal structure. Most of them consisted of a foreword, a section dedicated to news and reports,⁷⁸ in the form of photo reportages with brief commentary, as well as the section “In The Words Of The Enemy,” which cited statements of public opinion leaders, intellectuals, or members of the political elite on the Islamic State. Other noticeable columns in the early editions include: standalone articles (“Article”), dedicated reports, and a “Feature” section, consisting of a cover story. From the third edition a “Special” section was introduced, which consisted of articles written by John Cantlie,⁷⁹ a British journalist who was taken into captivity by IS in 2012 or pieces legitimising the execution of James Foley.⁸⁰ From the fifth edition, greater importance was attached to the religious formation of readers, which was manifested by the introduction of “Hikmah” (wisdom). It featured quotations from core texts of Islam, accompanied by “contemplative” background images, such as sunsets, meadows, or forests.

From the seventh edition, four improvements in Dabiq were noticeable. Firstly, the “Among the Believers Are Men” section was launched, which was dedicated to promoting the profiles of martyrs. It became a regular column in all subsequent volumes of this magazine, which indicated the rising importance of shahadah (martyrdom) in the agenda of Daesh. Secondly, a section dedicated to the women of the “Caliphate” was created. Its texts were usually written by women, but its first edition contained an interview with Hayat Boumeddiene, the wife of French terrorist Amedy Coulibaly.⁸¹ Thirdly, an interview column was also established,⁸² which usually featured personal insights of Islamic State leaders, as well as its most notorious members. Fourthly, a section dedicated to discussing historical issues, which was important for inspiring readers, was finally introduced (“From The Pages Of History”).⁸³ In addition, Dabiq also consisted of a column dedicated to promoting the most important audiovisuals published by the Islamic State through advertisement banners – the “Top 10.”

Rumiyah adopted a less complicated, but also more flexible internal structure. It consisted of a foreword, as well as a column focused on providing information on Islamic State achievements – “Military and Covert Operations.”⁸⁴ Editorial staff decided to keep interviews and advertisements, but their format changed. Initially, “Selected 10” (instead of “Top 10”) was featured, but in time – probably due to the crisis within the propaganda machine – its form was adjusted in line with the lower output of the Islamic State media offices. In effect, final editions included advertisement banners of only one video at a time (instead of a list of ten).⁸⁵ Other standalone sections known from Dabiq either appeared irregularly or – as in the case of “Hikmah” and “In the Words Of The Enemy” – were never featured in the same form. The role of the first was taken over by multiple infographics, which discussed various religious issues. The second was not continued. Rumiyah also lacked “Specials” written by John Cantlie. The “Sisters” section returned in the fifth edition of the magazine,⁸⁶ and became a regular feature until the publication of the final 13th issue. “Among the Believers Are Men” was featured in volumes #1, #3, #8, #10 and #11, but there were many other articles which effectively fulfilled the same role.

Instead Rumiyah introduced a number of new sections. Initially, “Exclusive” was created, which merged the roles of the “Special” and “Feature” sections in Dabiq. It usually consisted of texts of the greatest importance for the agenda of the “Caliphate,” such as statements from its leaders.⁸⁷ Moreover, “Just Terror Tactics” was launched, which constituted a significant change when compared to the previous periodical that did not include any instructions for terrorists. Rumiyah changed this approach and dedicated several issues to training readers in the techniques of terrorist attacks, including car (truck) ramming,⁸⁸ hostage taking⁸⁹ and arson.⁹⁰ As Reed and Ingram noted, it offered “readers instructional guidance for engaging in terrorist attacks.”⁹¹ However, according to them, its content was unimpressive when compared to the flagship periodical of al-Qaeda: “JT has tended to focus on simpler, less sophisticated types of attacks whereas Inspire tended to offer a mix.”⁹² Overall, from the viewpoint of the organisation of content, the newer magazine proved to be a peculiar mixture of solutions introduced earlier in Dabiq with new ideas in a much more condensed form.

Content analysis of Dabiq enabled the determination of several interesting tendencies in the themes discussed by the editors (Table 2.2). They manifested predominant interest in three groups of issues, while other issues were generally of marginal importance. They paid great attention to deliberating on purely political issues, i.e. those which were related to power struggle in various dimensions and perspectives. Such content in Dabiq ranged from 9 (#3) to 47 (#10) pages, with an average for all 15 issues of 28.1 pages.

Table 2.2 Core themes exploited in the content of Dabiq (per page)

Issue | Politics | Operations | Religion | Society | Economy | Miscellaneous
1 | 27 | 18 | 27 | 8 | 1 | 4
2 | 12 | 17 | 23 | 3 | 0 | 3
3 | 9 | 18 | 24 | 8 | 0 | 3
4 | 21 | 20 | 22 | 6 | 3 | 6
5 | 22 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 2
6 | 33 | 26 | 29 | 4 | 5 | 2
7 | 36 | 36 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 11
8 | 32 | 21 | 32 | 6 | 0 | 12
9 | 40 | 29 | 24 | 11 | 0 | 12
10 | 47 | 25 | 44 | 11 | 0 | 12
11 | 32 | 15 | 17 | 11 | 1 | 11
12 | 37 | 26 | 17 | 10 | 1 | 11
13 | 22 | 23 | 29 | 3 | 0 | 13
14 | 41 | 24 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 8
15 | 11 | 26 | 68 | 12 | 0 | 7
Average | 28.13 | 22.33 | 28.73 | 7.33 | 0.86 | 7.8

Source: Content analysis.

In the abundance of articles discussing what is broadly understood as politics, there were very few which attempted to carry out any professional and unbiased analysis. Most of them were somewhat simplistic rants that made a simple division between the “good guys” (Islamic State and its followers) and the “bad guys” (literally the rest of the world). In order to emphasise this distinction, editors of Dabiq even made use of the popular concept of the clash of civilisations. This case is noticeable in its fourth volume that announced “the end of the lie called Western civilization and the rise of the Islamic giant.”⁹³ In this context, political content usually served the purpose of attacking factions, groups, states or even civilisations accused of being hostile towards the “Caliphate” or Muslims in general. Interestingly, while many articles were devoted to attacking transatlantic communities and democracy, even greater importance was given to criticising decision-makers in Muslim states. The broadly understood West was condemned for illegitimate actions against the ummah and its representatives (IS). This included its involvement in the MENA region, which was customarily presented as a “crusade.” A similar narrative was employed to attack Muslim leaders, mostly for their actions allegedly directed against Islam. Both of these tendencies were frequently merged. For instance, the third edition of the magazine commented on the situation in the Middle East with the following statement: “So while genocide is committed by the Maliki, Asadi, and Israeli forces against the Muslims via systematic massacres, chemical warfare, rape, and starvation by siege, Obama watches with euphoria.”⁹⁴ Additionally, the Muslim political elite was accused not only of corruption but also of conspiring with and being subjects of the “crusaders.” Dabiq #9 made it clear that “crusaders” and “their Jewish, hypocritical, and apostate allies […] plot against Islam.”⁹⁵ This text was accompanied by multiple images of Muslim and American leaders standing together. Symbolically, not only long-term American partners – such as Saudi Arabia (codenamed as al-Salul) – were blamed for this, but even Iran was accused of being a part of this conspiracy.⁹⁶

In addition to states, a great deal of political texts were devoted to attacking local factions, which were hostile towards the Islamic State, such as Kurdish militias or – more importantly – so called “jihadi claimants.” The second group consisted of radical Islamist organisations or militias that rivalled Daesh for the limited pool of extremist Muslim followers. They were accused of being fake, turncoat believers. Obviously, they were also blamed for cooperating with politicians against the interests of the ummah. This narrative proved to be so important that it was included as cover stories of Dabiq #6 (on al-Qaeda in Waziristan) and #14 (on the Muslim – or “Murtadd” as editors claimed – Brotherhood).⁹⁷ On a side note, the criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood may have been partially inherited from the ideology of al-Qaeda, which paid great attention to highlighting its mistakes in Syria and Egypt.⁹⁸ Finally, political content also referred to information on the activities of the “Caliphate” as a state, including the “efficient” administration of conquered territories, expansion into new areas (oaths of allegiance), and allegedly “flourishing” relations with its subjects.⁹⁹

The only notable exception from the leading form of political deliberations, which were similar to simplistic tirades, could be found in articles authored by John Cantlie. Possibly due to his indubitable skills and experience as a British journalist, his articles were much more nuanced and – at least partially – gave the impression of “objectivity” in describing political issues of great significance for the “Caliphate.” In his texts, he usually referred to and criticised the politics of Western governments, but in a more complex, sometimes even metaphorical way, to entice more demanding readers. For instance, in Dabiq #6 he argued that due to its military activities abroad, the United States’ economy was on the brink of collapse,¹⁰⁰ while in the ninth edition he presented Daesh as a global phenomenon “that the West and the democratic world as a whole is ill-equipped to deal with.”¹⁰¹

Religious deliberations proved to be slightly more frequent, as they – depending on the volume – ranged from 11 (#5) to 68 pages (#15), with an average for all 15 issues of 28.7. This is unsurprising, considering the fact that the core of the “Caliphate’s” ideology is founded on the radical interpretation of Islam. It is, therefore, natural that from day one, Dabiq was heavily interested in the religious formation of readers in a way which was beneficial for the agenda of al-Baghdadi’s organisation. In some respects, almost all of the core messages conveyed by the editors were more or less permeated with references to the Salafi interpretation of Islam. In this context, several interesting tendencies are visible. First of all, the magazine consisted of articles which provided theological argumentation backing up the proclamation of the “Caliphate.” The very first volume contained a text that advertised the concept of imamah (leadership in Islam) and argued that “the Islamic State is a true imamah.”¹⁰² Another core narrative, based on Islamic theology, was related to criticism of Muslims who allegedly violate the core principles of their religion. These pieces also supported the concept of takfir. However, they not only referred to Shia or Sufi Muslims but also to Sunnis (frequently labelled as sahwat¹⁰³). Those believers that abandoned violent jihad were compared to “the fornicators, the sodomites, and the drunkards.”¹⁰⁴ The tendencies of bidah¹⁰⁵ were frequently condemned, which usually corresponded with harsh criticism of the vast majority of Islamic scholars. For instance, Dabiq #8 discussed and criticised the concept of irja’ (postponement), which served the purpose of denouncing Muslim factions fighting in Iraq and Syria against Islamic State.¹⁰⁶ Surprisingly, a great deal of content of this magazine was also devoted to attacking the beliefs and customs of rafidah (“rejectors,” i.e. Shias).¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the editorial staff were highly concerned with presenting Salafi Islam as the only true path and undermining the legitimisation of all other religions, including – most of all – Christianity. This was manifested by the content of the 15th issue, which was devoted to undermining dogmas of Catholicism and convincing readers of the necessity of converting to Islam.¹⁰⁸ Thus, it became the only issue of Dabiq that predominantly targeted disbelievers. Even simple, operational activities of Daesh were accompanied by fragments related to religion. These pieces, among others, advertised ribat (frontline service),¹⁰⁹ explained the reasoning behind the immolation of a Jordanian pilot¹¹⁰ or explained the necessity of enslaving Yazidis.¹¹¹ Some articles were addressed to women and discussed, for instance, the situation of the widows of martyrs from the viewpoint of shari’ah.¹¹² Finally, many texts consisting of religious content, especially in the earlier issues, discussed the role of the Islamic State prior to and during the aforementioned, approaching Apocalypse (labelled as the “Hour”).¹¹³

The number of pages concerning the operations conducted by the Islamic State ranged from 11 (#5) to 36 pages (#7), with an average for all 15 issues of 22.3. Thus, it proved to be the third most common type of content identified in Dabiq. Generally, the magazine was interested in highlighting its military and terrorist achievements, which were advertised in dedicated sections (“Reports,” “Islamic State News”) or in standalone articles, which were devoted to various, up-to-date events. Many articles of this type also referred to hudud for violating Islamic values in territories controlled by Daesh. For instance, the third volume boasted of the punishment of the Shu’aytat tribe for its “treachery,”¹¹⁴ and discussed the “liberation” of the town of Dabiq.¹¹⁵ A perfect example of a text discussing the operations of Daesh can be seen in the column “A Selection of Military Operations Across the Islamic State,” which was featured in Dabiq #11. It listed and briefly discussed actions conducted by its members in various wilayats. Among others, it boasted: “On Thursday, Ramadan 29, the soldiers of the Khilafah succeeded in destroying a ship belonging to the murtadd Egyptian navy in the Mediterranean Sea north of Rafah. They targeted the vessel with a guided missile and succeeded in completely destroying it and killing those inside.”¹¹⁶ Thus, on the one hand, this type of content was meant to convey the message that the Islamic State was experiencing a string of victories. Whilst on the other, it also expressed that the organisation was efficient in governing and defending its own territories, through the application of “justice” towards those who violate shari’ah.

Other types of content analysed proved to be much less frequent. The mean average for social issues discussed in Dabiq was only 7.3 pages, and there were magazines which did not devote even a single page to discussing such matters (#5). Those which did so usually touched on issues of importance for the wellbeing of ummah, according to the Islamic State’s worldview. These issues were usually discussed in sections dedicated to women, which, for instance, concentrated on the validity of polygyny in Islam.¹¹⁷ This finding corresponds with Vale’s study which noticed that during the peak of IS power in the Middle East the role of women in the organisation was largely confined to the domestic sphere.¹¹⁸ The economy was of even less importance for the editorial staff, as the average share of pages per issue was only 0.8. This figure is not a surprise when considering the fact that nine volumes did not mention economic issues whatsoever. The most common economic issue discussed was related to the introduction of the golden dinar in territories seized by the Islamic State.¹¹⁹ Some biased commentary on the deficiencies of economic systems worldwide was also noticeable. Finally, content which did not fit the aforementioned categories had an average share of 7.8 pages per volume. It covered, among others, pages containing advertisement banners, cover pages, tables of contents, title pages of articles, as well as pieces which discussed the personal characteristics of terrorists, frequently included in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section.¹²⁰

The editorial staff of Rumiyah proved to have slightly different preferences in terms of featured content (Table 2.3). First of all, this magazine proved to be much less interested in political affairs. Pages consisting of this type of content ranged from 2 (#1) to 20 (#3) pages, with an average of only 9.07. Nevertheless, the means of debating political matters, which were employed by the magazine, were quite similar to its predecessor. For instance, Rumiyah #3 attacked Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood,¹²¹ #5 condemned sahwah for their cooperation with the United States and their allies,¹²² while #9 featured the statement of the “Caliphate’s” spokesman Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir who attacked the US-led coalition for its war against the Islamic State.¹²³ Visible changes could be seen in the fact that less importance was attached to articles highlighting Islamic State’s administration in territories controlled by the group. This suggested that the editors were less interested in manifesting the statehood ambitions of the group during the deepening crisis on all battlefronts in 2016–2017.

Table 2.3 Core themes exploited in the content of Rumiyah (per page)

Issue | Politics | Operations | Religion | Society | Economy | Miscellaneous
1 | 2 | 18 | 29 | 0 | 2 | 2
2 | 6 | 22 | 22 | 2 | 0 | 3
3 | 20 | 29 | 29 | 0 | 2 | 4
4 | 8 | 28 | 19 | 2 | 0 | 1
5 | 11 | 28 | 27 | 3 | 0 | 1
6 | 6 | 30 | 24 | 4 | 3 | 1
7 | 7 | 11 | 24 | 4 | 0 | 8
8 | 7 | 18 | 30 | 2 | 2 | 16
9 | 15 | 37 | 35 | 3 | 0 | 4
10 | 12 | 21 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 10
11 | 11 | 31 | 40 | 4 | 0 | 8
12 | 5 | 29 | 18 | 4 | 1 | 12
13 | 8 | 19 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 8
Average | 9.07 | 24.69 | 26.38 | 2.38 | 0.84 | 6

Source: Content analysis.

Instead, additional emphasis was placed on religious deliberations. Rumiyah proved to be especially interested in debating topics that could be utilised for the purposes of damage control. Maintaining the triumphant narratives known from Dabiq proved to be quite difficult, thus new ways of downplaying defeats suffered by the Islamic State in 2016–2017 were sought.¹²⁴ For instance, many volumes of Rumiyah (#1, #2) highlighted the importance of unity (jama’ah)¹²⁵ among Muslims. Editors frequently exploited Quranic surah al-Imran’s 103, which stated: “and cling firmly to the rope of Allah altogether and do not become divided.”¹²⁶ This was used in relation to the difficulties experienced by the organisation. Another important narrative referred to killing “infidels” and “apostates.” Among others, Rumiyah discussed under what circumstances the women and children of mushrikin (polytheists) may be killed.¹²⁷ Moreover, it was also interested in promoting the steadfastness of mujahidin on the battlefields. Their hardships were presented as “trials” from Allah.¹²⁸ Likewise, martyrdom was depicted as the final destiny for militants, e.g. through articles which referred to examples of Sahabah (companions of the Prophet Mohammad).¹²⁹ Interestingly, many infographics included in the content of Rumiyah referred to religious customs. For instance, the sixth volume consisted of a piece that listed nine ways of atoning sins in Islam.¹³⁰

The second most common type of content was related to more practical issues, related to the terrorist and military activities of mujahidin. Pages coded as “operations” ranged from 11 (#7) to 37 (#9), with an average of 24.6 for all 13 issues of this periodical. These results indicate that the editors attached great importance to promoting the achievements of IS members, both on the battlefields and in terms of suicide operations. As mentioned above, these were predominantly discussed in the “Operations” and, subsequently, the “Military and Covert Operations” section. There were, however, also standalone pieces, e.g. in the form of interviews, which discussed the actions of the group in various areas, in detail.¹³¹ Moreover, as mentioned above, this publication consisted of a new section “Just Terror Tactics,” which highlighted the greater attention given to the formation of new terrorists through the content of this magazine.

Other types of content proved to be scarce in Rumiyah. Society-related content had an average of 2.38 pages for all 13 issues, and there were as many as three that did not contain even a single fragment. Those which did were usually included in the section dedicated to women (“Sisters”). For instance, Rumiyah #7 discussed husband–wife relations and criticised backbiting.¹³² In fact, all pieces of this kind were similar to Dabiq, as they discussed various problems experienced by a “perfect” – according to IS ideology – Muslim family or presented women as “seedbeds” of radicalisation. As for texts discussing economics, they proved to be even more rare. The average share of this type of content for all 13 issues was less than one page. Seven editions did not refer to this theme at all. The few articles that did so were used as a means of damage control. For instance, the eighth edition condemned Muslim women for their focus on luxury. Instead it praised ascetism (zuhd), which corresponded with the deteriorating standard of living in the areas controlled by Daesh.¹³³ The share of other themes in the content of Rumiyah was quite high – on average 6 pages per edition. They basically consisted of the same elements as in Dabiq.

To summarise, Rumiyah was more concentrated on religion and actions conducted by the militants of Daesh and less on politics or social affairs, when compared to Dabiq. Its articles were permeated with religious content and were usually related to dedication, steadfastness, and patience in jihad, which could be treated as a means of damage control in the face of the deepening crisis facing the organisation. Dabiq’s texts on religion, while also related to jihad, were usually much broader. The strategic situation of the Islamic State, as well as its military achievements, were still praised in the newer magazine, despite the prolonged series of defeats. This manifested the interest of the editors in maintaining the triumphant image of the organisation. Moreover, Rumiyah consisted of instructions for preparing terrorist attacks, which were non-existent in its predecessor. Finally, Rumiyah paid less attention to discussing the course of international relations, which was of crucial importance in Dabiq. Articles presenting the “Caliphate” as a state, including its governance over ummah, were also much less visible.

Despite all these differences, both magazines maintained a partially similar internal structure, including sections dedicated to promoting martyrdom, influencing women and providing biased news. Moreover, despite the different focus of both periodicals, the narratives and style employed by Dabiq were generally similar to those from Rumiyah. Each magazine was interested in, among others, highlighting the achievements of the organisation, criticising hostile entities, praising mujahidin, and explaining the core dogmas of its agenda. This confirms the conclusions of Wignell et al., who argued that “Dabiq and Rumiyah are more similar than they are different.”¹³⁴

In this context, this brief analysis allows the leading groups of topics debated and the target audience of these magazines to be identified. Surprisingly, to date there is no consensus among academics on these particular issues. On the one hand, according to Ingram, Dabiq “has been central to its propaganda war for Western Muslims.”¹³⁵ He also perceived the magazine’s primary goal as to persuade readers to support Daesh, either by conducting hijrah, or by engaging in acts of domestic terrorism.¹³⁶ A similar viewpoint was held, among others, by Alexander and Alexander, who argued that the magazine “encourages pious Sunni Muslims outside the region to immigrate to the Islamic State.”¹³⁷ The Carter Center’s report follows the same path by stating that “Dabiq has revolutionized recruitment of foreign fighters through its use of crisp imagery, its thematic design, and innovative use of languages.”¹³⁸ However, in contrast, Azman noticed that its messages are conveyed to both supporters of Daesh and also to its potential followers and enemies.¹³⁹ Moreover, according to Shori Liang, Dabiq was dedicated to global, thus not exclusively Western, audiences.¹⁴⁰ Finally, Colas listed the second generation of English-speaking Muslims, converts, Western policy-makers, and members of Daesh who were not well integrated into the group as the most important target audiences of this periodical.¹⁴¹

From the viewpoint of this study both perspectives are more or less correct. Dabiq and subsequently Rumiyah were designed predominantly to influence Anglophone Sunni Muslims. This intent is obvious after even a brief and cursory glance at these magazines. Their content was permeated with specialised Islamic nomenclature in Arabic, the meaning of which is difficult to grasp for “disbelievers.” In addition, they were heavily focused on religious deliberations, explaining the validity of the Islamic State’s extremist version of shari’ah. This does not mean, however, that the periodicals attempted to “convince the convinced.” They reached out not only to already radicalised Muslims, being the most likely group of readers, but also to those Sunnis who remained critical towards the self-proclaimed “Caliphate.” They were continuously invited to follow the “proper” interpretation of Islam and to join the “caravan” of jihad.

Nevertheless, there were dedicated sections of these magazines, which – at least partially – aimed to influence other groups of online audiences. Many articles were designed in a way that corresponded with the cultural framing of the broadly understood West. This was visible, for instance, in articles authored by John Cantlie, whose methods of narration, irony, and metaphors would be difficult to grasp for inhabitants of the Middle East or Africa. Moreover, Anglophone Christians were targeted, which was proven by the content of the 15th issue of Dabiq. Similarly, some texts, at least partially, were dedicated to reaching out to Shia Muslims, as they issued demands of repentance. Finally, the editors of both magazines were perfectly aware of the fact that their content was carefully analysed by the international community. Thus, some sections, such as “In the Words of the Enemy,” could be perceived as a tool of indirect debate with Western mass media and opinion-forming circles. In effect, Dabiq and Rumiyah were also a means of gaining additional global resonance.

2.4Francophone internet users as a target of the propaganda machine of Daesh: the case of Dar al-Islam

From the viewpoint of chronology, the Dar al-Islam magazine was the second – after Dabiq – serious endeavour of the al-Hayat Media Center, which attempted to reach out to non-Arabic audiences. It was designed as an instrument of influencing Internet users from France. Nevertheless, this publication series, also, had the significant potential of resonating in Sub-Saharan Africa, where French is one of the most popular languages.¹⁴² According to its very creators, Dar al-Islam became “a tool of incitement to hijrah and jihad and a modest contribution of Francophone brothers who live in the Caliphate.”¹⁴³ It also aimed to show the “immense blessing” of a life under the “law of Allah, in the midst of believers.”¹⁴⁴

Dar al-Islam was established on December 23, 2014 (1st Rabi al-Awwal 1436). Its first issue featured a triumphant theme as its cover story by claiming that the “Islamic State extends its territory.” It was accompanied by a picture showing a crowd pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi in the background (Figure 2.5). It was the shortest of all ten volumes published, as it consisted of only 15 pages. Its introduction boasted of the revival of the “Caliphate.”¹⁴⁵ The rest of this edition concentrated more on traditional topics, which were heavily exploited in Dabiq. Its articles referred either to religious deliberations, such as the importance of monotheism as a prerequisite for victory against the “infidels,”¹⁴⁶ or to issues that supported the glorious image of Daesh. Among others, it featured stories which explained the legitimacy of the “Caliphate,” as well as reiterated the obligation of all Muslims to pledge bay’ah to al-Baghdadi.¹⁴⁷ Expansion of Daesh in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, and Algeria was also discussed and accompanied by lengthy quotations from Khalifah’s communiqué.¹⁴⁸ Finally, this issue featured the widely advertised “comeback” of the golden dinar.¹⁴⁹

Figure 2.5Cover page of Dar al-Islam #1.

Source: Internet Archive.

The second volume appeared online in February 2015 and corresponded with the tragic terrorist attacks in Paris, against Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket. Considering the target audience of this periodical, this proved to be the obvious choice for the cover story, which bore the title: “May Allah Curse France” (Figure 2.6). The introduction focused on praising these terrorists and legitimising violence against disbelievers. Additionally, the Islamic State was said to be the only efficient means of ending the domination of “crusaders” and “Jews” over Muslims.¹⁵⁰ Unsurprisingly, all other articles included in this volume were more or less related to these events. One story explained the necessity of killing those who insulted the Prophet Mohammad, which was related to the attacks against Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists. Interestingly, it also condemned Christians in France, who allegedly did not react when the editorial staff of this French weekly mocked Jesus Christ.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, Dar al-Islam #2 praised Amedy Coulibaly (Aboû Basîr Abdoullâh al-Ifriqî) for his actions, which were presented as the greatest way of attaining salvation.¹⁵² He was also showcased as an example of a martyr, whose actions should be followed by others.¹⁵³ Furthermore, this edition contained a text which discussed the history of the alleged negative attitude of France towards Islam, thus acting in an indirect way of inspiring readers to attack its government and citizens.¹⁵⁴ Finally, it featured an interview with Coulibaly’s wife.¹⁵⁵ Overall, the whole issue was devoted to capitalising on the Paris attacks. At its core, it also concentrated on developing the eulogy of Amedy Coulibaly, the only terrorist to take part in these events who pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi. In contrast, the profiles of the Kouachi brothers, associated with al-Qaeda, were almost non-existent in the narrative.¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, the whole issue was even shorter than the first one, as it consisted of only 14 pages.

Figure 2.6Cover page of Dar al-Islam #2.

Source: Internet Archive.

The third issue was released at the end of March 2015 and chose the “destruction of idols” as its cover story. It was much longer than the first two volumes, as it consisted of 23 pages. The introduction was focused on hisbah (shari’ah police) and argued that the Islamic State is the only entity on Earth which follows the laws of Allah.¹⁵⁷ This message was continued in the first article, which discussed the destruction of “idols,” defined as Shia tombs and temples. It also highlighted the alleged “hate” of Shias towards Islam and Sunni Muslims.¹⁵⁸ Some articles were more inclined to touch on quasi-theological issues, as they discussed the “rules of hijrah,”¹⁵⁹ the foundations of Islam,¹⁶⁰ and the legitimacy of shahadah (martyrdom) operations.¹⁶¹ This particular issue also featured an article entitled “Islamic State In The Words of The Enemy,” the idea of which was drawn from Dabiq. However, in contrast to this flagship magazine, which usually paid attention to the opinions of representatives of the American or British political and intellectual elite, Dar al-Islam discussed the viewpoint of French pundits. It proved that its editors were interested in adapting its content to the specificity of the political debate in the 5th Republic.¹⁶² This issue resembled Dabiq even more closely, as it copy-pasted a translated interview with the Tunisian terrorist Abou Muouqatil at-Tounsi (Abu Muqatil at-Tunusi).¹⁶³ It was originally released in the eighth edition of the Anglophone e-magazine (Figure 2.7).¹⁶⁴ Thus, the content of the third edition was not only much more different when compared to earlier volumes but it also mimicked – in some aspects – the flagship periodical of Daesh.

Figure 2.7Comparison of the content of Dabiq #8 (left) and Dar al-Islam #3 (right).

Source: Internet Archive.

The fourth edition, released in June 2015, proved to be a serious step forward. From this moment, Dar al-Islam ceased to resemble a crude newsletter and emerged as a full-fledged magazine of comparable quality to Dabiq. First of all, this issue was much longer, as it consisted of 42 pages and its graphical layout showed serious signs of improvements. The cover story was focused on the battle against “apostates.” This topic was discussed in the introduction, which also referred to the “End Times,”¹⁶⁵ as well as in the first article that supported the concept of takfir.¹⁶⁶ Other stories promoted the statehood and achievements of Daesh through a variety of means. Among others, they discussed the application of hudud (punishments) by the Islamic State in response to “adultery,” which was illustrated with a picture of a hand holding a stone, as well as a homosexual man dropped from the roof.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, it contained a report on the allegedly peaceful and well-organised life under the “Caliphate’s” administration in Mosul. It featured a number of images presenting tidy streets, stocked markets, gardens and universities that “flourished” in the shade of al-Baghdadi’s power. Surprisingly, little commentary was included.¹⁶⁸ In some respects this particular photo reportage was reminiscent of the infamous Mujatweets video series, which presented the daily life of the Islamic State’s “citizens.”¹⁶⁹

This issue manifested even more similarities to Dabiq than the previous one. It not only consisted of another section entitled “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy”¹⁷⁰ but also featured a dedicated news column, which contained a multitude of images accompanied by short commentary. They discussed IS’s victories in Syria (Tadmur) and Iraq (Ramadi), terrorist attacks in Texas and Afghanistan, as well as a new pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi in Algeria.¹⁷¹ It even featured a translated testimony of Abu Jarir ash-Shamali on al-Qaeda in Waziristan, which was promoted as a cover story in the sixth edition of Dabiq.¹⁷²

The fifth edition was released in July 2015 and consisted of 49 pages. Its cover story proved to be similar to the 10th edition of Dabiq: “Shari’ah Of Allah Or Shari’ah Of Men.” Thus, the featured story was related to sahwat in Iraq and Syria. They were attacked and condemned in the introduction¹⁷³ and also in the first article, which accused Muslim factions fighting against Daesh in the Middle East of supporting nationalism and democracy. Moreover, editors argued that the al-Nusra Front cooperated with them, which was presented as a great sin.¹⁷⁴ The very same article was exploited in the 10th edition of Dabiq.¹⁷⁵ The fifth issue also copy-pasted a translated text, which was featured in the fourth edition of the flagship magazine: “The Revival Of Slavery Before The Hour.” It discussed and legitimised the persecution of Yazidis, conducted by the Islamic State.¹⁷⁶ According to Roy, the most surprising thing about this article is that

the return of slavery here, after having fallen into disuse over the course of history, is presented not merely as the revival of a practice allowed in the early days of Islam, but as proof that the end of the world is coming, because they have returned to the situation at the time of the Prophet, and thus the nullification of the time of man.¹⁷⁷

Dar al-Islam #5 also continued to argue that the Islamic State is the only entity that applies the correct form of shari’ah. This time the argumentation employed was related to the jizyah tax, which was imposed over “infidels” in the territories controlled by Daesh.¹⁷⁸ Other pieces featured discussed IS’s operations conducted to liberate jihadi prisoners,¹⁷⁹ the health service under the “Caliphate,”¹⁸⁰ and provided news on the “Caliphate’s” achievements, among others, in Homs, Tadmur, and France (terrorist attack).¹⁸¹ Similarly to Dabiq and to earlier editions, a section on the opinions of its enemies on the Islamic State was included, but it was the first one which featured a non-French person – Barack Obama.¹⁸² Moreover, this edition contained an unusual element in the form of security instructions for mujahidin. They discussed means of maintaining privacy on the Internet (VPNs, TOR network, TrueCrypt), as well as rules for preparing terrorist attacks (e.g. shaving off beards to avoid suspicion).¹⁸³ As for the other sections, this issue consisted of the “Top 10” video advertisements, as well as a banner promoting the French version of the Maysarah magazine (Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8Fragment of Maysarah magazine advertisement in Dar al-Islam #5.

Source: Internet Archive.

The sixth edition was produced in September 2015 and consisted of 57 pages. This time it was noticeably more inclined to discuss religious topics (Figure 2.9). Its cover story was focused on murji’ah (“those who postpone”) and irja (“postponement”). It proved to be a means of criticising Islamic scholars who have a negative attitude towards Daesh.¹⁸⁴ This leading narrative was carried on in another article, which attacked Muslim scholars for their alleged deviance.¹⁸⁵ Other pieces provided advice for the wives of martyrs,¹⁸⁶ featured a statement of the wali of Western Africa¹⁸⁷ and promoted the ribat service in the Deir ez-Zor province.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, this issue consisted of regular columns which discussed the opinions of disbelievers on the Islamic State and conveyed news of the recent achievements of Daesh. While it was concentrated on religion, traditional political rants were also visible. For instance, the introduction criticised France for its engagement in the US-led coalition against Daesh.¹⁸⁹ Most importantly, Dar al-Islam #6 continued the trend introduced in the previous issue and featured quite detailed instructions for mujahidin. This time they referred to the handling of firearms, such as AK-47, Glock, TT (Toula-Tokarev), as well as Russian F-1 grenades.¹⁹⁰ Finally, it provided readers with posters with information about two IS hostages from China and Norway – Fan Jinghui and Ole Johan Grimsgaard Ofstad. They were also featured in Dabiq.

Figure 2.9Cover page of Dar al-Islam #6.

Source: Internet Archive.

The seventh edition consisted of 58 pages and was released at the end of November 2015. The cover story was once again focused on France (Figure 2.10), which suffered from a series of terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13.¹⁹¹ It was, therefore, an easy decision for the editorial staff to capitalise on these tragic events to further the agenda of Daesh among Francophone readers. The introduction commenced with an indicative statement: “Poor France. She ends the year as she started it: in tears and blood.”¹⁹² These acts of terrorism were presented as a response to the “crimes” of France, including its engagement in the coalition fighting the Islamic State. This theme was also exploited in the final sections of the magazine in the form of a photo reportage.¹⁹³ Other articles discussed prophetic methodology as the foundation of the “Caliphate,”¹⁹⁴ criticised the educational systems in the states of the “infidels” (including France), which were presented as a means of spreading corruption among Muslim children,¹⁹⁵ and promoted polygamy as the desired basis of a perfect family.¹⁹⁶ It also argued that ummah is threatened by conspiracy created by, among others, atheists and Christians.¹⁹⁷ Once again, pieces published in Dabiq were reused, as this issue featured an interview with Abu Samir al-Urduni, who previously operated in the Al-Nusra Front. This text constituted, therefore, a means of attacking al-Qaeda and other jihadi factions active in the Levant.¹⁹⁸ Finally, the regular columns – “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy” and “News from the Islamic State” – were included. The first one contained lengthy excerpts from Marc Edouard Nabe, who discussed the phenomenon of IS in his publication.¹⁹⁹ Thus, once again this column was adapted to its target, Francophone audience. As for the news, this was mostly represented by images showing, for example, the application of punishments of stoning (for adultery) and hand amputation (for robbery), as well as the educational system under Daesh. The magazine also featured another poster, this time presenting the corpses of the Chinese and Norwegian hostages, two “Top 10” sections, as well as a banner of the French version of the infamous No Respite (Ne Me Donnez Pas De Répit) video.

Figure 2.10Cover page of Dar al-Islam #7.

Source: Internet Archive.

The eighth volume of Dar al-Islam was released in February 2016 (Figure 2.11). It consisted of 114 pages. It was not only much longer than its predecessors, and in fact the lengthiest volume of Dabiq, but it also bore signs of numerous improvements. Among others, the “Introduction” section re-emerged as “Editorial,” the structure of the table of contents was much more deliberate, and the overall graphical layout proved to be much more sophisticated. This was especially noticeable in the “News from the Islamic State” section, which took on a completely new and advanced form, reminiscent of al-Naba’s infographics.²⁰⁰ Its cover story continued the topic of the seventh edition – the terrorist attacks in Paris, which were the most significant achievement of Daesh in terms of terrorist attacks in Europe. Thus, the introduction not only promised new operations of IS members against France but also blamed France’s government for these events. The French population was depicted as a victim of its government’s failed policy and propaganda.²⁰¹ Subsequently, the magazine discussed the legitimacy of these attacks, which was backed up by more anti-French argumentation. It also highlighted potential targets for terrorist operations in France in the future, including the assemblies and marches of the Front Nationale.²⁰² It was followed by the testament of Abdelhamid Abaaoud (Abu Umar al-Baljiki), which encouraged readers to support the “Caliphate,” wage jihad and conduct martyrdom operations.²⁰³ This theme was also exploited in the regular section – “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy” – which cited the French blogger Cédric Mas. He discussed the threat of terrorism in the 5th Republic.²⁰⁴ Moreover, this issue featured a photo reportage on the terrorists who participated in the November 13 operation. It presented their activities before their departure to France. Among others, these pictures were proof of their participation in the execution of hostages.²⁰⁵ Other stories discussed the relationship between the Shias and Dajjal (devil),²⁰⁶ provided testaments of Abû Rayyân al-Firansî (Omar ibn Muhammad Mostefai)²⁰⁷ and Abû Mujâhid al-Baljîkî,²⁰⁸ and deliberated on ways of distinguishing between “truth” and “falseness” in Islam.²⁰⁹ Interestingly, there was even more evidence indicating that the editors were inspired by Dabiq. For instance, Dar al-Islam #8 brought in the well-known column called “Among the Believers Are Men.”²¹⁰ It consisted of a eulogy of Abu Umar al-Firansi, who was a French citizen. The article praised him and described his path towards martyrdom. However, in contrast to the flagship magazine of Daesh, this apotheosis of shahadah was written by his widowed wife.²¹¹ This issue also consisted of an interview with Hafiz Sa’id Khan, governor of the IS province of Khurasan.²¹²

Figure 2.11Cover page of Dar al-Islam #8.

Source: Internet Archive.

The ninth edition of Dar al-Islam was released at the end of April 2016. It was much shorter than the eighth, as there were only 78 pages in total. It maintained the new quality in terms of the organisation of content and the visual layout. The editorial boasted of the effects of terrorist attacks in Brussels.²¹³ This topic was also advertised by the poster that followed, which demanded that the readers begin their journey on “the path of Allah” (Figure 2.12). This time the cover story was much more concentrated on theology. It aimed to persuade readers that Daesh follows and promotes Islamic values. Its actions were compared to the achievements of the Prophet’s companions – the Sahabah. This article was presented as a piece which responded to the criticism from some Muslim scholars stating that the “Caliphate” has nothing to do with Islam.²¹⁴ The magazine also consisted of another “Among the Believers Are Men” column, which featured the infamous Mohammad Emwazi. It proved to be quite detailed when it came to describing his hijrah to the Islamic State. Interestingly, a different eulogy of “Jihadi John” was also included in the 13th issue of Dabiq.²¹⁵ Moreover, the ninth volume of Dar al-Islam featured two regular columns. “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy” cited an article on Daesh authored by the American-French cultural anthropologist Scott Atran.²¹⁶ “News from the Islamic State” discussed, among others, events in the Philippines, as well as the operations of mujahidin against the Syrian Arab Army in Levant and against the Taliban in Afghanistan.²¹⁷ It also featured a photo reportage which focused on ordinary life under the rule of the “Caliphate” in Libya (Sirte). This fragment consisted of images of children in a playground, as well as scenes from a hospital.²¹⁸ Finally, editors decided to bring back detailed instructional material. Similarly to Dar al-Islam #5, they provided readers with a piece discussing some basic measures which would enable them to maintain privacy and security on the Internet. This article, accompanied by a number of screenshots, discussed TOR network, HTTPS, SSL certificates, PGP encryption and the privacy-driven Tails operating system. Among others, authors explained how to install Tails and how to use PGP encryption in this operating system. The manual also discussed the “safe” way of using dedicated chatting software – Jabber. Overall, these instructions were very advanced and provided step-by-step advice.²¹⁹ Finally, the magazine highlighted a target for another potential terrorist attack in France – the imam of the Great Mosque in Bordeaux. He was labelled by editors as “Wanted Dead.” The content of this poster was unusual, as it not only accused him of violating the rules of Islam but also provided readers with the address of his mosque, accompanied by a satellite map.²²⁰

Figure 2.12Poster included in Dar al-Islam #9.

Source: Internet Archive.

The final, tenth edition of Dar al-Islam was published in summer 2016 (Figure 2.13). In September, this magazine was replaced by the French edition of Rumiyah. The tenth volume consisted of only 58 pages. Its cover story – “Game Over” – once again concentrated on events in France – the terrorist attacks in Nice and Magnanville. In the cover story, the editors declared that the 5th Republic had lost the war with the Islamic State.²²¹ Interestingly, the “Editorial” for this issue was written by Larossi Abballa, the murderer of a police officer and his partner in Magnanville (June 13, 2016). He pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi and called on Muslims in France to attack “infidels.”²²² It also consisted of Abu Umar al-Shishani’s testament, which among others, urged readers to never abandon jihad and hijrah. Furthermore, this volume featured a second part of an article which legitimised the terrorist attacks in Paris, Saint-Denis and Brussels. The authors of this piece argued that it is forbidden to insult Allah, the Prophet Mohammed, Islam, or the Quran. The article accused the West of persecuting Muslims, and this issue was illustrated with images of deceased children.²²³ It was also the only issue of Dar al-Islam that contained a piece of damage control, which referred to the rising strategic difficulties faced by Daesh in 2016. The war with the US-led coalition was presented as a struggle between David and Goliath.²²⁴ It manifested numerous similarities to Dabiq. To begin with, this issue introduced a text dedicated to females. It discussed the achievements of women from the Golden Age of Islam, which was similar to the “Women” section of the flagship periodical. Women were praised for their achievements in such areas as social development, participation in jihad, healthcare, literature, and poetry. The article was concluded with a message to the women of the “Caliphate” to follow in the footsteps of their great predecessors.²²⁵ Secondly, the “Among the Believers Are Men” column was included once again. This time it featured Abu Sayf ad-Din. The history of his life was written by his wife Umm Sayf ad-Din al-Firansiyah.²²⁶ Thirdly, the editors maintained “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy.” The column cited the article of Hassan Abu Haniyah, who discussed the tactics employed by Daesh.²²⁷ Fourthly, “News From The Islamic State” discussed numerous achievements of the group, including suicide attacks and military operations in Iraq.²²⁸

Figure 2.13Cover page of Dar al-Islam #10.

Source: Internet Archive.

In this context, this volume contained two unusual columns, which were also present in Dar al-Islam #9. The first was the second part of professional cyber security instructions for mujahidin. This time, they focused on safe communication via smartphones. The manual provided by the magazine explained means of encryption in the Android operating system, as well as methods for the safe exploitation of browsers and communication software (ORBOT, ORFOX, ChatSecure). Additionally, PGP encryption was also described.²²⁹ The second uncommon piece was the order to assassinate another French imam – this time from Brest.²³⁰

Dar al-Islam proved to be a very interesting and sophisticated publication of the French branch of the al-Hayat Media Center. As Nance and Sampson rightly noted, it was launched as a rather short and simplistic magazine, but it expanded steadily.²³¹ Its organisation of content as well as style evolved over time. In effect, its last editions were on par with or – in some areas – even slightly more advanced than Dabiq. This was due to the fact that the editors of Dar al-Islam in many ways not only attempted to follow the example of the flagship magazine but also demonstrated creativity in elaborating innovatory forms of promoting the agenda of Daesh.

On the one hand, as mentioned above, many of Dar al-Islam’s articles were mere translations of texts previously used in Dabiq. Furthermore, the nomenclature and argumentation used in both series of publications were almost identical. As Roy emphasised, “the articles in Dabiq and Dar al-Islam are structured as arguments that describe and justify, as if the crime could not achieve its full impact until it was transformed into a discourse on itself.”²³²Additionally, regular columns of Dar al-Islam, such as “News From The Islamic State,” “Islamic State In The Words Of The Enemy,” and “Among the Believers Are Men” were taken from the flagship periodical.²³³ On the other hand, all these sections showed signs of serious improvements, and not just in terms of graphical layout. For instance, the profiles of martyrs were frequently elaborated by widows, which added a more personal dimension to these texts. They were also accompanied by testaments, which were uncommon in Dabiq. They proved to be a refined form of conveying calls to wage jihad and conduct hijrah to readers. Moreover, the news section took a completely different – more advanced – form. Finally, while universal stories were included, a great part of Dar al-Islam’s content was adapted strictly to influence its Francophone audience. Editors visibly paid attention to political and scientific debate in France and commented on it on a regular basis. Significant attention was paid to presenting this country as one of the greatest enemies of the Islamic State. The 5th Republic was predominantly condemned for its well-known secularism, allegedly negative attitude towards Islam and participation in the US-led coalition in the Middle East. To summarise, Sparks was right when stating that Dar al-Islam “is similar, but not a carbon copy to ISIS’s English-language magazine, Dabiq.”²³⁴

2.5Konstantiniyye as a means of reinforcing radicalism in Turkey

The internal situation in Turkey can be perceived as one of the key determinants of the Islamic State’s activities since its establishment in the Levant. First of all, it was a crucial factor in influencing the inflow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. This state constituted, as mentioned above, a transfer hub for mujahidin conducting hijrah to the Islamic State in Sham. In this context, it is estimated that over 25,000 recruits travelled through Turkey to join the group.²³⁵ Secondly, al-Baghdadi’s organisation remained highly interested in reaching out to a large pool of radicalised Turks.²³⁶ As Starr emphasised in 2014, “better known as a transit country for foreign fighters to travel to Syria, Turkey is increasingly becoming a source of fundamentalist fighters.”²³⁷ Accessible data indicates that between 8,000 and 10,000 Turks moved to Syria and Iraq since the beginning of the war as foreign fighters.²³⁸ Thirdly, Ankara’s national security policy was a crucial factor influencing the military situation of the “Caliphate” in the Middle East. This was not only due to its controversial military involvement in the Syrian war, especially when it comes to its approach towards Kurds,²³⁹ but also its overall attitude to IS’s presence at its borders and within the country. According to Janes Intelligence Weekly, there were over 3,000 members of Daesh sleeper cells in Turkey.²⁴⁰

This clearly meant that Turkish citizens constituted a high-level target for the propaganda machine of Daesh. It was interested in provoking their criticism towards Turkey’s political and intellectual elite, which was a necessary requirement for successfully recruiting new members and followers from this country. Initially the primary means of reaching out to Turkish citizens was based on face-to-face and small group interactions. This was quickly backed up by IS’s Turkish-language propaganda, composed of three phases. The first was founded on the use of social media by IS’s Turkish members. The second consisted of pro-IS standalone websites in Turkish. Finally, the third phase was related to the emergence of a dedicated periodical – Konstantiniyye – which was launched in June 2015 by the al-Hayat Media Center.²⁴¹ By August 2016 seven issues of this e-magazine had been released.

From the perspective of its graphical layout, it did not stand out when compared to other pieces of written propaganda issued by Daesh at the time. Its first editions were rather crude in terms of the visuals employed, but those which were published in 2016 showed visible improvements. It is also noticeable that this periodical partially exploited graphics (advertisements, infographics) originally elaborated by other periodicals, such as Dabiq or al-Naba (Figure 2.14). It should be stressed that the most advanced pieces of visual propaganda were usually located in the final pages of each edition.

Figure 2.14Comparison of the “Top 10/Selected 10” column in the second issue of Konstantiniyye #2 (left) and Dabiq #10 (right).

Source: Internet Archive.

In terms of its organisation of content Konstantiniyye chose the path of simplicity. It lacked the dedicated sections known from Dabiq, Rumiyah or Dar al-Islam. For instance, it was bereft of regular columns which would enable the boasting of the achievements of Daesh (news/reports) or the promotion of the martyrdom of its members. Aside from the front page and table of contents, there were only three constant elements identifiable. The first was an introduction, which was dedicated to briefly presenting the content of the magazine and to discussing Turkish internal affairs. Konstantiniyye also consisted of the “Top 10” section, which advertised the most important audiovisuals produced by the Islamic State’s propaganda machine. The third constant element could be found at the end of the magazine. The last page featured quotations from the religious texts of Islam, which was similar to the flagship periodicals. This peculiar structure was, however, not necessarily a shortcoming. While being less sophisticated in terms of its organisation of content when compared to Dabiq, Konstantiniyye, due to its flexibility, could devote more attention to certain narratives which were prioritised by its editorial staff. In effect, the content of all seven editions was carefully considered and largely adapted to the political and social specificity of its target audience.

The very first volume consisting of 46 pages featured the conquest of Constantinople as its cover story. It also provided readers with the translated statement of an IS spokesman, deliberations on the destruction of cultural heritage in territories seized by the group, as well as discussion on developments in jihad in Western Africa. Two of these articles criticised the Turkish political elite, while others contained argumentation stating that democracy is the political system of disbelievers.²⁴²

The second, much lengthier (60 pages), issue started with an introduction focused on the significance of Turks in the Islamic State’s media operations. The rest of this volume debated the reasons for Islamic State’s struggle against Kurds and criticised the Turkish political elite.²⁴³ It was also dominated by religious deliberations, related to shirk (sin), for example. The magazine manifested visible improvements in terms of its graphical layouts. It consisted of advertisements of, for instance, al-Bayan Radio and “Top 10” videos, which was a constant element of Dabiq.

The third volume was even longer, with 72 pages. Its cover story concentrated on suicide bombing attacks,²⁴⁴ but the introduction “traditionally” criticised both Erdoğan and Kurds. It also contained harsh criticism of the leading Turkish Islamic scholar Mehmet Görmez, who was labelled an “apostate” and “traitor.”²⁴⁵ Finally, one article was fully devoted to denunciating Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was accused of being responsible for the hardships of Muslims and of being allied with the West.²⁴⁶

The fourth edition was slightly shorter, as it consisted of 68 pages, and featured Turkey’s leader with Vladimir Putin on the front page. Its opening reiterated the criticism of the Turkish government, among others, for its alliance with “crusaders.”²⁴⁷ Its other texts condemned secularism in Turkey, Russian involvement in the Middle East, discussed the significance of marriage in Islam, promoted martyrdom and boasted about the terrorist attack against a Russian plane over Sinai. This edition also featured images documenting the tragic events in Paris.²⁴⁸

Konstantiniyye #5 was issued in January 2016 and consisted of 56 pages (Figure 2.15). As Stein noted, it “sharpened its anti-Turkey message.”²⁴⁹ Its content was permeated with argumentation indicating that Turkey is a corrupt and blasphemous state. This narration was exploited in the introduction,²⁵⁰ as well as in the first article, which – once again – argued that Ankara is ruled by “apostates.”²⁵¹ This was followed by another piece, which personally attacked Erdoğan for his alleged dereliction of Islamic values.²⁵² Other texts were either more inclined to building up jihadi fervour amongst readers, as they, for example, legitimised violence against infidels²⁵³ or discussed the recent achievements of the Islamic State.

Figure 2.15Advertisement in Konstantiniyye #5.

Source: Internet Archive.

The sixth edition was shorter, as it contained only 52 pages. The cover page featured the former Egyptian President and Muslim Brotherhood leader – Mohamed Morsi. The introduction was similar to previous issues as it condemned the decision-makers in Turkey.²⁵⁴ The articles which followed castigated the Turkish military service,²⁵⁵ attacked the Muslim Brotherhood²⁵⁶ and praised the ribat (frontline service).²⁵⁷ This volume also included a poster featuring a kidnapped Turkish soldier.

The seventh and final volume, released on the Internet in August 2016, contained 60 pages (Figure 2.16). In the introduction, editors discussed the failed coup d’état which took place in Turkey. The editors remained highly critical of both sides of the conflict – Erdoğan and Gulen – which were presented as similarly blasphemous.²⁵⁸ Other pieces legitimised violence against kuffar (disbelievers)²⁵⁹ and encouraged readers to conduct hijrah from dar al-harb to areas controlled by Daesh.²⁶⁰ This issue of Konstantiniyye also consisted of a unique piece, i.e. an interview with a kidnapped Turkish soldier. This material heavily referred to the theme of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict and was obviously highly critical towards Erdoğan’s rule.²⁶¹

Figure 2.16Cover page of Konstantiniyye #7.

Source: Internet Archive.

Interesting observations on the content of Konstantiniyye were provided by the study of Korkmaz, who analysed keywords exploited by its editorial staff. According to Korkmaz, the term “war” proved to be one of the most common notions in all its issues, with an average of 110.42 uses per volume. It was also permeated with “classic” nomenclature labelling hostile entities, such as: kafir (average of 60.42 per volume), kufr (51.71), mushrikun (28.85), idol (4.42), idolatry (2.42), shirk (29.57) and taghut (46.42). In contrast, more positive and peace-related terms, such as “negotiation,” “dialogue,” and “tolerance,” were scarcely utilised. The most common words from this group were “justice” (6.71) and “freedom” (3.14).²⁶² This data clearly confirms that this magazine paid great attention to labelling the enemies of Daesh (the Turkish political elite, Arab political elite, the West, Kurdish militias) and inciting violence against them. Little importance was attached to less jihad-oriented themes, including social affairs, which – in contrast – were regularly discussed by Dabiq. Furthermore, the study of Korkomaz assessed the intensity of references to the religious texts of Islam, which indicates that Konstantiniyye was much more inclined to exploit the Quran over hadiths (82.28 uses per magazine vs. 32.28). The most commonly used surah was at-Tawbah.²⁶³

To summarise, Konstantiniyye concentrated on exploiting several narratives. First of all, it was extremely interested in discussing Turkey’s internal and external affairs. In each edition editorial staff criticised its political and social elite, who were characterised as devoid of real Islamic values. Erdoğan, as well as other important figures from among the Turkish elite, was accused of being sinful and allied with the enemies of Islam. Thus, Nance and Sampson were correct when stating that the criticism of Turkey’s relationship with the United States, Europe, and Russia was “always fodder for the magazine.”²⁶⁴ Secondly, it also focused on discussing Kurdish politics, as well as Kurdish–Turkish relations. Thirdly, it consisted of quasi-religious deliberations, which was similar to other Daesh periodicals. Finally, other issues of importance to the group’s agenda, such as criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood, were rarely discussed.

2.6Reaching out to Russian communities: Furat.Press and Istok

At the apogee of the Islamic State’s power, two periodicals which targeted Russian-speaking Internet users emerged. The first – Furat.Press – was an unofficial newsletter, which was established by the Furat Media Foundation at the end of April 2015. There were only two issues released.²⁶⁵ From the viewpoint of its graphical layout, organisation of content, as well as the narratives employed, this newsletter was visibly a step backwards when compared to the official “ethnic” magazines of Daesh. Its overall quality was lacking, if not amateurish. It lacked a table of contents, dedicated sections and advanced pieces of visual propaganda. As for the core messages conveyed by this periodical, they were neither surprising nor sophisticated. The cover of the first edition concentrated on advertising the prophetic methodology of the “Caliphate.” It was entitled “One Row, One Flag, One Leader. The Caliphate Based On Prophet’s Methodology,” which was reminiscent of the infamous slogan of the Nazis: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. It consisted of only 13 pages, all of which were relatively unstructured and simplistic in terms of their visual impression. The first article focused on combating sahwat and consisted of argumentation legitimising violence against them.²⁶⁶ Others either did the same or promoted profiles of mujahidin, who joined the “Caliphate,” including these who were previously “disbelievers” but eventually “repented.”²⁶⁷ As Wejkszner emphasised, by presenting the “spiritual path” that led the featured militants to join Daesh, this periodical aimed to inspire readers to follow in their footsteps.²⁶⁸

The second issue was even shorter, as it consisted of only seven pages. This volume was entitled: “No, They Are Alive.” Its content was entirely devoted to the promotion of jihad and martyrdom, as the greatest sacrifice “on the path” of Allah.²⁶⁹ This means that while Furat.Press was written in Russian, it lacked narratives adapted to the cultural specificity of the target group, i.e. Muslims living in post-Soviet areas. Overall, it came across as a half-hearted and half-baked project, which was initiated by one or a couple of individuals with limited editorial skills. Thus, it is not a surprise that the Furat Media Foundation quickly abandoned this newsletter.

This decision was fully understandable when considering the fact that the al-Hayat Media Center launched the first edition of Istok, dedicated to Russian-speaking online audiences in May 2015 (Figure 2.17). As Seib emphasised, it belonged to “the propagandistic repertoire in which Russian-speaking fighters can spread ISIS’s ideology.”²⁷⁰ Its editors, as they claimed themselves, had a background in fighting against the “Russian tyrants” in the Caucasus.²⁷¹ The first issue consisted of 24 pages and its quality, in terms of organisation of content and graphical layout, was of comparable quality to early editions of Konstantiniyye. It was permeated with rhetoric explaining the sources, “methodology,” and achievements of the Islamic State. The very first article discussed the experiences of mujahidin from the Northern Caucasus and their path to pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It also criticised the Syrian regime and other jihadi groups active in the Middle East, such as Ahrar al-Sham. Obviously, Daesh was praised as the embodiment of true Islam.²⁷² Two other articles featured in this volume touched upon similar subjects. The first described the history of the Islamic State since the times of Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, as well as offering a brief introduction on its ideology.²⁷³ The second discussed the legitimacy of the “Caliphate,” which was supported by a plethora of religious citations and arguments.²⁷⁴ Overall, there were only three lengthy articles in the first issue.

Figure 2.17Cover page of Istok #1.

Source: Internet Archive.

The second issue of Istok was released in August 2015. It consisted of 44 pages and showed serious improvement. It began with a translation of the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s statement from May 2015. It praised the steadfastness of mujahidin fighting for the group and inspired violence against the enemies of Islam.²⁷⁵ Another text discussed the conspiracy of sahwat against the Islamic State, defended the concept of takfir and rejected claims that Daesh was an emanation of a khawarij sect.²⁷⁶ The third article was once again focused on criticising parties fighting against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (mostly labelled as sahwat), with special emphasis put on the al-Nusra Front. It also praised the achievements of Daesh as a state of true shari’ah.²⁷⁷ Other articles discussed the ideological identity of IS’s militants and argued that they are heirs of Muslims from the Golden Era of Islam,²⁷⁸ supported the idea of the slavery of women (“concubinage”),²⁷⁹ discussed the activities of the religious police (hisbah) in the “Caliphate,”²⁸⁰ and promoted the profile of the Islamic State martyr Abu Osama al-Maghribi.²⁸¹

The third volume, consisting of 70 pages, was released by the al-Hayat Media Center at the end of November 2015, which corresponded with the successful Islamic State attack against a Russian plane over Sinai and the aforementioned events in France (Figure 2.18). It is, therefore, unsurprising that they were among the core topics discussed in this issue. It began with images of the documents of deceased Russians, as well as photographs of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris. This was followed by a story which explained that both Daesh operations against France and Russia were revenge for their alleged crimes against ummah, including Moscow’s activities in Caucasus and its support of al-Assad’s regime.²⁸² This article also featured an image of the bomb that was used on the Russian plane.²⁸³ Other texts discussed a variety of topics, including conspiracies against Islam and jihad.²⁸⁴ This issue also consisted of calls to hijrah, a translation of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s statement, as well as two profiles of Islamic State militants, including one Russian citizen.²⁸⁵ Once again, Islamic State’s religious police was also promoted in this issue.²⁸⁶

Figure 2.18Cover page of Istok #3.

Source: Internet Archive.

The final, fourth volume was released after half a year of delay – in May 2016. It was substantially shorter, as it consisted of only 42 pages. Its first text contained the apotheosis of a martyrdom operation conducted by a teenage boy²⁸⁷ and incitement of violence against disbelievers.²⁸⁸ The articles that followed consisted of interesting attempts at damage control. This was the case with a piece which argued that there were certain benefits to the US-led coalition bombardments of IS’s territories. According to its author, they could be perceived as a tool allowing the swift passage from dunya (worldly life) to Jannah (the Islamic version of Heaven)²⁸⁹ for believers. It was also depicted as a “vitamin” that allows true faith to grow, a path to asceticism, and a means of bringing the followers of Daesh together by strengthening their ties and friendship.²⁹⁰ Another text was dedicated to influencing readers living in Russia and the Northern Caucasus. It discussed the profile of and condemned a Chechen woman, Elvira Karaeva, who was accused by Daesh of spying for Moscow and subsequently executed.²⁹¹ It also deliberated on the situation of Muslims in Europe²⁹² and featured an interview with a paramedic from the Islamic State.²⁹³ Interestingly, it was the only issue of Istok that contained high-quality infographics.

To summarise, Istok proved to be a second-tier magazine of the Islamic State. Over approximately a year there were only four issues published, which suggests that the Al-Hayat Media Center attached relatively little importance to influencing Russian-speaking readers, when compared to Anglophone states, France, and Turkey. While there were noticeable improvements introduced in every subsequent volume, especially when it came to graphical layout, Istok lacked regular columns, similar to those from Dabiq or Dar al-Islam. In a certain sense, it was similar to Konstantiniyye in terms of its simplistic internal structure, but it was even more unpolished. Moreover, texts containing references to the Caucasus or post-Soviet areas (including Russia) constituted a relatively small share of its content. Obviously, as mentioned above, such pieces were visible,²⁹⁴ but they were overshadowed by other, more universal topics. When compared to Dar al-Islam, Istok did not pay a similar level of attention to discussing Russian national security or foreign policies. Interestingly, it also did not contain references to a conflict of interest between Daesh and the Caucasus Emirate.²⁹⁵ Finally, as EUROPOL’s report indicated, “unlike other IS publications, Istok does not provide its readers with guidelines for preparing terrorist attacks or with any other ‘practical’ advice.”²⁹⁶ In other words, it was a limited attempt to inspire and recruit Islamic radicals, which was quickly replaced by the Russian version of Rumiyah.

2.7Al-Naba as a tool of communication with internal audiences

The first periodical dedicated to Arabic-speaking audiences – al-Naba – was launched in March 2014 and took the form of a newsletter. The choice of publishing in this language was a natural and obvious one, as Arabs constituted the vast majority of the Islamic State’s subjects. Arabic could also be used to influence local populations in Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as a large part of Muslim minorities in Europe, North America, or Asia. To put it simply, Arabs constituted the most important – both internally and externally – target group of its propaganda machine. According to Winter and Mahlouly, initially al-Naba was designed for offline dissemination in territories seized by the Islamic State.²⁹⁷ Thus, issues two to nine were distributed “by hand” in the areas of Iraq, Syria, and Libya controlled by this organisation.²⁹⁸ Later on, however, it became an important tool in its online propaganda, which was distributed through Telegram and various “surface web” URLs. Up to December 2019, more than 200 issues were released on the Internet. In time, it proved to be the only official publication series of the Islamic State which survived its fall as a territorial organisation.

All editions of al-Naba were simpler and much shorter when compared to the leading e-magazines described above. Usually each volume looked like a standard newspaper, composed of, on average, around a dozen of pages. There were no dedicated cover pages nor regular sections of a format comparable to Dabiq included. In this context, there were two core functions of this publication series. First of all, its primary role was to inform readers about the military and terrorist achievements of the Islamic State. In other words, it was a tool for creating its aforementioned “winner’s image.” For instance, the very first volume of al-Naba discussed the operations of Daesh against PKK in the Raqqa province,²⁹⁹ as well as its battles against the Syrian Arab Army.³⁰⁰ Literally every issue of this periodical consisted of similar news in the form of condensed articles or commentaries, which usually lacked developed argumentation which was noticeable in other publication series of Daesh. This news was frequently supported by statistics of Islamic State’s operations in various provinces.³⁰¹

These characteristics were confirmed by the study of Winter and Mahlouly, according to whom the newsletter consisted of briefer, tactical information articles. As they argued, it was also much more focused on up-to-date military issues and its perception of jihad was much more pragmatic than in Rumiyah, as it focused on “real-world concerns.” Moreover, the newsletter was highly interested in the events taking place in the core territories under the control of the “Caliphate”: Iraq and Syria. Finally, both authors suggested that al-Naba was tailored to reach mostly “in-country” audiences.³⁰²

Secondly, the newsletter proved to be one of the primary sources dedicated to conveying official communiqués of the Islamic State to its followers and members. This can be seen in numerous editions, including the one from February 2018 which announced the resumption of the “war of attrition” in Libya.³⁰³ Another example can be spotted in the August 2016 edition which announced the new leader of the Islamic State’s province in Western Africa.³⁰⁴

This does not mean, however, that al-Naba was not used for other purposes. Among others, this newspaper was exploited to advertise the “martyrdom industry” of Daesh.³⁰⁵ Issues #10, #11, #12, #13, #15, and #23 all contained references to suicide bombers.³⁰⁶ Nevertheless, its method of achieving this goal was somewhat crude. In contrast to the flagship magazines, which attached great importance to religious, political, and ethical justification of shahadah (martyrdom), al-Naba usually just provided brief information on suicide operations, combined with a straightforward apotheosis of the martyrs. Moreover, this series was also known for featuring interviews with Daesh militants. For instance, a former member of al-Qaeda Abu Ubaydah al-Lubnani was interviewed in the 19th edition of this newsletter.³⁰⁷ The newsletter also consisted of frequent calls for violence against the disbelievers, which was a common trait in all pieces of text propaganda affiliated to the Islamic State.³⁰⁸ Finally, al-Naba occasionally featured instructions on how to conduct terrorist attacks and texts discussing theological issues.³⁰⁹

The graphical layer of al-Naba was rather simplistic in nature. This meant that it utilised a low number of images when compared to the flagship magazines. According to Winkler’s study, “the relative de-emphasis on visual messaging is consistent with the traditional oral culture of the MENA region.”³¹⁰ Nevertheless, it seems that the editorial staff over time became keener to use sophisticated pieces of graphical propaganda that strengthened the core messages. These included images depicting, for example, armed clashes,³¹¹ the aftermath of terrorist attacks,³¹² IS militants,³¹³ deceased enemies,³¹⁴ and executions.³¹⁵ Unlike the other e-periodicals of Daesh, such as Dabiq or Rumiyah, gruesome images were relatively frequent in al-Naba. Moreover, the newsletter’s editorial staff created numerous and advanced infographics (usually two per volume) (Figure 2.19). These productions were frequently translated and exploited either in other periodicals of the Islamic State or as standalone pieces of visual propaganda.³¹⁶ Analysis of these productions was conducted by Winkler, el-Damanhoury and Lemieux. They argued that “through a patterned application of statistical, historical, religious, and scientific arguments from authority to predictable topical areas, the infographics in al-Naba’ reinforce Daesh as a key source of information for the citizenry of the proclaimed caliphate.”³¹⁷ Moreover, according to Winkler, these infographics can be divided into two categories: those which address issues of physical security and those which focus on psychological security. The first subgroup aimed to improve IS’s credibility as a state which can defend its “citizens.” Thus, such infographics discussed its efficiency in killing “infidels” and presented, in detail, operations conducted by the group. The second subgroup, according to Winkler, aimed to discredit information coming from the enemies of the “Caliphate.”³¹⁸

Figure 2.19Infographics included in al-Naba #1.

Source: Jihadology.net.

To summarise, al-Naba was mostly dedicated to reaching an Arabic-speaking audience, including followers of the Islamic State in the Middle East. This explains its simpler form, deprived of more thought-out argumentation known from other periodicals of Daesh. At the same time, however, Al-Naba employed most of the themes exploited by its propaganda machine, including the promotion of martyrs and mujahidin, news on successful operations, the statements of leaders, criticism of disbelievers, or events taking place in its territories. It also served as a means of supporting other outlets of the “Caliphate,” as its content was redistributed and reused elsewhere.

2.8Written propaganda reborn? Unofficial periodicals after the fall of the “Caliphate”

The fall of Rumiyah in 2017 created a huge breach in the monolith of the Islamic State’s written propaganda. From this moment, as discussed previously, the group was bereft of its flagship periodical, which was a prominent way of communicating with global – and usually more demanding – online audiences. This significant gap was clearly a manifestation of the increasing difficulties experienced by the “Caliphate” due to the ongoing military operations of Kurdish militias, Russia, and the US-led coalition.³¹⁹

This serious change in its digital jihadist campaign was met with a peculiar reaction from its followers. As mentioned above, while unofficial media cells supporting Islamic State’s agenda were active during the apogee of its power (al-Battar Media Foundation), their role was purely supportive. In contrast, from the end of 2017, many independent groups emerged and became engaged in the production of pieces of text propaganda that aimed to compensate for the loss of the flagship magazine of Daesh.

One of the first to do so was a consortium of pro-IS cells, namely: Ashhad Media Company, Sunni Shield Foundation and al-Saqri Corporation for Military Sciences. The consortium was headed by the al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation.³²⁰ On October 10, 2018 it launched a magazine entitled Youth of the Caliphate (Shabab al-Khilafah), the first issue of which was released on a file-sharing website (Archive.org). Subsequent editions were distributed via pro-IS channels on Telegram. Predominantly written in Arabic, this periodical aimed to influence and manipulate young audiences, as its title suggests. The inaugural edition consisted of a number of well-edited articles, accompanied by posters and advertisement banners promoting propaganda videos. One encouraged readers to conduct acts of lone-wolf terrorism in Australia as it contained a metaphorical message: “Australia, harvest time has come in your homes.”³²¹ Interestingly, the magazine was inclined to advertise publications of a plethora of other unofficial cells of Daesh, such as Asawirti Media, the Khattab Media Foundation, al-Bushrayat or the al-Adiyat Media Production Company. Interestingly, even unaffiliated individuals were encouraged to contribute to its content.³²² The second issue, published on November 9, 2018, was similar in nature, as it incited audiences to use violence against Western nations through all means possible, including truck-ramming, stabbing attacks, or the use of firearms. Its content was permeated by posters and advertisement banners, which previously appeared in other productions of Daesh, such as al-Naba. Other articles focused, for example, on cyber security and online propaganda. The magazine warned mujahidin on the use of smartphones and discussed the importance of distributing pro-IS materials on the Internet. It also conveyed a call for recruitment directed to experts in media production, which was issued by pro-Daesh Sarh al-Khilafa.³²³ The third edition, published on December 11, 2018 contained a number of visual materials in English. They conveyed threats against the West and encouraged readers to conduct terrorist actions, such as truck or car-ramming. One of them claimed that “Harvest time has come in your homes,” which was accompanied by a picture of the Capitol Building, being proof that it was dedicated to influencing American society. Nevertheless, Australia and European countries were also threatened. Interestingly, the magazine exploited the slogan of “just terror,” which had been utilised by Rumiyah in the past.³²⁴ The fourth edition was released at the beginning of 2019. It was expanded in terms of the languages used, as in addition to Arabic and English, pieces in French were also included. This issue explained how readers could contribute to the content of the magazine and contained belated posters which demanded that they take action against “infidels” during the New Year’s Eve celebrations which had already passed. It also featured an interview with the spokesman of the group responsible for the publication of Youth of the Caliphate (YC).³²⁵ The fifth volume, released on Telegram in February 2019, once again featured materials in three languages: Arabic, English, and French. Some of its elements could be interpreted as attempts to downplay the crisis of the Islamic State. It argued that its strength lies in ideology and its supporters, in contrast to its territory which is insignificant. Moreover, the issue consisted of a call to French people, which urged them to force the government of the 5th Republic to stop fighting against Daesh. It claimed responsibility for an explosion in an apartment block in Magnitogorsk and condemned US soldiers who were depicted as corrupt mercenaries.³²⁶ The sixth edition, released on March 9, 2019, featured an article from Abu Muhammad al-Bengali in English that urged readers to wage jihad in Bangladesh. It also continued its habit of issuing threats of terrorist attacks.³²⁷ The seventh issue, released in April, discussed the methods of war utilised by Daesh, as well as promoting a propaganda video produced by Muntasir Media.³²⁸ The eighth edition, which was launched in May 2019, concentrated on the burning of Notre Dame cathedral. It claimed that “lone lions” of the “Caliphate” had burned other Christian churches prior to this event. It also highlighted a video statement of al-Baghdadi, as well as terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka. It also consisted of numerous posters and banners demanding readers conduct terrorist attacks against disbelievers. Finally, it encouraged them to share their stories and ideas during the month of Ramadan with editors.³²⁹ The ninth edition, released in June 2019, discussed the propaganda production of Muntasir Media.³³⁰ Subsequent editions #10 and #11, produced in the two following months, were similar, as they featured visual materials (posters and banners) from other propaganda cells of the “Caliphate” and encouraged readers to contribute to its content. Moreover, the tenth promised that the following volumes would use only exclusive materials, which eventually proved to be untrue.³³¹ The final twelfth issue was published online in September 2019. It was probably the most sophisticated edition of this magazine. It consisted of a unique article in English that attacked the missionary activities of Christians in Africa, which were depicted as a manifestation of racism. Additionally, it encouraged Muslim women to carry out terrorist attacks. Other materials included referred, for example, to the deceased militants of Daesh. Additionally, the magazine featured a poster which claimed that the US President Donald Trump had Alzheimer’s disease, due to his statement on the victory over the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Surprisingly, three days after the publication of this edition, the al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation announced that it was ending this project. It also invited readers to share their ideas on the future endeavours that should be undertaken by the editors in the future.³³²

Despite the fact that many of its articles were quite short and unsophisticated, for several reasons this magazine proved to be an interesting undertaking of the Islamic State-affiliated digital jihadist machine. First of all, it was a significant manifestation of the developing cooperation between various unofficial propaganda cells of Daesh in its post-territorial phase. While many of the official bureaus were effectively crippled, other groups of supporters emerged online and acted together. Youth of the Caliphate proved to be the most prominent effect of their collaboration. Secondly, Youth of the Caliphate compiled materials produced by various official and unofficial outlets of Daesh. Due to this fact, its organisation of content was somewhat chaotic when compared to official e-magazines. This is even more visible when considering the fact that this periodical contained pieces in Arabic, English, and French at the same time. The very same trait, however, also meant that it was devoted to reaching global audiences. Thirdly, the magazine paid great attention to establishing direct contact with readers and engaging them in the publication process of the magazine. This was a unique trait when compared to other pieces of IS-written propaganda. Fourthly, great focus was placed on featuring posters, advertisement banners, and infographics. They not only served the purpose of propagating other pieces of pro-IS propaganda but also encouraged readers to carry out terrorist operations, usually against the West. Finally, it proved to be quite popular among Internet users. Editors boasted that it was followed by approximately 6,000 readers, which is a lot for an unofficial periodical of Daesh.³³³

The second important unofficial periodical that was launched in the post-territorial phase was From Dabiq to Rome (FDR). It was established in early 2018 by Ahlut-Tawhid Publications.³³⁴ It appeared online at more or less two-week intervals. By mid-2019 more than 60 editions had been released. Initially, it was distributed via the Ghuraba website, as well as through AHP’s accounts on file-sharing websites (Archive.org) and microblogs (Reddit.com). In time, its primary proliferation channel shifted to Telegram. Its very title suggested that it was an ambitious attempt to replace the long-gone flagship magazines of Daesh. Nevertheless, its form and content were far from the quality and scope of Dabiq and Rumiyah. Ahlut-Tawhid Publications’ initiative took the form of a short newspaper. As its editors explained, it was “a simple and easy means to reach a wider audience to assist in the spreading of the authentic teachings of the prophets.”³³⁵ They also aimed to “raise awareness of critical issues that affect the Muslim nation and to counter the ongoing, continuous crusader campaign.”³³⁶ Its length usually ranged from a few to more than a dozen pages. The reason why it may have been quite attractive to some radicalised Internet users was the fact that it was published in English, which meant that it constituted the only pro-IS periodical with a universal (global) reach at the time.

From Dabiq to Rome’s overall layout was similar in form to newsletters from the early 2000s, however over time it visibly improved. The cover page was merged with the table of contents but lacked a dedicated cover story. This meant that the narratives employed in consecutive editions lacked focus. The cover page displayed a single image, usually taken from the official propaganda channels of Daesh, such as the releases of the A’maq News Agency. FDR also lacked a foreword or introduction of any kind. However, the final pages displayed infographics, posters, and advertisement banners, similar to other pro-IS publication series. For instance, its 19th edition was concluded with an advertisement of an e-book released by Ahlut-Tawhid Publications. It was preceded by two infographics showcasing statistics of the Islamic State’s operations.³³⁷ Finally, the newsletter was devoid of background graphics, which were widely used in other official text publications of Daesh.

The bulletin did not have developed organisation of content in the form of regular columns known from other magazines. Its only systematic section was the “News Headlines,” which served the purpose of conveying information on the achievements of the Islamic State. For instance, the ninth edition stated that:

the bleeding of the apostate Egyptian army continues in Sayna (Sinai), due to the favor of Allah. In the past week many Egyptian army soldiers were killed, this according to Egyptian military sources, with most casualties coming from improvised explosive devices planted by the Islamic State.³³⁸

It also mentioned events taking place in Palestine, as well as in Syria.³³⁹ In time, “News Headlines” re-emerged as “Islamic State Military And Covert Operations,” which was an obvious rip-off from Rumiyah. The layout of the modified section was similar to the flagship periodicals of IS, as the news was organised by geographical location of operations. The 63rd volume boasted of the execution of Syrian soldiers in Wilayat Hims, as well as praised the victory of IS’s militants in West Africa Wilayah.³⁴⁰ Interestingly, this section contained an introductory sentence which was almost identical to the one known from Rumiyah:

As the soldiers of the Khilafah continue war on the forces of kufr, we take a glimpse at a few recent operations conducted by the mujahidin of the Islamic State over the past week. These operations are merely a selection of the various operations that the Islamic State has conducted on various fronts across many regions.³⁴¹

When compared to the former flagship magazine, FDR’s introduction surprisingly lacked a reference to the blessing of Allah. The absence of a statement that these actions resulted in the expansion of the Islamic State’s territory was also noticeable.³⁴² The latter was, however, understandable as there were no areas under the control of Daesh at this point.

From time to time, “Editorials” were also featured. By definition, they were written by members of AHP and related to varying themes, including important political events or issues experienced by jihadis. For example, the “Editorial” of the 17th edition focused on the electoral victory of Erdoğan in Turkey. Similar to the mainstream narratives employed by Daesh, he was accused of supporting secularism and nationalism. The author argued that

the kufr and shirk of Erdogan is clear and in open daylight for any and all to see. If one happens to be ignorant of his situation and kufr, then the proofs are shown to him from the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus. After that, if one still believes Erdogan is a Muslim or doubts his kufr, or validates his way, then he is a kafir for belying the texts.³⁴³

Another example may be spotted in the 25th edition. This was, in fact, quite a sophisticated piece of damage control that denied any allegations of emerging divisions among the Islamic State’s ranks. The editors suggested that the organisation was experiencing insignificant influence of extremists, but this was in contrast to the divisions experienced by the society of the United States. Moreover, he emphasised that:

The matter isn’t about the Islamic State, as it is known under the leadership of Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi […]; it is about tawhid and shirk, the allies of Allah vs. the allies of Shaytan, whatever form and names it takes. The Islamic State is not a new trend in the cycles of mankind’s timeline nor is the Islamic State a new nation. Rather, this nation and group has stood the test of time and is 1400 years old. Rather, this ummah of tawhid is as old as mankind.³⁴⁴

As for other pieces of content noticeable, they were much less differentiated than in other official magazines. For instance, some issues contained a “Q&A” section, which usually consisted of reprints from other publications. The 28th edition featured a short talk with Ali al-Khudayr, a Saudi extremist cleric, who was imprisoned in 2003. It criticised Muslims who “seek judgement” from the Western judicial system. It argued that “this is shirk in regard to seeking judgement from other than Allah and His messenger.”³⁴⁵ From Dabiq to Rome #31 even consisted of two short Q&As, one with a representative of al-Bayan Radio and one with Hassan Husayn. The first touched upon the classic topic of the criticism of the political elite in Muslim states, while the second discussed the permissibility of takfir.³⁴⁶

Quite often From Dabiq to Rome featured articles related to theological or ideological aspects of the Islamic State’s activities. More practical pieces, similar to, for example, “Just Terror Tactics” from Rumiyah, were rare. For instance, From Dabiq to Rome #29 discussed the foundations of the jihadi manhaj (doctrine, methodology),³⁴⁷ while #33 focused on the concepts of disbelief and takfir,³⁴⁸ as well as on the pillars and conditions of Islam.³⁴⁹ Historical examples of ideological significance were also exploited. Among others, the second volume featured stories of the “marvelous encounter of Musa and al-Khidr”³⁵⁰ and of the grandson of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhab.³⁵¹ Additionally, from time to time FDR featured pieces fulfilling the role of damage control. Some of them argued that the Islamic State’s difficult situation would be solved by Allah: “Allah will support it as long as it wants to establish the Shari’ah of Allah.”³⁵²

To recapitulate, this peculiar newsletter discussed classic themes, which were previously employed by other official outlets of the “Caliphate.” Its editorial staff attached great importance to politico-religious themes, which was reminiscent of Dabiq’s content. Attempts at downplaying the difficult situation of the group in the Middle East were also noticeable. Moreover, FDR was particularly interested in supporting the “winner’s image” of the group by conveying news on the achievements of Daesh. Nevertheless, it remained quite simplistic in terms of its overall form and layout when compared to official IS magazines from 2014 to 2017.

The third attempt to resurrect Islamic State’s periodicals was related to endeavours targeting the followers of Daesh in Arabic-speaking communities exclusively. In November 2017, the pro-Daesh Sunni Shield Foundation (also known as the al-Dar’ al-Sunni Foundation) launched a magazine entitled al-Anfal (“spoils of war”). It was distributed in 10-day intervals via file-sharing websites, as well as through Telegram. Its content included news on the “Caliphate’s” operational achievements, interviews with members of the group, infographics, as well as articles concentrated on the religious aspects of terrorist activities. The magazine was known for utilising materials previously produced by the official propaganda cells of Daesh. It also contained advice related to maintaining cyber security and privacy on the Internet. Moreover, it was permeated with calls for its readers to conduct violence against disbelievers. For instance, the first edition encouraged them to attack “infidels” in the West, while the second ordered the carrying out of stabbing attacks. The fourth contained a poster depicting a mujahid besides the Eiffel Tower, with an encrypted call to organise lone-wolf terrorist attacks in France. Furthermore, the 26th edition featured a poster which even threatened the enemies of Daesh with the use of weapons of mass destruction. It contained the infamous slogan of “just terror,” as well as a promise: “We will soon do this.”³⁵³

The last interesting undertaking of pro-Daesh cells was initiated on November 22, 2018. On that day the pro-Daesh Hanifiyah Media group, which targets communities in South-Eastern Asia, issued the first edition of an untitled periodical for radicalised Muslims in Malaysia. Until March 2019, three volumes were released, each with a different title on the cover page: Zhahirina ‘Alal Haq (“we are on the righteous path”), Fie Sabililah (“in the cause of Allah”) and Ansharullah (“supporters of Allah”). According to the study of Alkaff and Singh, this magazine had several distinct features. First of all, it concentrated on raising readers’ awareness in terms of anti-Daesh news distributed by the media. Secondly, it exploited religious argumentation to legitimise Islamic State’s ideology and stance. Thirdly, it was permeated with references to historical examples. Among others, it argued that jihad has always been interpreted as an armed struggle (qital), which is obviously untrue.³⁵⁴ Examples of the companions of the Prophet (Sahabah) were also utilised. Fourthly, apocalyptical narratives were also spotted. Finally, this periodical referred to the hardships endured by the Muslim communities, which was depicted as one of the key reasons for violence against “oppressive” disbelievers. Therefore, the thematic landscape of this magazine was nothing new, as it mostly concentrated on jihad, hijrah, and martyrdom.³⁵⁵

Notes

1 Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Follow the White Rabbit – Tracking IS Online and Insights into What Jihadists Share,” in Digital Jihad. Online Communication and Violent Extremism, edited by Francesco Marone (Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2019), 47.

2 “Documents in Caliphate Library,” Online Jihad: Monitoring Jihadist Online Communities, March 25, 2019, https://onlinejihad.net/2019/03/25/documents-in- caliphate-library/.

3 Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 139.

4 It is, however, important to note that al-Hayat’s logo did not appear until the second edition of the newsletter. This possibly means that the first issue was created by a loosely associated group of editors.

5 Haroro J. Ingram, “Islamic State’s English-language Magazines, 2014–2017: Trends & Implications for CT-CVE Strategic Communications,” ICCT Research Paper March, (2018), 6–7.

6 Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines. Research Guide, Strategic Insights and Policy Response (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), 54.

7 Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, 1 (2016), 41.

8 “Ahmad Abousamra,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-abousamra.

9 Nur Aziemah Azman, “‘Islamic State’ (IS) Propaganda: Dabiq and Future Directions of ‘Islamic State’,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016), 4.

10 For instance, Berger and Stern labelled Dabiq “remarkable.” See Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS. The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 119.

11 Valentina Bartolucci, “Inside the Propaganda Machine of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Its Evolution Following the Rise of Islamic State,” in Jihadism Transformed. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas, edited by Simon Staffell and Akil N. Awan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 122.

12 See Justin O’Shea, “ISIS: The Role of Ideology and Eschatology in the Islamic State,” The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs 1, 2 (2016); Greg Fealy, “Apocalyptic Thought, Conspiracism and Jihad in Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, 1 (2019).

13 See “Content,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 2.

14 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse. The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 143.

15 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, 3 (2016), 459.

16 Andrew C. Sparks, “Dar al-Islam: A Quantitative Analysis of ISIS’s French Language Magazine,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1494413.

17 See Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, “Propaganda of Terror. Konstantiniyye Magazine and the Discourse of Daesh,” ORSAM Report, 204 (2016), 13; Aaron Stein, Islamic State Networks in Turkey. Recruitment for the Caliphate, (Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2016).

18 North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2015), 10–13; Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 158–160.

19 Remy Mahzam, “The Electronic Digitisation of ISIS: Building a Multi-media Legacy,” RSIS Commentary, 228 (2015), 2.

20 See William Merrin, Digital War. A Critical Introduction (New York/Oxon: Routledge, 2019), chap. 11.

21 Charles Lister, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 241.

22 “Among the Believers Are Men: Shaykh Abu Sulayman ash-Shami,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 45.

23 Nur Aziemah Azman, “‘Islamic State’ (IS) Propaganda: Dabiq and Future Directions of ‘Islamic State’,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016), 4.

24 Adam Withnall, “Isis Loses ‘Prophesied’ Town of Dabiq to Syrian Rebels After Short Battle,” Independent, 16.10.2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-dabiq-loses-apocalyptic-prophesy-town-of-dabiq-to-syria-rebels-short-battle-a7363931.html.

25 Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 1.

26 Nur Aziemah Azman, “‘Islamic State’ (IS) Propaganda: Dabiq and Future Directions of ‘Islamic State’,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016), 5.

27 Dina Temple-Raston, “How the U.S. Hacked ISIS,” NPR, September 26, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis?utm_campaign = storyshare&utm_source = twitter.com&utm_medium = social&t = 1,569,911,613,237&t = 1,569,955,287,406.

28 Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines. Research Guide, Strategic Insights and Policy Response (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), 58–67.

29 Clarifying Matters of Methodology (Ahlut-Tawhid Publications), 13.

30 Centre Mediatique an-Nur, Internet Archive, https://archive.org/search.php?query = centre%20mediatique%20an%20nur.

31 On defections from the IS’s ranks see: Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, “Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 6 (2015).

32 See Bennett Clifford, “‘Trucks, Knives, Bombs, Whatever:’ Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram,” CTC Sentinel 11, 5 (2018); “Cyber-Terrorism Activities,” IDC Herzliya ICT Cyber-Desk Periodic Review, 16 (2016), 9; Pierluigi Paganini, “ISIS’s Afaaq Electronic Foundation (AEF) Spreads Awareness on Anti-surveillance Tools,” Security Affairs, February 4, 2016, https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/44214/intelligence/isis-afaaq-electronic-foundation-aef.html.

33 Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 1–7.

34 “Car Bomb Rocks ar-Raqqah,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 1.

35 “Shola in Homs Bombarded,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 3.

36 “Gates of al-Khair Reached,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 2.

37 “Hunting for Tanks,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 4.

38 “Sahwat Announce Repentance,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 5.

39 “Shola in Homs Bombarded,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 3.

40 “Aid Distribution,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 5.

41 “Light Through Knowledge,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 6.

42 “Command is for Allah,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014), 6.

43 “Trade Flourishes Under the Rule of the Islamic State,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014); “Fresh Produce Injects Life Into Halab Market,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

44 “Implementing the Hudud,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 2.

45 “Refugee Camp Visited,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 2.

46 “Shabeeh Executed,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 3.

47 “Retaking al-Khayr,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 6.

48 “Liberation of as-Sabhah and al-Bareehah,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 7.

49 “On the Hunt,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 5.

50 “To Repent or Not,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 5.

51 “And Allah Takes From Us Shuhada,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 6.

52 “Istishhadiyyun,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014), 3.

53 “Enter Upon Them Through the Gates,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

54 “Maliki’s Forces Humiliated,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014), 2.

55 “Islamic State Advances in al-Khayr,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014), 3.

56 “Islamic State Provides Security to Farmers,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014), 5.

57 “Community Shows Support for Hadd,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014), 4.

58 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State (New York: The Soufan Group, 2014), 55–56.

59 See Mohamed Elewa Badar, “The Road to Genocide: The Propaganda Machine of the Self-declared Islamic State (IS),” International Criminal Law Review, 6 (2016).

60 Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines. Research Guide, Strategic Insights and Policy Response (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), 54.

61 “Propagating the Correct Manhaj,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014), 1.

62 “Interview with the Seminar Organizer, Shaikh Abul-Hawraa’ Al-Jazaa’iri,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014), 3.

63 “On Patrol with the Office of Consumer Protection,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014), 4.

64 “Farmers Reap the Rewards of Their Harvest by Giving Zakah,” Islamic State Report, 2 (2014), 1.

65 Ibid., 2.

66 “On the Beat ISR Examines How the Islamic Police Safeguards ar-Raqqah and Their Importance in State Building,” Islamic State Report, 2 (2014), 5.

67 “Islamic State Liberates the City of Mosul,” Islamic State Report, 3 (2014), 1.

68 Ibid., 4–5.

69 “Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit,” Islamic State Report, 4 (2014), 3.

70 “The Battle of Asadullah al-Bilawi,” Islamic State Report, 4 (2014), 5–7.

71 Haroro J. Ingram, “Islamic State’s English-language Magazines, 2014–2017: Trends & Implications for CT-CVE Strategic Communications,” ICCT Research Paper March, (2018), 8.

72 Harleen K. Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State,” ISW Backgrounder, August 15 (2014), 1.

73 For instance, Wignell et al. noticed various, sometimes, differing opinions of experts and the media on the transition from Dabiq to Rumiyah and their focus. See Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017), 1–2.

74 See Sara Brzuszkiewicz, “Radicalisation in Europe after the Fall of Islamic State: Trends and Risks,” European View 17, 2 (2018), 146.

75 “Content,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 2.

76 “Contents,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 2.

77 Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017), 5.

78 In Dabiq #2 two sections, “Islamic State News” and “Islamic State Reports,” were introduced. Usually, however, both were merged together in one column. See “Content,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 2.

79 His first article for the al-Hayat Media Center was published in the fourth volume of Dabiq. See John Cantlie, “Hard Talk. The Real Story Behind My Videos,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 52–55.

80 “Foley’s Blood is on Obama’s Hands,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 37–40.

81 “A Brief Interview with Umm Basir al-Muhajirah,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 50–51.

82 “Interview with Abu Umar al-Baljiki,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 72–74.

83 “From the Pages of History: An Explicit Ultimatum from the Salaf to the Apostates,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 17–19.

84 This section was named as “Operations” in Rumiyah #1 and #2.

85 See “Selected 10,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 9; “Inside the Khilafah 3,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 21.

86 “I Will Outnumber the Other Nations Through You,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 34–35.

87 “Important Memorandums,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 4–6.

88 “Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 10–12.

89 “Just Terror Tactics: Hostage Taking,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 46–51.

90 “Just Terror Tactics: Arson Attacks,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 8–10.

91 Alastair Reed and Haroro J. Ingram, “Exploring the Role of Instructional Material in AQAP’s Inspire and ISIS’ Rumiyah,” in 1st European Counter Terrorism Centre Conference on online terrorist propaganda (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2017), 7–8.

92 Ibid., 8.

93 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 4.

94 “In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 35.

95 “And Allah is the Best of Plotters,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 50.

96 Ibid., 51–53.

97 “The Murtadd Brotherhood,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 28–43; Abu Jarir ash-Shamali, “Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan. A Testimony from Within,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 40–55.

98 Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 114–115.

99 See “Foreword,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 3; “Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 22–33.

100 John Cantlie, “Meltdown,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 58–62.

101 John Cantlie, “The Perfect Storm,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 74.

102 “The Concept of Imamah (Leadership) is from the Millah (Path) of Ibrahim,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 27.

103 As Hassan Hassan noted, “Sahwat was originally restricted to the tribal Awakening Councils established in western Iraq to fight ISIS’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) during the 2007 U.S. troop surge. The term since has been broadened to include any and all opponents and collaborators coming from Sunni communities.” Hassan Hassan, “Out of the Desert. ISIS’s Strategy for a Long War,” Middle East Institute Policy Paper, 8 (2015), 2. See more in: Craig Whiteside, “Nine Bullets for the Traitors, One for the Enemy: The Slogans and Strategy behind the Islamic State’s Campaign to Defeat the Sunni Awakening (2006–2017),” ICCT Research Paper, September (2018).

104 “The Evil of Division and Taqlid,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 13.

105 Translated as “innovation” or “heresy.” This term refers to practices that stand in contradiction to the teachings of Prophet Mohammad. See Firdaus Khairi Abdul Kadir, Asyraf Abd Rahman, Fadzli Adam, Rahimah Ebong, and Moustafa Hassan Mohamed Elkhaiat, “The Perspective of Traditional Muslim Scholars on Heretical Innovations,” International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 7, 8 (2017), 229.

106 “Irja, the Most Dangerous Bid’ah (And its Effect on the Jihad in Sham),” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 39–56.

107 “The Rafidah from Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 32–45. On the meaning of rafidah (literally “rejectors”) see: Susanne Olsson, “Shia as Internal Others: A Salafi Rejection of the “Rejecters,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 28, 4 (2017), 409–430.

108 Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah, “How I Came to Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 36–39.

109 “The Virtues of Ribat for the Cause of Allah,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 8–13.

110 “The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 5–8.

111 “The Revival of Slavery Before The Hour,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 14–17.

112 “Advice on Ihdad,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 24–26.

113 “Until it Burns the Crusader Armies in Dabiq,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 3–5.

114 “The Punishment of Shu’aytat for Treachery,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 12–14.

115 “The Liberation of Dabiq,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 15.

116 “A Selection of Military Operations Across the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 28.

117 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “Two, Three or Four,” Dabiq, 12 (2015), 19–22.

118 See Gina Vale, “Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps,” ICCT Policy Brief, October (2019), 1.

119 “The Rise of the Khilafah. Return of the Gold Dinar,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 3.

120 “Among the Believers Are Men: Hudhayfah al-Battawi,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 40.

121 “The Weakest House is That of a Spider,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 2–3.

122 “The Syrian Sahwat. Shallow Unity and Reliance on Taghut,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

123 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “Be Patient, for Indeed the Promise of Allah Is True,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 35.

124 See Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

125 “The Religion of Islam and the Jama’ah of the Muslims,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 4–8.

126 Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, “Paths to Victory,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 20.

127 “Collateral Carnage,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 6–7.

128 Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, “Paths to Victory,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 30.

129 “Examples of the Sahabah’s Eagerness to Attain Shahadah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 40–43.

130 “Ways to Atone Sins,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 25.

131 “Interview with the Amir of the Soldiers of the Khilafah in East Asia,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 36–41.

132 “The Flesh of Your Spouse is Poisonous,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 30–32.

133 “Zuhd in the Dunya Is the Way of the Salaf,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 16–18.

134 Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017), 18.

135 Haroro J. Ingram, Learning from ISIS’s Virtual Propaganda War for Western Muslims: A Comparison of Inspire and Dabiq (Hague: ICCT, 2017), 1.

136 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, 3 (2016), 459.

137 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State. Combating the Caliphate Without Borders (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 74.

138 Overview of Daesh’s Online Recruitment Propaganda Magazine, Dabiq (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2015), 2.

139 Nur Aziemah Azman, “‘Islamic State’ (IS) Propaganda: Dabiq and Future Directions of ‘Islamic State’,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016), 3.

140 Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda,” GSCP Policy Paper, 2 (2015), 4.

141 Brandon Colas, “What Does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Magazine,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, 3 (2017), 173.

142 Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 152.

143 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 2.

144 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014), 2.

145 Ibid., 2.

146 “Le Tawhîd est la première condition de la victoire,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014), 3–4.

147 “Les preuves du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014), 5–6.

148 “L’État Islamique étend son territoire,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014) 7–9.

149 “Le retour vers l’or et l’argent,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014), 10.

150 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 2.

151 “Attaquer ceux qui insultent le Prophète,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 3–4.

152 “Le salut par l’allégeance et l’épée,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 5–6.

153 “Un exemple à suivre,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 7–8.

154 “L’histoire de l’inimitié de la France envers l’Islâm,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 10.

155 “Interview de l’épouse de notre frère Aboû Basîr Abdoullâh al-Ifriqî (qu’Allâh l’accepte),” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015), 11–12.

156 On relations between Coulibaly, Kouachi brothers and Daesh, see e.g. Krzysztof Izak, “Co po Islamskim Państwie Kalifatu? Stan obecny i kierunki rozwoju zagrożeń terrorystycznych,” Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 19, (2018), 84.

157 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 2.

158 “L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. La destruction des idôles,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 3–7.

159 “Les régles de la hidjrah,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 8–10.

160 “Le fondement de l’Islâm et sa règle,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 11–12.

161 “La légitimité des opérations martyres,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 14–15.

162 “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 13.

163 “Interview du frère Abou Mouqâtil at-Tounsî. Djihad en Tunisie,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015), 18–21.

164 See “Interview with Abu Muqatil,” Dabiq, 8 (2015).

165 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 3.

166 “L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. Le combat contre les apostats,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 4–9.

167 “L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. La lapidation de celui qui commet l’adultère,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 10–13.

168 “La vie à Mosul sous l’ombre du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 35–40.

169 See Alberto M. Fernandez, “Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers, October (2015), 8.

170 Nevertheless, once again its content was adapted to Francophone audiences. It featured opinions of Jean Charles Brisard. See “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 28.

171 “Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 29–34.

172 See Aboû Jarîr Ach-Chamâlî, “Al-Qa’idah au Waziristan. Un témoignage de l’intérieur,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015), 14–24; Abu Jarir ash-Shamali, “Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan. A Testimony from Within,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 40–55.

173 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 3.

174 “La chari’ah d’Allâh ou la chari’ah de l’homme. Combattre le Califat est-il une apostasie?,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 4–7.

175 “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men (Is Waging War against the Khalifah Apostasy?),” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 50–64.

176 See “La revification de l’esclavage avant l’Heure,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015); “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dabiq, 4 (2014).

177 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of Islamic State (London: Hurst&Company, 2017), 55.

178 “L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allah. Prendre la jiziyah des mécréants (Gens du livre),” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 18–21.

179 “La libération des prisonniers,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 27–28.

180 “Reportage. Services hospitaliers,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 37–40.

181 “Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 41–47.

182 “Dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 36.

183 “Les règles de sécurité du musulman,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015), 30–33.

184 “Irjâ, la plus dangereuse des innovations et ses croyances,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 4–17.

185 “Les savants du mal,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 18–25.

186 “Femmes de martyr. Conseils et règles,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 28–32.

187 “Communiqué du Walî de la région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 42.

188 “Ribat dans la région de Deir Az-Zour,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 44–47.

189 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 3.

190 “Et préparez contre eux tout ce que vous pouvez comme force,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015), 34–39.

191 See more in: Weimeng Yeo, “The 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks: An Assessment,” RSIS Commentary, 250 (2015); Daniel Byman, “Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy,” Brookings Policy Brief, 12 (2018), 4.

192 “Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 3.

193 “Reportage. Attentats bénis de Paris,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 45–49.

194 “La méthodologie prophétique dans l’établissement de la religion,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 6–11.

195 “Ô vous qui avez cru! Préservez vos personnes et vos familles d’un feu,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 12–17.

196 “Deux, trois ou quatre,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 20–23.

197 “Tu les croirais unis, alors que leurs coeurs sont divisés,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 25.

198 See “Interview with Abu Samir al-Urduni,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 70–76; “Interview d’Abû Samîr al-Urdunî,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 30–34.

199 “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015), 35–44.

200 “Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 108–113.

201 “Éditorial,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 3.

202 “Attentats sur la voie prophétique,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 7–38.

203 “Le testament de notre frère Abû ‘Umar al-Baljîkî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 41.

204 “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 88–99.

205 “Reportage. Photos des lions des attaques du 13 Novembre avant leur départ des terres du Califat pour aller terroriser la France,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 100–107.

206 The same topic was also discussed in the 13th edition of Dabiq, but both articles were not identical. See “The Rafidah. From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 32–45; “Les Rafidites d’Ibn Saba’ jusqu’au Dajjal,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 42–49.

207 “Le testament de notre frère Abû Rayyân al-Firansî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 52–53.

208 “Le testament de notre frère Abû Mujâhid al-Baljîkî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 67–69.

209 “Comment connaitre la vérité,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 54–64.

210 It was regularly included in Dabiq since its seventh edition.

211 Umm ‘Umar al-Firansiyah, “Il est parmi les croyants des hommes,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 70–77.

212 “Interview du cheikh Hâfiz Sa’îd Khân, gouverneur de la wilayah du Khurâsân,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016), 78–86.

213 “Éditorial,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 4.

214 “L’État Islamique sur les pas des compagnons,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 6–23.

215 The content of this section was not, however, copy-pasted from Dabiq. The articles were not identical. Dar al-Islam’s piece was much longer and more detailed. See “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Muharib al-Muhajir,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 22–23; “Il est parmi les croyants des hommes. Histoire de la hijrah de notre frère Abû Muhârib al-Muhâjir vers le Cham,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 25–36.

216 “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 54–67.

217 “Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 72–76.

218 “Reportage. Photos. La vie à Syrte à l’ombre du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 68–71.

219 “Sécurité informatique,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 38–52.

220 “Security database,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016), 53.

221 “Game over,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 26–27.

222 Larossi Abballa, “Éditorial,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 4.

223 “Attentats sur la voie prophétique. Deuxième partie,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 20.

224 “De là où ils ne s’y attendent pas,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 28.

225 Umm Sumayyah al-Firanciya, “Des femmes autour du Prophète,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 31–35.

226 Umm Sayf ad-Dîn al-Firansiyah, “Il est parmi les hommes des croyants,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 36–37.

227 Hassan Abû Haniyah, “L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 48–50.

228 “Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 52–57.

229 “Sécurité informatique. Deuxième partie,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 38–46.

230 “Security database,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016), 47.

231 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 153.

232 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of Islamic State (London: Hurst&Company, 2017), 51.

233 However, “Dar al-Islam” also lacked many columns which were a constant element of Dabiq, such as “Hikmah.”

234 Andrew C. Sparks, “Dar al-Islam: A Quantitative Analysis of ISIS’s French Language Magazine,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1494413

235 Ahmet Y. Yayla, “ISIS in Turkey. The Government’s Response Has Global Consequences,” Researchgate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication319651402_ISIS_IN_TURKEY.

236 See Ebu Ece Özbey, “Turkey’s Fight Against Youth Radicalisation: Small Steps on a Long Path,” Euro MESCO Policy Brief, 78 (2018); Cihan Tuğal, “Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning,” Economy and Society 31, 1 (2002); Necati Anaz, Ömer Aslan and Mehmet Özkan, “Turkish Foreign Terrorist Fighters and the Emergence of a New Kind of Radicalization,” Turkish Studies 17, 4 (2016); Merve Tahiroglu and Jonathan Schanzer, Islamic State Networks in Turkey (Washington D.C.: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017).

237 Stephen Starr, “A Deeper Look at Syria-Related Jihadist Activity in Turkey,” CTC Sentinel 7, 8 (2014), 7.

238 Colin P. Clarke and Ahmet Y. Yayla, “The United States Can’t Rely on Turkey to Defeat ISIS,” Foreign Policy, December 31, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/31/the-united-states-cant-rely-on-turkey-to-defeat-isis-kurds-syria-ypg-erdogan/.

239 Nathalie Tocci, “Making (Non)Sense of Turkey’s Policy on Kobane,” Global Turkey in Europe Commentary, November (2014), 1.

240 Merve Tahiroglu and Jonathan Schanzer, Islamic State Networks in Turkey (Washington D.C.: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017), 19. See also https://newrepublic.com/article/120821/islamic-state-isis-has-sleeper-cells-turkey-says-national-police

241 Aaron Stein, Islamic State Networks in Turkey. Recruitment for the Caliphate (Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2016), 4.

242 See Konstantiniyye, 1 (2015).

243 “Erdoğan’ in Kürt ‘Devleti’,” Konstantiniyye 2 (2015), 49–51; “Hicret Etmeyene Ikrah Yoktur,” Konstantiniyye, 2 (2015), 10.

244 “İstişhadi Operasyonlarin Caizliği Ve Fazileti,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015), 32–43.

245 “Hiyanet Raporu,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015), 44.

246 “Türkiye’ye Mesaj,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015), 63–66.

247 “Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015), 3–4.

248 See e.g. “Türikiye’deki Okullarda Bulunan Küfürler ve Haramlar,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015); “Sen Onları Bİrlİk Sanırsın, Oysa Kalpleri Paramparçadır,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015), 28–32.

249 Aaron Stein, Islamic State Networks in Turkey. Recruitment for the Caliphate (Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2016), 4.

250 “Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016).

251 “Küfredenler Ise Tağutun Yolunda Savaşirlar,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016), 5–12.

252 “Bekleyin Biz de Sizinle Birlikte Beklemekteyiz,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016), 47.

253 “Allah’in Yardimini Getiren Zaferin Esbablari,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016), 24–32.

254 “Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016).

255 “Tağutİ Sİstemlere Askerlİğİn Hükmü-2,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016), 5–12.

256 “Mürted Kardeşler,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016), 15.

257 “Allah Yolunda Ribat Ve Faziletleri,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016), 35–41.

258 “Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016).

259 “Harbi Kafirin Tanimi,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016), 3–8.

260 “Hicretin Akhami,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016), 9–13.

261 “Esir TSK Askerinden Türikiye’ye Mesaj,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016), 14–19.

262 Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, “Propaganda of Terror. Konstantiniyye Magazine and the Discourse of Daesh,” ORSAM Report, 204 (2016), 14–15.

263 Ibid., 15–16.

264 Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 154.

265 Alisa Fainberg, “The Islamic State Speaks Russian – A New Market for ISIS Propaganda,” ICT Jihadi Monitoring Group Insights, January (2016), https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1598/The-Islamic-State-speaks-Russian#gsc.tab = 0, 12.

266 “Урожай Сахаватов,” Furat.Press, 1 (2015), 1–3.

267 “ӢӠ Mpӑҡӑ Ҡ Cвetӯ,” Furat.Press, 1 (2015), 5–8.

268 Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 160.

269 “Умпите От Злобы,” Furat.Press, 2 (2015), 1–3.

270 Anna Seib, “Wilayat al-Qawkaz – The Islamic State in the North Caucasus. Frames, Strategies and Credibility of Radical Islamist Propaganda Videos,” Journal of Deradicalization, 15 (2018), 160.

271 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS. Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 152.

272 “Мы из вас и вы из нас,” Istok, 1 (2015), 2–7.

273 “Ахлюль-халь валь-акд,” Istok, 1 (2015), 8–11.

274 “Халифы,” Istok, 1 (2015), 13–22.

275 “Выступайте в поход, легко ли это вам будет или обременительно,” Istok, 2 (2015).

276 “Заговор сахаватов против исламского государства,” Istok, 2 (2015).

277 “Закон создателя или закон созданий?,” Istok, 2 (2015).

278 “Кто мы, откуда и куда? Ответ вопрошающим,” Istok, 2 (2015).

279 “Наложницы или блудницы? аналитика,” Istok, 2 (2015).

280 “Шариатская полиция. Описание действительности,” Istok, 2 (2015).

281 “Из биографии шахидов. Герои исламского государства,” Istok, 2 (2015).

282 “Днирасплаты,” Istok, 3 (2015).

283 Ibid., 5.

284 “Путь, ведущийкуничтожениюзаговоров,” Istok, 3 (2015).

285 Artur Wejkszner, Państwo Islamskie. Narodziny nowego kalifatu (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 159.

286 “Хисба. Отделпопризыву к одобряемому и запретупорицаемого,” Istok, 3 (2015).

287 “Опередил меня мой сын,” Istok, 4 (2016).

288 “Военное положение с кафирами,” Istok, 4 (2016).

289 On the concept see more in: Nerina Rustomji, The Garden and the Fire: Heaven and Hell in Islamic Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

290 “Благоухание и пользыбомбардировок,” Istok, 4 (2016).

291 “КараеваЭльвира. АгентспецслужбРоссии,” Istok, 4 (2016).

292 “СвободаИслама в Европе. Заблуждениеилиреальность,” Istok, 4 (2016).

293 “Военная медицина Исламского Государства,” Istok, 4 (2016).

294 See David Winston, “DIY Terrorism: A Look at the Paradigm Shift in Daesh’s Recruitment Tactics Through the Lens of Central Asian Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” Terrorism, 1 (2018), 11.

295 North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2015), 13. On the topic, see more in: Marta Ter, “The Caucasus Emirate, the Other Russian Front,” Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 129 (2015).

296 North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2015), 13

297 Dounia Mahlouly and Charlie Winter, A Tale of Two Caliphates. Comparing the Islamic State’s Internal and External Messaging Priorities (Dublin: VOX-Pol, 2018), 4.

298 Carol Winkler, “Visual Images: Distinguishing Daesh’s Internal and External Communication Strategies,” in Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes, edited by Houda Abadi (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2016), 15; Malcolm Nance and Chris Sampson, Hacking ISIS. How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 155; Charlie Winter and Haid Haid, “Jihadist Propaganda, Offline. Strategic Communications in Modern Warfare,” Middle East Institute Policy Paper, 3 (2018), 3.

299 “شمال ولاية الرقة PKKعملية انغماسية جديدة على مرتدي الـ,” al-Naba, 1 (2014), 2.

300 “ورة)ّانغماسيو (ولاية حماة) يفجعون مرتدي الدفاع الوثني وجنود النظام النصيري في قرية (الصب,” al-Naba, 1 (2014), 3.

301 See “Egypt Security Watch,” The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, September 07–13, 2019, https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TIMEP-ESW_briefing_9.7–13.19.pdf.

302 Dounia Mahlouly and Charlie Winter, A Tale of Two Caliphates. Comparing the Islamic State’s Internal and External Messaging Priorities (Dublin: VOX-Pol, 2018), 4–5.

303 Michael Munoz, “Selling the Long War: Islamic State Propaganda after the Caliphate,” CTC Sentinel 11, 10 (2018), 32.

304 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies Report, (2016), 3.

305 Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide. A Statistical Analysis of the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Industry,” ICCT Research Paper, February (2017), 7.

306 Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “A Rebuttal of Al-Qaeda and IS’ Theological Justification of Suicide Bombing,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9, 7 (2017), 17.

307 Thomas Joscelyn and David Daoud, “Al Qaeda Defector Discusses Group’s Secrets in Islamic State Magazine,” Longwar Journal, 03.05.2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/05/al-qaeda-defector-discusses-groups-secrets-in-islamic-state-magazine.php; “Interview with Abu ‘Ubaydah al-Lubnani. Part 1,” Longwar Journal, 04.05.2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/part-of-interview-with-abu-ubaydah-al-lubnani-from-al-naba.

308 Yasir Yosef Kuoti, “Islamic State in Yemen,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, December (2016), 4.

309 See ISIS’s Media Network: Developments in 2018 and Future Courses of Action (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019), 35.

310 Carol Winkler, “Visual Images: Distinguishing Daesh’s Internal and External Communication Strategies,” in Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes, edited by Houda Abadi (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2016), 16.

311 “كاميرات المراقبة والاحتياط منها,” al-Naba, 167 (2019), 9.

312 See al-Naba, 179 (2019), 1.

313 See al-Naba, 192 (2019), 1.

314 See al-Naba, 124 (2018), 1.

315 See al-Naba, 61 (2016), 1.

316 See e.g. “White Phosphorus,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 39.

317 Carol Winkler, Kareem el-Damanhoury, and Anthony Lemieux, “Validating Extremism: Strategic Use of Authority Appeals in al-Naba’ Infographics,” Journal of Argumentation in Context 7, 1 (2018), 33.

318 Carol Winkler, “Visual Images: Distinguishing Daesh’s Internal and External Communication Strategies,” in Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes, edited by Houda Abadi (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2016), 16–17.

319 Daniel Milton, Down But Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2018).

320 Online Jihadist Propaganda. 2018 in Review (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2018), 12.

321 “Eye on Extremism: December 11, 2018,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/roundup/eye-extremism-december-11-2018; ISIS’s Media Network: Developments in 2018 and Future Courses of Action (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019), 36.

322 Online Jihadist Propaganda. 2018 in Review (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2018), 12.

323 “Make Time for ‘Media Jihad’ Every Day, Pro-ISIS Magazine Tells Youths,” Homeland Security Today, November 18, 2018, https://www.hstoday.ussubject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/make-time-for-media-jihad-every-day-pro-isis-magazine-tells-youths/.

324 “Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Weekend Summary,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 13, 2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-weekend-summary-332.

325 “Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Weekend Summary, The Middle East Media Research Institute, January 12, 2019, https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-weekend-summary-336; “Jihadoscope,” Twitter, January 7, 2019, https://twitter.com/jihadoscope/status/1082479157920047104.

326 “Extremist Content Online: Neo-Nazis Continue Recruiting,” Regional Cooperation Council, February 13, 2019, https://www.rcc.int/p-cve/news/185/extremist-content-online-neo-nazis-continue-recruiting.

327 Iftekharul Bashar, “Islamic State Ideology Continues to Resonate in Bangladesh,” Middle East Institute, September 3, 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/islamic-state-ideology-continues-resonate-bangladesh#_edn12.

328 “Melisa,” Twitter, April 8, 2019, https://twitter.com/cmellaniac/status1115333257162383360.

329 “Youth of the Caliphate #8,” IFI Monitoring, May 13, 2019, https://monitoring.ifiadvisory.com/en/youth-of-caliphate-8/.

330 “Switched,” Twitter, June 8, 2019, https://twitter.com/switch_d/status1137326415853031424.

331 “Jihadoscope,” Twitter, July 7, 2019, https://twitter.com/JihadoScope/status1147872221030993920.

332 “Extremist Content Online: Last Edition of ISIS Magazine Youth of the Caliphate Released,” Counter Terrorism Project, September 10, 2019, https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-last-edition-isis-magazine-youth-caliphate-released; “TRACterrorism.org,” Twitter, September 3, 2019, https://twitter.com/TRACterrorism/status/1169083487195979777; “Jihadoscope,” Twitter, September 5, 2019, https://twitter.com/jihadoscope/status/1169601893716365312.

333 “Jihadoscope,” Twitter, September 5, 2019, https://twitter.com/jihadoscope/status/1169601893716365312.

334 ISIS’s Media Network: Developments in 2018 and Future Courses of Action (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2019), 36–37; Miron Lakomy, “Picturing the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Vanishing or Resurfacing from the World Wide Web?,” EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 70 (2018).

335 “About,” From Dabiq to Rome, 1 (2018), 2.

336 Ibid., 2.

337 “News Headlines,” From Dabiq to Rome, 19 (2018), 10–11.

338 “News Headlines,” From Dabiq to Rome, 9 (2018), 9.

339 Ibid., 10.

340 “Islamic State Military and Covert Operations,” From Dabiq to Rome, 63 (2019), 8.

341 Ibid., 6.

342 See “Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 36.

343 “Congratulating the Taghut Erdogan on Winning the Elections,” From Dabiq to Rome, 17 (2018), 9.

344 “Editorial – Removing the Misconception: A House Divided?,” From Dabiq to Rome, 25 (2018), 4.

345 “Q&A w/Shaykh ‘Ali al-Khudayr on Tahakum,” From Dabiq to Rome, 28 (2018), 5.

346 “Bayan Radio Q&A,” From Dabiq to Rome, 31 (2018), 9; “Q&A w/Shaykh Hassan Husayn,” From Dabiq to Rome, 31 (2018), 9.

347 “What Are The Foundations of the Jihadi Manhaj?,” From Dabiq to Rome, 29 (2018), 1–5.

348 Sulayman al-‘Alwan, “Kufr and Takfir, Its Difference,” From Dabiq to Rome, 33 (2018), 7–9.

349 Abu Malik at-Tamimi, “Pillars and Conditions of Islam,” From Dabiq to Rome, 33 (2018), 9–10.

350 “The Story of Musa and al-Khidr,” From Dabiq to Rome, 2 (2018), 12.

351 Ahmad Jibril, “The Story of the Grandson of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhab,” From Dabiq to Rome, 2 (2018), 2–6. Abdil-Wahhab works were also cited. See: Muhammad ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhab, “The Shahadah: Four Matters Negated and Four Matters Affirmed,” From Dabiq to Rome, 9 (2018), 7–8.

352 Abu Basir al-Muhajir, “The Islamic State is Not Able,” From Dabiq to Rome, 9 (2018), 8.

353 ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State (Ramat Hasharon: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018), 25–26; “Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Weekend Summary,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 8, 2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-weekend-summary-331.

354 For instance, ElSayed noted that jihad and qital are not the same. According to some Islamic interpretations, “qital is jihad, but not every jihad is qital.” See Amin ElSayed, Reclaiming Jihad: A Qur’anic Critique of Terrorism (Cambridge: Kube Publishing Ltd., 2015), 83.

355 Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman and Jasminder Singh, “New Pro-Islamic State Magazine: A Persistent Ideological Threat,” RSIS Commentary, 40 (2019).

3 Reading between the lines

Understanding the propaganda techniques exploited by Dabiq and Rumiyah

3.1Methodology of the research project

Dabiq and Rumiyah have widely been considered by the academic community as “flagship” e-magazines due to their exquisite quality and global resonance. Some experts argue that they were also representative of the online campaign of Daesh. Among others, Christien stated that “Dabiq can be considered a significant documentation of IS’ propaganda strategy.”¹ This means that by explaining their modus operandi in terms of winning the hearts and minds of readers would not only shed more light on the reasons why the digital jihad of the Islamic State was so alluring for some Internet users but also develop proper counter-narratives. Therefore, the research project that is concluded by this book aimed to find out what kind of propaganda devices, methods, and argumentation were exploited by their editorial staffs to influence the emotions and opinions of readers in a manner beneficial to the group’s agenda. Moreover, the project intended to compare these magazines, which would enable the identification of changes in their manipulative layer between the apogee of IS’s power (2014–2015) and its subsequent fall (2016–2017).

In order to reach these objectives, multi-layered content analysis of both magazines was employed.² The research sample consisted of all Anglophone issues of both periodicals. In effect, there were 28 units of analysis (15 editions of Dabiq and 13 editions of Rumiyah) taken into consideration. One unit of observation constituted one page of an analysed volume. Thus, there were 942 units of observation in Dabiq and 590 units of observation in Rumiyah in this research project. Each unit (page) of all consecutive editions of both magazines was analysed and coded in terms of presence (yes/no) and specificity of certain content and propaganda features.

The first layer concentrated on analysis of the propaganda devices employed. This was founded on the well-known concept of seven devices, which was elaborated by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in the 1930s. It was originally developed to detect and understand the modus operandi of Nazi German propaganda.³ However, since the end of the Second World War it has been utilised to analyse various instances of broadly understood information warfare,⁴ including those related to the activities of radical Islamist organisations.⁵ Sproule noted that it is the “most ubiquitous and long-lasting among the many frameworks of propaganda criticism and analysis.”⁶ Thus, it is a still valid, universal and well-proven framework that provides understanding of how propagandists – in this case al-Hayat Media Center’s operatives – attempt to achieve a desired response from online audiences.⁷

The IPA concept consists of seven devices. The first – name-calling – is heavily based on conjuring of negative emotions, such as hate or fear, through the use of pejorative labels (“bad words”) provided without evidence. According to Sproule, “the propagandist applied such bad names as ‘fascist’ or ‘communist’ to the opponent to stimulate hate and fear.”⁸ Thus, this study coded all terms that stigmatised and denounced real or artificial enemies of the Islamic State as instances of name-calling. The second device – glittering generalities – stands in direct opposition to the previous one. It utilises positive labels, so called “virtue words,” including such terms as truth, freedom, and honour. These notions are customarily associated with the programme of the propagandist.⁹ Thus, in the context of this study, all positive terms that were associated with the Islamic State, its ideology, actions, or its interpretation of Islam, were coded as glittering generalities. The third device – transfer – according to Miller, is a technique which relies on carrying over the authority or prestige of something widely respected to something that the propagandist would have the reader accept.¹⁰ Due to the fact that both Dabiq and Rumiyah were predominantly designed to reach Anglophone Muslims, all instances of the exploitation of the key authorities in Islam were coded as transfer. These included Allah and his commandments (the Quran), the Prophet Mohammad (hadiths), his companions (Sahabah), other prophets, as well as the most recognised Islamic scholars. The fourth device – testimonial – is based, as its name suggests, on testimonies which support the agenda of the propagandist.¹¹ In effect, interviews and articles consisting of first-person experience or insights, which supported the ideology of Daesh, were coded this way. The fifth method – plain folks – is the instrument of presenting propagandists as ordinary men. It means that “through language and action, elite give themselves the common touch with the objective of conveying a favorable impression about their ideas and proposals.”¹² In effect, the study attempted to identify statements that presented members of the “Caliphate” as regular people. Another device – bandwagon – is founded on appeals to common identity and “follow the crowd” logic.¹³ Thus, attempts to exploit Muslim identity in order to make the target audience support the agenda of the Islamic State were coded this way. Finally, card-stacking, according to IPA, is a “device in which the propagandist employs all the arts of deception to win our support for himself (…) He stacks the cards against the truth. He uses under-emphasis and over-emphasis to dodge issues and evade facts. He resorts to lies, censorship, and distortion. He omits facts.”¹⁴ However, for the purpose of this study, the definition of this method was narrowed down strictly to statements consisting of lies which were either obvious or verifiable in independent sources. This was done due to the fact that both magazines were permeated with the evasion of difficult issues, while themes beneficial for the group’s agenda were over-emphasised. Thus, content analysis based on the definition provided by the IPA would provide no meaningful conclusions.

The second layer focused on explaining the means of argumentation utilised. Each page of both magazines was coded in terms of the presence of one-sided or two-sided argumentation. One-sided arguments provide only one viewpoint at a time.¹⁵ These are manifested in narratives that present either the positive or negative traits of a certain issue discussed exclusively. In theory, such a means of argumentation may be employed to convince less educated and demanding audiences, which maintain a positive or neutral attitude towards the propagandist. In contrast, two-sided arguments are manifested in deliberations presenting both the pros and cons of a problem, and one of them is usually shown as the preferred solution. They are exploited to influence more enlightened audiences, who may express a negative attitude towards the propagandist.¹⁶ It is worth mentioning that two-sided argumentation is also believed to be a tool for increasing the credibility and trustworthiness of a message.¹⁷ Such analysis enabled understanding of the level of sophistication of IS’s argumentation techniques and the gathering of additional knowledge on the expected traits of the target audience of Dabiq and Rumiyah.

The third layer of analysis aimed to understand how the magazine encouraged readers to undertake certain actions, which were in line with the Islamic State’s agenda. It drew from the classification of propaganda techniques, based on the behavioural intensity criteria. It consists of methods triggering mental states (but lacking evident calls for action) and methods triggering behaviour.¹⁸ In this context, this study attempted to detect pages consisting of three types of calls to action, which are natural for Islamist terrorist online propaganda: recruitment calls (including demands of hijrah,¹⁹ as well as statements obliging Muslims to pledge bay’ah²⁰ to al-Baghdadi), calls to wage jihad (including demands of militant and terrorist actions), as well as daw’ah,²¹ i.e. demands of conversion to Islam. The structure and location of these calls were taken under consideration as well. Moreover, pages consisting of argumentation legitimising violence were coded separately. This was done in order to understand the detailed reasoning behind these calls, which may have a significant impact on international security.²² In other words, the study aimed to detect, measure the frequency, and assess the structure of calls to action, issued by Dabiq and Rumiyah, as well as to understand the reasoning behind messages urging Muslims to enter the path of violent jihad.

The fourth layer of content analysis was designed to strengthen conclusions related to the rationale behind communiqués which aimed to trigger certain behaviours in the readers. First of all, the study examined fragments which designated enemies of the Islamic State, including existing states, international organisations, factions, militias and terrorist organisations. In other words, the goal here was to understand who was mentioned in the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah as a hostile entity, how frequently, and why. Only those statements which identified hostiles by name, whether a state, faction, or its leader, were coded. This proved to be helpful in understanding who was presented as primary targets for acts of violence inspired by the al-Hayat Media Center. Secondly, statements related to deceased IS members, who were labelled as martyrs, were detected and assessed. The primary objective here was to understand who was presented as shahid and how. This, in turn, enabled the exploration of the usability of their profiles in promoting martyrdom (including suicide attacks) in the service of the Islamic State. Thirdly, the project aimed to detect and analyse narratives utilising the Muslim “victimhood card.” Allegations concerning the persecution of ummah by “infidels” are traditionally used in the propaganda of Islamist terrorist organisations as a convenient way of inciting hatred towards disbelievers and explaining the necessity of resorting to violence against them.²³ This issue was therefore analysed in relation to arguments legitimising attacks against “infidels” in both magazines.

This study also exploited limited word frequency analysis, which enabled the strengthening of the conclusions from the content analysis. It was predominantly utilised to detect key words, ordinarily accompanying some propaganda devices.

Finally, comparative analysis was applied in this research project. The results of the content analysis of all 28 issues of Dabiq (15) and Rumiyah (13) were compared chronologically in order to understand how their propaganda strategy evolved over time, especially in the context of the changing military situation of the “Caliphate.” Additionally, Dabiq as a whole was compared to Rumiyah.

It has to be stressed that the study adopted both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach enabled the assessment of how often certain methods of influencing readers were employed, meaning that the long-term inclinations of the editors could be detected. The qualitative approach focused on less evident and frequently non-literal meanings of the messages conveyed by Dabiq and Rumiyah. It aimed to discover patterns in the propaganda devices or argumentation used by these magazines, which would be otherwise impossible to observe based on purely quantitative data. A combination of both perceptions provided a detailed image of the methods exploited by the flagship periodicals of Daesh to manipulate Internet users.

3.2Propaganda devices and argumentation used in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Meet the enemy: the name-calling device

As mentioned in the previous section, the name-calling device is manifested in the use of “bad words”, serving the purpose of denouncing hostile entities. In the past, popular name-calling devices included such terms as “heretic” or “communist.”²⁴ Thus, the study attempted to identify all terms carrying unfavourable connotations which were used to designate and stigmatise the enemies of the Islamic State. In this context, it is not a surprise that both magazines proved to be full of these expressions (Table 3.1). Pages consisting of at least one instance of name-calling ranged from 21 (#1) to as many as 63 (#9) in Dabiq. The average use per volume for this publication series was 47.1 pages. Considering the fact that on average each issue consisted of 62.8 pages, approximately 75% of them utilised this device, which proves its significance. Likewise, the average use of name-calling for all 13 volumes of Rumiyah was 33.6. The number of pages coded as “positive” ranged from 26 (#1) to 50 (#11). Considering the average page count for this periodical (45.3), the share of pages with name-calling was 74.1%, so almost the same level as Dabiq. This literally means that the editorial staff of both e-magazines paid similar attention to castigating enemies, from a purely quantitative viewpoint.

Table 3.1 Pages consisting of name-calling devices in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issues | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 21 | 26
2 | 28 | 31
3 | 28 | 37
4 | 41 | 32
5 | 32 | 39
6 | 44 | 30
7 | 62 | 27
8 | 56 | 32
9 | 63 | 45
10 | 60 | 29
11 | 57 | 50
12 | 52 | 33
13 | 43 | 27
14 | 58 | –
15 | 62 | –
Average | 47.13 | 33.69

Source: Content analysis.

Both magazines employed a similar set of “bad names,” which were used for the same purpose of inciting hate and fear among their readers towards targeted individuals, groups, beliefs, factions or states. They were used both in the form of adjectives and nouns, in Arabic as well as in English. The vast majority of them originated from the religious texts of Islam (including the Quran and hadiths). Others were traditionally exploited by Muslim radicals for decades, at least.

The two most flexible and most significant negative labels exploited were: infidel/−s (also used in Arabic form of kafir/kuffar) and apostate/−s (murtadd/murtaddin). Both draw from and capitalise on the stigma applied to the very idea of disbelief in Islam, at least according to radical interpretations of the Quran and hadiths. Ali noted that “Muslim extremists believe that Quran provides instruction for Muslims to hate and disavow people of the Religious Other.”²⁵ This effectively opens a space for narratives encouraging ummah to use violence against them, remove them from power, subject them to Islamic governance, and seize their wealth, which lies at the core of the ideology of jihad. As Wiktorowicz accurately noted, infidels can be fought against because “the primary objective of Muslims is to establish God’s rule on earth (divine hukm).”²⁶ There is, however, a qualitative distinction between both notions as well. While, in fact, “apostates” are disbelievers, they are composed of Muslims who violate the core values and rules of their religion. Employment of this term is directly related to the Salafi-jihadi concepts of takfir (excommunication) and nawaqid al-Islam (nullifiers of Islam). The second idea consists of ten acts that, by definition, automatically nullify one’s membership in the community of believers. These include, among others, engagement in shirk (i.e. sin, meant as polytheism), accepting intermediaries in worship, justifying disbelief, mocking religion, or practising black magic. As Hassan argued, “while some clerics insist that there are degrees of faithlessness and that a sinner does not necessarily become an infidel by committing certain acts, the Islamic State generally rejects gradation and believes that all acts of unbelief are effectively equal. In the same vein, it believes that a Muslim has a religious duty to identify and label infidels or apostates, and failure to do so can lead one to become an infidel or apostate himself.”²⁷

In this context, the broader term of disbeliever was usually employed by the editors to designate a large pool of enemies from outside of the Islamic world, i.e. both followers of other religions (especially Christians) and atheists. Nevertheless, sometimes it was also used to label Muslims who do not support the “Caliphate’s” ideology.²⁸ The predominant function of both was to stigmatise the enemies of ummah, embodied by the followers of Daesh, and incite hatred towards them. The attitude of editors towards kuffar was described in detail in the 15th edition of Dabiq. In the article entitled “Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You” they stated: “We hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah […] your disbelief is the primary reason we fight you, as we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit to the authority of Islam, either by becoming Muslims, or by paying jizyah […] and living in humiliation under the rule of Muslims.”²⁹ Likewise, Rumiyah #1 argued that “anyone who is neither a Muslim nor a dhimmi kafir (while still a tyrant against himself, deserving both hatred and humiliation) is a hostile tyrant deserving aggression.”³⁰ Sometimes magazines made a clear distinction between kuffar asliyyin (disbelievers, who are not apostates) and murtaddin.³¹ “Apostates” were frequently depicted as those who posed a greater and more immediate threat to the pureness of Islam. They should be dealt with prior to waging war against “infidels”. This was confirmed by Hassan, who stated that

the group argues that focusing on the far enemy (the West) and ignoring the near enemy (Muslim enemies in the region, especially Shia) is ineffective. Under the Islamic State’s vision, the far enemy will be dragged into the region as Osama bin Laden planned, but by attacking the near enemy.³²

Thus, when compared to non-Muslim kuffar, murtaddin constituted a greater evil in IS’s worldview, as they were responsible for violating Islamic values and subjected to the rule of disbelievers.³³

Both “bad words” were closely related to the third negative label of polytheist (mushrik/mushrikin), which originates from the Quran and hadiths. Its exploitation corresponded with frequently reiterated accusations that enemies of the Islamic State defy the very idea of monotheism (tawhid), and they constitute enemies of “true believers.” As expected, this term was predominantly utilised to denounce Christians, due to their dogma of the Holy Trinity,³⁴ as well as followers of other religions, such as Hinduism.³⁵ However, it also served the purpose of stigmatising Shia Muslims, who were accused of religious practices which stand in contradiction to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and the essence of the Quran. Rumiyah #6 emphasised that

this is just as the soldiers of the Islamic State today, in the east and the west, find no fault with targeting the Rafidi and Isma’ili mushrikin inside their temples, even though they call them ‘masajid.’ That is due to them actually being places of worship for other than Allah, so Muslims must avoid attending such places.³⁶

As mentioned in this fragment, the “bad name” of mushrik – used in relation to Shia Muslims – was frequently accompanied by another pejorative term of rafidi/−ah (“rejector/−s”).³⁷ In this context, it should be stressed that Shia Muslims proved to be one of the primary targets of the name-calling device and this was especially visible in Dabiq. It dedicated a significant number of articles to presenting this branch of Islam as the pinnacle of “corruption” and “evildoing.” Among others, it argued that “authenticity is something impossible for a lying Rafidi to ever achieve, as they are infamous of being the greatest liars of the creation.”³⁸ It also argued that Mahdi of Shia is the Dajjal (“devil”) himself. Other articles basically did the same by inciting hatred and contempt of readers towards Shia Muslims, due to their rejection of Sunnah and their allegedly corrupt religious practices. Dabiq #13 insisted that this group “like all deviant sects, would evolve over time, innovating more and more heresies, kufr, and wickedness.”³⁹

The “bad names” of rafidah, murtaddin, and mushrikin were frequently related to or accompanied by another pejorative term which was exploited in reference to Muslims who did not support Daesh – “hypocrites” (munafiq/munafiqin). This particular term was exploited to identify Muslims who were still part of the community of believers but did not adhere to the core values of Islam. This term proved to be especially important for Rumiyah, which expressed a tendency of referring to the “hypocrisy” of Sunni Muslims who did not join jihad. In a certain sense, this was also a means of damage control, as editors aimed to convince readers that the problems experienced by the group in 2016/2017 were partially caused by the indifference, ignorance, and corruption of the masses of untruthful members of ummah. Among others, Rumiyah’s fourth edition featured an article dedicated to this issue. It was, in fact, a fragment of ibn Taymiyyah’s work, in which he argued that

mankind has divided into three groups: the muminin (believers), who are those who believe in him inwardly […], and outwardly […]; the kuffar (disbelievers), who disbelieve in him outwardly, and the munafiqin (hypocrites), those who believe in him outwardly but not inwardly.⁴⁰

This term was also related to nifaq (hypocrisy) that may “creep into the heart of anyone who wrongly views his relationship to the kuffar.”⁴¹ In other words, in order to downplay the crisis of the organisation, Rumiyah attached great importance to criticising munafiqin who were distinguished from the true believers at “times of hardships” and “tests” from Allah.⁴²

Another commonly exploited “bad name” in both magazines was taghut (plural tawaghit). According to Revkin, it is “a derogatory term used by the Islamic State and other Salafi-jihadist groups to denote idolatrous groups and usually refers to governments that rely on positive law (as opposed to divine law).”⁴³ In fact, tawaghit constituted one of the central points of the Islamic State’s grim worldview conveyed by both magazines. They attacked ruling political elite as the most important cause of the hardships experienced by ummah. They were also accused of being responsible for widespread “corruption” in the world of Islam. This notion was primarily exploited to stigmatise rulers of Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, which were condemned by editors for taking divine worship for themselves.⁴⁴ However, from time to time, also Western “disbelieving” decision-makers were labelled as tawaghit.⁴⁵ Both groups were accused of cooperating with each other against Muslims, as Dabiq #6 emphasised.⁴⁶

Finally, the last core “bad name” exploited by both periodicals was “crusader,” which was utilised to denounce traditionally Christian, Western states, and their political elite, soldiers, or citizens, including the United States and members of the European Union. This negative notion obviously referred to the complicated history of Christian–Muslim relations and capitalised on the fact that the crusades in the Middle Ages was one of the key points of the politics of memory in the Islamic world, especially since the 20th century.⁴⁷ Thus, exploitation of this term aimed to convince readers that the Holy War against dar al-Islam (the “house of submission”⁴⁸) is still ongoing and that the Islamic State is the only defender of Muslims. Through this term, editors attempted to use historical resentments and fear shared by the “believers” for the benefit of Daesh. In a certain sense, this attitude could also have capitalised on the “Westernophobia” of some Muslim communities, which was noticed, for example by Marranci.⁴⁹

In addition to the “mainstream” pejorative nouns discussed above, there were also others, more or less common, which were characteristic of the rhetoric employed in Dabiq and Rumiyah. For instance, one can mention the term of “palace scholars,” which was utilised to condemn those religious leaders of Muslims who did not support the legitimacy and actions of the “Caliphate.” It was also a means of convincing readers that their judgment in matters of faith was clouded by their subjugation to tawaghit.⁵⁰

As visible in examples cited above, this wide spectrum of “bad names” was usually accompanied with a huge number of negative adjectives and nouns, which aimed to present their actions, beliefs or ideology in an even worse perspective. These included such terms as shirk/shirki (sin/sinful), evil, evildoing, ignorance, corruption, deviance, kufr (disbelief), paganism, filth, falsehood, lie, heresy, disease, wickedness, disgrace, foolishness, impurity, or vileness. Usually they were exploited in a very illustrative or metaphorical way. An example of such an attitude may be found in Rumiyah #3, which attacked Turks and the Muslim Brotherhood with the following statement: “since the followers of the Turkish taghut Erbakan have been the most disgraceful school of the Murtadd Brotherhood, the most severely of them drenched in the swamp of shirk.”⁵¹ Turkey was also described as a “vile state.”⁵² Another symbolic example may be found in Dabiq #13, which described rafidah as “people of treachery and cowardice” and “pagan apostates” whose blood is “filthy.”⁵³

In terms of word frequency, there are visible differences between Dabiq and Rumiyah.⁵⁴ To begin with, the earlier flagship magazine was generally more interested in using the negative labels of “crusader” (an average of 48.53 words per issue) and rafidah (an average of 34.93 words per issue) (Table 3.2). This attitude naturally corresponds with the aforementioned attention paid to the criticism of Christians and Western nations, as well as to the condemnation of Shia Muslims. Dabiq featured a plethora of articles which castigated the latter from various angles, including the alleged invalidity of their religious beliefs and also “hostile” actions undertaken by factions and states representing their interests, including Iran and Iraqi militias. Broader negative labels of kuffar and murtaddin proved to be similarly popular with an average of 26.4 and 26.8 uses per issue. The term of mushrikin in singular and plural forms was the least frequent core “bad name,” with only 10 words per volume.

Table 3.2 Frequency of selected “bad names” exploited in Dabiq

Issue | Crusader | Kafir/Kuffar | Rafidah/Rafidi | Murtadd/Murtaddin | Mushrik/Mushrikin
1 | 16 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2
2 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5
3 | 12 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 3
4 | 46 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 12
5 | 16 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 5
6 | 25 | 19 | 32 | 28 | 2
7 | 74 | 43 | 5 | 61 | 10
8 | 36 | 42 | 10 | 21 | 20
9 | 130 | 60 | 51 | 2 | 11
10 | 68 | 48 | 13 | 29 | 26
11 | 86 | 20 | 61 | 24 | 12
12 | 84 | 45 | 55 | 58 | 4
13 | 41 | 40 | 227 | 59 | 17
14 | 39 | 42 | 40 | 73 | 14
15 | 49 | 3 | 8 | 23 | 7
Average | 48.53 | 26.4 | 34.93 | 26.8 | 10

Source: Word frequency analysis.

The terms “crusader” and rafidah were slightly less frequent in the content of Rumiyah, with an average of 29.69 and 23.38 words per issue (Table 3.3). However, the newer magazine paid much greater attention to exploiting the terms of kuffar (32.46), murtaddin (43.92) and mushrikin (24.23). Considering the fact that Rumiyah was much shorter than Dabiq, two interesting conclusions may be drawn. On the one hand, in this case the name-calling device was more focused on stigmatising “near enemies.” On the other hand, editorial staff were keen to use less precise negative labels, such as “infidel,” instead of “crusader” or rafidah.

Table 3.3 Frequency of selected “bad names” exploited in Rumiyah

Issue | Crusader | Kafir/Kuffar | Rafidah/Rafidi | Murtadd/Murtaddin | Mushrik/Mushrikin
1 | 20 | 30 | 17 | 52 | 23
2 | 47 | 46 | 3 | 47 | 35
3 | 30 | 23 | 26 | 41 | 41
4 | 20 | 11 | 13 | 41 | 3
5 | 27 | 42 | 28 | 58 | 16
6 | 18 | 22 | 38 | 66 | 48
7 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 36 | 22
8 | 16 | 34 | 11 | 21 | 24
9 | 29 | 32 | 34 | 26 | 26
10 | 60 | 12 | 47 | 30 | 27
11 | 36 | 80 | 39 | 37 | 28
12 | 30 | 54 | 12 | 57 | 14
13 | 39 | 22 | 20 | 59 | 8
Average | 29.69 | 32.46 | 23.38 | 43.92 | 24.23

Source: Content analysis.

To summarise, while there were slight differences in the exact “bad names” exploited by Dabiq and Rumiyah, the logic behind the exploitation of name-calling was identical. First of all, this propaganda device constituted the most important means of showing IS’s supporters who the “bad guys” are and why. All non-Muslims were depicted en masse as the “scum” of humankind that seek to destroy true Islam and subjugate Muslims. They comprised an alliance, collectively labelled as the “camp of kufr” or the “camp of shirk.” According to Daesh, it was composed of a wide spectrum of factions, states, and religions, including “jihadi claimants,” Sunni “apostates,” and “hypocrites,” Shia Muslims (rafidah), Muslim tawaghit, Christian “crusaders,” or even Hindu “polytheists,” cooperating together against the Khilafah. This narration permeated the content of both magazines. For instance, the seventh edition of Dabiq dedicated its cover story to discussing this matter in detail. It argued that the 9/11 attacks exposed the entente of “deviant ‘Islamic’ movements, the palace ‘scholars,’ and the deviant du’at, not to mention the apostate tawaghit, as all of them rushed to serve the crusaders led by Bush in the war against Islam.”⁵⁵ It also insisted that the emergence of the Islamic State forced the “grayzone” – composed of Muslims who did not side with anyone – to the brink of extinction, as there was no further excuses for avoiding participation in jihad. In effect, it accused “hypocritical” believers of “abandoning the grayzone and fleeing to the camp of apostasy and kufr.”⁵⁶ Therefore, the name-calling device served the purpose of persuading readers that there is no third option, meaning that Muslims had to declare their fealty to al-Baghdadi. As a consequence, everyone who does not support Daesh automatically becomes part of the “camp of disbelief” and is perceived as an enemy of ummah. In this perspective, this propaganda method was an instrument for creating an artificial black-and-white vision of the world, consisting of the Islamic State and the “vile” rest.

As suggested above, name-calling was an emanation of the concept of takfir. Dabiq and Rumiyah paid great attention to labelling all Muslim factions and groups which did not support the Islamic State as “apostates.” This effectively meant that they were automatically deprived of the benefits and protection resulting from being part of the community of believers. In a certain sense, murtaddin were depicted as the primary enemy of the followers of the Islamic State, which stood in line with the tradition of Iraqi al-Qaeda of az-Zarqawi.

“Bad words” proved to be a means of denouncing, stigmatising, or even humiliating various groups of enemies. Non-Muslims and Muslim “apostates” were presented in a demeaning way, usually as something bereft of human characteristics. Among others, they were frequently described as “impure,” “corrupted” or “filthy.” In a certain sense, harming an “infidel” was a simple act comparable to, for example, killing an insect. This is due to the fact that kuffar were depicted as something much worse than a believer, who were the only people that deserve dignity and to rule over others, as well as certain rights and privileges. In effect, in many ways this means of narration was reminiscent of the rhetoric employed by parties and states responsible for genocide in the past, including Nazi propaganda on the Untermenschen.⁵⁷

Such a tendency to portray hostile entities in this way, including followers of other religions, as well as nations, states, and factions served the purpose of convincing readers that the use of violence against them is not only legitimate, but also expected. Any call for jihad against kuffar was accompanied with a set of messages indicating that they are composed of people who are despicable by definition. This, in turn, enabled the “bypassing” of all ethical constraints that may exist among radicalised readers. Both Dabiq and Rumiyah, therefore, argued that the Islamic State faces corrupt deviants of all kinds that should be dealt with by force and either subjugated (“People of the Book”), killed, or enslaved.

Highlighting the heroism and valour of the mujahidin: glittering generalities

Glittering generalities, when compared to name-calling, is the other side of the same coin. While the latter is founded on the use of pejorative terms, glittering generalities exploits positive labels in order to improve the image and promote the agenda of the propagandist. Thus, this study attempted to identify and analyse all instances of “virtue words,” which were used in relation to the Islamic State, its ideology, actions, members, and its interpretation of Islam.

From the quantitative viewpoint, both magazines attached great importance to exploiting this device (Table 3.4). Pages which contained at least one instance of glittering generalities in Dabiq ranged from eight (#2) to 33 (#7, #33), with an average for all 15 volumes of 20.06 pages. As for Rumiyah, the results varied from seven (#7) to as many as 26 (#9) pages, with an average use for all 13 editions of 18.15 pages. Considering the fact that the newer magazine was shorter in length when compared to the older one (45.3 to 62.8 pages, on average), Rumiyah had a greater share of pages with instances of this method than Dabiq (40% vs. 32%). This prevalence could be caused by the fact that it was known for featuring articles which were, in fact, pieces of damage control at the time of the downfall of the organisation.⁵⁸

Table 3.4 Pages consisting of the glittering generalities device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 13 | 11
2 |  8 | 20
3 |  9 | 22
4 | 17 | 19
5 | 22 | 21
6 | 18 | 14
7 | 33 | 7
8 | 23 | 27
9 | 25 | 26
10 | 21 | 14
11 | 19 | 24
12 | 22 | 14
13 | 22 | 17
14 | 16 | –
15 | 33 | –
Average | 20.06 | 18.15

Source: Content analysis.

As for qualitative tendencies, there was a relatively constant set of positive notions that were utilised to idealise mujahidin fighting for the Islamic State, its leaders, as well as its followers in general. This was done in order to present them as near-perfect Muslims. It consisted of such terms as: bravery, steadfastness, heroism, truthfulness, dedication, righteousness, firmness, honesty, goodness, courage, fearlessness, generosity, helpfulness, and sincerity. This method of using glittering generalities was especially evident in the hagiographies of martyrs, which were featured in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section (Figure 3.1). For instance, Rumiyah #11, which promoted Abu Mujahid al-Faransi (Macreme Abroujui), described him with the following statements:

He was a man whom people would fear, as he was known amongst his peers as brave and fearless […] He was generous in nature and noble in his manners, despite his indulgence in disobedience and sins […] He was administrative-minded and organized […] All of these characteristics were sufficient to make him eligible to be a leader.⁵⁹

A similar example may be seen in Dabiq #9, which praised Hudhayfah al-Battawi as a “man in a time in which men were few. Of firm ‘aqidah and manhaj, he stemmed from a good, muwahhid family known for sacrifice and generosity.”⁶⁰ It also argued that “He mixed more with virtuous brothers, people of goodness, and experience. He used to fast and pray a lot at night […] He was a close friend for his brothers and source of steadfastness for them wherever he was.”⁶¹ The same piece described him or his fellow terrorists as “heroic soldiers,” or “steadfast like anchored mountain.”⁶² The same set of virtue words was also used by pieces that praised the achievements of the Islamic State’s members, but to a slightly lesser extent, which was caused by the more informative and less-hagiographic inclination of such articles.

Figure 3.1“Among the Believers Are Men” section in Dabiq #15. Source: Internet Archive.

This approach of presenting members, leaders, and followers of Daesh (both dead and alive) as pinnacles of virtue was symbolically manifested in the use of two crucial “virtue words.” They were presented as “knights,” who dedicated their life for the glory of Allah and the wellbeing of ummah. For instance, the 15th issue of Dabiq argued that “bloodthirsty knights of the Caliphate continue to wage their war”⁶³ and mentioned “knights in Orlando and Nice.”⁶⁴ The notions of the “knights of shahadah” or “shahadah knights” were frequently utilised to indicate the positive-only traits of “martyred” militants.⁶⁵ Likewise, the 12th edition of Dabiq argued that “the Islamic State dispatched its brave knights to wage war in the homelands of the wicked crusaders, leaving Paris and its residents ‘shocked and awed.’ The eight knights brought Paris down to its knees.”⁶⁶ The use of this specific term capitalised on stereotypes associating knights with honour, dedication, and chivalry. However, little space for the imagination of readers was left, as these terms were customarily accompanied by a wide range of the aforementioned positive terms.

Mujahidin were also frequently labelled as “lions.” From a purely technical viewpoint, this term served the same purpose as “knights” – associating the militants of Daesh with popular and positive stereotypes related to these animals, including their fearlessness, power, and leadership. Once again, in order to avoid any doubts on these matters, “lions” were associated with a number of positive traits. Among others, Dabiq #7 included the following statement in the hagiography of Amedy Coulibaly: “He was a lion; his actions testify to this. He exhibited might against the kuffar.”⁶⁷ Similarly, Rumiyah’s article dedicated to promoting steadfastness among mujahidin during the crisis consisted of calls to the “lions of Mosul” or the “lions of bravery.”⁶⁸

In addition to creating artificial images of Daesh-affiliated terrorists, glittering generalities were also exploited to advertise the “Caliphate’s” ideology, interpretation of religion, actions, and statehood. One of the most common ways of doing this was based on associating IS with the notions of “truth” and “truthfulness.” Islamic State was portrayed as a beacon of truth. In effect, its “prophetic methodology” was advertised by periodicals as the only authentic source of the interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah. Such a method of influencing readers was noticeable, for example, in Dabiq #14 which argued that Daesh is the “only true bastion of Shari’ah rule on earth”⁶⁹ and the “only true Muslim government on earth.”⁷⁰ Likewise, the “Caliphate’s” spokesman Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir in his statement published in Rumiyah #11 insisted that Islamic State’s followers are the only “truthful Muslims” that face trials from Allah (i.e. defeats suffered from the anti-IS coalition). In this context, Islam in general, being a foundation of the organisation’s appeal towards readers, was frequently associated with truth. This attitude was visible in Dabiq #15, which called Christians to “the religion of pure monotheism, truth, mercy, justice and the sword.”⁷¹

Similarly, the agenda and actions of Daesh were presented as pure “justice,” which was usually related to its implementation of God’s will (shari’ah), as well as to its violence against “enemies” of Islam. Through the use of this virtue word, the Islamic State was presented as the group that is the sole representative and saviour of oppressed Muslims. This intent was noticeable in Ansar al-Islam’s pledge of allegiance, in Dabiq #4, which stated:

this is the state that opened the lands of Islam, brought an end to the artificial borders between the lands of the Muslims, broke the shackles of the prisoners, and freed the lions. This is the state that established the laws of Allah, carried out the hudud, set up the various administrative offices, and brought justice to the oppressed.⁷²

Similarly, Rumiyah #8, in an article stigmatising rafidah, argued that “Islamic state is the only means of establishing the religion and spreading justice among people, and the establishment of justice is a matter which Allah obliged upon His creation.”⁷³ As a consequence, the actions of Daesh were presented as “just” in nature. The second periodical even featured the aforementioned “Just Terror Tactics” section. Its very title indicated that all acts of violence against disbelievers are merely the delivery of justice. Such intent was even expressed in the first edition of this section, which stated: “Instead of using the term ‘lone wolf’ we will refer to operations in Dar al-Kufr executed by mujahidin with bay’ah to the Khalifah as ‘just terror operations,’ ‘just’ being the adjective form for justice.”⁷⁴

Finally, the very existence and activities of the Islamic State were presented by both magazines as a great blessing for all “truthful” Muslims. They argued that the organisation was the only safeguard for ummah, persecuted for centuries by various “infidel” and “apostate” groups. Therefore, the very first issue of Dabiq cited al-Baghdadi’s statement, which argued that the proclamation of the “Caliphate” united Muslims that “became one, under a single flag and goal, in one pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of the faithful brotherhood. If kings were to taste this blessing, they would abandon their kingdoms and fight over this grace.”⁷⁵ Similar rhetoric was adopted by Rumiyah. For instance, the eulogy of Abu Mujahid al-Faransi stated that he always reminded his brother “of the virtues of hijrah and the blessings of living under the shade of the Shari’ah, and raising one’s children in Dar al-Islam.”⁷⁶

There were several distinct motives behind this use of glittering generalities in the content of both magazines. Primarily, it was useful in portraying Islamic State’s followers and members as a “truthful bunch,” a band of brothers who embodied the real ummah, in contrast to the masses of “deviant,” “apostate” factions, denounced through the name-calling device. It was also a way of convincing readers of the moral high ground held by the organisation over its enemies through references to justice and truthfulness. Additionally, both methods combined served the purpose of making a clear distinction between “truth” and “falsehood” and creating the aforementioned artificial vision of the world. While “bad names” were used to create the image of the “camp of kufr,” “virtue words” enabled the designation of the “camp of truth” or the “camp of iman,” represented by Daesh and its followers – “true,” monotheist Muslims (muwahiddin). This could be viewed in Rumiyah #11, which cited a text authored by az-Zarqawi. He used this distinction founded on name-calling and glittering generalities in his statement: “Truth wrestles with falsehood, Islam wages war against disbelief, jahiliyyah and hypocrisy creep in, and weak, frail individuals hold the staff from middle and ascribe themselves to their ummah, but give preference to their worldly life.”⁷⁷ The same means of influencing readers can be found in the aforementioned speech of al-Baghdadi, featured in the first edition of Dabiq. He claimed:

O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews.⁷⁸

Such manipulation, based on dichotomies and a black-and-white worldview, forced every Muslim reader to make a choice: whether he/she is a truthful believer, and thus, obliged to side with the “Caliphate,” or he/she belongs to the “camp of sin.” This narrative left no room for neutrality.

Moreover, glittering generalities were useful in inciting Internet audiences to undertake actions which were in line with the agenda of IS. Through this device members of Daesh were presented as near-perfect Muslims and the pinnacle of ummah that embody all traits of character praised in the Quran. In other words, they served as role-models for the readers, an example of whom should be followed by others. It should not be a surprise that this rhetoric was frequently accompanied by statements encouraging audiences to imitate their attitudes, beliefs, and actions.

Finally, glittering generalities were used to aggrandise Islamic State’s achievements and to diminish setbacks. It was a simple means of maintaining the aforementioned “winner’s trait,” a triumphant – but false – image of the group. This way of manipulating readers proved to be especially visible in Rumiyah which was focused on downplaying the military defeats of IS in the face of its accelerating decline.

Exploiting the religious authorities of Islam

Considering the fact that the ideology of Daesh is founded on radical interpretation of Islam,⁷⁹ it should not be a surprise to note that the editors of its flagship magazines paid great attention to exploiting core authorities of this religion to convince Muslims of the legality of its claims. This was manifested in the transfer propaganda device. From the quantitative perspective (Table 3.5), Dabiq varied from 25 (#2) to 64 (#15) pages containing at least one transfer, with an average of 40.6 pages for all 15 issues. This means that it was the second most common propaganda device exploited by its editorial staff. Rumiyah ranged from 27 (#6, #7) to 47 (#11) pages containing at least one instance of this type, with an average of 34.84 pages for all 13 issues. It proved to be the most common method utilised by its editors, which confirms the results of the thematic analysis discussed in Chapter 2. Rumiyah was more concentrated on religious affairs, which resulted in more references to the key authorities of Islam. These results mean that while transfer permeated both periodicals, considering their average length, it was relatively more common in Rumiyah than in Dabiq (with a share of 76.9% to 64.6%).

Table 3.5 Pages consisting of transfer device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 26 | 36
2 | 25 | 29
3 | 30 | 42
4 | 38 | 32
5 | 26 | 35
6 | 39 | 27
7 | 60 | 27
8 | 47 | 35
9 | 48 | 46
10 | 47 | 30
11 | 37 | 47
12 | 35 | 35
13 | 41 | 32
14 | 46 | –
15 | 64 | –
Average | 40.60 | 34.84

Source: Content analysis.

As mentioned above, there are five major sources of authority identified by the study. The first and most important was obviously Allah. As Shboul argued, “in Islam, as manipulated by Fundamentalists, Allah is the source of all powers and laws […] Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone.”⁸⁰ Moreover, according to Marsham, the legality of a Muslim caliphate may be derived only from God.⁸¹ Thus, in a certain sense editors had no other choice but to refer to Allah as the source that granted the Islamic State jurisdiction over all Muslims. There were two predominant methods of doing this; Dabiq and Rumiyah either exploited sentences directly connecting Allah’s will, commandments, and blessing with the “Caliphate,” or referred to his words in the form of selectively chosen fragments of the Quran, the holy book of Islam. As Marranci argued, “the Qur’an (recitation) […] is considered to be Allah’s revelation to his Prophet Muhammad.”⁸² Thus, fragments of this book are literally treated as the word of God.

This allowed the editors of both magazines to convey a number of messages to their readers. First of all, they argued that the Islamic State was Allah’s only representative on Earth, which introduces “pure” and “divine” shari’ah that is the cornerstone for the wellbeing of all Muslims. Furthermore, its rise, actions, as well as the rule of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were depicted as a direct blessing from Allah to the persecuted ummah. This method of influencing readers was noticeable in the very first issue of Dabiq that focused on the establishment of the “Caliphate.” It cited al-Baghdadi who stated: “O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership.”⁸³ Likewise, the third edition informed readers that “The Islamic State was established and announced in Iraq. Its domination and consolidation was then revived through its expansion into Sham, by Allah’s grace and bounty.”⁸⁴

Furthermore, both magazines argued that the Islamic State, in fact, fulfils the commandments of Allah by establishing the “Caliphate” and shari’ah, as well as by fighting against “infidels” and punishing “hypocrites” and “apostates.” In effect, the enemies of the Islamic State were presented as the enemies of Allah, which was noticeable, for example, in the fourth edition of Rumiyah. It featured Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir’s communiqué that called on followers of Daesh to “not let the enemy of Allah catch his breath or fortify his defenses.”⁸⁵ Thus, in a certain sense, the interests of the Islamic State were the same as the interests of Allah. Additionally, the betrayal of Daesh was the equivalent of defying the rule of God, and therefore perceived as an act of apostasy. This technique of debating the morale crisis among IS’s followers was especially visible in the second magazine, which consisted of many texts criticising hypocrisy and apostasy in times of “trials” from Allah, i.e. defeats on the battlefields of Syria, Iraq and Libya.⁸⁶

The very same logic was exploited to support messages urging Muslims to undertake certain actions. This was evident when it comes to calls to hijrah to the Islamic State, as well calls to bay’ah to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and engagement in jihad against disbelievers. For instance, the appeals of hijrah were supported by statements that territories seized by the Islamic State constituted dar al-Islam, while the rest was dar al-kufr (“house of disbelief”) or dar al-harb (“house of war”).⁸⁷ According to Rubenstein, the difference between these two constitutes the foundation of all Islamic concepts of peace and war.⁸⁸ Such intent was emphasised in the foreword to the second issue of Dabiq, which stated: “The first priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from darul kufr to darul-Islam.”⁸⁹ This was backed up with a quotation from the Quran (Taha: 84), which indicated that the migration of the prophet Musa (Moses in Christianity) pleased his Lord.⁹⁰ Likewise, violence against disbelievers was legitimised with a number of quotations from the Quran, especially including those coming from surah at-Tawbah. Frequent fragments used for this purpose included, for instance:

“O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers” (at-Tawbah: 123),⁹¹

“O Prophet, fight against disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination” (at-Tawbah: 73),⁹²

“Then kill the polytheists wherever you find them” (at-Tawbah: 5),⁹³

“Fight them, Allah will punish them by your hands. He will disgrace them, give you victory over them, satisfy the breasts of a believing people, and remove the fury in the believers’ hearts” (at-Tawbah: 14–15).⁹⁴

All of them were obviously interpreted in a way that indicated that slaughtering disbelievers stands in line with the commandments of Allah.

In a certain sense, quotations of the Quran or references to the supreme will of Allah accompanied and supported the vast majority of core messages conveyed by both magazines. Rumiyah, for instance, used its fragments to insist that the patience of mujahidin during the crisis, as well as their obedience to leaders, is an obligation imposed by God. This was noticeable in the speech of Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, featured in its ninth volume, where he utilised a fragment of surah an-Anfal (45–46), which stated:

O you who have believed, when you encounter a company [from the enemy forces], stand firm and remember Allah much that you may be successful. And obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength would depart; and be patient. Indeed, Allah is with the ‘patient’.⁹⁵

It was followed by ayat 60 of surah ar-Rum, which is also focused on patience.⁹⁶ One of the most symbolic and representative examples of this means of exploiting the authority of God may be found in the very same communiqué of Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir. He stated:

O soldiers of Khilafah, by the Lord of the heavens and the earth, the transaction is profitable! We will not stop or resign, by Allah’s permission. So be truthful when encountering the enemy, for whoever loves to meet Allah, then Allah loves to meet him. That is the lucrative business, which Allah specified for His believing slaves who sell their lives cheaply for His cause in order to make His words supreme and establish His shari’ah. The goal towards which the mujahid in the cause of Allah aspires to achieve the pleasure, pardon, generosity, granting of success, and blessings of his Lord. That is done by conforming to His command, avoiding what He prohibited, and fighting against His enemies in every area until the religion is entirely for Allah and the entire earth is ruled by the Shari’ah of Allah.⁹⁷

In other words, Islamic State’s jihad was depicted as a struggle to satisfy Allah and to make his religion supreme across the world. Those who succeed in this will be rewarded in this world (dunya) or in the afterlife (Jannah), which is quite typical in Islamic hermeneutics.⁹⁸

The second source of authority in Islam exploited by both magazines was always going to be the Prophet Mohammad. This is not only due to the significance of his prophethood, being the cornerstone of Islam, but also due to his role as the primary source of Sunnah. In this context, as Kebbi stressed, “sunnah, or the Prophet’s life example, includes Muhammad’s Hadiths and the particular way in which he lived […] Muslim scholars preach that Sunnah represents the perfect life example for Muslims to follow.”⁹⁹ Moreover, according to Marranci, “Muhammad was the Prophet of Islam, guided directly by Allah, and leader of the ummah; his actions, juridical decisions and explanations could decrypt some of the difficult passages Muslims find in the Qur’an.”¹⁰⁰ In other words, he is not only a role-model for ummah to follow but also the most important interpreter of Allah’s commandments.

His words and deeds were used by editors in an almost identical manner when compared to transfer based on the authority of Allah. Technically, they either exploited fragments of hadiths of the Prophet, originating from canonical collections of, for example, Sahih al-Bukhari or Sahih-Muslim, or used his authority more straightforwardly to back up narration beneficial to the group’s agenda. As Cook noted, “for Sunni Muslims the hadith literature is of central importance in deciding how to live one’s life.”¹⁰¹ Thus, in many places quotes from the Quran intertwined with citations from hadiths, which served the same purpose of, for instance, legitimising various forms of jihad against disbelievers or praising the steadfastness of militants in the face of difficulties on the battlefield. This is noticeable in Rumiyah #7, which featured an article entitled “Disavowal of the Mushrikin in the Lives of the Prophet and the Sahabah.” The text encouraged readers to fight against and kill “polytheists” and the “apostate” political elite, even if they are part of their family, by highlighting the example of the Prophet. It argued that:

when Allah facilitated the hijrah of His Prophet to Madinah and an Islamic state was established therein, disavowal of the mushrikin was no longer counted to be merely declaring enmity to them and dispraising them. Rather, waging jihad against them and fighting them until they surrender to the command of Allah was added to it.¹⁰²

This fragment combined transfer based on the authority of Allah and of the Prophet together by suggesting that the state founded by Mohammad was based on armed struggle against “polytheists,” which was in line with God’s will. Similarly, Rumiyah #2 explained the necessity of being harsh towards “infidels” by using the example of the Messenger, who ordered a prisoner to be killed just after the battle of Uhud.¹⁰³ The “Wisdom” section in the second issue of Dabiq featured a quotation of the Prophet on the relationship between hijrah and jihad, originating from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s hadith collection. It stated: “Allah’s Messenger […] Said, ‘Hijrah will not cease as long as there is jihad’.”¹⁰⁴ This enabled the combination of two important narratives of this magazine – calls to armed struggle against “infidels” and demands of migration towards IS territories. The most shocking example of this type of transfer could be found in the fifth edition of this magazine, which insisted that killing children and women of kuffar is perfectly legal from a religious viewpoint. This controversial statement was supported by the ruling and example of the Prophet Mohammad, who discussed this issue in one of his hadiths.¹⁰⁵

The authority of the Messenger was exploited to back up other important messages which supported the Islamic State’s agenda. Among others, it proved to be useful for maintaining the morale and unity of mujahidin. For instance, Dabiq #11 featured an article debating the negative effects of divisions and taqlid (“imitation”)¹⁰⁶ among Muslims. It highlighted the example of the Prophet Mohammad, who encouraged his followers to be patient with people in authority: “The third of these matters is that they considered disobeying the person in authority and refusing to yield to him a virtue […] Allah’s Messenger opposed them and ordered his companions to be patient with the injustices of the rulers.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, his words served the purpose of nullifying the potential doubts of militants concerning the rationality and judgement of the Islamic State’s leadership. Even in pieces referring to purely social issues, such as advice on ihdad (the period of mourning by a widow for her husband), words of the Prophet served as an incontestable tenet that should be followed without any deliberation.¹⁰⁸

While the authority of the Messenger, when compared to Allah’s, was largely used for similar purposes, there were certain differences as well. First of all, from day one the “Caliphate” was advertised by both magazines as a “prophetic” state, based on the rules established during the “Golden Era” of Islam. This way of influencing readers was especially visible in Dabiq, which reiterated over and over again that Daesh is founded on “prophetic methodology.” Its first issue quoted a hadith from Ahmad’s collection, consisting of Mohammad’s prediction. It indicated that after the times of tyrannical kingship, “Khilafah on the prophetic methodology” will be established.¹⁰⁹ The context of this fragment suggested that the Islamic State constituted the fulfilment of this foretelling. The seventh volume of Rumiyah even devoted its cover story to present this as the dream coming true. It contrasted the alleged corruption of tawaghit and other “apostate” parties (e.g. the Taliban and the Muslim Brotherhood) with pure shari’ah, based on Mohammad’s rulings and represented by the Islamic State.¹¹⁰ Likewise, Rumiyah #8 argued that only this group pursues the “straight path,” far from the aberrance of the rafidah. It emphasised that “the deviations which began at the beginning continue to be very distant from the prophetic methodology, even to the point of waging war against that methodology, which Allah and His Messenger were pleased with.”¹¹¹ The whole text was concluded with an indicative statement connecting Daesh to the legacy of Mohammad:

And with Allah’s permission, we will strive, in the coming articles of this series, to give more examples of this understanding, explaining the consequences of the paths of misguidance and comparing that to the prophetic methodology, which the Islamic State follows today, by the grace of Allah.¹¹²

As mentioned above, in contrast to Allah, the Messenger was also utilised as a role-model for readers to follow. Thus, as well as his rulings and words being used to support the ideology of Daesh, his actions as a leader and the first among believers served as an example that should be followed by all Muslims if they strive to be truthful. Such a means of influencing them was visible in an article arguing that the “Caliphate” is facing a coalition of enemies, including “jihadi claimants” and “crusaders.” Its content was based on references to actions of the Prophet, who had to wage war against a wide spectrum of “polytheists” in order to establish his Islamic state. Thus, the situation and actions of Daesh were compared to the endeavours of Mohammad.¹¹³

Finally, his authority was used to strengthen the apocalyptical narrative that was visible in Dabiq. For instance, many issues featured lengthy quotations of hadiths consisting of his prophecy in their ending pages. This was noticeable in volumes four, six and seven. Some even consisted of fragments arguing that the situation in the Levant and the Islamic State’s role in the events taking place there was in line with the Messenger’s prediction. The crucial role of Daesh in the approaching “Hour,” as the representation of “truthful” Muslims, was clearly based on his words.¹¹⁴

Other sources of authority exploited by Dabiq and Rumiyah were of purely secondary importance. The works of a narrow group of recognised but radical Islamic scholars from the past were utilised. This type of transfer was founded on the tradition in the Arab-Muslim world of underlining the importance of clerics who are authorised to interpret Quran and hadiths.¹¹⁵ This group included, among others, ibn Taymiyyah, Ibnul-Qayyim, Muhammad ibn Abdil-Wahhab and Ismail ibn Kathir. Their authority was usually used for three types of purposes. Firstly, they were exploited when it was difficult to find suitable quotations from the Quran and hadiths. For instance, ibn Taymiyyah was a favourite source of authority in terms of criticising Shia Muslims. Many articles that focused on the “deviance” and “corruption” of rafidah referred to his judgement. For instance, Dabiq #13 argued: “The ruling of apostasy upon the Rafidah as a sect and individuals was quoted earlier from numerous scholars from various eras. It was also a verdict of ibn Taymiyyah and others upon the Batiniyyah including the Druze, the Nusayriyyah, and the Isma’iliyyah.”¹¹⁶ Secondly, they were utilised as a means of convincing readers that IS’s way of interpreting the Quran and hadiths is correct. A symbolic example of this can be seen in “Just Terror Tactics” in Rumiyah #3. Its author, who aimed to encourage readers to harm “infidels,” cited the Quran: “‘Through them, disperse those behind them, that they might take heed’ (al-Anfal: 57).”¹¹⁷ It was immediately followed by the transfer of ibn Kathir, who was used as a source of legitimate interpretation of the holy book of Muslims: “Ibn Kathir said, explaining this verse, ‘It means, punish them severely and massacre them violently so that other enemies from the Arabs and non-Arabs are terrified and those punished and massacred become a lesson for the other enemies’.”¹¹⁸ Thirdly, occasionally the editors decided to publish larger fragments of their works, in the form of standalone articles focused on various theological matters of importance to the group’s agenda. This was visible in Rumiyah, which, for example, featured a text discussing the characteristics of “hypocrites” in Islam, authored by Ibnul-Qayyim¹¹⁹ or a piece criticising “evil scholars,” which was based on the work of Abdil-Wahhab.¹²⁰

Both magazines were also keen to use the example of the Sahabah, companions of the Prophet, who are widely considered in Islam to be near-perfect Muslims. Similar to the Messenger himself, they served as an example to be followed by the readers. Their authority was used to support the concept of takfir. According to Dabiq #6, “the madhhab of the Salaf though is crystal clear, for the Sahabah had consensus on making takfir of those who resisted paying zakah.”¹²¹ They were also utilised as role models of steadfastness and martyrdom. This was especially visible in Rumiyah, whose tenth edition noted: “Those who research the lives of Sahabah will find that one out of every five of them die in his bed, while four out of five were killed as shuhada in the fields of jihad.”¹²² It even featured a standalone article entitled “Examples of the Sahabah’s Eagerness to Attain Shahadah.” It listed a number of companions of the Prophet Muhammad who attained martyrdom and praised their deeds. This piece was concluded with a statement manifesting the use of transfer device:

Such was the Sahabah’s eagerness to attain this high rank in Jannah, despite them being the most pious, devout, and knowledgeable of the people, and neither did any eagerness to seek knowledge and to teach it, nor did any attachment to the Dunya, their fathers, and their sons prevent them from striving to reach it. And their followers will proceed upon their footsteps until the Day of Judgement, until the last of them fights the Dajjal.¹²³

Finally, the authority of other prophets in Islam were rarely exploited, however their role, when compared to Mohammad, was noticeably inferior. Among others, the profile of Yayha (John the Baptist in Christendom) was used by Dabiq #5 to promote the idea of martyrdom. The magazine argued that Yayha

achieved the noblest of deaths after having lived the noblest of lives. He was a Prophet of Allah belonging to a family of Prophethood and righteousness. He was sent to the rebellious Children of Isra’il to guide them back to Allah, and he remained firm upon his mission until he returned to Allah as a shahid.¹²⁴

This very same article also mentioned Isa ibn Maryam (Jesus Christ), as a prophet who will lead Muslims in the final battle against the Dajjal (devil).¹²⁵

To summarise, the transfer device was one of the most crucial and widespread propaganda methods exploited by both magazines. It was manifested by selectively chosen quotations from religious texts (the Quran, hadiths and recognised theological works), which supported the argumentation employed by editors, or by statements indicating the compatibility of the Islamic State’s ideology and actions with the commandments of Allah and Sunnah. In effect, Allah and the Prophet Mohammad constituted the most important source of authority utilised to endorse Daesh and its members. The other sources listed played a supportive, auxiliary role and were visibly less common in the content of both magazines.

Distorting reality: card-stacking at play

Even a cursory glance at Dabiq and Rumiyah allows the reader to notice that both flagship magazines were permeated with narratives that distort reality, this being the classic manifestation of the card-stacking device. It was a regular means for editors to omit topics that were difficult for the Islamic State’s agenda including arguments undermining the legitimacy of the “Caliphate” or defeats suffered by the organisation in Libya, Syria, or Iraq. Instead, they were very keen to highlight topics which were beneficial for IS interests. This led to manipulated texts that boasted of its “successful” governance over conquered territories, as well as pieces on its military and terrorist “achievements.” This tendency of overemphasising victories and underemphasising defeats was especially noticeable in Rumiyah, which consisted of many aforementioned attempts of damage control. This was done through the omission of important facts on the deteriorating situation of the “Caliphate.”¹²⁶ Generally, this device was widespread in both Dabiq and Rumiyah. This study, however, narrowed down the analysis of card-stacking strictly to statements that stood in clear opposition to the truth, from the viewpoint of common knowledge and facts verifiable from independent, trustworthy sources.

Even with such a limited perspective, this propaganda method still proved to be fairly common in Dabiq. Pages consisting of at least one verifiable lie ranged from three (#1, #2) to 21 (#4), with an average of 12.1 pages for all 15 issues of this magazine. In contrast, it was much less frequent in Rumiyah, which varied from one (#13) to seven (#5) pages coded as “positive,” with the average use for all 13 volumes of this periodical being only 3.7 (Table 3.6), which is quite surprising. Even after considering the fact that the newer magazine was shorter, there is still a visible gap between both magazines. The average share of card-stacking in the content of Dabiq was 19.3% in contrast to Rumiyah’s 8.3%.

Table 3.6 Pages consisting of the card-stacking device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 26 | 36
2 | 25 | 29
3 | 30 | 42
4 | 38 | 32
5 | 26 | 35
6 | 39 | 27
7 | 60 | 27
8 | 47 | 35
9 | 48 | 46
10 | 47 | 30
11 | 37 | 47
12 | 35 | 35
13 | 41 | 32
14 | 46 | –
15 | 64 | –
Average | 40.60 | 34.84

Source: Content analysis.

From the qualitative viewpoint, there were several methods of card-stacking discovered in both magazines. First of all, it was a significant instrument for building a triumphant, but artificial image of the Islamic State during its apogee. This attitude was especially visible in Dabiq, which frequently lied about its background, activities, or motives. For instance, its first edition whitewashed relations between the “Caliphate’s” mujahidin and the inhabitants of conquered territories. Among others, it emphasised a “flourishing relationship between the Islamic State and its citizens” as well as advertising “the state of security and stability enjoyed by the areas under the Islamic State’s authority.”¹²⁷ Taking into consideration the well known facts about mass crimes committed by its militants on the civilian population, these statements stand in glaring contradiction with the truth.¹²⁸ The magazine also attempted to legitimise its “special” political status through lies concerning the opinions of others. For instance, Dabiq #8 stated that Western politicians sensu largo began to admit that the “Caliphate” was a state, while no such thing happened.¹²⁹ Moreover, through card-stacking, editors and authors attempted to aggrandise the effects of its actions. This was the case with John Cantlie’s article in Dabiq #5. He emphasised that several attacks conducted by the Islamic State’s followers in Australia, the United States, and Canada caused worldwide chaos.¹³⁰

Card-stacking was also used to belittle the effects of military operations conducted by the US-led coalition against Daesh. For instance, the aforementioned article of Cantlie began with an indicative statement: “$424 million dollars’ worth of airstrikes over Iraq and Syria have resulted in little more than the continued expansion and consolidation of the Islamic State in both countries, while the black flag of tawhid now flutters on the skylines of Libya, Yemen, Sinai, and elsewhere as the growth of the Islamic State gathers pace abroad.”¹³¹

This particular type of card-stacking was also visible in Rumiyah. Its editors used it as a tool for dealing with the increasing series of defeats suffered by the organisation. An interesting manifestation of this trend may be found in the “Military and Covert Operations” section, which was regularly opened with a sentence indicating that the Islamic State’s territories were constantly expanding and its members succeeding in “terrorizing, massacring, and humiliating the enemies of Allah.”¹³² Considering the fact that at the time Daesh was on the brink of collapse as a territorial organisation, such statements were far from being true. Similarly, Rumiyah #11 labelled the battle for Mosul, which was lost by mujahidin, as “one of the hardest and largest battles in history.”¹³³ The subsequent issue emphasised that Daesh managed to eliminate “tens of thousands” of “infidel” soldiers and vehicles during this encounter.¹³⁴ Both claims were incorrect.

Another noticeable type of card-stacking was related to the distortion of reality surrounding the Islamic State and its supporters. Editors of both magazines aimed to deform political, social, and economic affairs not only in the Muslim world but also in the West. Many issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah conveyed lies concerning relations between the group and its broadly understood enemies. For instance, the fourth edition of Dabiq argued that Daesh (and its previous incarnations) had never initiated war with Americans or Europeans.¹³⁵ Card-stacking was also used to strengthen the leading message indicating that Muslims – represented by the “Caliphate” – face a wide alliance of “crusaders” and “apostates,” i.e. the previously mentioned “camp of falsehood.” Dabiq #12 stated:

So the kuffar – whether they are Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox Christians, whether they are Orthodox, Conservative, or Progressive Jews, whether they are Buddhists, Hindus, or Sikhs, whether they are capitalists, communists, or fascists – they are ultimately allies of one another against Islam and the Muslims. This is because Islam – the religion of truth and fitrah – is the greatest threat to their religions of falsehood.¹³⁶

This very same article also accused the United States of cooperating with Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad, which was a clear lie.¹³⁷ Rumiyah #5 even dared to feature an infographic indicating that the “secular kafir government” of Turkey helped Kurdish (PKK) forces during the battle of Kobane.¹³⁸ Its earlier edition stated that Turkey opened its borders “to supply the PKK atheists in ‘Ayn al-Islam.”¹³⁹ Similar untruths were related to other regional actors. For instance, the editors of Rumiyah stressed that Saudi Arabia openly occupied parts of Syria.¹⁴⁰ The most glaring example of this way of manipulating readers can be found in the seventh edition of Rumiyah, which claimed: “The battles that have ensued in the city of Bab, between the allies of Rahman – the soldiers of the Islamic State – and the allies of Shaytan from the murtaddin of the Turkish and Nusayri armies, the Sahwat, the Rafidi militias, and the Russian and American Crusaders, and their allies from the evil scholars, the claimants of jihad, and the political parties and organisations, has indeed revealed the truth for all to see the nature of these murtaddin who refuse the rule of Shari’ah.”¹⁴¹ The article also reiterated that they are allied with one another “against the people of Islam.”¹⁴² In this context, some articles conveyed extreme and eye-catching nonsense, bordering on delusion, concerning the nature of the enemy faced by Daesh. For instance, Dabiq #13 condemned Iran by arguing that: “Just as the Roman Empire never fully fell, but merely adopted new names, the Safawiyyah thrive – based in Iran – with their Rafidi aim of eradicating Ahlus-Sunnah and replacing them with a population of apostasy.”¹⁴³

The very same method of distorting reality was used to convince online audiences of “jihadi claimants” cooperating with “apostates” and “crusaders.” This was visible, among others, in Dabiq #11, which argued that the Taliban cooperates with Afghani intelligence.¹⁴⁴ Another article featured in the same volume stressed that Syrian jihadists, including the al-Nusra Front, were supported by the Jordanian monarchy.¹⁴⁵ Similar narration can be found in Rumiyah #10, which accused the Taliban of having “allegiance to the kuffar” and being a “humble servant and a watch dog.”¹⁴⁶ Moreover, it also blamed the Taliban for submitting a proposal to fight “the Islamic State on behalf of the Crusader nations and tawaghit government,” which, according to the author, was

merely repeating what many other organisations and factions falsely claiming Islam had done before them, such as the Sahwah factions in Iraq, and their likes from the Sahwat of Sham and Libya, which the al-Qa’idah organisation – who have ba’yah to the nationalist Taliban movement – are allied to.¹⁴⁷

The enemies of Daesh were also blamed for all manner of “crimes” committed against the ummah. For instance, the activities of “crusaders” were depicted as a war against all Muslims, but in particular against civilians. John Cantlie proved to be keen to use this method in his text entitled “The Anger Factory.” He not only blamed Western governments for inciting anger among Muslims that result in terrorist attacks¹⁴⁸ but also accused the United States of imposing sanctions against Iraq that resulted in 500,000 Muslim children dead. According to him, “America would start wars and kill hundreds of thousands of people to protect the value of the dollar amongst other economic interests.”¹⁴⁹ The West was also attacked for empowering apostasy in the lands of Islam.¹⁵⁰ The military commander of Raqqa, interviewed in the 12th edition of Rumiyah, clearly stated that “the main goal of the Crusader campaign is to wipe out Islam and the Muslims, and to turn people back from their religion after tawhid had returned to them following a period in which the people did not know tawhid.”¹⁵¹ From this perspective, all actions undertaken by the Islamic State’s militants were presented as merely a response to the aggression of the disbelievers and “apostates.”

The Western governments were even blamed for being responsible for the deaths of their own citizens, who were killed by the Islamic State’s executioners. Among others, Dabiq #3 featured an article entitled “Foley’s Blood Is On Obama’s Hands.” It not only argued that James Foley’s decapitation was retribution for the United States’ military aggression against Muslims but it also stressed that Obama did not comply with the demands of Daesh and bombed Iraq. This, in turn, was “the last nail in James’s coffin.”¹⁵² Obviously, similar methods of distorting reality were employed to explain the necessity of fighting other groups of kuffar. For instance, Egyptian Copts, who are frequently persecuted by the Muslim majority of this country,¹⁵³ were depicted as “belligerent disbelievers” that are responsible for alleged crimes against ummah. Rumiyah #9 emphasised that “The Christians of Misr […] are engaged in fighting the Muslims through their continuous transgressions against any Christian who embraces Islam, kidnapping them, killing them, and putting them through trial and tribulation in order to make them return to shirk.”¹⁵⁴ A similar narrative was also employed in Dabiq #7, which described the purported misdemeanours of “war-waging” Copts in Egypt.¹⁵⁵

Similarly to Rumiyah, Dabiq was also quite interested in distorting the social and economic reality of the Western world, in order to incite contempt in its readers towards democracy, secularism, and capitalism. The most prominent examples of this tendency can be identified in the articles of John Cantlie, who expressed extraordinary skill in castigating the way of life in developed societies. One of his pieces was composed of a series of lies and simplifications concerning the world’s financial system based on the US dollar and the economic dominance of the United States. It was contrasted with the “healthy” system introduced by Daesh. Among others, Cantlie argued that due to grave mistakes committed by America, an economic crisis was imminent and that the banking system is a scam.¹⁵⁶ Similar narration was employed in Dabiq #3, which insisted that the current socio-economic system in the West is a major cause of the slavery of Muslims. It stated that “the modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc. is one that leaves the Muslim in constant feeling of subjugation to a kafir master.”¹⁵⁷ Thus, it attempted to encourage ummah in the West to reject it, which would facilitate their decision of conducting hijrah to Syria and Iraq.

Finally, the exploitation of lies was also a common way of convincing readers of the “deviance” and “corruption” of other religions, which was obviously contrasted with the “greatness” and “pureness” of Islam. In order to do this, editors of both Dabiq and Rumiyah ridiculed other beliefs, including non-Sunni interpretations of the Quran, through the distortion of their theological foundations. For instance, Dabiq argued that Mahdi in Shiism is in fact a “devil” (Dajjal).¹⁵⁸ This branch of Islam was also depicted as a “Jewish” conspiracy against true Muslims. The article entitled “The Rafidah from Ibn Saba to the Dajjal” stated: “The Jews and the Rafidah are two sides of the same coin. The religion of Rafd (“Shiism”) was nothing but a plot by a Jew – ibn Saba’ – following the footsteps of his Jewish predecessor Paul, who had corrupted the pure religion of the Messiah, leaving the Christians upon the Pauline deviance and heresies.”¹⁵⁹ Additionally, Shias were accused of worshipping the dead, which was presented as an act that undermined the fundamental concept of monotheism in Islam. The very same article cited above argued that “they are the sect most famous for grave-worshipping amongst all deviant sects. […] The Rafidah now prostrate to graves and circumambulate them. They supplicate the buried and seek intercession from them. Their hearts are attached to them more than Allah!”¹⁶⁰ These statements stand in opposition to Shia theology, which does not recognise contradiction between monotheism (the worship of Allah alone) and the cult of saints.¹⁶¹

Likewise, the beliefs of Christians were distorted. The 15th edition of Dabiq consisted of numerous untruths related to core dogmas of Christianity (Figure 3.2). For instance, the concept of the Holy Trinity was not only mocked but also depicted as a manifestation of polytheism.¹⁶² Another example may be found in the testimony of a female convert from Finland, who stated: “You say you just need to believe in Jesus and you’ll go to Heaven, but how does it make sense that somebody died on your behalf and then you’re free to do whatever you please, whatever bad things that come to your mind, to live without any rules or regulations and then expect to be taken to Heaven?”¹⁶³ This stands in clear contradiction with mainstream Christian theology.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, Christians were presented as people who worship the cross, not God.¹⁶⁵

Figure 3.2Cover page of Dabiq #15. Source: Internet Archive.

Even Yazidis were denounced for their alleged habit of worshipping the “devil.”¹⁶⁶ Obviously, adopting such a perception was necessary for legitimising the Islamic State’s “harshness” towards this group. This intent was noticeable in the ninth edition of Dabiq, which featured an article explaining the “benefits” of female slavery in Islam. It focused on Yazidi women and argued that their sexual slavery was a manifestation of “kindness” towards them and “all of those who accepted Islam had done so voluntarily, not against their will.”¹⁶⁷

To summarise, many untruths conveyed by Dabiq and Rumiyah proved to be quite primitive, even from the perspective of an uneducated audience. This was the case with the statements presenting Shia Islam as a “Jewish conspiracy” or arguments indicating that the Roman Empire is still alive. It was a feature that potentially limited the efficiency of card-stacking. However, sometimes magazines, especially Dabiq, contained more sophisticated lies related to the political or economic reality surrounding the Islamic State. Editors were also keen to disfigure the beliefs of religions other than Sunni Islam (the Salafi interpretation). They attempted to capitalise on the fact that matters of theology are not only quite complicated, even for more enlightened Internet users, but are also a subject of common stereotypes shared by many Sunni Muslims. The most subtle untruths were constructed by John Cantlie, who used his lengthy experience as a journalist, combined with a great dose of irony and metaphors, to write compelling articles which twisted the political, social, and economic situation in the Western states. The lack of his texts in Rumiyah, as well as reduced emphasis placed on criticism of “jihadi claimants” and rafidah, were probably the main reasons why card-stacking was much less evident in this magazine.

Following the crowd: join the bandwagon or die

For ages, appeals to the identity that bonds a target community together has constituted one of the key manifestations of propaganda. It is, therefore, not a surprise that the Islamic State followed the same path by appealing to the common Muslim identity. Such a means of influencing Internet users, based on the “follow the crowd” logic, proved to be an integral element of the narratives employed by Dabiq and Rumiyah. Readers were bombarded with statements indicating that they have various obligations arising from the very fact that they belong to the ummah (Table 3.7). Pages consisting of at least one appeal to Muslim identity ranged from four (#6) to 18 (#7) in Dabiq, with an average of 11 pages for all 15 issues combined. As for Rumiyah, it ranged from one (#13) to 11 (#1) pages coded as “positive.” The average use for all editions of the magazine was six. Even whilst taking into consideration the aforementioned shorter length of the latter, the share of this propaganda method in both magazines was slightly greater in Dabiq (17.5% to 13.2%).

Table 3.7 Pages consisting of the bandwagon device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 11 | 11
2 | 4 | 5
3 | 12 | 8
4 | 9 | 7
5 | 15 | 4
6 | 4 | 4
7 | 18 | 3
8 | 14 | 9
9 | 16 | 10
10 | 14 | 5
11 | 15 | 8
12 | 11 | 3
13 | 8 | 1
14 | 8 | –
15 | 6 | –
Average | 11 | 6

Source: Content analysis.

There were two general types of bandwagon discovered by this study. The first was manifested in communiqués stating that the Islamic State is the representative of Muslims worldwide and that it is supported by their masses. This indirectly encouraged readers to follow the “majority.” Such statements were also a great tool for creating the “winner’s image,” by indicating that Islamic State’s achievements led to greater, worldwide support for the organisation. This method of propaganda was especially visible in Dabiq, as many of its issues focused on IS’s resonance in the ummah, as a result of its expansion. The first article featured in Dabiq #1 (“Khilafah Declared”) was predominantly based on bandwagon. It argued that the “revival” of the “Caliphate” “filled the streets of the Islamic State with faithful joy.”¹⁶⁸ This was accompanied with numerous images presenting crowds on the streets waving black banners of the group. The same rhetoric was employed in the report that followed. It focused on tribal assemblies in Halab and, once again, presented images of crowds pledging bay’ah to al-Baghdadi.¹⁶⁹ Narration highlighting massive and rapidly increasing support for Amirul-Mu’minin (“commander of the faithful”) could be spotted in other early editions of this flagship magazine, which were published at the peak of the organisation’s power. For example, Dabiq #2 emphasised that members of sahwat repented en masse and joined forces with Daesh. It stated that they “left the deviant parties in the hundreds, sometimes whole battalions, to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State.”¹⁷⁰ The third issue stressed that its ranks are composed of representatives of multiple nations, including Jordanians, Tunisians, Egyptians, Turks, Russians, Europeans, and Americans. Additionally, editors argued that Daesh “has gathered the bulk of the muhajirin in Sham and has become the largest collection of muhajirin in the world.”¹⁷¹ Similar statements, indicating that Daesh enjoys massive support, were included in Dabiq #4 and #5. The fourth stressed that even ethnic groups traditionally hostile to Daesh, such as Kurds, represent a great part of its ranks.¹⁷² The fifth highlighted the global support enjoyed by the “Caliphate,” especially in Sinai, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and the Arabian Peninsula. It even argued that a series of pledges of allegiance to al-Baghdadi led to Muslims “all over the Khilafah to take to the streets in celebration.”¹⁷³ Issues six and seven were no different. However, from 2015 this type of bandwagon became less and less frequent. This was probably caused by the difficulties experienced by the group on the battlefields of Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Due to the setbacks suffered, narration on the massive support enjoyed by the Islamic State became much harder to maintain. Effectively, in Rumiyah such a method of influencing readers was infrequent and adapted to the new rhetoric of the IS propaganda machine. For instance, its second edition highlighted the reaction of ummah to the deteriorating situation of IS’s “citizens” in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. It argued: “as the aircrafts and drones of the Crusader coalition continue to bomb and terrorize Muslims of Iraq, Sham, Libya, and other wilayat of the Khilafah, their Muslim brothers and sisters all over the world read the news with aching pain.”¹⁷⁴

The second type of bandwagon was exploited from day one, but over time it became more and more common. In essence, it was much more straightforward concerning the “follow the crowd” logic, as it emphasised that due to the simple fact that the reader is Muslim, he/she should undertake certain actions which are in line with the Islamic State’s agenda. This was noticeable, once again, in the first edition of Dabiq, which demanded that Internet users migrate to territories controlled by the group. It clearly stated that

The state is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.¹⁷⁵

The ninth issue, which discussed healthcare in the Islamic State, called all Muslim students to migrate to dar al-Islam:

this should be received as a wake-up call for the many Muslim students in the lands of kufr who claim to study medicine to ‘benefit and support the Muslim Ummah,’ but then remain in those lands, chasing after worldly pleasures instead of performing hijrah to the Islamic State – and despite hijrah being an undeniable Islamic obligation, in addition to the fact that hijrah was and still is relatively easy. The Islamic State offers everything that you need to live and work here, so what are you waiting for?¹⁷⁶

Both magazines also featured more general recruitment calls which were based on bandwagon. This can be found in the 10th edition of Dabiq that stated:

We call the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere to give bay’ah to the Khilafah in obedience to Allah’s command, for the truth has become clear as the sun in the middle of the day, and only the blind one is incapable of seeing it.¹⁷⁷

Thus, the obligation of pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi was explained through the very fact that readers identify themselves as sincere Muslims. The same reasoning was also noticeable in statements related to calls to jihad. Dabiq and Rumiyah argued that it is obligatory for all male Muslims to wage war against disbelievers. Such manipulations were noticeable in the infamous statements issued by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, which were frequently cited in Dabiq.¹⁷⁸

This type of bandwagon was also exploited to influence the opinions of readers on a plethora of issues of social and religious significance. For example, females who demonstrated excessive indulgence in luxury were condemned. Such a “sinful” attitude was contrasted with zuhd (ascetism), which is an expected trait of all genuine women in ummah.¹⁷⁹ They were also advised (“O Muslimah”) on their attendance to mosques.¹⁸⁰ Muslim identity was even used to encourage women to break family ties with “apostates,” by directly addressing them as the “bondwoman of Allah.”¹⁸¹

Bandwagon was therefore primarily designed to create and exploit a sense of mutual understanding between the readers and the editors, founded on the fact that both have the same religious identity. In order to do this, the authors appealed to the readers with a set of indicative words and phrases, including not only “Muslim” but also “brothers” and “sisters.” Thus, the idea of brotherhood and sisterhood served as an instrument for creating “common ground” that could be used to influence readers. Other customary terms that were frequently related to the use of bandwagon included “believers,” muhajirin (emigrants), muwahiddin or the aforementioned “bondwoman of Allah.”¹⁸² In many cases, these labels were utilised in direct calls to members of ummah (“O Muslims,” “O muwahiddin” etc.) or statements indicating that the masses are supporting the proper side in the conflict, so the readers should follow their example. In order to be even more appealing, bandwagon was frequently combined with transfer and glittering generalities. On the one hand, Daesh addressed “truthful” believers only, meaning that all those that would not comply would automatically become “hypocrites” or “apostates.” On the other hand, unquestionable commandments of Allah and the example of the Prophet served the same purpose of convincing Muslims that their religious identity requires participation in jihad.

Editors also paid great attention to avoiding the suspicion of Arab-centric chauvinism or nationalism when using bandwagon. Highlighting the multicultural composition of the “Caliphate’s” “caravan” was especially visible in Dabiq. Rhetoric which made no difference between believers based on their ethnicity and origin was sometimes used in opposition to the purported discrimination of minorities in the West. It should not be a surprise that anti-racist rants could be spotted in other pieces of Islamic State propaganda, including the infamous No Respite video. This symbolic means of appealing to Western audiences, which are usually much more sensitive to and receptive of appeals based on multiculturalism, was employed, for instance, in the 11th issue of Dabiq. It stated: “racism is a tool of Shaytan, which, like nationalism, is intended to divide and weaken the children of Adam and prevent them from uniting the truth.”¹⁸³ This statement was accompanied by a bandwagon device, indicating that all Muslims should conduct hijrah to the Islamic State. Similar rhetoric can also be found in its fifth edition that stated: “They see that the Khilafah has not only returned, but is remaining and expanding, bringing Muslims of all colors under one banner and one leader.”¹⁸⁴ Finally, this intent was even stressed by al-Baghdadi himself, in his communiqué from Dabiq #1. He ordered all Muslims to conduct hijrah because “Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis.”¹⁸⁵

Ordinary men or paragons of virtue? Exploitation of plain folks

By definition, “plain folks” appeals to the target audience by highlighting the commonality and ordinariness of the propagandist, who is a “man of the people,” similar to others, with all their strengths and weaknesses. There was, however, difficulty in applying this propaganda method in the Islamic State’s flagship publications. This is due to the fact that, as mentioned above, Daesh was interested in creating near-perfect images of their members and leaders, as well as of the organisation itself. By all means possible mujahidin were therefore compared to a contemporary version of Sahabah and presented as the pinnacle of ummah. In effect, narratives comparing them to ordinary, i.e. deficient, men did not fit. Thus, it is not a surprise to note that this was the least common propaganda device utilised in Dabiq and Rumiyah (Table 3.8). The majority of their issues lacked even a single instance of this technique, which is quite indicative of the priorities of the editorial staffs. In Rumiyah there were only two isolated examples (#7, #11). Plain folks was slightly more common in Dabiq, as there were seven volumes which consisted of between one and three pages coded as “positive.”

Table 3.8 Pages consisting of the plain folks device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 0 | 0
2 | 0 | 0
3 | 1 | 0
4 | 3 | 0
5 | 0 | 0
6 | 1 | 0
7 | 3 | 1
8 | 1 | 0
9 | 0 | 0
10 | 0 | 0
11 | 0 | 1
12 | 1 | 0
13 | 0 | 0
14 | 0 | –
15 | 1 | –
Average | 0.73 | 0.15

Source: Content analysis.

Analysis of these few cases proves that this device was used only in three situations that were all consistent with the need to aggrandise the merits of the Islamic State’s members and followers. First of all, it was present in articles containing the testimonies of converts to Islam from Finland, which were featured by Rumiyah #7 and Dabiq #15. They described themselves as ordinary people, with little knowledge and awareness of matters of religion. This was manifested, for example, by the statement of Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah that, in terms of religious education, she was “pretty much the same as everyone else.”¹⁸⁶ In the case of Rumiyah #7, the author reflected upon various groups of Muslims who taught her. She claimed that she was unaware of the fact that some of them were disbelievers. Subsequently, her eyes were opened by “someone who was braver than most of the others.”¹⁸⁷ Both served the purpose of showcasing the process of the transition from the “darkness” of ignorance to the “enlightenment” of pure Salafi Islam.

Secondly, the slightly higher frequency of plain folks in Dabiq was caused by the fact that it was utilised by John Cantlie in his series of articles. He attempted to pose as a humble, independent commentator of the Islamic State’s actions, as well as of global politics. For instance, in his article featured in the fourth edition of the magazine, he argued: “I am just a man in a dark room with a mattress on the floor.”¹⁸⁸ Likewise, in Dabiq #8, when he discussed the uniqueness of the “Caliphate’s” phenomenon, he claimed: “I am certainly no expert on such matters and my views are those of a layman.”¹⁸⁹ Thus, in a certain sense, he utilised plain folks to avoid the impression that his articles were ex cathedra lectures that praised the terrorist organisation.

Finally, plain folks was rarely used in the eulogies of fallen mujahidin and articles advising readers to follow Islamic State’s agenda. However, this can be seen in Dabiq #7 which promoted the actions and profile of Amedy Coulibaly. While he was praised as a perfect Muslim, the narrative also depicted him as a man of the crowd and a person who maintained great relations with other believers.¹⁹⁰ A different approach was adopted by Rumiyah #11 which featured the profile of Abu Mujahid al-Faransi. Aside from his near-perfect traits listed, the author mentioned his modesty and simplicity as a caller to Islam and his significant role among the masses of youngsters of the suburbs of Paris.¹⁹¹ Both cases, however, stood out from the general trend of preferring glittering generalities over plain folks.

Interview with a terrorist: testimonial as a means of influencing readers

The last propaganda device considered by this study – testimonial – proved to be much more common when compared to plain folks. It was founded on the idea that readers could be more receptive to messages conveyed by the Islamic State’s magazines if they became acquainted with the first-person perspective reasoning of its members. From the quantitative viewpoint (Table 3.9), this form of influencing target audiences was much more common in Dabiq (nine pages on average for all 15 volumes, constituting 14.3% of its average length), when compared to Rumiyah (3.3 pages, 7.2%).

Table 3.9 Pages consisting of the testimonial device in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | DABIQ | RUMIYAH
1 | 0 | 3
2 | 0 | 0
3 | 3 | 0
4 | 6 | 4
5 | 4 | 4
6 | 20 | 5
7 | 19 | 2
8 | 10 | 1
9 | 10 | 4
10 | 6 | 5
11 | 6 | 0
12 | 12 | 10
13 | 6 | 6
14 | 16 | –
15 | 17 | –
Average | 9 | 3.3

Source: Content analysis.

There were two predominant methods of exploiting testimonial in both magazines. Firstly, it adopted the form of interviews that conveyed the first-person experience of leaders and members of the Islamic State. They were usually very detailed in terms of discussing the motives behind actions of mujahidin. For instance, the first question to Abu’ Umar al-Baljiki, who was featured in Dabiq #7, was related to the reasons for his “operation” in Belgium. He explained that he wanted to terrorise Europe due to its “crusade” against Muslims.¹⁹² Likewise, Dabiq #8, which questioned Abu Muqatil at-Tunusi, the killer of the Tunisian politician Mohammed Brahmi, began with a question on the reasons for this assassination. According to his answer, he and his companions wanted to “cause chaos […] in the lands by killing Brahmi so as to facilitate the brothers’ movements and so that we would be able to bring in weapons and liberate our brothers from prisons.”¹⁹³ Interviews with IS amirs (leaders) were more inclined to provide readers with a bigger picture, related to local or regional problems. For instance, the commander of hisbah in Sinai explained the necessity of fighting against Sufis in this area by listing the “proof” of their apostasy and deviance.¹⁹⁴ Thus, while these pieces conveyed personal insights, they rarely discussed purely individual motivations. There were, however, some visible exceptions, such as the one in Dabiq #10 that interviewed a former member of the al-Nusra Front – Abu Samir al-Urduni. It provided his in-depth experience and the rationale behind his decision to leave al-Qaeda-affiliates, which enabled readers to identify with his move. As he explained: “After my examination and following of the events, I felt that there was a plot being carried out against the Islamic State with the participation of ‘Jabhat an-Nusrah.’ So I decided to keep myself distant and move to the south.”¹⁹⁵ This was followed by a description of other events that made him support Daesh.¹⁹⁶

Secondly, these interviews adopted an “insider’s perspective” by providing detailed information on activities undertaken both at tactical and operational levels, depending on whom was featured. Thus, a talk with the leader of the Libyan wilayat focused on the military operations of the Islamic State in the area.¹⁹⁷ Likewise, the aforementioned interview with Abu’ Umar al-Baljiki discussed a gun battle with law enforcement and the reason why his pictures were published by the mass media.¹⁹⁸ Thus, they were in fact testimonies that allowed readers to receive first-hand information on the activities of Daesh.

Thirdly, such interviews described the general political, military, social, and religious situation in the area discussed (Figure 3.3). Therefore, many pieces began with the description of trends in the area discussed, including the status of jihadis. For instance, Rumiyah #6 discussed in detail the frontline situation around the city of Tadmur (Palmyra), including the amount of war booty (ghanimah) taken.¹⁹⁹ Similarly, Dabiq #12 started with the insights of the interviewee on the level of support for the “Caliphate” in Somalia, as well as the general political tendencies in the area.²⁰⁰

Finally, these interviews were frequently concluded with calls to action. IS’s amir in the Khurasan province, featured in the 13th edition of Dabiq, summarised his interview with a call for Muslims to unify and aid the “Caliphate.”²⁰¹

Figure 3.3Cover page of an interview featured in Rumiyah #10. Source: Internet Archive.

The second type of testimonial was manifested in articles that consisted of purely personal experiences and insights, written in the first person. These were basically a means of creating a feeling of mutual understanding or – in some cases – even intimacy between the editorial staff and the readers. This was done by outlining the step-by-step reasoning and emotions experienced by the author. This means of influencing audience can be found, once again, in the articles written by John Cantlie. As mentioned in the previous section, he was very keen to present himself as a humble commentator. At the same time, however, he frequently provided his first-hand experience as a hostage of the Islamic State, without any hope of rescue or survival. This indirectly suggested that he had no other choice but to be honest with readers. This intent was visible in the article entitled “Hard talk. The real story behind my videos,” which was published in Dabiq #4. It was permeated by his first-hand thoughts. As he stated:

I am just a man in a dark room with a mattress on the floor. It is clean and comfortable; for a man in my position, it is enough. Four of my cellmates have already been executed by the Islamic State in the most visceral way possible after the British and American governments apparently made a joint decision not to discuss terms for our release with our captors. And now, unless something changes very quickly and very radically, I await my turn.²⁰²

This statement was followed by other fragments that discussed in detail his relationship with mujahidin and fellow hostages, as well as descriptions of the difficulties he endured. His short text, combining plain folks, card-stacking, and his testimony as a hostage, aimed to incite compassion among the readers, due to his grave situation. It also attempted to convince them that the Islamic State was not as bad as Westerners might think.²⁰³ This method was obviously visible in his articles that followed. In Dabiq #5 he stated: “From my own experience here, our governments are too aloof, prideful, and conventional in their way of thinking to have any idea how to proceed in the face of such a global threat.”²⁰⁴ Thus, his unique situation and background allowed the publication to present his insights as something more accurate, honest and wise.

A similar way of using this device can be found in other articles, including the aforementioned conversion process of the woman from Finland. Her article, included in the 15th issue of Dabiq, in fact constituted a lengthy testimony where she carefully described her background, thoughts, doubts, as well as her experiences that led her to embrace Islam. The article carefully described the emotions of the author, who subsequently transitioned from having a “mild” belief in Allah to Salafism and support of the Islamic State. In a certain sense, it took the form of personal memoirs, which facilitated the creation of a personal bond with readers in a similar situation. Therefore, it perfectly fitted the agenda of this volume that aimed to target Christian readers.²⁰⁵

To summarise, there were two general motives behind the use of testimonial as a means of influencing readers. On the one hand, interviews conveyed an insider’s perspective on the activities conducted by the Islamic State, in order to build up its triumphant image and incite readers to follow its agenda. These pieces, while containing personal insights, lacked narratives which enabled readers to get more attached. This was, however, not the case with the second group of quite rare “memoirs.” These fragments were usually very sophisticated in terms of providing the emotions, experience, and reasoning of authors that support the Islamic State. Such an approach reduced the distance between the editorial staff and readers, by showing the “human face” of terrorists and their supporters. In effect, such a means of propaganda may be appealing for some of the more disoriented members of the target audience.

In search of simplicity: one-sided vs. two-sided argumentation

Attempting to understand the essence of the propaganda methods utilised by the editors of the flagship magazines of Daesh would be incomplete if these attempts were not supported by the analysis of these methods’ means of argumentation. One-sided and two-sided messages not only constitute a “carrier” for propaganda devices but also increase their efficiency in influencing different types of audiences. Pages consisting of simpler, one-sided argumentation, which present only one viewpoint at the time, proved to be four times more common in Dabiq than more sophisticated two-sided messages (Table 3.10). The first group of arguments ranged from 19 (#2) to as many as 60 (#7, #15) pages, with an average of 42.5 pages for all of its editions. In contrast, pages consisting of two viewpoints ranged from two to 20 pages per volume, with an average of 10.7 pages.

Table 3.10 Types of argumentation exploited in Dabiq

Issue | One-sided messages | Two-sided messages
1 | 34 | 2
2 | 19 | 8
3 | 34 | 0
4 | 39 | 8
5 | 31 | 2
6 | 34 | 18
7 | 60 | 14
8 | 44 | 19
9 | 58 | 11
10 | 54 | 15
11 | 46 | 9
12 | 48 | 8
13 | 34 | 11
14 | 43 | 20
15 | 60 | 16
Average | 42.53 | 10.73

Source: Content analysis.

Rumiyah proved to be even less sophisticated in this respect (Table 3.11). Pages consisting of one-sided messages varied between 26 (#7) to 45 (#9), with an average of 34.84 pages per issue. Two-sided argumentation was scarce, with an average use of 3.61 pages for all 13 editions. It should be highlighted that there were two volumes which did not contain even a single page providing readers with two viewpoints at the same time (#8, #13). In effect, two-sided argumentation was approximately 10 times less frequent when compared to one-sided.

Table 3.11 Types of argumentation exploited in Rumiyah

Issue | One-sided messages | Two-sided messages
1 | 32 | 3
2 | 29 | 1
3 | 42 | 2
4 | 33 | 1
5 | 36 | 4
6 | 29 | 7
7 | 26 | 2
8 | 37 | 0
9 | 45 | 6
10 | 30 | 9
11 | 44 | 10
12 | 35 | 2
13 | 35 | 0
Average | 34.84 | 3.61

Source: Content analysis.

This enables certain conclusions to be drawn. First of all, the editorial staffs of the two publications were predominantly interested in conveying simplified messages, dedicated to reaching less educated and aware audiences. The worldview presented in Dabiq and Rumiyah was generally strictly based on the Islamic State’s ideology and usually lacked alternative opinions. Either these were not mentioned at all or they were condemned without due deliberations. This attitude resulted in the aforementioned tendency of exploiting glittering generalities and transfer to make readers believe that Daesh is an emanation of truth and Islamic justice. Effectively, no other perspective employed could be presented as even a mild alternative to its “perfect” agenda.

Even if the magazines provided two-sided messages on the same page, the one standing in opposition to Daesh’s agenda was only briefly characterised (or cited). Subsequently, it was rebuked with “counterarguments,” frequently based on name-calling and selectively chosen quotations from religious texts. This meant that in many of these rare cases, where readers had the opportunity to learn about opinions that questioned IS’s ideology and actions, they were framed by editors in a way that ensured their “proper” (i.e. negative) interpretation. This can be seen, among others, in Dabiq #8 which concentrated on criticism of al-Qaeda and its allies in Syria. It consisted of lengthy citations of the communiqué issued by the Shamiyyah Front, but at the same time it was harshly condemned by the author.²⁰⁶ This way of conveying two-sided messages was also visible in articles authored by John Cantlie, who frequently mocked the statements of Western politicians, publications of think tanks, or mass media, immediately after bringing them up.²⁰⁷ Even in the section “In the Words of the Enemy,” which was devoted to citing pundits and politicians views and statements on the Islamic State, lengthy quotations were preceded with the editor’s commentary that ensured the “proper” understanding of the text that followed.²⁰⁸ Thus, in the vast majority of cases two-way argumentation was, in fact, more or less artificial.

Nevertheless, despite all of these limitations, Dabiq was still much more advanced in terms of the argumentation used when compared to Rumiyah. While one-sided messages were much more common in the older magazine, its editorial staff paid attention to highlighting alternative viewpoints in order to confront them with the “truthful” agenda of Daesh. Therefore, at least partially, they tried to pretend to discuss some issues objectively. In opposition, the editors of Rumiyah were generally uninterested in featuring opinions that were inconsistent with the Islamic State’s ideology. While other beliefs, ideologies or concepts were mentioned, most of the time they were condemned straightaway. Rumiyah concentrated on pieces that strengthened the leading narratives which were beneficial for the group, without taking any risks that readers could develop an “improper” understanding of the political or religious affairs discussed. There were, however, some exceptions. These were noticeable in volumes which had to deal with criticism from the Salafi community. For instance, Rumiyah #5 published an article that dealt with the theological criticism of some Islamic scholars (labelled as “claimants of knowledge” or “scholars of the tawaghit”) on the use of fire in IS’s executions. In order to counter their arguments, authors were forced to cite some of their accusations.²⁰⁹ Another example can be seen in Rumiyah #2 which issued memorandums of the Central Office Overseeing Shar’i Dawawin. In order to defend the “Caliphate’s” interpretation of takfir, they discussed two theological positions, both of which were criticised.²¹⁰

3.3Triggering emotions or behaviour? Identifying core messages aiming to inspire the target audience to follow IS’s agenda

Near enemy vs. far enemy: designating members of the “camp of falsehood”

As mentioned in previous sections, Dabiq and Rumiyah paid great attention to creating an artificial, black-and-white vision of the world which was composed of two camps. The “camp of falsehood” allegedly consisted of a large spectrum of enemies, including “crusaders,” Shia Muslims and Muslim “apostates,” which were designated through name-calling. Obviously, these labels were vague and imprecise. Thus, in order to ensure the proper channelling of “stigma” and the hatred of readers, they were frequently accompanied by communiqués which listed real, hostile entities, such as states, factions, or governments. This study merged two methods of analysis to understand the priorities of the editors when labelling these enemies. On the one hand, it employed content analysis, which coded all pages with at least one specified profile of the enemy of Daesh. On the other hand, word frequency analysis was used to provide more detailed data.

Results of the content analysis show a difference in the approach adopted by both magazines to designate enemies (Table 3.12). Dabiq ranged from 16 to 55 pages per issue with at least one clear reference to a hostile state, faction, nation, or government. The average amount of such pages for all 15 issues was 37.4 (59.5% of its average length). In contrast, pages coded as “positive” for Rumiyah ranged from 11 to 28, with an average of 18.3 (40.3% of its average length). This means that while both attached great importance to designating enemies, such references were more frequent in Dabiq.

Table 3.12 Pages consisting of detailed profiles of the Islamic State’s enemies

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 16 | 11
2 | 16 | 15
3 | 22 | 15
4 | 31 | 20
5 | 20 | 21
6 | 43 | 23
7 | 47 | 11
8 | 33 | 15
9 | 55 | 28
10 | 53 | 23
11 | 43 | 27
12 | 52 | 14
13 | 41 | 15
14 | 50 | –
15 | 39 | –
Average | 37.4 | 18.3

Source: Content analysis.

More interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results of the word frequency analysis. The study counted a selected group of words related to states, politicians and factions mentioned by the magazines, in order to understand the importance given to each particular enemy.²¹¹ All states and factions under consideration were associated with two distinct groups, based on the classic concept adopted by various Salafi-jihadi groups: of “near enemies” and “far enemies.” The first group consists of Muslim “apostates” in general, including governments of tawaghit. The second is composed of “crusader” states, such as the United States, Europe, Russia, as well as other traditionally non-Muslim countries, e.g. from Eastern Asia. In this context, Islamic State and its previous incarnations were known for attaching greatest importance to “near enemies,” with a special emphasis on Shia Muslims.²¹² It was, therefore, interesting to verify whether this was still the case in both flagship periodicals.

As for the “far enemies”, the study counted terms related to the United States, Russia, China, France, as well as Europe as a geopolitical whole. The comparative analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah reveals interesting tendencies (Table 3.13).

Table 3.13 Frequency of words related to selected “far enemies” in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue of Dabiq | United states | America/american | Russia/russian | China/chinese | Europe/european | France
1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0
2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
3 | 1 | 33 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0
4 | 4 | 33 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 1
5 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0
6 | 2 | 44 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2
7 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 9
8 | 2 | 20 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 7
9 | 6 | 31 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1
10 | 2 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 1
11 | 15 | 68 | 39 | 1 | 14 | 1
12 | 0 | 64 | 58 | 2 | 5 | 4
13 | 1 | 22 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1
14 | 3 | 31 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 3
15 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 4
Average | 2.73 | 27.13 | 8.53 | 0.8 | 5.53 | 2.26
Issue of Rumiyah | United States | America/American | Russia/Russian | China/Chinese | Europe/European | France
1 | 0 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0
2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
3 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1
4 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1
5 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2
6 | 0 | 14 | 36 | 0 | 1 | 0
7 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0
8 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0
9 | 1 | 16 | 9 | 0 | 8 | 2
10 | 1 | 26 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 0
11 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 16
12 | 1 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0
13 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1
Average | 0.23 | 9.15 | 7.15 | 0.07 | 2.07 | 1.76

Source: Word frequency analysis.

In all of the analysed cases, notions directly indicating various groups of “far enemies” were more abundant in Dabiq. The term “United States” was used on average 2.73 times per issue, in contrast to 0.23 in Rumiyah. The broader label of “America” and “American” were, however, much more common in both, but still Dabiq led with an average of 27.13 uses per volume. The intensity of references to the United States is unsurprising, as it was classically depicted by radical Muslims as the head of the global conspiracy against Islam.²¹³ The “Caliphate’s” magazines were no different. The US was not only presented as the head of the “crusader” countries but also as a stimulus behind actions conducted by the Muslim “apostate” regimes. This narrative was visible in a text entitled “From the battle of al-Ahzab to the war of coalitions,” published in Dabiq #11. Its author attempted to distort the political reality of the Middle East by falsely arguing that there are many Muslim states that are allied with “America,” including Iran and Syria.²¹⁴ In a certain sense, the United States was depicted as the “sum of all evil,” the greatest threat that endangers the integrity and safety of ummah. On a side note, the British government was also frequently mentioned, usually in texts which debated US foreign policy. Thus, both countries were treated as working in tandem on actions targeting the wellbeing of Muslims.

Surprisingly, the editors proved to be interested in mentioning Russia as an enemy. The average use of the terms “Russia/Russian” for Dabiq and Rumiyah was, respectively, 8.53 and 7.15. The Federation was primarily depicted as an integral part of the “crusader” coalition against Daesh. Despite all the nuances in Moscow’s foreign policy and the rising tensions in its relations with the West,²¹⁵ it was accused of cooperating not only with Iran, Syria, and Iraq (which is true), but also with the United States. Criticism was also aimed in the direction of its involvement in the fight against radical Salafi Islam in the Caucasus.²¹⁶ In this context, Stempien was right when stating that while Russian-related topics were not core content of either magazine, the Federation was presented “next to U.S., as a leader of the crusaders and infidels.”²¹⁷ Narratives related to Russia sometimes also mentioned China, which was usually depicted as the Federation’s ally and a natural enemy of the ummah.²¹⁸

As for the European states, as a whole they were mentioned quite rarely, but once again Dabiq (5.53) had slightly more references than Rumiyah (2.07). Primarily, they were presented en masse as a place of “rotten” beliefs, decadence, sexual deviance, and sin. Sometimes, Europe was even compared to jahiliyyah (“ignorance”).²¹⁹ However, it was also mentioned as an area inhabited by masses of muwahiddin, who should either conduct hijrah or engage in acts of home-grown terrorism. In this context, alleged violations of Muslim rights in Europe were reiterated.²²⁰ In addition to the UK, which was treated as America’s closest partner, the editors frequently focused on France. The 5th Republic was presented as a prominent member of the “crusader” coalition and a place of origin of many Muslims.²²¹ While it was not mentioned as frequently as the United States or Russia, the editors displayed an extraordinary level of hatred towards this state. This was probably triggered by its secularism, which was presented as a major reason why the basic religious rights of “believers” are violated, and as a consequence the “difficult” situation of this minority was discussed. This attitude towards France was manifested, for instance, in the infamous call of al-Adnani, which was featured in Dabiq #4. He stated:

So O muwahiddin, do not let this battle pass you by wherever you may be. You must strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawaghit […] If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian or a Canadian […] then rely upon Allah, and kill him.²²²

This rhetoric highlighting the difficulties experienced by Muslims in France was also employed in Rumiyah #11. It discussed the “humiliating conditions” of the impoverished suburbs of Paris, where many of them live.²²³

Word frequency analysis allowed even more interesting tendencies in presenting “near enemies” by both magazines to be pinpointed (Table 3.14). It confirmed, as expected, that Dabiq attached much greater attention to hostiles within the world of Islam, when compared to states from the dar al-harb. Nevertheless, Rumiyah – which was very keen to use name-calling to stigmatise members of the “camp of falsehood” – maintained relative equilibrium between references to “far” and “near” enemies.

Table 3.14 Frequency of words related to selected “near enemies” in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue ofDabiq | Al-qa’idah/al-qaeda | Jawlani /Jawlani front/Nusra | PKK | Turkey/erdogan | Kurd/kurdish/kurdistan | Egypt/sisi/Morsi | Iraq/maliki | Free syrian army/fsa | Iran/persia/safawi | Nusayri/assad/nusayriyyah
1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 36 | 1 | 7 | 2
2 | 3 | 20 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 11
3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 43 | 0 | 9 | 8
4 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 3 | 16 | 2 | 48 | 6 | 44 | 22
5 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 11 | 4 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 0
6 | 73 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 23 | 3 | 21 | 4
7 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 18 | 25 | 2 | 2 | 6
8 | 12 | 10 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 35 | 17 | 7 | 2
9 | 26 | 44 | 6 | 19 | 11 | 5 | 27 | 14 | 47 | 40
10 | 39 | 155 | 35 | 29 | 43 | 3 | 32 | 33 | 10 | 13
11 | 17 | 12 | 16 | 17 | 8 | 18 | 87 | 1 | 85 | 18
12 | 37 | 43 | 35 | 11 | 12 | 5 | 50 | 19 | 32 | 36
13 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 24 | 1 | 66 | 15
14 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 43 | 19 | 1 | 16 | 16
15 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 23
Average | 15.06 | 21.26 | 10 | 6.86 | 8 | 8.93 | 31.2 | 6.66 | 24.13 | 14.4
1 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3
2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 12
3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 13 | 5 | 3 | 16 | 0 | 5 | 8
4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 15 | 2
5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 11 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 18
6 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 5 | 73
7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 13
8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 6
9 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 7
10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 10 | 2
11 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 4
12 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 0
13 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 2
Average | 0.15 | 1 | 3.30 | 4.69 | 1.30 | 1.84 | 11.30 | 0.07 | 3.53 | 11.53

Source: Word frequency analysis.

Dabiq frequently attacked so called “jihadi claimants,” including primarily al-Qaeda and its affiliated organisations, such as the al-Nusra Front (labelled the “Jawlani Front”). AQ was mentioned on average more than 15 times per issue, while the al-Nusra Front more than 21 times. This means that the attention given to denouncing the radical Islamist rivals of Daesh was relatively greater than to attacking the United States, due to their “negative” role in misleading unitary Muslims. This is also proven by the fact that Dabiq featured a series of articles which listed and carefully discussed various transgressions committed by “fake” jihadis, including their cooperation with “apostates” and “crusaders,” rejection of takfir, as well as acting against the leadership of the Khalifah.²²⁴ While the prevalence of attacks against al-Qaeda over the United States was surprising, the logic behind this tendency is perfectly understandable, as it constituted IS’s greatest competitor for the limited pool of radicalised Muslims that could be recruited.²²⁵ Therefore, undermining their legitimacy as defendants of ummah and sincere mujahidin was reasonable. However, it is quite striking that Rumiyah ceased to do this. In fact, it barely mentioned these groups per se, as the average use of their names was only 0.15 per issue in the case of al-Qaeda and 1 per issue in the case of its Syrian branch – the Jawlani Front/al-Nusra. In light of the fact that highlighting hypocrisy among Muslims as well as criticising their lack of unity were important problems highlighted by its editorial staff, the absence of this attitude is even more strange. Salafi jihadis and Islamic scholars generally were still presented as a major cause of divisions in the ummah, but this rhetoric usually lacked detailed references to existing violent extremist organisations (VEOs).²²⁶

Likewise, Dabiq was much more interested in attacking the PKK (an average of 10 words per issue vs. 3.3 in Rumiyah) and Kurdish militias in general (average of 8 vs. 1.1). If discussed, they were presented by both magazines as a mere “tool” of “apostate” regimes, as well as an ally of “infidels” in their fight against the Islamic State. Dabiq #9, for example, argued that “the crusaders relied upon the Kurdish allies of Rafidah in Iraq (the Peshmerga) and upon the Kurdish allies of the Nusayriyyah in Sham (the PKK).”²²⁷ Once again, it was surprising that in the final editions of Rumiyah, despite the crucial role of Kurds in defeating Daesh on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, there was a lack of fragments that vilified them. Obviously, they featured in pieces of news and infographics on the losses suffered by their factions,²²⁸ but articles devoted to, for example, discussing the battle for Mosul, were very vague in terms of mentioning the “near enemies” that participated in combat. In contrast, some of the “far enemies,” such as the United States were mentioned more frequently.²²⁹

The same tendency can be observed in terms of denouncing rebel factions (the Free Syrian Army) fighting in Syria. Their designation as enemies was noticeable in Dabiq (6.66 words per issue on average). In contrast, Rumiyah manifested almost no interest in the actions of this group (0.07 words per issue on average). In all cases they were described as “apostates,” who were the subjects of other, more influential factions or foreign powers.²³⁰

As for the states and governments that were part of the “near enemy,” more quantitative differences between Dabiq and Rumiyah can be observed. They mostly concern references to Egypt (8.93 vs. 1.84 words per issue) and Iran (24.13 vs. 3.53). Once again, the earlier magazine proved to be much more focused on designating hostile entities in the vicinity of the Islamic State. On the one hand, Dabiq usually mentioned Egypt when discussing the Muslim Brotherhood, labelled murtadd, and Copts, who were accused of being “belligerent.” Moreover, its political elite (both Morsi and Sisi) was labelled tawaghit and condemned for their cooperation with the “crusaders.”²³¹ On the other hand, attacks against Iran were much more visible in Dabiq due to the aforementioned hostility of its editorial staff towards Shia Muslims. Consequently, Teheran was accused of spearheading various campaigns targeting “truthful” Sunni Muslims and the Islamic State, cooperating with “crusaders” (Russia) and other disbelievers (China), as well as supporting the enemies of Daesh in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. It was also blamed for causing various “deviances” in Islam²³² and the history of the Safawiyyah was also referred to. Contemporary Iran was falsely presented as just another embodiment of the same regime, which has the “aim of eradicating Ahlus-Sunnah and replacing them with a population of apostasy.”²³³ Similar fragments were difficult to find in Rumiyah. There were, however, two distinct exceptions. The first was visible in the fifth edition, which featured an interview with the leader of hisbah in Sinai, which deliberated on the political and religious situation in Egypt.²³⁴ The second could be found in Rumiyah #10 which featured an article attacking rafidah and the political system of Iran. It was, however, mostly concentrated on religion-related argumentation.²³⁵

Finally, from the quantitative viewpoint, both magazines were interested in labelling Turkey, Iraq and Syria as enemies of the Islamic State. They were all discussed in a generally similar manner, as being ruled by tawaghit and cooperating with either “crusaders” or Shia Muslims (Iran). Iraq and Syria were frequently mentioned in sections highlighting the Islamic State’s military operations.²³⁶ However, they were also portrayed as responsible for committing crimes against the Sunni civilian population. This was visible, among others, in the first edition of Dabiq #1,²³⁷ where Turkey was not only accused of being a member of the anti-IS coalition but also as the logistical hub through which mujahidin migrate towards dar al-Islam.²³⁸

To summarise, there are two general tendencies visible when it comes to profiling the enemies of Daesh in both magazines. First of all, Dabiq was usually much more dedicated and conscientious in designating hostile entities, when compared to Rumiyah which was keener to utilise vague negative labels (“bad words”) instead of discussing their detailed profiles. Secondly, both periodicals manifested greater interest in referring to the profiles of “near enemies” than to “far enemies.” The only exception to this trend was the United States, which was generally presented as the leader of the worldwide alliance against “truthful” Muslims. This confirms the Islamic State’s long-standing preference to fight against “apostasy” in dar al-Islam over disbelief in dar al-harb.

Advertising the martyrdom industry

According to Freamon, shahada (“martyrdom”)²³⁹ is a

doctrine that posits that believers who give their lives on the battlefield in a military jihad, ‘for the cause of God’ and in furtherance of military objective of the jihad, do not die but, rather, immediately enter paradise, where they are copiously rewarded for their religious sacrifice.²⁴⁰

In this context, for decades suicide attacks have constituted an integral part of the Islamist terrorist organisations modus operandi.²⁴¹ The Islamic State is no different in this respect. Since 2016, mostly due to the deteriorating strategic situation in its core territories in Syria and Iraq, the frequency and significance of so called “martyrdom operations” increased. Winter stressed that its “suicide attacks, which were adopted long ago as a result of strategic calculations, might now be motivated by something more tactical. Indeed, in a manner not dissimilar to Imperial Japan, which formally adopted militarised suicide in the final stages of World War II after it had suffered a series of crippling strategic defeats, IS seems to have begun to resort to defensive suicide as a way to mitigate territorial loss and resist the immensity of the military pressure it faces.”²⁴² This effectively meant that Daesh was increasingly in need of volunteers for suicide operations. In order to find them, the propaganda machine was forced to employ narratives that advertised this very idea.

This study attempted to measure the significance of the “martyrdom industry” in the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah. In order to do so, it adopted both word frequency analysis and content analysis. The word frequency analysis focused on terms referring to martyrdom in all 28 issues of both magazines: “shuhada” (“martyrs”), “shahada” (“martyrdom”), “martyr,” “martyrs,” and “martyrdom.” Arabic and English terms were counted separately. In all issues of Dabiq (see Table 3.15) the terms of shuhada and shahada were utilised at least once, with an average use of 10 words per volume. There is a visible increase in the exploitation of these Arabic notions from the seventh edition, which signifies the increased attention given to this narrative. This coincided with the fact that from this volume, the periodical “matured” in terms of its organisation of content and length. At the same time, however, Dabiq rarely exploited English terms based on the root word “martyr,” which could be caused simply by the linguistic preferences of its editorial staff. On average Dabiq used “martyr/−s” and “martyrdom” (counted together) only four times per volume. In two editions these words were not used even once. The only exception can be seen in the 15th edition, in which these terms were used as many as 18 times. This increase can be explained by the aforementioned uniqueness of this volume, devoted to primarily influencing Christians.

Table 3.15 Frequency of words referring to martyrdom in Dabiq

Issue | Shuhada/shahada | Martyr/-s /Martyrdom
1 | 5 | 2
2 | 1 | 0
3 | 3 | 2
4 | 9 | 2
5 | 9 | 3
6 | 6 | 0
7 | 22 | 5
8 | 5 | 5
9 | 21 | 1
10 | 4 | 2
11 | 10 | 3
12 | 15 | 7
13 | 17 | 7
14 | 19 | 3
15 | 5 | 18
Average | 10 | 4

Source: Word frequency analysis.

Rumiyah exploited the terms shuhada and shahada even more frequently (see Table 3.16). On average they were used 10.8 times per issue, in contrast to Dabiq’s 10. A slight decrease in the use of these Arabic terms may be noticed only in the intermediate issues from #5 to #8. As for the English words “martyr/−s” and “martyrdom,” they were utilised much less often, as their average frequency for all 13 volumes was only 1.4, in contrast to 4 in Dabiq.

Table 3.16 Frequency of words referring to martyrdom in Rumiyah

Issue | Shuhada/shahada | Martyr/-s /martyrdom
1 | 9 | 2
2 | 22 | 2
3 | 13 | 3
4 | 11 | 3
5 | 5 | 1
6 | 9 | 0
7 | 1 | 0
8 | 4 | 4
9 | 9 | 1
10 | 18 | 1
11 | 20 | 2
12 | 11 | 0
13 | 9 | 0
Average | 10.8 | 1.4

Source: Word frequency analysis.

These quantitative results prove that both magazines regularly referred to the theme of martyrdom, which was expected. Slightly greater interest in discussing this issue in Rumiyah is understandable, considering the changing situation of the Islamic State in 2016 and 2017.

As for the content analysis, the study coded as “positive” all pages where editors discussed the actions of or referred to people labelled as “martyrs.” Theoretical references to shahadah were not considered (Table 3.17). Dabiq devoted an average number of 9.4 pages per volume to discussing their profiles (14.9% of the average length). Early editions (1–6) manifested much lesser interest in this topic, compared to later issues.

Table 3.17 Pages consisting of profiles of shuhada in the content of Dabiq

Issue | Pages consisting of references to martyrs
1 | 5
2 | 3
3 | 2
4 | 1
5 | 6
6 | 4
7 | 19
8 | 11
9 | 12
10 | 10
11 | 6
12 | 15
13 | 15
14 | 11
15 | 21
Average | 9.4

Source: Content analysis.

On the other hand, pages presenting the profiles of shuhada in Rumiyah ranged from five to 15, with an average of 11.2. Therefore, the average share of pages devoted to promoting martyrs in this magazine was greater than in Dabiq – 24.7% (Table 3.18).

Table 3.18 Pages consisting of profiles of shuhada in the content of Rumiyah

Issue | Pages consisting of references to martyrs
1 | 12
2 | 13
3 | 10
4 | 15
5 | 12
6 | 12
7 | 5
8 | 12
9 | 11
10 | 11
11 | 14
12 | 12
13 | 7
Average | 11.2

Source: Content analysis.

Qualitative content analysis allowed five distinct ways of presenting martyrs to be identified. Firstly, editors created fully fledged hagiographies of the deceased mujahidin. Such texts were usually included in the aforementioned “Among the Believers Are Men” column, which became an integral part of both Dabiq and Rumiyah. Its primary function was to create role models for the Islamic State’s followers. This section was frequently supported by the similar, but extraordinarily well-prepared, articles referring to martyrs who died in events which were important from the viewpoint of the “Caliphate’s” agenda, such as high-profile terrorist attacks.²⁴³

In Dabiq, the “Among the Believers Are Men” section usually presented one profile of a martyr at a time. For instance, the 14th edition of Dabiq focused on the case of a shahid from Bangladesh, Abu Jandal al-Bangali,²⁴⁴ while the seventh described the life and death of Abu Qudamah al-Misri (Table 3.19).²⁴⁵ Three editions of Dabiq promoted two shuhada in the same section. This column featured both high-profile deceased jihadis, such as the infamous “Jihadi John,” killed by a US airstrike in Raqqa, as well as ordinary, lower-ranked members of the organisation. Furthermore, this section was also relatively balanced in terms of the place of birth and/or residence of those featured. Among the 12 martyrs which were promoted by the “Among the Believers Are Men” in Dabiq, as many as five had previously lived in Western countries: two brothers in Canada, one in Great Britain, and two in Germany. However, the vast majority of them operated and “sacrificed” their lives in Syria, which symbolised the significance of this core area in the Islamic State’s propaganda. There were only two issues which discussed the actions of shuhada in Afghanistan and Iraq. Deceased militants from Africa were never featured.

Table 3.19 Martyrs featured in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section of Dabiq

Issue | Featured shahid | Location of shuhada operations
1 | Abu Qudamah al-Misri | Syria
2 | Shaykh Abu Talhah Abdur-Ra’uf Khadim al-Khurasani | Afghanistan
3 | Hudhayfah al-Battawi | Iraq
4 | Abu Malik at-Tamimi, Abu ‘Umar at-Tunusi | Syria, Syria
5 | Abu Ja’far al-Almani | Syria
6 | Abu Junaydah al-Almani, Abu Shurayh as-Silani | Syria, Syria
7 | Abu Muharib al-Muhajir (so-called “Jihadi John”) | Syria
8 | Abu Jandal al-Bangali | Syria
9 | Abu ‘Abdillah al-Canadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Canadi | Syria, Syria

Source: Content analysis.

Rumiyah adopted slightly different organisation of its content promoting the profiles of shuhada. Only five of the thirteen issues of this magazine contained the “Among the Believers Are Men” column (Table 3.20). One of them was promoted in the form of a cover story.²⁴⁶ In contrast to Dabiq, all deceased mujahidin featured originated from outside of the Middle East, i.e. from Great Britain, France, the United States, Australia, and Malaysia. Moreover, one of them operated and was killed in Philippines, which constituted a significant change in comparison to the earlier periodical. This was, however, understandable, considering the fact that numerous issues of Rumiyah boasted about the achievements of the Islamic State in Eastern Asia (its short-lived conquest of Marawi).²⁴⁷ It has to be stressed that the absence of the “Among the Believers Are Men” column in the majority of the editions of Rumiyah was compensated for by other articles which fulfilled the same function and consisted of similar narration. For instance, the second issue featured an “exclusive” article entitled “The Shuhada of the Ghulshan Attack,” which highlighted and praised terrorists who died during the attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh.²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it is noticeable that this type of hagiographic text, which underlined the heroism and dedication of martyrs, was less visible in this magazine.

Table 3.20 Martyrs featured in the “Among the Believers Are Men” section of Rumiyah

Issue | Featured shahid | Location of Shuhada operations
1 | Abu Mansur al-Muhajir | Syria
2 | – | –
3 | Abu ‘Abdillah al-Britani | Syria
4 | – | –
5 | – | –
6 | – | –
7 | – | –
8 | Shaykh Abu Sulayman ash-Shami | Syria
9 | – | –
10 | Abu Sabah al-Muhajir | Philippines
11 | Abu Mujahid al-Faransi | Syria
12 | – | –
13 | – | –

Source: Content analysis.

Ordinary hagiographies (Figure 3.4) had several interesting traits. First of all, they were all founded on the frequent use of the previously discussed glittering generalities. “Virtue words” were exploited to describe the subjects’ characters, beliefs, and actions. For instance, the characteristic of a jihadi from Great Britain contained the following statement: “Abu ‘Abdillah was a very sociable, lively, friendly, gentle person with a soft heart and a blessed smile. He was one of those characters whom everyone liked. He was never arrogant, regardless of whatever position he held.”²⁴⁹ This was combined with typically detailed information about childhood, family situation, as well as the economic and social environment of the mujahidin, which served the same purpose of highlighting their merits. This was noticeable in Dabiq #11 which contained a description of the social background and interpersonal skills of a German jihadi. It was founded on the aforementioned dichotomic narrative which contrasts the moral decay of disbelievers with Islamic zeal:

Abu Ja’far was very beloved amongst the brothers. He was always friendly and ready to help at all times, forever having a smile on his face for his brothers. He grew up in an environment rampant with crime and corruption, but despite that, he never went through a period of jahiliyyah. He was raised as a practicing Muslim from his childhood.²⁵⁰

Figure 3.4Cover page of Rumiyah #8, featuring the hagiography of Abu Sulayman ash-Shami. Source: Internet Archive.

Furthermore, this section attached great importance to explaining the reasons behind a shahid’s decision to embark on the “path of jihad.” In the piece devoted to the aforementioned “Jihadi John,” its author wrote: “At a young age, the honorable brother traveled with his family to London. This would become a place he grew to hate along with its kafir people, whose customs were far-removed from the praiseworthy values he was accustomed to.”²⁵¹ Another notable example can be found in Dabiq #15 which described the process of the conversion from Christianity to Islam of two of its Canadian martyrs.²⁵² Additionally, as previously mentioned, these texts usually provided very specific information on the activities of the highlighted mujahid after his enlistment in IS ranks, including his position, responsibilities, as well as the actions which directly led to him attaining shuhada. This act was obviously depicted as a great and honourable achievement, being a part of sacrificing dunya (worldly matters) for Allah. Finally, the shuhada were obviously presented as great role-models. This intent was visible in, for example, Dabiq #9 which featured Hudhayfah al-Battawi:

He (rahimahullah) was eager to achieve shahadah, so he got what he was yearning for, not dying until he made the apostates cry, debilitated them with wounds, and made them taste death and sadness […] The worldly life, its pleasures, and adornments did not succeed in tempting him even for a single day. Every Muslim should raise his head out of pride for these men, with glory and honor, in the face of the people of falsehood.²⁵³

The second type of narration identified focused on the two unique types of IS troops: istishhadiyyin and inghimasiyyin. As Matusitz stressed,

Istishhad is the Arabic term for martyrdom, the process of dying as a martyr (or heroic death). When translated word-for-word, it essentially means ‘self-chosen martyrdom’ […] In common jihadist phraseology, the term highlights heroism in the accomplishment of sacrifice (rather than anonymous death in battle).²⁵⁴

The inghimasiyyin (“those who become immersed”),²⁵⁵ according to Barfi, “are highly motivated and fearless, donning explosive belts that they do not hesitate to use.”²⁵⁶ He also noted that they “should not be confused with suicide bombers whose sole mission is to blow themselves up. The Inghimasiyyin only detonate their charges after fighting and only if death is imminent.”²⁵⁷ Thus, the first group consists mostly of terrorists, who conduct suicide operations, e.g. in the form of SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device)²⁵⁸ attacks. The second group is composed of elite “shock” troops, who use explosive belts only if there is no other option on the battlefield.

In this context, the editors of both magazines clearly distinguished both categories of martyrs. They were also considered to be and presented as the crème de la crème of IS’s ranks. However, an uneven approach to both groups may be noticed. As inghimasiyyin and istishhadiyyin were frequently featured in Dabiq and Rumiyah, the second type of shuhada seemed to be featured more in the propaganda of Daesh. This was manifested by the fact that these periodicals usually provided the kunya (nom de guerre) of the perpetrators of istishhadi attacks, in contrast to inghimasi operatives who frequently (but not always) remained anonymous. This tendency is, however, understandable, considering the fact that the acts of istishhadiyyin were individual in nature and required the acceptance of inevitable death. For inghimasiyyin suicidal death was only one of the options on the battlefield. Additionally, they acted in groups which made them more difficult to promote in terms of creating “heroic” profiles.

Both types of mujahidin were usually highlighted in sections containing information on the “Caliphate’s” achievements on the battlefields, such as the “News,” “Reports,” and “A Selection of Military Operations Conducted by the Islamic State” in Dabiq, or the “Military and Covert Operations” in Rumiyah. However, such texts did usually not contain extensive deliberations on the very idea of martyrdom. They were simplistic in form, as they predominantly consisted of short pieces of information on the act of suicidal death, sometimes enriched with several “virtue words.” For instance, Dabiq #13 featured the following report:

Wilayat Khurasan: On the 2nd of Rabi al-Akhir, three inghimasi soldiers of the Khilafah attacked the Pakistani consulate in the city of Jalalabad. One of the brothers (may Allah accept him) detonated his explosive belt on the consulate guards […] paving the way for the other two inghimasi soldiers.²⁵⁹

Another notable example can be found in Dabiq’s 14th edition, which stated:

Wilayat Ádan Abyan – On the 17th of Rabi al-Akhir, the istishhadi Abu Hanifah al-Holandi detonated his explosive vehicle on the Ma’ashiq Presidential Palace, which is the residential base of the taghut of Yemen […] The brother killed nearly 10 of the taghut’s guards, including some officers, and injured approximately 20 more. May Allah accept him among the shuhada.²⁶⁰

Sometimes, the magazines discussed both types of actions at the same time. Such a case was visible in the sixth edition of Rumiyah:

On the 16th of Rabi’ al-Akhir, a group of inghimasiyyin stealthily advanced to the PKK’s rear lines in the village of Suwaydiyyah Saghirah in the wilayah’s western countryside and carried out a surprise attack on the murtaddin. Clashes took place for several hours and were punctuated by an istishhadi operation carried out by Abu ‘Abdillah ash-Shishani.²⁶¹

Thus, Dabiq and Rumiyah employed identical modus operandi in promoting the actions of inghimasi and istishhadi. This was not only useful for advertising martyrdom but also for contributing to the “Caliphate’s” triumphant image.

The third type of narration was built upon historical and religious examples, drawn from the Quran or hadiths. Personas, which are important in Islamic theology, such as those of prophets and Sahabah, were frequently exploited to depict shahada as a manifestation of piousness and zeal.²⁶² This act was also presented as something desired and rewarded by Allah with a special place in Jannah. For instance, this was evident in one of the texts praising the martyrdom of Ja’far Ibn Abi Talib during the battle of Mutah, which stated: “He then embraced it with his upper arms until he was killed, and he was 33 years old. So Allah rewarded him for that with two wings in Jannah with which he flies wherever he wishes.”²⁶³ These pieces were usually supported by selectively chosen and interpreted quotations from the Quran, such as the surah As-Saff 10–12, which states:

O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a transaction that will save you from a painful punishment? [It is that] you believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and with your lives. That is the best for you, if you should know. He will forgive you your sins and admit you to gardens beneath which rivers flow and pleasant dwellings in gardens of perpetual residence. That is the great attainment.²⁶⁴

The fourth type of narration was related to the profiles of the former, deceased shaykhs (leaders) of the Islamic State and its earlier incarnations. Among others, the last moments of Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and Osama bin Laden served this purpose. Sometimes, articles about them were even accompanied with pictures presenting their corpses. Their deaths were glorified (through glittering generalities) and depicted as major turning points in the battle for purified Islam. Such an intent was visible in Dabiq #1 which featured a piece entitled “From Hijrah to Khilafah,” discussing IS’s path to establishing the “Caliphate.” It presented the profiles and actions of the former leaders of the organisation, featuring their pictures and statements praising their martyrdom. The text stressed:

And when the Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi (rahimahullah) gained shahadah alongside Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir (rahimahullah), the Islamic State did not waver, rather its leadership unanimously pledged allegiance to Amirul-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (hafidhahullah), continuing upon the path for a single Khilafah that unites the Ummah.²⁶⁵

In other words, their “sacrifice” was presented as an important step towards the realisation of the dream of the “single body” that unites all Muslims under one imam. Moreover, the shahada of leaders was sometimes used to strengthen the aforementioned narrative of the hardships of ummah. Among others, the seventh edition of Dabiq stated:

This came at a grave moment during the peak of hardships and difficulties, the harshest of tremors and crises, the forefront of which was the killing of the greatest leaders and symbols of jihad, those who lit the path for us by their efforts, contribution, and sacrifices, by their blood, skills, and corpses… Amongst them was the shahid of Islam – as we consider him – the imam and sayyid of his era, Abu Abdillah Usamah Ibn Ladin, the pride of the Ummah and the crown of its new era.”²⁶⁶

Finally, they were also useful as a means of damage control. For instance, the editors of Rumiyah argued that the death of az-Zarqawi changed nothing and that the happiness of the “crusaders” after he was killed was short-lived.²⁶⁷

The least important type of narration identified by this study concerns the profiles of anonymous martyrs. For instance, the first issue of Dabiq featured an article entitled “Regime targets Ar-Raqqah.” It discussed alleged SAA’s crimes against the inhabitants of IS’s “capital” and presented pictures of deceased Muslim children. A symbolic text was included: “On the morning of Monday, the 25th of Sha’ba, the Nusayri regime carried out an airstrike in Ar-Raqqah, resulting in five shuhada’ and multiple wounded.”²⁶⁸ This and other, similar fragments had little importance in promoting the martyrdom industry, however. Instead, they served other purposes, such as praising the dedication and steadfastness of the Islamic State’s mujahidin.

To conclude, as Winter’s report suggested,²⁶⁹ the role of suicide attacks in the tactics employed by Daesh increased over time, which coincided with the increasing military difficulties encountered by this group. The very same process may be observed in the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah, which attached more and more attention to presenting the profiles of shuhada. It was primarily a means of encouraging readers to follow in their footsteps. Such messages were usually founded on hagiographies, based on glittering generalities. Sometimes, it was also an interesting way of improving the image of the Islamic State, as well as a means of addressing the rising crisis of Daesh as a territorial organisation in Syria and Iraq. The latter was especially visible in Rumiyah, which argued that there are only two options for all “truthful” mujahidin: either victory or death, being a direct pass to Jannah.²⁷⁰

Playing the victim: means of legitimising “just terror” in Dabiq and Rumiyah

The primary function of all pieces of Islamic State’s propaganda, as stated earlier, was to encourage online audiences to participate in jihad against disbelievers and “apostates.” In order to do this, the flagship magazines provided readers with argumentation that legitimised violence against them. This intent was confirmed by this study which coded and analysed all pages consisting of such rationale (Table 3.21). From the quantitative perspective, Dabiq ranged from 18 (#1, #3, #12) to 38 (#4) pages that did this, with an average for all 15 issues of 27.06 pages. The newer magazine ranged from 12 (#7) to 33 pages (#11), with an average of 21.76. Considering the average length of both magazines, argumentation legitimising violence constituted about 43% of the content of Dabiq and almost half (48%) of the content of Rumiyah.

Table 3.21 Pages consisting of argumentation legitimising violence in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 18 | 22
2 | 20 | 21
3 | 18 | 27
4 | 38 | 25
5 | 21 | 26
6 | 22 | 14
7 | 52 | 12
8 | 30 | 17
9 | 37 | 30
10 | 25 | 21
11 | 19 | 33
12 | 18 | 22
13 | 29 | 13
14 | 31 | –
15 | 28 | –
Average | 27.06 | 21.76

Source: Content analysis.

From the qualitative viewpoint, the legitimisation of violence was based on a peculiar mixture of the propaganda devices and narratives discussed earlier. First of all, the primary tool utilised was the transfer device. The editors of both magazines frequently exploited selectively chosen quotations from the Quran and hadiths to convince readers that killing or harming disbelievers is not only halal (permissible) but also constitutes a good deed according to Islamic theology. This intent was clear in multiple articles which exploited either examples from the Prophet’s life or citations from surahs, including the previously mentioned at-Tawbah or al-Baqarah. For instance, the first issue of Rumiyah featured an article entitled “The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal For You, So Shed It.” As its title suggests, the text was focused on explaining to readers that it is lawful in Islam to kill disbelievers. This reasoning was based primarily on the Quran, whose fragments that encouraged readers to do this or presented kuffar as second-tier (“impure”) human beings were used. The author stressed that:

As for our King […] then we have entered into His din and must obey His rule wholeheartedly, and He said, ‘And fight them until there is no fitnah and the din is for Allah.’ But if they cease, then there is no aggression except against the tyrants (Al-Baqarah 193).²⁷¹

This was followed by a number of other quotations, including at-Tawbah 5 (“So when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikin wherever you find them and take them, surround them, and wait for them at every outpost”) or at-Tawbah 28 (“O you who believe! The mushrikin are nothing but impure”).²⁷² The article was concluded with a symbolic statement indicating that “the blood of the disbelievers is halal, and killing them is a form of worship to Allah.”²⁷³ A similar narrative was employed in the seventh edition of Dabiq, featuring a text “Islam Is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism.” It explained that the Prophet Mohammad was sent with four swords, for polytheists (mushrikin), “people of the book,” i.e. Jews and Christians (ahlul-kitab), hypocrites (munafiqin), and rebellious aggressors (bughat). This was supported by a number of quotations from the Quran and hadiths. The author exploited a fragment of surah al-Anfal (12): “I am with you, so strengthen those who have believed. I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieved, so strike [them] upon the necks and strike from them every fingertip.”²⁷⁴ Also surah Muhammad 4 was cited: “So when you meet those who disbelieve, strike their necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens.”²⁷⁵ Overall, the general message conveyed by this and similar texts was that at the very foundations of Islam lies the principle of violent division between Muslims and non-Muslims. On a side note, this means of interpretation of religious texts is nothing new in Islam. Analogous argumentation was exploited by classic Islamic scholars to explain, for example, great conquests from the seventh and eighth centuries.²⁷⁶

The second type of reasoning used to legitimise jihad was founded on the “victimhood card,” which is a classic element in Islamist terrorist propaganda.²⁷⁷ The study identified, coded, and analysed all pages which mentioned the persecution of or crimes against Muslims. It was not surprising to conclude that Dabiq and Rumiyah attached significant importance to exploiting this theme (Table 3.22). Dabiq ranged from one to 18 pages consisting of such messages, with an average of 9.2 pages for all 15 issues. Rumiyah contained between three and 15 pages coded as “positive,” and the average for the whole magazine was 6.3 pages. Considering the difference in length between them, the average share of pages debating Muslim victimhood was almost identical (14.6% to 13.9%).

Table 3.22 Pages consisting of narratives focused on the persecution of Muslims en masse

Issue | Dabiq | Rumiyah
1 | 7 | 3
2 | 1 | 6
3 | 10 | 8
4 | 7 | 7
5 | 6 | 8
6 | 7 | 4
7 | 18 | 4
8 | 11 | 8
9 | 13 | 15
10 | 4 | 6
11 | 10 | 3
12 | 12 | 7
13 | 8 | 3
14 | 13 | –
15 | 11 | –
Average | 9.2 | 6.30

Source: Content analysis.

From the qualitative viewpoint, references to hardships in both magazines followed the aforementioned “tradition” of Salafi-jihadi propaganda. First of all, the very reason behind the “Caliphate’s” proclamation was explained by the fact that it is dedicated to defending the wellbeing and honour of Muslims; Dabiq #1 made it clear that IS should bring back their dignity. It cited the speech of al-Baghdadi, who stated: “Soon, by Allah’s permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved.”²⁷⁸ Thus, he indirectly suggested that the current situation was far from that state. This was followed by al-Adnani’s communiqué, in which he stressed that

the time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise.²⁷⁹

Thus, the rise of IS was presented as a moment of transition from an era of persecution to the era of dignity and, therefore, domination over disbelievers.

In most cases references to hardships were much more explicit. They denounced specific groups of hostile entities which are responsible for the “suffering” of Sunni civilians. For instance, the second edition of Dabiq stated: “As for the massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim men, women, and children, then the Islamic State will do everything within its means to continue striking down every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path towards Palestine.”²⁸⁰ The first edition of this periodical featured a photo reportage from Tal Afar. It presented gruesome images of unarmed men allegedly murdered by “Safawi forces.”²⁸¹ Rumiyah followed the same pattern in highlighting the “criminal” acts of, for example, the United States, Russia, Syria, and other “apostate” governments of the Middle East. The seventh edition of Rumiyah argued that Russia and the “Nusayri regime”

continuously bombard the people of Sham, the same people whom they have supposedly come out in order to support and relieve from oppression […] much of the tears that have been shed during the past years for the people of Sham – who have suffered greatly, at the hands of the Nusayri army and its allies of the Rafidah and Russian Crusaders, in loss of life and the destruction of their cities and villages.²⁸²

Even the Egyptian Copts were accused of causing harm to “peaceful” Muslims.”²⁸³

These messages were usually accompanied with statements indicating that payback for these “crimes” is necessary, which is an essential requirement in order for it to be treated as a means of legitimising violence. This was visible, among others, in the seventh edition of Dabiq, which featured a text on the execution of a Jordanian pilot by burning. It attempted to explain this act, which was controversial even among Salafi-jihadis,²⁸⁴ by arguing that “the Islamic State had resolved to burn him alive as retribution for his crimes against Islam and the Muslims, including his active involvement in crusader airstrikes against Muslim lands.”²⁸⁵

Editorial staff were especially keen to mention acts of violence against Muslims which were related to the suffering of women and children, due to their non-belligerent status and innocence. For instance, the foreword of the third edition of Dabiq accused the United States of killing Muslim children, women and the elderly en masse in Iraq prior to its withdrawal.²⁸⁶ Its eighth issue lamented the hardships endured by women during hijrah to Islamic State territories,²⁸⁷ while the tenth stated that “warplanes of the cross” fly in the skies “to pour the lava of death upon the Muslims, upon helpless women and children.”²⁸⁸ Similarly, the fifth issue of Rumiyah featured an article entitled “The Flames Of Justice,” which suggested that the execution through burning should be perceived as an act of justice, fairness delivered to those who persecute ummah. It stressed that

after the brutal fires of the murtaddin – launched from their planes, tanks, and cannons – had devoured the skin, flesh, and bodies of the Muslims – men, women, and children alike – Allah healed the breasts of the people of wala and bara with what He decreed to occur at their hands in the burning of the imprisoned soldiers of the tawaghit.²⁸⁹

Therefore, this text constituted a mixture of the transfer (decree of Allah) and glittering generalities (“flames of justice”) devices, combined with statements indicating that the executions were merely revenge for similar actions conducted by “apostates” against innocent non-belligerents. This type of narrative was frequently accompanied by images depicting the victims’ injuries or even corpses. For instance, in Rumiyah #9, the article of az-Zarqawi contained a photograph of a severely injured child during surgery, with an indicative description: “They only fight the Muslims because they believe in Allah.”²⁹⁰

While all trends related to atrocities committed against Muslims remained relatively unchanged in Rumiyah, due to the deteriorating strategic situation of the “Caliphate,” its editors introduced a new element. Hardships began to serve as a means of downplaying the defeats suffered by the group. This shift was manifested in statements presenting the tribulations experienced by Muslims as a test from Allah, which would allow him to differentiate between “true” believers and turncoats. This was noticeable in the fourth edition, which contained an interview with the commander of the Tarabulus province. He compared mujahidin with Sahabah in terms of the suffering they experience and concluded:

Then, when their means all become constricted and they almost despair, there comes to them the support of Allah – if He knows there to be goodness in the hearts of His slaves – and there comes to them what is better than all that has been taken from them.²⁹¹

Similarly, the eighth edition discussed hardships as a means of differentiating between “patient believer and deceptive munafiq.”²⁹²

There were two general motives behind the use of the “victimhood card.” References to hardships endured by Muslims aimed to capitalise on the feeling of common identity and belonging shared by many members of ummah. Thus, statements highlighting crimes against them and, especially, against helpless women and children were a means of triggering certain emotions, such as compassion and anger, that would facilitate their engagement in violent actions against designated persecutors. In fact, frequently this type of narration was accompanied by calls for action.²⁹³ Therefore, terrorist attacks or executions were customarily presented as adequate revenge taken for the “crimes” committed by disbelievers. Moreover, the emphasis placed on the hardships of Muslims was a means of creating or – later – maintaining the positive image of the organisation, which was portrayed as the only safeguard for the suffering Sunni population worldwide. In other words, it was a symbolic signal for the readers that if they care about the wellbeing of the ummah, they should support Daesh in every way possible.²⁹⁴

It should be stressed that the core of this rhetoric was logically inconsistent with other, more belligerent messages conveyed by editors. While Dabiq and Rumiyah pitied the fate of Muslim civilians, at the same time they reiterated that there is no chance for definitive, long-lasting peace between the Islamic State and kuffar, because its final goal is to subjugate or to kill them. Furthermore, while it was extremely focused on inciting compassion among readers over the Muslim children and women killed, it still legitimised the killing of the women and children of disbelievers. This problem was even addressed by Rumiyah #5, which stressed:

One should also recall that the kuffar have killed far more Muslim women and children. However, even if the kuffar were to have never killed a single Muslim woman or child, it would be still permissible to target the kafir masses regardless of the collateral killing of kafir women and children caused thereby, as proven by the hadith reported from as-Sa’b.²⁹⁵

Thus, once again the editors expressed conviction that there is no equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. The second group was treated as something less valuable and, therefore, harming them in any way possible was permissible.

A qualitatively different argumentation was employed to discuss the culpability and punishment of munafiqin, i.e. these who violated core principles of Islam according to Daesh. They were blamed for breaking the unity of Muslims, serving the “apostates,” as well as being indifferent to the war between the “camp of falsehood” and the “camp of iman.”²⁹⁶ These argumentations were employed, among others, in articles criticising Sunni scholars who do not support the “Caliphate.” They were customarily stigmatised with various “bad names” (“palace scholars,” “imams of kufr”) and blamed for diverting Muslims from “the path of Allah.” These were the major ways in which the editors justified calls for their assassination.²⁹⁷

To recapitulate, both magazines attached quite similar levels of importance to legitimising violence and they used identical argumentation to do this. The editors exploited name-calling and transfer to stigmatise enemies and present them as human beings of inferior value. This was obviously related to the aforementioned black-and-white worldview conveyed, where a state of peace between the “camp of iman” and the “camp of kufr” is impossible. In effect, infidels by definition are destined to be either killed or ruled by Muslims. Moreover, acts of violence such as executions, militancy, and terrorism were presented as legitimate revenge for the crimes of the “infidels” against Muslims. Finally, also “hypocritical” Muslims were labelled a valid target due to their violation of the core principles of Islam, including the unity and recognition of the legitimate leader – i.e. “Caliph.”

Towards joining the “caravan” of the Islamic State: calls to action in the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah

The legitimisation of violence and all other core narratives explained previously were merely the foundation for the most important function of both magazines – inciting readers to actively support the Islamic State’s agenda. In order to better understand how editors attempted to reach this objective, this study focused on three predominant means of triggering behaviour among Internet users: calls to violence, recruitment appeals, and calls to convert to Islam. This project identified pages consisting of such messages and analysed them in terms of their overall structure.

As mentioned in previous sections, both periodicals were permeated with argumentation highlighting the truthfulness of Islam as a religion, but only in its radical Salafi interpretation. This was usually done with the use of virtue words. Salafi Islam was therefore presented as the only legitimate path to salvation and a true emanation of God’s commandments. Other interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah were disregarded and condemned. As a consequence, one could expect that the editors of Dabiq and Rumiyah would naturally take another step and convey messages directly encouraging readers to convert to Islam. This was, however, not the case. While such calls were sometimes included, they were scarce and of rather marginal significance (Table 3.23).

Table 3.23 Pages consisting of calls to conversion in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Calls to conversion in Dabiq | Calls to conversion in Rumiyah
1 | 0 | 0
2 | 0 | 0
3 | 0 | 0
4 | 0 | 0
5 | 0 | 0
6 | 0 | 0
7 | 2 | 0
8 | 0 | 0
9 | 0 | 1
10 | 0 | 0
11 | 1 | 0
12 | 0 | 0
13 | 0 | 0
14 | 0 | –
15 | 14 | –
Average | 1.13 | 0.07

Source: Content analysis.

Their average presence for all editions of Dabiq was only 1.13 pages, in contrast to Rumiyah’s 0.07 (only one page coded as “positive”). The vast majority of calls to conversion (14) were included in the 15th edition of Dabiq, as it was the only one, as mentioned previously, that was mostly dedicated to influencing Christians. It consisted of multiple texts that discussed “falsehood” and the “polytheist” nature of Christendom, which was contrasted with the aforementioned “truthfulness” and “purity” of Salafi Islam. Even the cover page featured an image of a mujahid destroying a cross at a church, with a symbolic statement: “Break the cross.” Calls were scattered throughout its content, which began with a text entitled “Contemplate the creation” by Abul-Harith ath-Thaghri, who discussed the very idea of believing in God, by combining testimonial with transfer and glittering generalities. While it consisted of criticism of other religions, it was mostly focused on the denigration of atheism. It was concluded by the statement that a “denier should contemplate his feeble arrogance and contrast it with the many signs of his Creator including those found in himself. He should repent from his hubris, recognize his Lord and submit to Him by following His final messenger, Muhammad.”²⁹⁸ Thus, its final words constituted a call to conversion which was mostly directed to atheists and based on a number of arguments, which were on the whole related to the unique character of nature, as well as to emotions experienced by humans. This article was followed by the “From the Pages of History” section, which focused on the process of the proliferation of Islam through originally Christian lands at the times of the Prophet. It discussed the alleged reactions of two Christian kings and a Byzantine Emperor to the daw’ah from the Muslims. The editors obviously praised those who converted.²⁹⁹ Once again, it was concluded by a call to conversion:

These are the same choices before the disbelieving Christians today. They have the option of trying to cling to the transient luxuries of life, rejecting the truth in favor of either paying jizyah to the Islamic State or continuing to wage a futile war against it. Alternatively, they can heed the warning of Allah that the worldly life is not guaranteed even for those who pursue it at the expense of their salvation, and thus choose to embrace Islam, champion the truth, attain the mercy of their Lord, and enter the Gardens of Paradise.³⁰⁰

Therefore, this particular call combined fear of becoming a target of IS’s actions with promise of eternal life in Jannah. Other articles contrasted the purity of Islam with the “decadence and obscenity” of Christendom,³⁰¹ listed reasons why Christian converts to Islam supported the Islamic State,³⁰² or discussed the process of conversion based on previously discussed memoirs.³⁰³ The cover story of this issue – “Break The Cross” – had the same purpose of persuading Christians to abandon their religion. It consisted of a number of somewhat sophisticated theological manipulations which aimed to present Christianity as a “corrupt” representation of the word of God. Among others, the article argued that both the Bible and Torah are forged and that the concept of the Holy Trinity is a form of paganism and polytheism.³⁰⁴ To recapitulate, with the use of a wide spectrum of propaganda devices, including the distortion of theological foundations ( card-stacking), combined with transfer, glittering generalities and name-calling, Christendom was not only presented as a forgery, but also as a source of “corruption” in the Western world. Interestingly, while other religions were attacked as well, calls for conversion only targeted Christians, which is symbolic.

Direct recruitment appeals proved to be much more frequent (Table 3.24). In this respect, Dabiq ranged from 0 (#6) to 11 (#10) pages coded as “positive,” with an average of 4.4 pages for all 15 issues. Rumiyah paid lesser attention to such demands, as there were as many as five issues which did not contain a single direct call to recruitment. Other issues featured only up to 3 pages (#4, #9) with this type of messages. The average use for all 13 editions was only 1.07 pages.

Table 3.24 Pages consisting of direct recruitment appeals in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Direct recruitment appeals in Dabiq | Direct recruitment appeals in Rumiyah
1 | 2 | 1
2 | 2 | 1
3 | 7 | 2
4 | 1 | 3
5 | 4 | 0
6 | 0 | 0
7 | 5 | 0
8 | 7 | 1
9 | 7 | 3
10 | 11 | 2
11 | 5 | 1
12 | 4 | 0
13 | 2 | 0
14 | 6 | –
15 | 3 | –
Average | 4.4 | 1.07

Source: Content analysis.

From the qualitative viewpoint, recruitment calls were related to rhetoric, which legitimised the statehood of the Islamic State and emphasised its prophetic methodology. As explained in previous sections, the editors utilised a number of arguments and propaganda devices to create an artificial and whitewashed image of the Islamic State as a perfect political entity and an embodiment of ummah.³⁰⁵ Their dichotomic, black-and-white vision of the world served the very same purpose. While most articles were rather straightforward in their intent, sometimes more sophisticated pieces were included. This was the case with a text authored by John Cantlie, who praised Daesh for its rapid expansion and argued that it turned “into a global phenomenon that the West and the democratic world as a whole is ill-equipped to deal with.”³⁰⁶ In other words, all these messages combined laid a foundation on which recruitment calls were conveyed. The positive image of the group was essential to ensuring its proper efficiency.

There were two general types of recruitment appeals identified in both magazines. On the one hand, they were manifested in fragments demanding Muslims conduct hijrah, i.e. to migrate to territories controlled by the Islamic State, which were presented as dar al-Islam. This type of recruitment call was much more visible in the first magazine, Dabiq, which also attached greater importance to discussing events taking place in the core territories seized by Daesh. Multiple examples were noticeable from the very first volume. As mentioned in previous sections, this edition featured a communiqué from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who issued a “call to hijrah.”³⁰⁷ Moreover, he attempted to recruit Muslim specialists, including scholars, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, judges, military members, doctors, engineers, as well as people with experience in administration. He emphasised that their support of ummah is crucial and it is their duty to answer this call: “We call them and remind them to fear Allah for their emigration is wajib’ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the dire need of the Muslims for them.”³⁰⁸ Other volumes followed this pattern and portrayed hijrah, through bandwagon, as an individual obligation of all truthful Muslims. This method of argumentation was sometimes accompanied by references to “deviance” and “corruption” in the “lands of disbelief.” In effect, migration from dar al-harb to dar-al Islam was not only praised but also presented as a means of nullifying the oppression of Muslims. Moreover, it was characterised as the only way to avoid the sin of inhabiting lands where their religion cannot be established. This was visible in Dabiq #7 which stressed:

Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two choices, they either apostatize and adopt the kufri religion propagated by Bush, Obama, Blair, Cameron, Sarkozy, and Hollande in the name of Islam so as to live amongst the kuffar without hardship, or they perform hijrah to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from the crusader governments and citizens.³⁰⁹

A similar stance was present in an article targeting female Muslims in the eighth edition of Dabiq, which described the hardships endured by women performing hijrah.³¹⁰ Symbolically, migration to the Islamic State was even compared to an act of transition and even purification. As the author stressed, their experience was described “as if we leave from darkness to light, from caves of darkness to a welcoming green land. Rather, by Allah, it is as if we are resurrected, from death to life!”³¹¹

In this context, a logical inconsistency in the messages conveyed by Dabiq is noticeable. On the one hand, those who did not react to the demands of migration were labelled hizbiyyin, i.e.,

those masquerading as supporters of the mujahidin – who continue to live under the authority of the murtadd puppets, and of defeatist Muslims who reside in the lands of kufr under the authority of the crusaders […] with no intention of making hijrah to those lands in which the word of Allah is the highest.³¹²

On the other hand, however, the magazine was quite apologetic when it came to capitalising on the actions of Islamic State’s members and followers in Western states. For instance, it explained that Amedy Coulibaly did not conduct hijrah because it would clash with his intent to carry out terrorist attacks in France.³¹³ Thus, his decision not to migrate could be justified by his plans for violent actions in the dar al-harb.

Rumiyah paid much less attention to urging readers to conduct hijrah. While this issue was sometimes brought up, it was usually done on the occasion of debating other topics. Moreover, in these rare cases Internet users were encouraged to choose other destinations than Syria and Iraq. For instance, in his interview Abu ‘Abdillah al-Muhajir, leader of IS in Eastern Asia, demanded for

all Muslims in the world […] to make hijrah to the regions in which the soldiers of the Khilafah are widely present in East Asia, and to do so in support of their brothers and in order to establish their state.³¹⁴

The second type of recruitment appeals identified was much broader and less specific. It consisted of demands of direct enlistment in the Islamic State ranks. Frequently they took the form of orders to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which was based on the legitimisation of his rule over ummah. Among others, the editors utilised transfer based on surah al-Imran 103: “Allah – the Exalted – said, {And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided}.”³¹⁵ Thus, bay’ah to al-Baghdadi was presented as the only way of avoiding divisions among muwahiddin. Another example can be seen in Dabiq #1 which emphasised that “This new condition opens the path for the complete unification of all Muslim peoples and lands under the single authority of the Khilafah.”³¹⁶ This statement was followed by an indicative demand: “The obligation is now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise their voices and pledge their allegiance to Imamul-Muslimin and Amirul-Mu’minin – the Khalifah – Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi.”³¹⁷ This form of demanding allegiance did not change in Rumiyah, although – similarly to calls to hijrah – they were much less frequent when compared to Dabiq. For instance, the “Just Terror Tactics” column, featured in the third edition of this periodical, advised followers who planned to conduct acts of terrorism that “an appropriate way should be determined for announcing one’s allegiance to the Khalifah of the Muslims and the goal of making Allah’s word supreme.”³¹⁸

Sometimes these calls to recruitment were vaguer in form. Among others, they capitalised on the victimhood of Muslims and the artificial division between the “camp of falsehood” and the “camp of iman.” Dabiq #9 cited al-Baghdadi, who noted:

O Muslims everywhere, has the time not come for you to realise the truth of the conflict and that it is between kufr and iman? See on which front the rulers of your lands stand and to which camp they belong. Has the time not come O Ahlus-Sunnah for you to know that you alone are the targets? This war is only against you and against your religion. Has the time not come for you to return to your religion, and your jihad, and thereby bring back your glory, honor, rights and leadership? Has the time not come for you to know that there is no might nor honor nor safety nor rights for you except in the shade of the Khilafah?³¹⁹

Some were even metaphorical in nature, as they argued that readers should “join the caravan of the Islamic State.” This slogan was included in the advertisement banners.³²⁰

Dabiq and Rumiyah, as expected, proved to be similarly interested in encouraging readers to take up arms against the enemies of the “Caliphate” (Table 3.25). The average presence of pages containing calls to violence for Dabiq was 4.2 (6.68% of its average length), in contrast to 3.53 pages (7.79%) of Rumiyah.

Table 3.25 Pages consisting of calls to violence in Dabiq and Rumiyah

Issue | Calls to violence in Dabiq | Calls to violence in Rumiyah
1 | 1 | 9
2 | 0 | 4
3 | 1 | 3
4 | 2 | 5
5 | 4 | 4
6 | 1 | 0
7 | 8 | 1
8 | 3 | 6
9 | 7 | 6
10 | 8 | 2
11 | 6 | 6
12 | 4 | 0
13 | 7 | 0
14 | 6 | –
15 | 5 | –
Average | 4.2 | 3.53

Source: Content analysis.

There were several predominant types of calls to violence identified. All of them were based on and accompanied by previously discussed argumentation indicating that causing harm to kuffar and murtaddin is not only legal but also ethical. Effectively, as the editors stated, such acts ensured one’s places in paradise. First of all, these calls took the form of direct orders issued to Muslims en masse to partake in acts of broadly understood terrorism against certain, designated groups of enemies. The bandwagon device ensured the proper interpretation of these calls, which insisted that Muslims have an obligation to act violently against all enemies of the “Caliphate.” Sometimes they were combined with peculiar metaphors and narratives related to the unity of ummah. This example can be seen in the infamous statements of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, which were included in Dabiq. In the fourth volume, he issued a simple and direct order: “Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him.”³²¹ He encouraged readers to attack the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Germany, the citizens of which should be killed wherever they could be found by the followers of Daesh.³²² Likewise, Rumiyah #9 encouraged masses of Muslims to kill “polytheists,” meaning – in this particular context – “belligerent Christians.” This edition stated that

one should seek closeness to Allah by targeting priests, monks, and others (those who serve as caretakers over the churches of the belligerent Christians, including the Christians of Musr), harming them and killing them, as they are in fact the leaders of kufr and they are the tawaghit who are worshiped besides Allah.³²³

Finally, an interesting example can be spotted in the introduction to the 12th edition of Dabiq, which highlighted terrorist attacks in France. It merged recruitment appeals with incitement to conduct terrorist actions:

So let every such muwahhid barred from hijrah purify himself of the branches of lesser hypocrisy that hold him back from performing jihad in his location. Let him record his will, renew his bay’ah, carry the Khilafah banner, and strike the crusaders and their pagan and apostate allies wherever he can find them, even if he is alone.³²⁴

The second group of calls to violence were much broader and could be interpreted as encouragement to partake in jihad, defined as armed struggle against disbelievers. They were usually founded on the same set of devices and argumentation as above, indicating that jihad is obligatory and that ummah are persecuted by kuffar and murtaddin. The 14th edition of Dabiq, which attacked the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasised that

jihad in this era is an obligation upon each and every Muslim as numerous lands of the Muslims have been usurped by the kuffar and numerous parties of apostasy have arisen therein. Until all these lands are retaken, cleansed of apostates, and ruled by the Shari’ah, the obligation does not drop.³²⁵

Another representative example was included in Dabiq #13 which featured an interview with the wali of the Khurasan province. He called readers to: “Come forth to fight the kuffar, mushrikin, and murtaddin, and to drive out their falsehood, which has committed haughty and gross tyranny in the land.”³²⁶ Similar narrative can be seen in the first edition of Rumiyah, which argued: “It is obligatory on the Muslim to manifest his disbelief in all of these apostates as much as he is able to, with his pen and tongue, and his sword and spear, thereby following the two khalils of Allah.”³²⁷

Finally, Dabiq contained a unique, single call to violence, which was issued by Islamic State’s hostage – James Foley. The third edition of the magazine featured his statement, in which he blamed the United States government for his death, as it “signed” his “death certificate.” This twisted rhetoric was accompanied by a direct message to his relatives and friends. He urged them to rise up against his “real killers, the US government, for what will happen to me is only a result of their complacency and criminality.”³²⁸ Thus, such a sentence could be treated as encouragement to use force against the American political elite and law enforcement. Interestingly, the subsequent edition of Dabiq featured another statement of a hostage – this time of Steven Sotloff. While he blamed the United States for his grave situation, he did not issue a call for action against it.³²⁹

To summarise, while both magazines concentrated on argumentation presenting Salafi Islam as the truth, they remained generally uninterested – with only one exception – in convincing readers to convert to Islam. This confirms that their target group was predominantly composed of Muslims. Surprisingly, direct recruitment appeals proved to be much more common in Dabiq, which also paid greater attention to supporting the statehood and legitimacy of the “Caliphate.” The form of these demands in both magazines was identical and they capitalised on the artificial, positive image of Daesh as a “state.” As for the calls to violence, their frequency and importance in both cases was almost identical. Aside from the aforementioned exception of James Foley’s declaration, they were either very detailed – when they incited acts of terrorism – or vague, if they were related to jihad in a general sense.

Notes

1 Agathe Christien, “The Representation of Youth in the Islamic State’s Propaganda Magazine Dabiq,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, 3 (2016), 2.

2 In order to avoid any problems related to the reliability of this individual research project, two methods were used. On the one hand, the principal investigator consulted the methodology and preliminary findings of this study with experts from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) in Washington D.C., during a research trip to the United States in November and December 2018. On the other hand, a “double check” principle was adopted, which meant that all volumes of Dabiq and Rumiyah were analysed and coded twice. The second round of analysis took place after consultations with MEMRI’s staff.

3 See Julius Yourman, “Propaganda Techniques Within Nazi Germany,” Journal of Educational Sociology 13, 3 (1939), 148–163.

4 See e.g. Oleksiy Khriyenko, “Propaganda Barometer – a Supportive Tool to Improve Media Literacy Towards Building a Critically Thinking Society,” GSTF Journal of Computing 6, no. 1 (2018); Shamsiah Abd Kadir, Ahmad Sauffiyan bin Abu Hasan, “A Content Analysis of Propaganda in Harakah Newspaper,” Journal of Media and Information Warfare 5, (2014).

5 See Moeen Koa, “Techniques of Strategic Political Communication: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Persuasive Devices,” International Journal of Strategic Communication 12, 5 (2018);

Julia E. Wright and Michael Bachmann, “Inciting Criminal Violence: An Examination of Al Qaida’s Persuasive Devices in the Digital World,” Journal of Terrorism Research 6, 2 (2015).

6 J. Michael Sproule, “Authorship and Origins of the Seven Propaganda Devices: A Research Note,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, 1 (2001), 135.

7 The author adopted Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition of propaganda, according to which it is “a form of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” See Garth S. Jowett and Victoria J. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London-New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1999), 1.

8 J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy. The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 135.

9 J. Michael Sproule, “Authorship and Origins of the Seven Propaganda Devices: A Research Note,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, 1 (2001), 136.

10 “How to Detect Propaganda,” Bulletin of American Association of University Professors (1915–1955) 24, 1 (1938), 49–55.

11 Julius Yourman, “Propaganda Techniques Within Nazi Germany,” Journal of Educational Sociology 13, 3 (1939), 153.

12 J. Michael Sproule, “Authorship and Origins of the Seven Propaganda Devices: A Research Note,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, 1 (2001), 136.

13 Ibid., 136.

14 “How to Detect Propaganda,” Bulletin of American Association of University Professors (1915–1955) 24, 1 (1938), 54.

15 See Jan Albert Van Laar, “One-Sided Arguments,” Synthese 154, 2 (2007), 308.

16 Adam Kosseski and Stanisław Kuśmierski, Teoria i praktyka propagandy (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1985), 171–172.

17 Bodo Lang, Christina Kwai-Choi Lee and Rami Zwick, “Message Sidedness at the Brand and Product Form Levels: Overcoming the Shortcomings of Two-Sided Messages?,” Advances in Consumer Research 26, (1999), 485.

18 Stanisław Kuśmierski and Aleksander Frydrychowicz, Podstawy wiedzy o propagandzie (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1980), 157–158.

19 The Hijrah (also transliterated as hegira) was the emigration of the Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina in 622. The term was, however, hijacked by Islamist terrorists who exploited the term (migration) to formulate recruitment calls. See Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili, “Islam and International Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 87, 858 (2005), 279; Artur Ciechanowicz, “Islamic State in Germany, Germans in Islamic State. Germany’s Homegrown Jihadists,” OSW Report, April (2017), 9.

20 Usually directly translated as “oath of allegiance” or “investiture.” According to Elie Podeh it is an act “by which certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognize the authority of another person as the head of a Muslim state.” See Elie Podeh, “The bay’a: Modern Political Uses of Islamic Ritual in the Arab World,” Die Welt des Islams 50, (2010),

21 Literally translated as “call” or “invitation,” it is a manifestation of the Islamic proselytism. See more in Jamal Malik, “Fiqh al-Da’wa: The Emerging Standardization of Islamic Proselytism,” Die Welt des Islams 58, 2 (2018); Todd M. Johnson and David R. Scoggins, “Christian Missions and Islamic Da’wah: A Preliminary Quantitative Assessment,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 29, 1 (2005), 9.

22 It is worth mentioning that the means of legitimising violence exploited by terrorist propaganda have been explored by the academic community for decades. It is an established research problem which should be treated separately from simple calls to action. See Javier Martin-Pena, “The Legitimisation of Political Violence: A Case Study of ETA in the Basque Country,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 17, 2 (2011); The Legitimization of Violence, edited by David E. Apter (Basingstoke, Hampshire, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Raisa Asikainen and Minna Saarnivaara, “Legitimation of Political Violence: The Cases of Hamas and the Khmer Rouge,” Studia Orientalia 101 (2007).

23 See e.g. Lauren Williams, Islamic State Propaganda and Mainstream Media (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2016), 4; Marcin Styszyński, “Jihadi Propaganda During the Military Intervention in Mali,” Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe X, 3 (2013), 230.

24 See J. Michael Sproule, “Authorship and Origins of the Seven Propaganda Devices: A Research Note,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, 1 (2001), 136.

25 Mohamed bin Ali, “Defining the ‘Enemies’ of God: Muslims Extremists Perception of the Religious Other,” Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture 6, 1 (2018), 80.

26 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, 2 (2005), 79.

27 Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 11.

28 Much more frequently they were, however, designated simply as “apostates.”

29 “Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 31.

30 “The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal for You, So Shed It,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 34.

31 “Dismantling a Khariji Cell,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 31.

32 Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 9.

33 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “The Hijrah,” Rumiyah 13, (2017), 31.

34 “Break the Cross,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 51.

35 “Islamic State Operations,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 41.

36 “Shedding Light on the Blessed Operation in Istanbul,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017),15.

37 On the term see e.g.: Emma el-Badawy, Milo Comerford and Peter Welby, Inside the Jihadi Mind. Understanding Ideology and Propaganda (London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017), 32, 42, 75.

38 “The ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah: The Dajjal,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 16.

39 “The Rafidah. From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 34.

40 Ibn Taymiyyah, “A Treatise on Hypocrisy and the Hypocrites,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016), 20.

41 “The Kafir’s Wealth Is Halal for You, So Take It, Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 15.

42 Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, “And Likewise the Messengers Are Afflicted, Then the Final Outcome Is Theirs. Part 2,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 14.

43 Mara Revkin, “The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper, July (2016), 15.

44 And Allah Is the Best of Plotters,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 50–59.

45 “In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 56.

46 Abu Maysarah ash-Shami, “The Qa’idah of Adh-Dhawahiri, Al-Harari, and An-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 21.

47 Muhammad Yaseen Gada, “Rethinking the Impact of the Crusades on the Muslim-Christian Thought and Development,” Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies 5, 2 (2017), 2.

48 Richard L. Rubenstein, Jihad and Genocide (Blue Ridge Summit: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), chap. 1.

49 Gabrielle Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006), 150–155.

50 “Irja, the Most Dangerous Bid’ah (And Its Effect on the Jihad in Sham),” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 42.

51 “The Weakest House Is That of a Spider,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 2.

52 Ibid., 2.

53 “The Rafidah. From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 42.

54 Word frequency analysis took both singular and plural forms into consideration.

55 “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 54.

56 Ibid., 58.

57 See David Welch, The Third Reich Politics and Propaganda (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 82–91.

58 See Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

59 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mujahid al-Faransi,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 45.

60 “Among the Believers Are Men: Hudahayfah al-Battawi,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 40.

61 Ibid., 41.

62 Ibid., 41–42.

63 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 7.

64 “Interview Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 69.

65 “The Shuhada of the Gulshan Attack,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 9.

66 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 12 (2015), 2.

67 “The Good Example of Abu Basir al-Ifriqi,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 71.

68 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “And When the Believers Saw the Confederates,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 21.

69 “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 13.

70 Ibid., 17.

71 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 4.

72 “Ansar al-Islam Pledges Allegiance to the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 22.

73 “Establishing the Islamic State. Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 9.

74 “Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 12.

75 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 7.

76 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mujahid al-Faransi,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 48.

77 Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, “Important Advice for the Mujahidin. Part 1,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 7.

78 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 10.

79 See e.g. Alex P. Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the ‘Islamic State’,” ICCT Research Paper, June (2015), 4.

80 Hani Ahmed Shboul, “Allah’s Political Sovereignty, as “Imagined” by Fundamentalist Muslims, and Its Role in Disapproving Secularism in the Arab World,” International Journal of Asian History, Culture and Tradition 5, 3 (2018), 3.

81 Andrew Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy. Accession and Succession in the First Muslim Empire (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1.

82 Gabrielle Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006), 17.

83 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 7.

84 “The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 5.

85 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “You Will Remember What I Have Told You,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016), 5.

86 See Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335,12.

87 On the term see more in: Muhammad Ahmad, “The Notions of Dar al-Harb and Dar Al-Islam in Islamic Jurisprudence with Special Reference to the Hanafi School,” Islamic Studies 47, 1 (2008), 5–37.

88 Richard L. Rubenstein, Jihad and Genocide (Blue Ridge Summit: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), chap. 1.

89 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 3.

90 Ibid. 3.

91 “The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 11.

92 “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 56.

93 “The Ruling on Ghanimah, Fay, and Ihtitab,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 30.

94 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “You Will Remember What I Have Told You,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016), 14.

95 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “Be Patient, for Indeed the Promise of Allah Is True,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 26.

96 Ibid., 26.

97 Ibid, 28.

98 Abdulrazaq Kilani, “Martyrs or Terrorists: Suicide Bombing in Islamic Hermeneutics,” International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 7, 4 (2015), 102–103.

99 Sadika Kebbi, “The Impact of Prophet Muhammad’s Misconceived Sunnah on the Traditional Muslim’s Lifestyle in Tripoli, Lebanon,” American Academic & Scholarly Research Journal 4, 5 (2012), 2.

100 Gabrielle Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006), 19.

101 David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 14.

102 “Disavowal of the Mushrikin in the Lives of the Prophet and the Sahabah,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 27.

103 “Brutality and Severity Towards the Kuffar,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 22.

104 “Hijrah and Jihad,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 18.

105 “Collateral Carnage,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 6–7.

106 According to Abdelaal, taqlid “means following the established opinions or decision of a certain jurist rather than introducing a new rule or decision by engaging in an individual interpretation (ijtihad). In other words, taqlid means adherence to others’ opinions regarding the question at hand.” See Mohamed A. Abdelaal, “Taqlid v. Ijtihad: The Rise of Taqlid as the Secondary Judicial Approach in Islamic Jurisprudence,” The Journal Jurisprudence 14, (2012), 161.

107 “The Evil of Division and Taqlid,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 11.

108 “Advice on Ihdad,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 24–26.

109 “From Hijrah to Khilafah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 34.

110 “Establishing the Islamic State. Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 6–9.

111 “Establishing the Islamic State. Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants. Part 2,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 11.

112 Ibid., 11.

113 “From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalition,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 46.

114 “The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 9.

115 See Nabil Mouline, Clerics of Islam: Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 1–16.

116 “The Rafidah. From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 43.

117 “Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 10.

118 Ibid., 10.

119 Ibnul-Qayyim, “The Characteristics of the Munafiqin. Part 1,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 26–29.

120 Sulayman ibn ‘Abdillah ibn Muhammad ibn Abdil-Wahhab, “They Took Their Scribes and Monks as Lords Besides Allah,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 22–25.

121 Abu Maysarah ash-Shami, “The Qa’idah of Adh-Dhawahiri, Al-Harari, and An-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 19.

122 Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, “And Likewise the Messengers Are Afflicted, Then the Final Outcome Is Theirs. Part 3,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 9.

123 “Examples of the Sahabah’s Eagerness to Attain Shahadah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 43.

124 “Yayha: Lessons from a Shahid,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 8.

125 Ibid., 8.

126 See Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

127 “Halab Tribal Assemblies,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 13.

128 See e.g. Mark Silinsky, Jihad and the West: Black Flag over Babylon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 1; “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/28/69, 6–7; Escape from Hell. Torture and Sexual Slavery in Islamic State Captivity in Iraq (London: Amnesty International, 2014); Terrence K. Kelly, James Dobbins, Barbara Sude and Ben Connable, Knowing the Enemy. Understanding the Islamic State and Principles for Defeating It (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 11.

129 John Cantlie, “The Paradigm Shift,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 66.

130 John Cantlie, “If I Were the US President Today…,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 37.

131 Ibid. 36.

132 “Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 26.

133 “Either We Exterminate the Mushrikin or Die Trying,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 5.

134 “Foreword,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 4.

135 “Excerpts from ‘Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful’ by the Official Spokesman for the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 6–9.

136 “You Think They Are Together But Their Hearts Are Divided,” Dabiq, 12 (2016), 43.

137 Ibid., 44.

138 “Crimes of Turkey,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 19.

139 “The Weakest House Is That of a Spider,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 2.

140 “The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham: Part II,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 7.

141 “That Allah Should Test Those Who Believe and Destroy the Disbelievers,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 4–5.

142 Ibid., 5.

143 “Know Your Enemy: Who Were the Safawiyyah?” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 12.

144 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 5.

145 “The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham: Part 4,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 7.

146 “The Murtadd Taliban Movement. On the Footsteps of the Iraqi and Shami Sahwat,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 42.

147 Ibid., 43.

148 John Cantlie, “The Anger Factory,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 76–81.

149 John Cantlie, “Meltdown,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 60–61.

150 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 4.

151 “It Will Be a Fire That Burns the Cross and Its People in Raqqah,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 33.

152 “Foley’s Blood Is on Obama’s Hands,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 38.

153 See Jason Brown, Violence against Copts in Egypt (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

154 “The Ruling on the Belligerent Christians,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 7.

155 “Revenge for the Muslimat Persecuted by the Coptic Crusaders of Egypt,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 32.

156 John Cantlie, “Meltdown,” Dabiq, 6 (2015), 58–62.

157 “Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 29.

158 “The ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah: The Dajjal,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 16.

159 “The Rafidah. From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 33.

160 Ibid., 36.

161 On the Sunni-Shia debate on the legality of shrine visitations see: Mohamed Elaskary and Eun Kyeong Yun, “Death, Resurrection, and Shrine Visitations: An Islamic Perspective,” Religions 8, 3 (2017).

162 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 7.

163 Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah, “How I Came to Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 39.

164 See “Heaven and Hell in Christian Thought,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, April 23, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heaven-hell/.

165 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 4.

166 “The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 8.

167 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “Slave-Girls or Prostitutes?,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 48.

168 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 7.

169 “Halab Tribal Assemblies,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 15.

170 “The Flood of the Mubahalah,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 29.

171 “The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 6.

172 “Excerpts From ‘Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful’ By the Official Spokesman for the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 9.

173 “Unifying the Ranks,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 12.

174 “The Shuhada of the Gulshan Attack,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 9.

175 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 11.

176 “Healthcare in the Khilafah,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 25. See also: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “This Is What Allah and His Messenger Promised Us. A Speech by Amirul-Muminin,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 9.

177 “The Qawqazi Caravan Gains Pace,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 37. See also “The Revival of Jihad in Bengal with the Spread of the Light of the Khilafah,” Dabiq, 12 (2016), 41.

178 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 4. See also: “A Message from East Africa,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 3; “Crimes of Turkey,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 19.

179 “Zuhd in the Dunya. Is the Way of the Salaf,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 17–18.

180 “The Female Slaves of Allah in the Houses of Allah,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 36.

181 “Wala and Bara, O Women,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 24.

182 However, not all notions of a “Muslim,” “brother,” or “sister” were manifestations of bandwagon. It has to be stressed that only those which met the definition stated above – including employment of the “follow the crowd” logic – were coded this way.

183 “Wala’ And Bara’ Versus American Racism,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 20.

184 “Unifying the Ranks,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 13.

185 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 11.

186 Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah, “How I Came to Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 36.

187 Umm Musa al-Finlandiyyah, “What They Never Told Me,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 18.

188 John Cantlie, “Hard Talk. The Real Story Behind My Videos,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 52.

189 John Cantlie, “Paradigm Shift,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 65.

190 “The Good Example of Abu Basir al-Ifriqi,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 71.

191 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mujahid al-Faransi,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 51.

192 “Interview with Abu’ Umar al-Baljiki,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 73.

193 “Interview with Abu Muqatil at-Tunusi,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 60.

194 “Interview with the Amir of Hisbah in Sinai,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 12–13.

195 “Interview with Abu Samir al-Urduni,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 71.

196 Ibid., 72.

197 “Interview with Abul-Mughirah al-Qahtani (The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilayat),” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 60.

198 “Interview with Abu’ Umar al-Baljiki,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 73–74.

199 “Interview with the Military Amir of Hims Wilayah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 34–35.

200 “Interview with Abu Muharib as-Sumali,” Dabiq, 12 (2015), 60.

201 “Interview with the Wali of Khurasan,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 54.

202 John Cantlie, “Hard Talk. The Real Story Behind My Videos,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 52–53.

203 Ibid., 52–55.

204 John Cantlie, “If I Were the US President Today…,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 39.

205 Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah, “How I Came to Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 36–39.

206 “The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham,” Dabiq, 8 (2016), 7–11.

207 See e.g. John Cantlie, “The Perfect Storm,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 74–77.

208 See “In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 60.

209 “The Flames of Justice,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 18.

210 “Important Memorandums,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 4.

211 It has to be stressed that while it enabled the detection of major trends in referring to political entities in both magazines, some of the terms counted could be used in a different, non-hostile context, such as the description of places where mujahidin operated.

212 See Aida Arosoaie, “Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda: An Account of Ideologues,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, 7 (2015), 34; Guido Steinberg and Isabelle Werenfels, “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Mediterranean Politics 12, 3 (2007), 407–413.

213 See e.g. Eliane Ettmüller, “The Fight against Jihadist Terrorism: Safeguarding Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights,” in Combating Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe. From Cooperation to Collaboration, edited by Christian Echle, Rohan Gunaratna, Patrick Reuppel, and Megha Sarmah (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ltd., 2018), 83.

214 “From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalition,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 47–48.

215 See e.g. Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West. Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power,” Chatham House Research Paper. Russia and Euroasia Programme, March (2016).

216 Ibid.,

217 Marta Sara Stempień, “Russia in the Eyes of Islamic State: An Analysis of the Content of Dabiq and Rumiyah Magazines and Russia’s Involvement in the Fight against the Islamic State,” Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1657097, 19.

218 “Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 40.

219 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mujahid al-Faransi,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 44.

220 “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 61.

221 “Wilayat Khurasan and the Bay’at From Qawqaz,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 37.

222 “Excerpts From ‘Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful’ By the Official Spokesman for the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 9.

223 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mujahid al-Faransi,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017), 45.

224 “The Allies of Al-Qa’idah in Sham,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 7–11.

225 On AQ-IS rivalry see more in: Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Al Qaeda-Islamic State Rivalry: Competition Yes, But No Competitive Escalation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, 1 (2020).

226 Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “Be Patient, For Indeed the Promise of Allah Is True,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 27.

227 “And Allah Is the Best of Plotters,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 57.

228 “Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 42.

229 “A Mujahid’s Memories From the Battle of Mosul,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017), 10–16.

230 “Irja’ The Most Dangerous Bid’ah (And Its Effect on the Jihad in Sham),” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 53.

231 “And Allah Is the Best of Plotters,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 58.

232 “Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 32–40.

233 Know Your Enemy: Who Were the Safawiyyah?,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 12.

234 “Interview with the Amir of Hisbah in Sinai,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 12–15.

235 “The Twelver Rafidah. From a Nonexistant Imam…To the Leadership of Tawaghit,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 20–26.

236 “Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 39.

237 “Tal Afar Liberated,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 16.

238 Umm Sulaym al-Muhajirah, “The Hijrah,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017), 32.

239 David Cook, “Martyrdom (Shahadah),” Oxford Bibliographies, October 25, 2012, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9,780,195,390,155/obo-9,780,195,390,155-0124.xml.

240 Bernard K. Freamon, “Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History,” Fordham International Law Journal 27, (2003), 307.

241 On the significance of martyrdom in Islam and in Islamist terrorism see: David Cook, “Suicide Attacks or ‘Martyrdom Operations’ in Contemporary Jihad Literature,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6, 1 (2002), 7–44.

242 Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide: A Statistical Analysis of the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Industry,” ICCT Research Paper, February (2017), 24.

243 “The Knights of Shahadah in Belgium,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 6.

244 “Among the Believers Are Men. Abu Jandal al-Bangali,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 50.

245 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Qudamah al-Misri,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 46.

246 It featured a hagiography of one of the masterminds behind the creation of Rumiyah: Abu Sulayman ash-Shami. See “Among the Believers Are Men: Shaykh Abu Sulayman ash-Shami,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 40–45.

247 Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

248 “The Shuhada of the Ghulshan Attack,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016), 8–11.

249 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu ‘Abdillah al-Britani,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 14.

250 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Ja’far al-Almani,” Dabiq, 11 (2015), 38.

251 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Muharib al-Muhajir,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 22.

252 “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu ‘Abdillah al-Canadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Canadi,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 70.

253 “Among the Believers Are Men: Hudhayfah al-Battawi,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 42. See also: “Among the Believers Are Men: Abu Mansur al-Muhajir,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 17.

254 Jonathan Matusitz, “The Communication of Suicide Terrorism,” in Handbook of Suicidal Behaviour, edited by Updesh Kumar (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2017), 162.

255 Hamza Hendawi, Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Bassem Mroue, “Are Shock Troops Who Fight to Death ISIS’ Secret Weapon in Syria and Iraq?,” Haaretz, July 8, 2015, https://www.haaretz.com/are-elite-shock-troops-isis-secret-weapon-1.5375742.

256 Barak Barfi, “The Military Doctrine of the Islamic State and the Limits of Ba’athist Influence,” CTC Sentinel 9, 2 (2016), 21.

257 Ibid., 21.

258 See Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, “Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Attrition in the Islamic State’s Defense of Mosul,” CTC Sentinel 10, 4 (2017), 2.

259 “A Selection of Military Operations Conducted by the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 19.

260 “Islamic State Operations,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 21.

261 “Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 28.

262 See “Yahya: Lessons from a Shahid,” Dabiq, 5 (2014); “Example of the Sahabah’s. Eagerness to Attain Shahadah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

263 “Example of the Sahabah’s. Eagerness to Attain Shahadah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017), 41.

264 Ibid., 40.

265 “From Hijrah to Khilafah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 40.

266 “Responding to the Doubts,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 25.

267 “Stand and Die. Upon That That for Which Your Brothers Died,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 2–3.

268 “Regime Targets Ar-Raqqah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 42. See also: “Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 30; Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, “Be Patient, For Indeed the Promise of Allah Is True,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 30.

269 See Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide: A Statistical Analysis of the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Industry,” ICCT Research Paper, February (2017), 24.

270 See Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

271 “The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal for You, So Shed It,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 34.

272 Ibid., 35.

273 Ibid., 36.

274 “Islam Is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 21.

275 Ibid., 21.

276 See Michael Bonner, Jihad and Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), chap. 4.

277 See, for example: Milan Obaidi, Robin Bergh, Jim Sidanius and Lotte Thomsen, “The Mistreatment of My People: Victimization-by-proxy and Behavioural Intentions to Commit Violence among Muslims in Denmark,” Political Psychology 39, 3 (2018); See Amaryllis Georges, ISIS Rhetoric for the Creation of the Ummah (Abu Dhabi, UAE: TRENDS Research & Advisory, 2015), 6.

278 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 8.

279 Ibid., 9.

280 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 4.

281 “Tal Afar Liberated,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 16.

282 “Foreword,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017), 4.

283 “The Ruling on the Belligerent Christians,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 7.

284 The use of flames as a means of “punishment” should be reserved for Allah alone according to Islamic theologians (fire of Jahannam). See e.g. Jon Hoover, “Islamic Universalism: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Salafi Deliberations on the Duration of Hell-Fire,” The Muslim World 99, 1 (2009), 181–201.

285 “The Burning of a Murtadd Pilot,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 5.

286 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 3.

287 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “The Twin Halves of the Muhajirin,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 32–37.

288 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “They Are Not Lawful Spouses for One Another,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 47.

289 “The Flames of Justice,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 16.

290 Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, “Then the Final Outcome Is Theirs,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 13.

291 “Interview with the Wali of Tarabulus Shaykh Abu Hudhayfah al-Muhajir,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016), 10.

292 Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, “And Likewise the Messengers Are Afflicted, Then the Final Outcome Is Theirs,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017), 22.

293 “Excerpts From ‘Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful’ by the Official Spokesman For The Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 9.

294 See more in Miron Lakomy, “‘One of the Two Good Outcomes’: Turning Defeats into Victories in the Islamic State’s Flagship Magazine Rumiyah,” Terrorism and Political Violence, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1506335.

295 “Collateral Carnage,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017), 7.

296 See more in: Miron Lakomy, “Recruitment and Incitement to Violence in the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Comparative Analysis Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2019.1568008, 10.

297 “Kill the Imams of Kufr,” Dabiq, 13 (2016), 6–8.

298 Abul-Harith ath-Thaghri, “Contemplate the Creation,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 15.

299 “The Response to the Call of the Prophet,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 14–19.

300 Ibid., 19.

301 “The Fitrah of Manking and the Near-Extinction of the Western Women,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 20–25.

302 “Words of Sincere Advice From an American Convert in the Islamic State to the Former Christian Who Accepted Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 26–29.

303 Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah, “How I Came to Islam,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 36–39.

304 “Break the Cross,” Dabiq, 15 (2016), 46–63.

305 Among others, the second issue of the older periodical featured several photo reportages, accompanied with a short description highlighting the statehood ambitions of Daesh. Two of them were related to the Islamic punishment (hadd) – the execution of former shabbihah members and of a woman accused of adultery. See “Hadd for 8 Shabbihah,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 33; “Hadd of Stoning,” Dabiq, 2 (2014), 36.

306 John Cantlie, “The Perfect Storm,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 74.

307 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 11.

308 Ibid., 11.

309 “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 62.

310 Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “The Twin Halves of the Muhajirin,” Dabiq, 8 (2015), 32–33.

311 Ibid., 35.

312 “The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 6.

313 “A Brief Interview with Umm Basir al-Muhajirah,” Dabiq, 7 (2015), 51.

314 “Interview with the Amir of the Soldiers of the Khilafah in East Asia,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017), 37.

315 “Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, 5 (2014), 22.

316 “From Hijrah to Khilafah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 40.

317 Ibid., 40.

318 “Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016), 12.

319 “And Allah Is the Best of Plotters,” Dabiq, 9 (2015), 56.

320 “Join the Caravan of Islamic State,” Dabiq, 10 (2015), 5; “Selected 10,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 9.

321 “Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 44.

322 Ibid., 44.

323 “The Ruling on the Belligerent Christians,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017), 8.

324 “Foreword,” Dabiq, 12 (2015), 3.

325 “The Murtadd Brotherhood,” Dabiq, 14 (2016), 36.

326 “Interview with the Wali of Khurasan,” Dabiq, 13, (2016), 54.

327 “The Religion of Islam and the Jama’ah of the Muslim,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016), 6.

328 “Foley’s Blood Is on Obama’s Hands,” Dabiq, 3 (2014), 40.

329 “A Message from Sotloff to His Mother Days Before His Execution,” Dabiq, 4 (2014), 48.

Conclusions

The series of astonishing military achievements of the Islamic State on the battlefields of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere, combined with brutal terrorist attacks and a unique propaganda campaign in cyberspace initiated in 2014 led to a new “trademark” in the world of Islamic terrorism to be created. As Silinsky accurately noted, “it replaced al Qaeda as the most attractive brand of Islamic extremism.”¹ This notorious image which proved to be alluring for many radicalised Muslims, was usually associated with a plethora of advanced productions from its central media bureaus, including, predominantly, gruesome execution videos, dynamic battle footage, and catchy anashids.² The “shock and awe” campaign of Daesh on the Web would be, however, flawed if not supported by online magazines and bulletins, which were dedicated to reaching more demanding types of audiences that sought to find a deeper “rationale” behind the Salafi-jihadi ideology. Initially, the group experimented with the al-Naba newspaper, which was created mostly for “internal” use. Despite its simplistic form, over time, it proved to be the only official periodical that survived the fall of the Islamic State as a territorial organisation. It was also one of the most important instruments for conveying condensed information and statements on the achievements of Daesh to Arabic-speaking Internet users. In mid-2014, it was followed by two “experimental” e-periodicals that were dedicated to influencing Anglophone audiences: Islamic State News and Islamic State Report. They proved to be somewhat crude, both in form and content, but constituted an opportunity to gain the experience required to kickstart more sophisticated projects and mark IS’s presence on the English-speaking Internet.

Shortly after, the al-Hayat Media Center followed in the footsteps of al-Qaeda’s Inspire by launching its first flagship magazine, Dabiq,³ which corresponded with the proclamation of the “Caliphate.” It constituted a major breakthrough in IS’s online propaganda campaign, as it was the first attempt to provide Internet users with a publication series of technical quality that met the standards of Western publishing houses. Additionally, its overall style and layout constantly improved. Dabiq was adapted to its audience, which was more resistant to or disinterested in action-packed and condensed means of messaging utilised by IS’s audiovisual and visual propaganda. This particular reason was even confirmed by the editors themselves in the introduction to the first issue, which stated:

After a review of some of the comments received on the first issues of Islamic State News and Islamic State Report, AlHayat Media Center decided to carry on the effort – in sha’allah – into a periodical magazine focusing on issues of tawhid, manhaj, hijrah, jihad, and jama’ah.⁴

This meant that its ambition was to deliberate on the very core and foundations of the Islamic State’s ideology.

Dabiq emerged as one of the key tools of digital jihad of Daesh, as it was not only read by some Anglophone Muslims, constituting the most important target group of this magazine, but was also closely followed by international public opinion, which frequently discussed the content of its editions.⁵ It is, therefore, not a surprise that the ambitions of the al-Hayat Media Center increased. It decided to launch three offspring e-periodicals dedicated to reaching Francophone (Dar al-Islam), Russian-speaking (Istok), and Turkish (Konstantiniyye) Internet users. While they all played a similar role of channelling Islamic State’s propaganda towards groups of special interest to its agenda, their overall quality varied. Istok proved to be quite simple in form, but Dar al-Islam and Konstantiniyye were much more advanced. All of them, however, conveyed messages which were generally in line with the core narratives employed by the editorial staff of Dabiq. Frequently they also reused articles previously exploited by this flagship periodical. Probably as a result of casualties among IS’s media operatives and the accelerating downfall of the group, combined with the US cyber operation against its electronic assets, they were all replaced by Rumiyah. Its resonance, as a mouthpiece of the Islamic State’s media bureaus on the Internet remained generally unchanged but only for a year. The release of the last, 13th volume of this flagship magazine in September 2017 meant that the group lost its most capable tool of written propaganda. To summarise, since the advent of its online campaign in 2014, the Islamic State’s central media bureaus spawned eight e-periodicals, which were dedicated to reaching both universal and more specific types of audiences. They proved to be, however, quite ephemeral in nature, as seven of them disappeared between 2014–2017. This gap has never been properly filled. While the online presence of Daesh was always accompanied by some unofficial pieces of written propaganda, since the fall of Rumiyah some groups of supporters have undertaken serious attempts at replacing al-Hayat’s publication series with their own dedicated electronic periodicals. Some of them (From Dabiq to Rome or Youth of the Caliphate), while still quite amateurish, proved to be surprisingly competent at imitating the content and messages conveyed by the official magazines. Nevertheless, they still failed to attract similar levels of attention from the international public.

From this perspective, Dabiq and Rumiyah were the most successful in terms of drawing the interest of Internet users, the mass media, law enforcement, and the academic community. In addition, they also set trends in terms of techniques of manipulating readers that were followed by other productions. Therefore, knowledge of the means and methods utilised by their editors to influence Internet audiences is crucial not only for moving forward the scientific debate on the phenomenon of the “virtual Caliphate” but also for the design of proper counter-radicalisation initiatives by governments and law enforcement agencies worldwide. This was the key reason why this research project predominantly focused on Dabiq and Rumiyah. The analysis conducted in this book allows several conclusions to be drawn.

First of all, this study compared the topics exploited by both magazines (Table 4.1), which enables changes in the priorities of the online propaganda between 2014 and 2017 to be pinpointed. It discovered that Dabiq and Rumiyah remained similarly focused on religion-related issues, which is natural considering the ideology of Daesh. Their editors paid great attention to convincing readers that violent jihad against disbelievers, as well as other Salafi concepts (e.g. takfir), are perfectly legitimate and also to heavily criticising other religions and non-Sunni branches of Islam. They also frequently featured articles related to religious customs which should be followed by “truthful” members of the Muslim society under shari’ah rule. Both magazines were also focused on highlighting Islamic State’s operations, which was a means of building its triumphant image, which was an important factor that facilitated recruitment; this generally stands in line with the findings of Droogan and Peattie’s study.⁶ However, in contrast to Dabiq, which lacked dedicated instructional materials, Rumiyah paid greater attention to educating readers on the means of organising and conducting terrorist attacks. This indicates that greater importance was attached to preparing readers to conduct home-grown terrorist attacks from 2016. As for politics, this theme proved to be crucial in the content of Dabiq which dedicated a huge part of its articles to distorting the political reality surrounding the Islamic State, attacking the anti-IS coalition, and criticising the political elite in Muslim states as well as rival jihadi factions. Surprisingly, Rumiyah followed a different path and manifested a general lack of interest in discussing such topics. Obviously, texts related to these issues were sometimes included but to a much lesser extent, especially when it comes to “jihadi claimants” and Shia Muslim factions, which were key targets of the political rants included in the first flagship magazine. Moreover, differences are also noticeable in fragments debating topics of social importance. While these pieces were quite frequent in Dabiq, Rumiyah did not attach particular attention to the formation of a “perfect” Muslim society. In both cases, economics proved to be of marginal importance. In effect, the first periodical was much more deliberate and offered readers a comprehensive worldview, composed of political deliberations including international affairs, pieces of quasi-theological nature, and news on the triumphs of Daesh, topped off with articles outlining the appropriate form of a Muslim family, based on shari’ah rules. This confirms the findings of Christien who argued that this magazine “offers a microcosm of IS’s propaganda pieces.”⁷ In contrast, Rumiyah merged a more practical inclination, manifested by a focus on military and terrorist operations, with a plethora of religious-themed articles. This conclusion stands in line with the opinion of Azman who noted that the emergence of this magazine marked a shift in the priorities of the propaganda of Daesh, as “from a state-building entity in Iraq and Syria, IS has now focused more on terrorist operations.”⁸ Additionally, the latter publication lacked apocalyptical narrative, which was visible by the change of its title. However, as Wignell et al. noticed, with this strategic shift, the editors focused on the “eventual conquest of Rome, which does not have a date attached to it and can therefore happen at any indefinite time in the future.”⁹

Table 4.1 Comparison of core themes discussed by Dabiq and Rumiyah (average page count)

| Politics | Operations | Religion | Society | Economics | Other
Average for Dabiq | 28.13 | 22.33 | 28.73 | 7.33 | 0.86 | 7,8
Average for Rumiyah | 9.07 | 24.69 | 26.38 | 2.38 | 0.84 | 6

Source: Content analysis.

The study discovered two interesting tendencies when it comes to the types of argumentation employed by the magazines’ editors. On the one hand, simpler, one-sided messages constituted the majority of the content of both periodicals. This means that, in theory, these publications should be less alluring and convincing for well-educated readers. This is even more evident when considering the fact that many of the two-sided messages, which provided the pros and cons of an issue discussed by the editors, in fact clearly and obviously leaned towards the pro-Daesh perspective. On the other hand, however, two-sided messages were much more frequent in Dabiq. This means that, by definition, it employed more sophisticated argumentation than Rumiyah. Thus, Dabiq not only provided a more deliberate worldview, but also its means of persuading readers about its validity were slightly more thoughtful.

From the quantitative perspective, the magazines proved to be permeated with all manner of propaganda devices, with the exception of plain folks (Table 4.2). Transfer constituted the most common method in both publications. Considering the nature of the Islamic State’s ideology this finding is unsurprising, as Daesh was similar to other Salafi-jihadi terrorist organisations that customarily attempt to provide the reasoning behind their actions through the exploitation of authorities in Islam. As Wignell et al. noted, “scripture is consistently behind all the arguments used by ISIS to justify what they do.”¹⁰ In fact, to be precise not only the scripture itself was behind these arguments but the authority of its author (according to Islamic theology, Allah) and protagonists (the Prophet Mohammad and other prophets) as well. Sometimes, if a suitable fragment could not be found in the Quran and hadiths, works of Islamic scholars were used instead.

Table 4.2 Comparison of propaganda devices exploited in Dabiq and Rumiyah (average page count)

| Name-calling | Glittering generalities | Transfer | Testimonial | Plain folks | Card stacking | Bandwagon
Average for Dabiq | 47.13 | 20.06 | 40.6 | 9 | 1 | 12.2 | 11
Average for Rumiyah | 33.69 | 18.15 | 34.84 | 3.38 | 0.15 | 3.76 | 6

Source: Content analysis.

The second most common means of propaganda was name-calling. The editors of Dabiq and Rumiyah manifested extraordinary interest in attaching negative labels to the “enemies” of the Islamic State, both those who were part of the Muslim world (“apostates”), as well as disbelievers from outside of traditionally Islamic areas. However, it was surprising to note that glittering generalities, the third most common device, proved to be almost twice as rare as name-calling. It suggests that, while the magazines were very interested in creating a positive image of the group, its actions, ideology, and members, denouncing the “enemies of Islam” was still prioritised.

Other propaganda devices were less common and there are some visible differences between both periodicals in terms of their frequency. Testimonial played an important role in Dabiq, but it was quite rarely used in Rumiyah. This was mostly caused by the fact that more sophisticated types of testimonies, in the form of memoirs and articles written in the first person that enabled readers to become acquainted with the reasoning of a propagandist were almost non-existent in the latter. Interviews which were less personal and appealing in nature were, however, still present. Moreover, while the magazines were permeated with over-emphasis of topics which were important for the group’s agenda and usually did not mention more problematic issues, the distortion of reality, defined as verifiable lies, proved to be less common than initially expected. Once again, however, untruths related to political, economic, social, or religious affairs proved to be much more frequent in Dabiq. This was partially caused by the fact that Rumiyah was less concentrated on discussing political affairs, which was usually accompanied by serious lies, including false statements on cooperation and partnership between “hostiles,” such as the United States, al-Qaeda, and Iran. Appeals to the common identity of Muslims, which was a manifestation of bandwagon, proved to be quite common. This device was slightly more frequent in Dabiq, but overall the editors of both publications emphasised that members of ummah have certain obligations towards the Khalifah due to their religious identity. Finally, there were only a few cases of aforementioned plain folks, as it stood in direct opposition with the dominating trend of using glittering generalities to create an artificial and positive image of mujahidin.

All these devices combined together constituted a carefully thought-out constellation of mutually reinforcing messages that aimed to manipulate users into following the Islamic State’s agenda. The first and probably most important message insisted that this organisation faces a wide alliance of enemies, labelled as the “camp of falsehood” or “camp of kufr,” representing a collection of the worst imaginable traits of humankind. Despite the varying political, ethnic, and religious identity of its members, the magazines insisted that they were all victims of a worldwide conspiracy of “sinners” which aimed to destroy pure Islam and its “true” representatives. A huge spectrum of “bad words,” including kuffar, “crusaders,” murtaddin, tawaghit, mushrikin, munafiqin, “deviance,” “corruption” and “impurity,” combined with card-stacking and transfer, were used to support this narrative. They all served the purpose of presenting hostiles in a degrading way, as human beings of inferior value which are detested by Allah and should be hated, without remorse, by “truthful” believers. The editors elaborated sophisticated yet antagonistic narratives,¹¹ which incited and consequentially exploited the negative emotions of readers towards “infidels” of all kinds, with the greatest emphasis placed on fear and hate. This finding partially stands in line with the conclusions of Lorenzo-Dus and Macdonald, who argued that Dabiq was founded on homogenisation, stereotyping, and pejoration strategies employed to create a negative image of the “West.”¹² However, it has to be stressed that the same tools were employed to criticise not only the West but also other groups, such as Muslim “apostates.” Effectively, if a person, group, faction, or state did not support IS’s radical ideology, it was automatically designated as an enemy.

The artificial vision of this “camp” of enemies was created through the use of ambiguous negative labels, which could be misinterpreted by readers. In order to avoid this risk, such a narrative was frequently accompanied by statements connecting these “bad words” with real factions and states, constituting either “near” or “far enemies.” In this context, there is a surprising difference between both flagship magazines, as Dabiq proved to be more inclined to do this, when compared to Rumiyah. This may have been caused by the aforementioned fact that politics did not constitute a central theme in the content of the latter. Moreover, the word frequency analysis indicated that the first periodical was keener to criticise “near enemies” than “far enemies” – with the exception of the United States, which was customarily depicted as the head of the international conspiracy against Islam. Priority was given to attacking rival radical Islamist factions – al-Qaeda and its branches, the Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood – as well as Shia actors, including, predominantly, Iran. The second magazine was still interested in denouncing the Iraqi and Syrian governments, as well as the United States, but it concentrated much less on al-Qaeda, the Free Syrian Army, and Iran. This change could be a result of the crisis facing the Islamic State, meaning that its ambitions had to be narrowed down to attack only those enemies considered to be crucial for the group’s strategic situation. This does not explain, however, why attacks against Kurds were so infrequent in its content.

This message corresponded closely with a second one, founded on the combination of glittering generalities, card-stacking, and transfer, which argued that the Islamic State is the embodiment of “truth” and the emanation of “justice.” These key “virtue words” permeated the content of both magazines. Not just Islam in its radical Salafi interpretation was presented as the “truth,” but also the “Caliphate,” as well as its “prophetic methodology.” The latter was advertised in a multitude of texts in order to convince readers that IS is the only organisation on Earth that has been sanctioned by Allah, strictly follows its commandments, and carries the standard of shari’ah of the Golden Era of Islam. This also meant that all its actions brought justice and dignity to oppressed members of ummah. Therefore, the Islamic State constituted the only representant of the “camp of iman” or the “camp of truth,” aligned with the will of God on Earth. This narrative was frequently accompanied by bandwagon, indicating that all Muslims are obliged to support Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as his organisation is the only safeguard for the wellbeing of believers. Therefore, its betrayal was equal to an act of apostasy which explains the intensity of the use of the name-calling device in relation to Muslim societies.

These two messages combined constituted a third one. Dabiq and Rumiyah argued that the world is composed of only two camps, with no third in between: the aforementioned “camp of truth,” represented by the Islamic State, and the deviant “camp of disbelief,” consisting of the rest. This dichotomic, black-and-white worldview forced readers to make a choice which affected their religious identity, safety, and even their afterlife, as neutrality was not an option. Siding with the Islamic State, according to this narration, allowed the individual to fulfil the commandments of Allah, preserve the unity of ummah, and become a “true” believer. Many articles attempted to persuade readers that the only path to salvation lies in support of the Islamic State. Thus, in a certain sense, the magazine exploited fear of damnation to recruit followers. In contrast, indifference towards jihad or scepticism towards the Islamic State granted membership in the “camp of shirk.” This meant that literally all people recognised by Daesh as enemies automatically constituted a legitimate target, as they were enemies of Allah himself. In this context, Greene was right to stress that Dabiq reinforced “ISIS’s vision of a world with no moral ‘gray zone’ or ‘freedom of choice’ in the realm of religion.”¹³ In fact, it was not only the realm of religion, but also of politics, society and even economics.¹⁴ The concept of wala and bara, intensively promoted by these magazines, indicated that truthful Muslims have to reject all signs of sin and disbelief, even if present among their closest family members. Overall, this tendency visibly corresponded with the aforementioned inclination to highlight the imminent Apocalypse. During the “End Times” humanity should be divided into two war-waging camps, one being a representation of Islam and the second of Christendom. Therefore, this direct contrast between the “camp of falsehood” and the “camp of faith” could be compared to the final clash between the forces of “good” and “evil” during the “Hour,” when IS would obviously play a positive role. This stands in line with the findings of Ingram, who argued in his analysis of Dabiq that its issues “plunge […] readers into a bi-polar world, characterized by cosmic war and on the verge of End Times, that demands Sunnis choose between the forces of good or evil.”¹⁵ However, due to the aforementioned lack of Apocalypse-driven articles, this type of messaging was much more shallow in Rumiyah.

While the first three messages aimed to influence the general worldview of readers in matters of philosophy of life, religion, and the overall perception of political and social affairs, the fourth was qualitatively different. It was more practical in nature, as it set out the statehood ambitions of the “Caliphate.”¹⁶ Dabiq, and sometimes also Rumiyah, utilised card-stacking, glittering generalities, testimonial, and bandwagon to create an artificial image of the organisation as a political entity, which was the natural home for all Muslims. This intent was especially visible in the content of the early (2014–2015) editions of the first magazine. Editors simply argued that the Islamic State, due to the positive traits mentioned above, is the embodiment of dar al-Islam. Through bandwagon, they demanded that Muslims worldwide migrate to its territories as it was their obligation. This was supported by testimonial and glittering generalities, conveying personal thoughts, experiences, and emotions, indicating that hijrah towards the “Caliphate” is a “dream come true.” It was frequently depicted as a major breakthrough in life, a transition “from darkness to enlightenment.” Moreover, the magazines frequently distorted, or to be more precise, whitewashed the grim reality of relations between its administration and its “citizens.” In this context, the editors argued that only in a “state for all Muslims,” may members of ummah seek refuge from the hardships endured elsewhere. This was due to the fact that the Islamic State was highly efficient at massacring members of the “camp of kufr.” Thus, creating its triumphant image served as a means of encouraging readers to embark on a difficult journey to the Middle East. In this context, Ingram was right when stating that “Pragmatic factors – like security, stability and livelihood – are drawn upon in communiques that are designed to promote ISIS’s politico-military efforts […] This messaging is designed to convince audiences of ISIS’s credibility and legitimacy as opposed to that of their enemies.”¹⁷

The fifth message was focused on profiles of the Islamic State’s members and followers and was also more practical in nature.¹⁸ The “camp of truth” must be composed of the best of humankind. Thus, both magazines bombarded readers with praise, mostly based on glittering generalities, which highlighted the “honour,” “dedication” and “courage” of mujahidin. They were frequently compared to “lions” and “knights,” which indirectly capitalised on common – and positive – stereotypes related to these terms. Through the transfer device they were presented as being akin to the companions of the Prophet – Sahabah – and therefore constituting pinnacles of virtue.¹⁹ In other words, detailed description of their positive traits, usually difficult but honourable background and “glorious” achievements served the purpose of designating “good guys,” i.e. role-models. Therefore, through bandwagon, editors demanded that readers follow in their footsteps.

It is important to note that not only living mujahidin were presented this way. The exploitation of these propaganda devices was also employed to create extremely positive profiles of martyrs. From the seventh issue of Dabiq, its editors were keen to provide readers with hagiographies of shuhada, that “proved” their dedication to fighting the infidels and defending Islam. Numerous “virtue words” were used to praise their characters and actions, which were usually discussed in detail. According to both magazines, their shahada constituted proof of iman (faith), zeal, and courage. These “flawless” profiles of dead militants were used to provide readers with prominent examples to follow and also to issue calls to action through appeals to identity (bandwagon). Finally, the very act of martyrdom was also promoted and depicted as the simplest way to paradise. In effect, martyrs were portrayed as elite among the ranks of Daesh and as people “chosen” by Allah.

The sixth message was basically a manifestation of damage control. Both directly and indirectly, the editors indicated that while the Islamic State is blessed by Allah (transfer), nothing bad can happen to its followers. Such statements used quite peculiar logic, as even death on the battlefield or during terrorist operation could be interpreted as a huge achievement, which was related to the aforementioned interest in promoting martyrdom. This tendency was symbolically manifested by the slogan: “one of the two good outcomes.” This meant that mujahidin are always successful, as either they will achieve victories on the battlefield or they will die trying, effectively attaining eternal life and pleasures in the highest levels of Jannah. In this context, featuring martyrs was also useful for arguing that the group did not experience any morale problems among its ranks, as it allegedly had a constant inflow of “willing” militants for istishhadi and inghimasi operations. Moreover, as mentioned above, Dabiq and Rumiyah conveyed lies regarding IS’s internal and external situation in order to highlight topics which were beneficial for the group’s agenda. This attitude was especially visible in Rumiyah, which frequently used such tools to downplay its worsening military situation in Syria and Iraq.

The final message was related to legitimisation of violence. Islamic State’s agenda was presented as a combination of offensive and defensive postures. To begin with, editors frequently reached out to the traditional “victimhood card.” They argued that Muslims had for ages suffered from subjugation to “crusaders,” “apostates” and tawaghit. Both Dabiq and Rumiyah, which paid quite a similar level of attention to this theme, distorted the reality surrounding ummah to describe alleged crimes committed against its civilian population. Great emphasis was especially given to hardships endured by Muslim children, women, and the elderly, who constituted innocent non-belligerents. Sometimes such narratives were also supported by testimonials, providing readers with first-hand emotions, and by name-calling. This “victimhood” aimed to incite anger amongst readers due to the suffering of muwahiddin both in dar al-Islam (defined traditionally) and dar al-harb. This, in turn, allowed the actions of the Islamic State to be presented as revenge and a means of ensuring the safety and dignity of all Muslims. Secondly, transfer was customarily utilised to back up argumentation indicating that violent jihad is the best way to attain salvation. Many fragments of hadiths and the Quran were used for this purpose. This corresponded with using name-calling to denounce and stigmatise the “enemies of Allah.” The editors argued that harming them is not only halal but it is a way of making the world better, bereft of “corruption” and “deviance.” In other words, disbelievers were presented in a humiliating way, which was reminiscent of propaganda accompanying various instances of genocide from the past. For example, one can mention Nazi hate speech, which targeted non-Aryan populations (Untermenschen).²⁰ The Third German Reich’s propaganda machine traditionally labelled them “enemies,” “aliens,” and “parasites,” which were responsible for “degeneration.”²¹ Furthermore, a similar attitude may be spotted in the Ten Commandments of Hutu that laid the foundations for the mass killings in Rwanda in 1994.²² Among others, it argued that Tutsis are “dishonest” and that “Hutu daughters are more worthy” when compared to Tutsis.²³ IS employed identical tools, which is significant when considering the fact that this organisation is responsible for mass ethnic and religious cleansings in Syria and Iraq. This kind of rhetoric was also strengthened by the aforementioned apocalyptical narrative. Dabiq argued that it is Islamic State’s destiny to confront all the other “nations” on Earth during the approaching al-Malhama al-Kubra. This effectively meant that it was the “Caliphate’s” role to fight against kuffar, as long-lasting peace between both “camps” is impossible. Thus, in a certain sense, even if “crusaders” were not responsible for harming Muslims and were not “polytheists,” they would still constitute a legitimate target, as Islam should eventually prevail and rule over the entire world. Finally, war against disbelievers was supported by appeals to the common identity of Muslims, indicating that only “truthful” believers engage in violent jihad.

All these messages combined provided readers with a complete but biased system of meaning, a worldview predominantly based on a wide spectrum of dichotomies, such as good vs. bad, black vs. white, darkness vs. enlightenment, worldly life (dunya) vs. the hereafter, crimes vs. justice, weak vs. strong, corruption vs. morality, lies vs. truth, and hypocrisy vs. zeal. This served the purpose of reinforcing direct calls to action, which were quite frequently issued by the editors of both magazines. Calls to conversion, which were analysed by this study, proved to be of marginal importance. With the exception of the 15th issue of Dabiq, the editors did not design narratives which attempted to make their readers convert to Islam. On the one hand, this confirms that the flagship magazines predominantly targeted Anglophone Muslims. On the other, these propaganda devices rather aimed to encourage them into “repenting,” defined as choosing the right attitude towards violent jihad and shari’ah. In contrast, direct calls to recruitment and calls to violence (jihad) were frequently featured. However, the latter, as Hegghammer and Nasser accurately argued, were “exactly that: a call addressed to sympathizers out there, not a commitment of the organization’s resources to future attacks.”²⁴ In a certain sense, both were interconnected, as carrying out terrorist attacks against disbelievers or joining the armed struggle against “crusaders” had to be preceded, as the editors insisted, by bay’ah. This does not necessarily mean that those who pledge allegiance have to join the organisation itself. Such an attitude enabled IS to remain flexible and appeal to those who remain in the dar al-harb and seek to conduct acts of lone-wolf terrorism.

In this context, Springer et al. listed three major inducements used by Islamist terrorist organisations for the purpose of recruitment: the appeal of religion, the call to battle and the lure of conspiracy. The first, as they argued, was based on piety and the willingness of devout Muslims to participate in jihad, which was depicted as a religious duty. The second was founded on the idea that Islam should dominate the world and that the caliphate should be restored. This was also related to narratives indicating that there is a danger to their vision of the Muslim world. Finally, the lure of conspiracy was used in areas where there were no military conflicts or the general population was critical towards the group’s radical agenda.²⁵ Two of these inducements, i.e. the appeal of religion (jihad as a religious obligation) and call to battle (restoration of the Caliphate, apocalyptic narrative, black-and-white worldview) may be easily seen in the flagship magazines of the Islamic State. Only the lure of conspiracy was not exploited by their editors. This was possibly caused by the fact that they attempted to portray the organisation as a legitimate state, and not as an ordinary group of terrorists acting “behind enemy lines.”

To summarise, the flagship magazines proved be quite an important phenomenon in the Islamic State’s propaganda that allowed this terrorist organisation to convey a distorted but also conscientious, in a certain sense, vision of the world, adapted to the cultural background of the target online audience. Dabiq and Rumiyah were different in many aspects, but their overall function and modus operandi in influencing readers remained relatively similar. They predominantly exploited visible dichotomies, created through name-calling and glittering generalities, topped off with narratives exploiting religious authorities of Islam and appeals to common Muslim identity, as well as lies, which allowed them to spin difficult topics for the benefit of the Salafi-jihadi agenda. In other words, these techniques constituted an important means of strategic messaging for the “Caliphate,” allowing a carefully considered, but deeply untrue vision of the world to be created, which served the final purpose of influencing members and potential followers of the organisation.

Notes

1 Mark Silinsky, Jihad and the West: Black Flag over Babylon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 3.

2 See e.g. Mark D. Robinson and Cori E. Dauber, “Grading the Quality of ISIS Videos: A Metric for Assessing the Technical Sophistication of Digital Video Propaganda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, 1–2; Cori E. Dauber, Mark D. Robinson, Jovan J. Baslious and Austin G. Blair, “Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif Has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, 3; Henrik Gråtrud, “Islamic State Nasheeds As Messaging Tools,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, 12 (2016); Jonathan Pieslak and Nelly Lahoud, “The Anashid of the Islamic State: Influence, History, Text, and Sound,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1457420.

3 While similarly advanced in overall format to many recognised Western magazines, both periodicals bore signs of certain differences. According to Vergani’s and Bliuc’s study, conducted from the viewpoint of the psychological dimension of communication, Dabiq manifested greater attention attached to authoritarianism and religiousness when compared to AQAP’s magazine. In this perspective, Lister was right to perceive it as “another element of competition with al-Qaeda.” See Matteo Vergani and Ana-Maria Bliuc, “The Language of New Terrorism: Differences in Psychological Dimensions of Communication in Dabiq and Inspire,” Journal of Language and Social Psychology 37, 5 (2018); Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 241.

4 “Introduction,” Dabiq, 1 (2014), 3.

5 See e.g. James Denselow, “Syria: Dabiq and ISIL’s End of times,” Al Jazeera, 17.10.2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/10/syria-dabiq-isil-times-161,017,052,013,796.html.

6 Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie, “Mapping the Thematic Landscape of Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, 6 (2017).

7 Agathe Christien, “The Representation of Youth in the Islamic State’s Propaganda Magazine Dabiq,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, 3 (2016), 2.

8 Nur Aziemah Azman, “‘Islamic State’ (IS) Propaganda: Dabiq and Future Directions of ‘Islamic State’,” A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 8, 10 (2016), 7.

9 Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017), 18.

10 Ibid., 17.

11 This marked an “intolerant” approach adopted by editors, which was noticed by Wignell et al. See Peter Wignell et al., “A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 2 (2017), 18.

12 Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Stuart Macdonald, “Othering the West in the Online Jihadist Propaganda Magazines Inspire and Dabiq,” Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict 6, 1 (2018).

13 Kyle J. Greene, “ISIS: Trends in Terrorist Media and Propaganda,” International Studies Capstone Research Papers, 4–24 (2015), 23.

14 This has been already noticed by Macdonald et al., who argued that there is no purported distinction between religion and politics in the jihadi magazines. See Stuart Macdonald, Nyasha Maravanyika, David Nezri, Elliot Perry and Kate Thomas, “Online Jihadist Magazines and the ‘Religious Terrorism’ Thesis,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11, 3 (2018).

15 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, 3 (2016), 17.

16 Kibble accurately noticed that the establishment of the Islamic State was presented in Dabiq as “the duty of a Muslim.” See David G. Kibble, “Dabiq, the Islamic State’s Magazine: A Critical Analysis,” Middle East Policy 23, 3 (2016), 133.

17 Haroro J. Ingram, Learning from ISIS’s Virtual Propaganda War for Western Muslims: A Comparison of Inspire and Dabiq (Hague: ICCT, 2017), 2.

18 According to Macdonald and Lorenzo-Dus, Islamist terrorist magazines are usually focused on images of non-leader jihadis. See Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Stuart Macdonald, “Visual Jihad: Constructing the ‘Good Muslim’ in Online Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1559508.

19 The attitude of the editors of highlighting the heroism of IS militants was noticed by Welch. See Tyler Welch, “Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 11, 3 (2018).

20 David Welch, The Third Reich. Politics and Propaganda (Routledge: London and New York, 1993), 83, 130, 134.

21 “State of Deception. The Power of Nazi Propaganda,” United Nations Holocaust Remembrance, https://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/EM/pdf/State%20of%20Deception%20The%20Power%20of%20Nazi%20Propaganda.pdf.

22 See Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37, 2 (1999), 265.

23 “The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ published in Kangura, No. 6 (December 1990),” Uwosh.edu, http://www.uwosh.edu/faculty_staff/henson/188/rwanda_kangura_ten.html.

24 Thomas Hedgehammer and Petter Nasser, “Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), 16.

25 Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 143–148.

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“Collateral Carnage,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“Command Is for Allah,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“Comment connaitre la vérité,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Communiqué du Walî de la région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Community Shows Support for Hadd,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

“Congratulating the Taghut Erdogan on Winning the Elections,” From Dabiq to Rome, 17 (2018).

“Content,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“Content,” Dabiq, 2 (2014).

“Contents,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017).

“Crimes of Turkey,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“Dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“De là où ils ne s’y attendent pas,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016).

“Deux, trois ou quatre,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“Disavowal of the Mushrikin in the Lives of the Prophet and the Sahabah,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017).

“Dismantling a Khariji Cell,” Dabiq, 6 (2015).

“Éditorial,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Éditorial,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“Editorial-Removing the Misconception: A House Divided?,” From Dabiq to Rome, 25 (2018).

“Either We Exterminate the Mushrikin or Die Trying,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017).

“Enter Upon Them Through the Gates,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

“Erdoğan’ in Kürt ‘Devleti’,” Konstantiniyye, 2 (2015).

“Esir TSK Askerinden Türikiye’ye Mesaj,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016).

“Establishing the Islamic State. Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017).

“Establishing the Islamic State. Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants. Part 2,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017).

“Et préparez contre eux tout ce que vous pouvez comme force,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Example of the Sahabah’s Eagerness to Attain Shahadah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

“Excerpts from ‘Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful’ by the Official Spokesman for the Islamic State,” Dabiq, 4 (2014).

“Farmers Reap the Rewards of Their Harvest by Giving Zakah,” Islamic State Report, 2 (2014).

“Femmes de martyr. Conseils et règles,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Foley’s Blood Is on Obama’s Hands,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 2 (2014).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 4 (2014).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 5 (2014).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 8 (2015).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 10 (2015).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 12 (2015).

“Foreword,” Dabiq, 15 (2016).

“Foreword,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017).

“Foreword,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017).

“Fresh Produce Injects Life into Halab Market,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“From Hijrah to Khilafah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalition,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“From the Pages of History: An Explicit Ultimatum from the Salaf to the Apostates,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“Game Over,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016).

“Gates of al-Khair Reached,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“Hadd for 8 Shabbihah,” Dabiq, 2 (2014).

“Hadd of Stoning,” Dabiq, 2 (2014).

“Halab Tribal Assemblies,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

Haniyah, Hassan Abû, “L’État Islamique dans les Mots de l’Ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016).

“Harbi Kafirin Tanimi,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016).

“Healthcare in the Khilafah,” Dabiq, 9 (2015).

“Hicret Etmeyene Ikrah Yoktur,” Konstantiniyye, 2 (2015).

“Hicretin Akhami,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016).

“Hijrah and Jihad,” Dabiq, 2 (2014).

“Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“Hiyanet Raporu,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015).

“Hunting for Tanks,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“I Will Outnumber the Other Nations Through You,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

Ibn Abdil-Wahhab, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdillah Ibn Muhammad, “They Took Their Scribes and Monks as Lords Besides Allah,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017).

Ibn Taymiyyah, “A Treatise on Hypocrisy and the Hypocrites,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016).

Ibnul-Qayyim, “The Characteristics of the Munafiqin. Part 1,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017).

“Il est parmi les croyants des hommes. Histoire de la hijrah de notre frère Abû Muhârib al-Muhâjir vers le Cham,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“Implementing the Hudud,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Important Memorandums,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016).

“In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 6 (2015).

“In the Words of the Enemy,” Dabiq, 9 (2015).

“Inside the Khilafah 3,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017).

“Interview Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi,” Dabiq, 15 (2016).

“Interview d’Abû Samîr al-Urdunî,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“Interview de l’épouse de notre frère Aboû Basîr Abdoullâh al-Ifriqî (qu’Allâh l’accepte),” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015).

“Interview du cheikh Hâfiz Sa’îd Khân, gouverneur de la wilayah du Khurâsân,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Interview du frère Abou Mouqâtil at-Tounsî. Djihad en Tunisie,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“Interview with Abu Muqatil at-Tunusi,” Dabiq, 8 (2015).

“Interview with Abu Muqatil,”Dabiq, 8 (2015).

“Interview with Abu Samir al-Urduni,” Dabiq, 10 (2015).

“Interview with Abu Umar al-Baljiki,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“Interview with Abul-Mughirah al-Qahtani (The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilayat),” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“Interview with the Amir of Hisbah in Sinai,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“Interview with the Amir of the Soldiers of the Khilafah in East Asia,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017).

“Interview with the Military Amir of Hims Wilayah,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

“Interview with the Seminar Organizer, Shaikh Abul-Hawraa’ Al-Jazaa’iri,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014).

“Interview with the Wali of Khurasan,” Dabiq, 13 (2016).

“Interview with the Wali of Tarabulus Shaykh Abu Hudhayfah al-Muhajir,” Rumiyah, 4 (2016).

“Interview with: Abu Muharib as-Sumali,” Dabiq, 12 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Introduction,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“Irjâ, la plus dangereuse des innovations et ses croyances,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Irja, the Most Dangerous Bid’ah (and Its Effect on the Jihad in Sham),” Dabiq, 8 (2015).

“Islam Is the Religion of the Sword Not Pacifism,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“Islamic State Advances in al-Khayr,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

“Islamic State Liberates the City of Mosul,” Islamic State Report, 3 (2014).

“Islamic State Military and Covert Operations,” From Dabiq to Rome, 63 (2019).

Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“Islamic State Operations,” Dabiq, 14 (2016).

“Islamic State Operations,” Dabiq, 15 (2016).

“Islamic State Provides Security to Farmers,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

“İstişhadi Operasyonlarin Caizliği Ve Fazileti,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015).

“Istishhadiyyun,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“It Will Be a Fire That Burns the Cross and Its People in Raqqah,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017).

Jibril, Ahmad, “The Story of the Grandson of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhab,” From Dabiq to Rome, 2 (2018).

“Join the Caravan of Islamic State,” Dabiq, 10 (2015).

“Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016).

“Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016).

“Just Terror Tactics: Arson Attacks,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“Just Terror Tactics: Hostage Taking,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017).

“Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“Kill the Imams of Kufr,” Dabiq, 13 (2016).

“Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” Dabiq, 14 (2016).

“Know Your Enemy: Who Were the Safawiyyah?,” Dabiq, 13 (2016).

Konstantiniyye, 1 (2015).

“Küfredenler Ise Tağutun Yolunda Savaşirlar,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016).

“L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. La destruction des idôles,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. La lapidation de celui qui commet l’adultère,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“L’État Islamique applique le jugement d’Allâh. Le combat contre les apostats,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“L’État Islamique Applique le jugement d’Allah. Prendre la Jiziyah des Mécreants (Gens du Livre),” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“L’État Islamique dans les mots de l’ennemi,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“L’État Islamique étend son territoire,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014).

“L’État Islamique sur les pas des compagnons,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“L’histoire de l’inimitié de la France envers l’Islâm,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015).

“La chari’ah d’Allâh ou la chari’ah de l’homme. Combattre le Califat est-il une apostasie?,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“La légitimité des opérations martyres,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“La libération des prisonniers,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“La méthodologie prophétique dans l’établissement de la religion,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“La revification de l’esclavage avant l’heure,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“La vie à Mosul sous l’ombre du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“Le fondement de l’Islâm et sa règle,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“Les preuves du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014).

“Le retour vers l’or et l’argent,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014).

“Le salut par l’allégeance et l’épée,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015).

“Le Tawhîd est la première condition de la victoire,” Dar al-Islam, 1 (2014).

“Le testament de notre frère Abû ‘Umar al-Baljîkî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Le testament de notre frère Abû Mujâhid al-Baljîkî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Le testament de notre frere Abû Rayyân al-Firansî,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Les Rafidites d’Ibn Saba’ Jusqu’au Dajjal,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Les régles de la hidjrah,” Dar al-Islam, 3 (2015).

“Les règles de sécurité du musulman,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“Les savants du mal,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

“Liberation of as-Sabhah and al-Bareehah,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Light Through Knowledge,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“Maliki’s Forces Humiliated,” Islamic State News, 3 (2014).

“Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

“Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017).

“Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017).

“Military and Covert Operations,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017).

“Mürted Kardeşler,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016).

“News Headlines,” From Dabiq to Rome, 19 (2018).

“Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 4 (2015).

“Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“Nouvelles de l’État Islamique,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016).

“Ô vous qui avez cru! Préservez vos personnes et vos familles d’un feu,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“On Patrol with the Office of Consumer Protection,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014).

“On the Beat ISR Examines How the Islamic Police Safeguards ar-Raqqah and Their Importance in State Building,” Islamic State Report, 2 (2014).

“On the Hunt,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015).

“Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 5 (2016).

“Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016).

“Önsöz,” Konstantiniyye, 7 (2016).

“Propagating the Correct Manhaj,” Islamic State Report, 1 (2014).

“Q&A w/Shaykh ‘Ali al-Khudayr on Tahakum,” From Dabiq to Rome, 28 (2018).

“Q&A w/Shaykh Hassan Husayn,” From Dabiq to Rome, 31 (2018).

“Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq, 4 (2014).

“Refugee Camp Visited,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Regime Targets Ar-Raqqah,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“Remaining and Expanding,” Dabiq, 5 (2014).

“Reportage. Attentats bénis de Paris,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“Reportage. Photos des lions des attaques du 13 novembre avant leur départ des terres du Califat pour aller terroriser la France,” Dar al-Islam, 8 (2016).

“Reportage. Photos. La vie à Syrte à l’ombre du Califat,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

“Reportage. Services hospitaliers,” Dar al-Islam, 5 (2015).

“Responding to the Doubts,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“Retaking al-Khayr,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Revenge for the Muslimat Persecuted by the Coptic Crusaders of Egypt,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“Ribat dans la région de Deir Az-Zour,” Dar al-Islam, 6 (2015).

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“Sécurité informatique. Deuxième partie,” Dar al-Islam, 10 (2016).

“Security Database,” Dar al-Islam, 9 (2016).

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“Selected 10,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016).

“Sen Onları Bİrlİk Sanırsın, Oysa Kalpleri Paramparçadır,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015).

“Shabeeh Executed,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Shedding Light on the Blessed Operation in Istanbul,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

“Shola in Homs Bombarded,” Islamic State News, 1 (2014).

“Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit,” Islamic State Report, 4 (2014).

“Stand and Die. Upon That That for Which Your Brothers Died,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016).

“Tağutİ Sİstemlere Askerlİğİn Hükmü-2,” Konstantiniyye, 6 (2016).

“Tal Afar Liberated,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“That Allah Should Test Those Who Believe and Destroy the Disbelievers,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017).

“The ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah: The Dajjal,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham,” Dabiq, 8 (2015).

“The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham,” Dabiq, 8 (2016).

“The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham. Part 4,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“The Allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham. Part 2,” Dabiq, 9 (2015).

“The Battle of Asadullah al-Bilawi,” Islamic State Report, 4 (2014).

“The Burning of a Murtadd Pilot,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“The Concept of Imamah (Leadership) Is from the Millah (Path) of Ibrahim,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“The Evil of Division and Taqlid,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“The Female Slaves of Allah in the Houses of Allah,” Rumiyah, 12 (2017).

“The Fitrah of Manking and the Near-Extinction of the Western Women,” Dabiq, 15 (2016).

“The Flames of Justice,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“The Flesh of Your Spouse Is Poisonous,” Rumiyah, 7 (2017).

“The Good Example of Abu Basir al-Ifriqi,” Dabiq, 7 (2015).

“The Islamic State Before Al-Malhamah,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal for You, So Shed It,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016).

“The Kafir’s Wealth Is Halal for You, So Take It,” Rumiyah, 8 (2017).

“The Knights of Shahadah in Belgium,” Dabiq, 14 (2016).

“The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men (Is Waging War Against the Khilafah Apostasy?),” Dabiq, 10 (2015).

“The Liberation of Dabiq,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“The Murtadd Brotherhood,” Dabiq, 14 (2016).

“The Murtadd Taliban Movement. On the Footsteps of the Iraqi and Shami Sahwat,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017).

“The Punishment of Shu’aytat for Treachery,” Dabiq, 3 (2014).

“The Qawqazi Caravan Gains Pace,” Dabiq, 10 (2015).

“The Rafidah from Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, 13 (2016).

“The Religion of Islam and the Jama’ah of the Muslim,” Rumiyah, 1 (2016).

“The Response to the Call of the Prophet,” Dabiq, 15 (2016).

“The Revival of Jihad in Bengal with the Spread of the Light of the Khilafah,” Dabiq, 12 (2016).

“The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dabiq, 4 (2014).

“The Rise of the Khilafah. Return of the Gold Dinar,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“The Ruling on Ghanimah, Fay, and Ihtitab,” Rumiyah, 11 (2017).

“The Ruling on the Belligerent Christians,” Rumiyah, 9 (2017).

“The Shuhada of the Ghulshan Attack,” Rumiyah, 2 (2016).

“The Story of Musa and al-Khidr,” From Dabiq to Rome, 2 (2018).

“The Syrian Sahwat. Shallow Unity and Reliance on Taghut,” Rumiyah, 5 (2017).

“The Twelver Rafidah. From a Nonexistant Imam…To the Leadership of Tawaghit,” Rumiyah, 10 (2017).

“The Virtues of Ribat for the Cause of Allah,” Dabiq, 9 (2015).

“The Weakest House Is That of a Spider,” Rumiyah, 3 (2016).

“To Repent or Not,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Trade Flourishes Under the Rule of the Islamic State,” Islamic State News, 2 (2014).

“Tu les croirais unis, alors que leurs coeurs sont divisés,” Dar al-Islam, 7 (2015).

“Türikiye’deki Okullarda Bulunan Küfürler ve Haramlar,” Konstantiniyye, 4 (2015).

“Türkiye’ye Mesaj,” Konstantiniyye, 3 (2015).

“Un exemple à suivre,” Dar al-Islam, 2 (2015).

“Unifying the Ranks,” Dabiq, 5 (2014).

“Until It Burns the Crusader Armies in Dabiq,” Dabiq, 1 (2014).

“Wala and Bara, O Women,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

“Wala’ and Bara’ Versus American Racism,” Dabiq, 11 (2015).

“Ways to Atone Sins,” Rumiyah, 6 (2017).

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“White Phosphorus,” Rumiyah, 13 (2017).

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“You Think They Are Together But Their Hearts Are Divided,” Dabiq, 12 (2016).

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“Военное положение с кафирами,” Istok, 4 (2016).

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“Днирасплаты,” Istok, 3 (2015).

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“Закон создателя или закон созданий?,” Istok, 2 (2015).

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Index

Page numbers in n indicate notes.

9/11 attacks 1, 43, 134, 235

A Message to America 19, 37

A Message to Jordan 30

A Message to the Allies of America 19

A’maq News Agency 28, 31, 39, 59, 110

Abaaoud, Abdelhamid 87

Abballa, Larossi 92, 119n222

Abdelaal, Mohamed A. 200n106

Abdullah, Thamir Samir Saleh (al-Khattab) 10, 11

Abousamra, Ahmad 21, 36, 47, 113n8

Abu Ghraib 11, 42

Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir 61, 62, 75, 117n123, 138, 141–143, 199n68, 199n85, 199n94, 199n95, 203n226, 204n268

Afaaq Electronic Foundation 32, 40, 61, 114n32

Aghaei, Sarah 6n22

Ahlut-Tawhid Publications 31, 32, 40, 59, 109, 110, 114n29

Ahmad, Muhammad 199n87

Ajnad Foundation 28, 30, 51

Akhbar al-Muslimin 31

Al Jazeera 42, 122n304

Al-Aba Foundation 29

Al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation 32, 107, 108

Al-Absi, Amr 36

Al-Adiyat Media Production Company 107

Al-Adnani, Abu Muhammad 17, 36, 57, 156, 168, 194

Al-Almani, Abu Talha (Deso Dogg) 21, 36, 47

Al-Anbari, Abu Ali 59

Al-Ansar (magazine) 10

Al-Ansar (website) 31

Al-Assad, Bashar 101, 149

Al-Awlaki, Anwar 13, 22, 48

Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr 4, 17, 19, 22, 25–27, 30, 34, 37, 38, 53, 54, 61, 66, 73, 78, 80, 82, 83, 92, 93, 101, 108, 111, 127, 135, 139, 141, 142, 155–157, 182, 185, 192, 193, 202n176, 213

Al-Bangali, Abu Jandal 176, 177, 203n244

Al-Battar Foundation 31, 32

Al-Battawi, Hudhayfah 117n120, 137, 177, 180, 198n60, 204n253

Al-Bayan Radio 20, 28, 29, 54, 95, 111

Al-Bukhari 143

Al-Buraq 10

al-Bushrayat 107

Al-Dar al-Sunni Foundation 33, 112

Al-Dhakhair Foundation 32

Alexander, Dean 2, 20, 77

Alexander, Yonah 2, 20, 77

Al-Fahdawi, Shaker Wahib 36

Al-Fajr Media Center 12

Al-Faqeer Media 32, 40

Al-Faransi, Abu Mujahid 136, 139, 159, 178, 198n59, 199n76, 202n191, 203n219, 203n223

Al-Fateh Media 32

Al-Firansî, Abű Rayyân 87, 119n207

Al-Furat Media Foundation 31–33

Al-Furqan Foundation 28, 29

Al-Furqan, Abu Muhammad 36, 55

Al-Ghuraba 40

Al-Hayat Media Center 21, 28, 30, 38–40, 50, 51, 54–58, 65, 69, 78, 92, 94, 99, 101, 103, 115n79, 126, 127, 207, 208

Al-Himma Library 28, 31, 51, 54

Al-I’tisam Foundation 28, 30, 31

Al-Kasasabeh, Muath 29

Al-Khansaa 13

Al-Khayr 64, 65, 115n47, 115n55

Al-Khudayr, ‘Ali 111, 124n345

Al-Kital 10

Al-Lubnani, Abu Ubaydah 105, 122n307

Alma’sadah al-Jihadiah 15

Al-Maghribi, Abu Osama 101

Al-Malhama al-Kubra 216

Al-Muhajir, Abu Hamzah 57, 69, 117n126, 117n128, 182

Al-Muhajireen Foundation 32, 40

Al-Naba 3, 5, 20, 29, 37, 54, 55, 87, 94, 103–107, 122n299, 122n300, 122n307, 122n311–122n315, 123n317, 207

Alneda.com 13

Al-Nusra Front 83, 101, 150, 160, 169–171

Aloswa.org 13

Al-Qaeda 1, 4–6, 8n45, 10–13, 15–17, 22, 27, 41–50, 54, 55, 58, 71, 73, 80, 83, 87, 105, 113n11, 114, 114n21, 116n97, 118n172, 122n306, 122n307, 135, 160, 164, 169–171, 207, 211, 212, 217n3

Al-Qaeda Organization in the Lands of the Two Rivers 15, 45

Al-Qarar 32

Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production 12

al-Saqri Corporation for Military Sciences 107

Al-Shaam, Bilad 25

Alshech, Eli 45

Al-Urduni, Abu Samir 87, 160

Al-Wafa Foundation 32

Al-Wafa Media Foundation 33

Al-Yaqin Foundation 32

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman 15

Alzoubi, Yayha 39

Al-Zuhili, Sheikh Wahbeh 197n19

Amirul-Mu’minin 155, 182, 193

An-Anfal 54

Anashid 11, 36, 217n2

And They Were Ordered to Disbelieve in it 59

Ansar al-Khilafah fi Italia 32

Ansharullah 112

Apelbaum, Jacob 45

Apocalypse 2, 3, 6n21, 27, 50, 56, 69, 74, 113n14, 213

Apter, David E. 197n22

Archive.fo 26

ARMA 3 21

Armstrong, Matt 13

Ar-Rumi, Abu Hamzah 59

Ashhad Foundation 33

Ash-Shami, Abu Sulayman 21, 36, 55, 114n22, 178, 179, 198n46, 200n121, 204n246

Ash-Shishani, Abu ‘Abdillah 181

Ath-Thaghri, Abul-Harith 190, 205n298

Atran, Scott 89

At-Tahaddi 10

At-Tunusi, Abu Muqatil 80, 160, 177, 202n193

Awan, Akin N. 2, 3

Azman, Nur Aziemah 57, 77, 210

Az-Zarqawi, Abu Mus’ab 15, 16, 28, 56, 69, 101, 135, 139, 182, 187, 198n42, 199n77, 200n122, 205n290, 205n292

Badar, Mohamed Elewa 28, 65

Baqiyyah 17

Barfi, Barak 180

Barrett, Richard 6n7, 65

Bartolucci, Valentina 55

Basayev, Shamil 10

Bashar, Iftekharul 149

Battle of Uhud 144

Berger, J.M. 16–18, 23, 25, 113n10

Bin Laden, Osama 13, 15, 22, 42, 45, 48, 130, 182

Bitchute.com 26, 40

Bliuc, Ana-Maria 217n3

Blogspot 22, 26, 31

Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth 49

Bonner, Michael 48

Boumeddiene, Hayat 70

Brahmi, Mohammed 160

Breaking the Walls 17

Bunat al-Amjad Media 32

Bunker, Robert J. 58

Bunt, Gary R. 13

Burke, Jason 42

Byman, Daniel 1, 18, 20

Caliph Ibrahim 2

Caliphate Cyber Army 33

Caliphate Library 54, 113n2

Call of Duty 23, 47, 52, 217n2

Call of Jihad 23

Cantlie, John 21, 34, 70, 71, 73, 78, 115n79, 116n100, 116n101, 148–152, 158, 162, 164, 191, 201n129, 201n148–201n149, 201n156

Centre Médiatique an-Nur 32, 40, 59, 114n30

Charlie Hebdo 80

Christien, Agathe 125, 210

Ciechanowicz, Artur 197n19

Clanging of the swords 18, 29, 30

Clarifying Matters of Methodology 59, 114n29

Clifford, Bennett 39

Colas, Brandon 4, 77

Commonwealth Countering Violent

Extremism Unit 37

Commonwealth of Nations 37

Cook, David 143

Cook, Joana 6n7

Coulibaly, Amedy 70, 80, 118n156, 138, 158, 193

da’wah 26, 31, 197n21

Dailymotion.com 26

dajjal 87, 116n107, 119n206, 131, 146, 147, 151, 198n38, 198n53, 200n116, 201n158, 201n159

Dar al-Islam (magazine) 3, 5, 20, 30, 56, 78–93

Darul Hilafe 56

Dawn Has Appeared 30

Dawn of Glad Tidings 21

Department of Homeland Security 37

Department of State 37

Diaspora 25

Diwan 28, 29

Docdroid.net 26

Docgo.net 26

Drasat.com 13

Droogan, Julian 4, 209

dunya 103, 117n133, 143, 146, 178, 202n179, 216

Dziewanowski, Jacek 13

El Araby, Mohammad 30

El Damanhoury, Kareem 4, 105

Elaskary, Mohamed 201n161

El-Badawy, Emma 198n37

Eliraz, Giora 43

ElSayed, Amin 124n354

Emwazi, Mohammad (Jihadi John) 21, 36, 47, 89, 176–178

End Times 2, 27, 57, 82, 213

Erdem, Burcu Kaya 8n45

Erdoğan, Recepp Tayyip 95, 97, 99, 110, 111, 120n243, 124n354, 170, 171

Facebook 12, 25, 36

Fernandez, Alberto M. 47

Fie Sabililah 112

Fisabilillah 20

Fisher, Ali 53

Fishman, Brian H. 1, 26

Foley, James 19, 21, 46, 70, 195

Follow the Caravan 30

Freamon, Bernard K. 173

Friendica 25

Friis, Simone Molin 20, 24

From Dabiq to Rome (magazine) 5, 32, 33, 109, 111, 123n335, 124n344, 208

Furat.Press (magazine) 57, 99, 121n266, 121n267

Gaddafi, Muammar 149

Gambetta, Diego 47

Gambhir, Harleen K. 67

Gates, Scott 2

Ghost Caliphate Section 33

Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 36, 53

Global Islamic Media Front 12, 15, 16, 43

Glowing Symphony 58

Golden Era of Islam 101, 144, 212

Google Drive 26

Görmez, Mehmet 95

Goto, Kenji 19

Grand Theft Auto 5 21

Gråtrud, Henrik 47

Greene, Kyle J. 213

Groupe Islamique Armé 10

Guantanamo 11, 16, 42

hadith 70, 97, 126, 129, 130, 143–147, 181, 183, 184, 188, 211

Hamas 10, 22, 197n22

Hamming, Tore Refslund 203n225

Hanin 10

Haqq 30, 31

Harrow, Martin 16

Harvest of the Soldiers 38, 39, 53

Hassan, Hassan 27, 116n103, 130

Hegghammer, Thomas 44, 216

Hell of the Russians 11

Helmus, Todd C. 49

Henning, Alan 19

Hezbollah 10, 15, 22

hijrah 19, 58, 77, 78, 80, 89, 92, 93, 97, 101, 113, 119n215, 127, 139, 142, 144, 151, 155–157, 168, 182, 186, 192, 193, 195, 197n19, 198n33, 200n104, 200n109, 201n157, 203n238, 204n265, 206n316, 208, 214

hikmah 70, 71, 120n233

hisbah 26, 27, 80, 101, 160, 172, 202n194, 203n234

Hoffman, Bruce 13

Hollywood 18, 30, 47

Holtmann, Philipp 9

Hoover, Jon 205n284

hudud 55, 74, 82, 114n44, 138

Huroof 21, 34, 35

Ibn Abi Talib, Ja’far 181

Ibn Jibrin, ‘Abdullah 59

Ibn Taymiyyah 131, 145, 146, 198n40

Ibnul-Qayyim 145, 146, 200n119

Ibrahim, Azeem 11

IED (Improvised Explosive Device) 18, 110, 180

ihdad 117n112, 144, 200n108

imam 66, 89, 92, 182, 203n235

In the Way of God 30, 51

Indeed They Are Mushrikun 59

Inform My Companions 30

inghimasi 180, 181, 215

Ingram, Haroro J. 2, 4, 27, 55, 56, 66, 71, 77, 213, 214

Inspire (magazine) 4, 7n29, 13, 14, 44, 55, 71, 116n91, 117n135, 217n3, 218n12, 218n17

Institute for Propaganda Analysis 4, 125

Internet Archive 14, 17, 26, 30, 40, 51, 60, 62, 63, 69, 79, 81, 82, 84–86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 114n30, 137, 153, 161, 179

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 30

irja 73, 83, 116n106, 118n184, 198n50, 203n230

Islamic State News (newsletter) 5, 20, 54, 55, 59, 61, 63–65, 74, 114n33–115n57, 207, 208

Islamic State Report (newsletter) 20, 55, 61, 65–67, 115n33–115n57, 115n61–115n64, 115n66–115n67, 115n69–115n70, 115n78, 207, 208

istishhadi 115n52, 180, 181, 215

Istok (magazine) 3, 30, 56, 57, 99–103, 121n272–121n293, 208

Izak, Krzysztof 118n156

Jabber 89

Jacoby, Tim 4

jahiliyyah 139, 168, 178

jama’ah 117n125, 206n327

jannah 103, 143, 146, 181, 183, 190, 215

Jehad.net 10, 13

Jesus Christ 80, 147

Jinghui, Fan 84

Johnson, Todd M. 197n21

Jones, Seth G. 34

Jordán, Javier 12, 15, 44

Jowett, Garth S. 197n7

Just Terror Tactics 61, 71, 76, 111, 116n88, 146, 193, 199n74, 200n117, 206n318

Kadir Firdaus Khairi 116n105

Kalashnikov E-Security Team 33

Karaeva, Elvira 103

Kassig, Peter 19

Kebbi, Sadika 143

Kepel, Gilles 15, 45

Khan, Hafiz Sa’id 89, 119n212

khateeb 65

Khattab Media Foundation 33, 107

Khilafah News (newsletter) 59

Khurasan Province Media Office 29

Kibble, David G. 4, 218n16

Kik 39

Kobane 120n239, 149

Konstantiniyye (magazine) 3, 5, 20, 30, 56, 93–99, 101, 103, 113n17, 120n242–121n262, 208

Korkmaz, Sertaç Canalp 97

Kosmynka, Stanisław 10

kufr 3, 97, 110, 111, 124n348, 131, 132, 134, 139, 142, 156, 188, 192, 193, 195, 199n69, 205n297, 211, 214

kunya 180

Kybernetiq (magazine) 8n45

Le Comportement du Mujahid. L'Altruisme 60–61

Lenglachner, Fabian 8n45

Let’s Go 30

Let’s go for Jihad 20

Ligouri Bunker, Pamela 58

Lister, Charles R. 25, 45, 57, 217n3

Liveleak.com 19

Looney, Seán 4

Lorenzo-Dus, Nuria 4, 212, 218n12, 218n18

Macdonald, Stuart 4, 212, 218n12, 218n14

Macnair, Logan 26, 50

Mahlouly, Dounia 104

Mahzam, Remy 36, 57

Malik, Jamal 197n21

Manbij 34, 64

Marone, Francesco 46

Marranci, Gabrielle 6n10, 6n18, 132, 140, 143

Marsham, Andrew 140

Martin-Pena, Javier 197n22

Matusitz, Jonathan 180

Maysarah (magazine) 83, 84, 198n46, 200n121

McCants, William 3, 27, 56

Media Front to Support the Islamic State 32

Media Operative. You are also a mujahid 31

Medium.com 26, 40

Message of a Jihadist 30

Micallef, Joseph V. 15, 24, 42

Microsoft 36

Milton, Daniel 20, 28, 29, 31, 34, 37, 38, 49

Ministry of Central Media 28

Ministry of Media 28

Morgan, Jonaton 25

Mosul 1, 19, 30, 34, 52, 54, 66, 82, 115n67, 118n168, 138, 149, 169, 203n229, 204n258

Mu’Askar al-Battar (magazine) 13–15

Mu’ta Agency 33

Muharir al-Ansar 32

Mujahideen Shura Council 28

Muntasir Media 33, 108

murji’ah 83

Musa 111, 124, 142

Muslim Brotherhood 27, 73, 75, 97, 99, 132, 145, 172, 195, 212

My Brother 30

My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared 30

MySpace 12

Nabe, Marc Edouard 87

Nance, Malcolm 19, 24, 29, 92, 99

Nanninga, Pieter 37, 41

National Security Agency 58

Night of Bush Capturing 15

No Respite 87, 157

Ô Moudjahid. Écoute & Obéis 59, 61

Obama, Barack 72, 83, 151, 192

Ofstad, Ole Johan Grimsgaard 84

Oh Hearts of Iron 30

Oh My Lord I Ask You 30

Oh Soldiers of Truth 30

Ottoman Empire 56

Pdf-archive.org 26

Peattie, Shane 4

Podder, Sukanya 2

Podeh, Elie 197n20

Powell, Helen 39

Powers, Shawn 13

Prophet Mohammad 76, 80, 83, 84, 89, 92, 99, 109, 112, 116n105, 118n151, 119n194, 119n202, 120n223, 120n225, 126, 131, 141–147, 157, 183, 184, 190, 197n19, 200n99, 205n299, 211, 214

Prucha, Nico 54

Putin, Vladimir 95

qital 112, 124n354

Quest for Bush 15

Quest for Saddam 15

Quitter 25

Ramadi 16, 34, 83

Raqqa 34, 41, 52, 61, 65, 104, 150, 176

Reed, Alastair 71

Remah Foundation 32

Revkin, Mara 132

ribat 64, 74, 83, 97, 116n109, 119n188, 121n257

Roy, Olivier 2, 23, 83, 93

Rubenstein, Richard L. 142

Saarnivaara, Minna 197n22

Saddam, Hussein 15

Sageman, Marc 9–11, 13, 46

Sahabah 76, 89, 112, 126, 144, 146, 157, 181, 187, 200n102, 200n123, 214

Sahih-Muslim 143

Salil as-Sawarim 18, 20

Sampson, Chris 19, 92, 99

Sarh al-Khilafa 107

Sawt al-Jihad (magazine) 13

Schmid, Alex P. 12

Schori Liang, Christina 77

Scribd.com 26

Second Message to America 19

Seib, Anna 99

Semati, Mehdi 23

Semple, Michael 48

shahadah 70, 80, 89, 105, 117n129, 124n351, 137, 146, 173–183, 200n123, 203n239, 203n243, 204n262, 204n263

shari’ah 1, 12, 80, 83, 112, 138, 141, 143, 209, 210, 212

Shboul, Hani Ahmed 140

Shehabat, Ahmad 39

Shia 15, 73, 78, 80, 116n107, 130, 131, 133, 134, 146, 152, 165, 166, 172, 201n161, 209, 212

Shirk of Obedience 59

Shumukh 10

Signal 26

Silent Circle 26

Silinsky, Mark 207

Sirte 34, 89

Skype 26

SnapChat 26

Sons of the Caliphate Army 33

Soon, Soon 30

Sotloff, Steven 19, 196, 206n329

Soufan, Ali 18, 24

SoundCloud 26

Sparks, Andrew C. 56, 93

Speckhard, Anne 47

Springer, Devin R. 6n9, 15, 46, 216

Sproule, J. Michael 125, 126

Staffell, Simon 2

Starr, Stephen 93

Stein, Aaron 97

Stempień, Marta Sara 168

Stern, Jessica 16–18, 23, 25, 113n10

Structure of the Caliphate 29

Sufi 27, 73, 160

sunnah 66, 111, 131, 138, 143, 147, 189, 200n99

Sunni 15, 22, 59, 61, 77, 80, 116, 131, 134, 143, 151, 152, 172, 186–188, 201n161, 209

Sunni Shield Foundation 107, 112

Surespot 26, 39

SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) 18, 34, 180

Szpunar, Piotr M. 23

takfir 2, 12, 73, 82, 101, 111, 124n348, 130, 135, 146, 165, 169, 209

Taliban 22, 27, 48, 89, 145, 150, 201n146, 212

Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn 15

Task Force „Ares” 58

Tech Against Terrorism 36

Telegram 26, 31, 33, 39, 40, 49, 53, 54, 59, 61, 104, 107–109, 112, 114n32

The Description of the Prophet’s Fast 59

The Onion Router 25

Thirty Suggestions for Islamic State Emirs and Soldiers 31

This Brotherhood 30

Threema 26

Thurwat al-Sinan (magazine) 16

Top-Level Domain 25

Torres, Manuel R. 12, 15, 16

TrueCrypt 83

Twitter 23, 25, 30–33, 36, 49–51, 53, 59, 114, 123n325, 123n328, 123n330–123n333

ummah 2, 3, 12, 17, 23, 30, 32, 66, 67, 72–74, 77, 87, 101, 111, 128–132, 135, 137, 139–141, 143, 150, 151, 154–157, 168, 169, 182, 187, 188, 191–195, 205n277, 211–215

UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate 36

United Cyber Caliphate 33

USAID 37

Vale, Gina 6n7

Vergani, Matteo 217n3

VHS cassette 11

Viber 26

Vice News 37

Vkontakte 25

Voice of Jihad (magazine) 13

wala and bara 2, 187, 202n181, 202n183, 213

Walk Towards the Light 30

War on Terror 11, 12, 42

Watkin, Amy-Louise 4

We Have The Swords 30

Web 1.0 3, 6n22, 9, 10, 12, 24, 25, 37, 39, 40

Web 2.0 6n2, 12, 13, 24, 26, 37, 39, 40

Weimann, Gabriel 10

Weiss, Caleb 41

Weiss, Michael 27

Wejkszner, Artur 99

Welch, David 198n57, 218n20

Welch, Tyler 4, 7n33, 218n19

What Is Really Like to Fight for the Islamic State 37

Whatsapp 26, 39

Wickr 26

Wignell, Peter 4, 70, 77, 115n77, 210, 211, 218n9, 218n11

Wiktorowicz, Quintan 129

Wilayat al-Qawkaz 22, 121n270

Winkler, Carol 4, 105

Winter, Charlie 19, 26, 104, 173

Yayha 53, 147, 200n124

Yazidis 74, 83, 152

Youth of the Caliphate (magazine) 5, 107–109, 123, 208

YouTube 11, 13, 19, 26, 36, 37, 43, 45, 46, 53

Yukawa, Haruna 19

Zelin, Aaron Y. 26, 37

Zhahirina ‘Alal Haq 112

zuhd 76, 117n133, 156, 202n179